UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 
AT  LOS  ANGELES 


UNIVERSITY  of  CALIFOKNlii 

AT 

LOS  AJSGELES 


T  fUU  A  DV 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


A  TREATISE  ON  THE 

CONSCIOUS   IMPROVEMENT  OF 

SOCIETY  BY  SOCIETY 


BY 

LESTER  F.  WARD 


L'application  est  la  pierre  de  touche  de 
toute  doctrine.  —  Adolphe  Costk 


GINN    &   COMPANY 

BOSTON   .  NEW  YORK   •  CHICAGO   •  LONDON 


btc? 


Copyright,  igo6 
By  LESTER  F.  WARD 


ALL   RIGHTS  RBSBRVSO 
614.12 


GINN  &   COMPANY  .  PRO- 
PRIETORS .  BOSTON  •  U.S.A. 


m 


vr^ 


PREFACE 

This  work  and  its  predecessor,  Pure  Sociology,  constitute  together 
a  system  of  sociology,  and  these,  with  Dynamic  Sociology,  The 
Psychic  Factors  of  Civilization,  and  the  Outlines  of  Sociology,  make 
up  a  more  comprehensive  system  of  social  philosophy.  Should  any 
reader  acquaint  himself  with  the  whole,  he  will  find  it  not  only  con- 
sistent with  itself,  but  progressive  in  the  sense  that  each  successive 
volume  carries  the  subject  a  step  farther  with  a  minimum  of  repeti- 
tion or  duplicate  treatment. 

The  central  thought  is  that  of  a  true  science  of  society,  capable, 
in  the  measure  that  it  approaches  completeness,  of  being  turned  to 
the  profit  of  mankind.  If  there  is  one  respect  in  which  it  differs 
more  than  in  others  from  rival  systems  of  philosophy  it  is  in  its 
practical  character  of  never  losing  sight  of  the  end  or  purpose,  nor 
of  the  possibilities  of  conscious  effort.  It  is  a  reaction  against  the 
philosophy  of  despair  that  has  come  to  dominate  even  the  most 
enlightened  scientific  thought.  It  aims  to  point  out  a  remedy  for 
the  general  paralysis  that  is  creeping  over  the  world,  and  which  a 
too  narrow  conception  of  the  law  of  cosmic  evolution  serv^es  rather 
to  increase  than  to  diminish.  It  proclaims  the  efficacy  of  effort, 
provided  it  is  guided  by  intelligence.  It  would  remove  the  embargo 
laid  upon  human  activity  by  a  false  interpretation  of  scientific 
determinism,  and,  without  having  recourse  to  the  equally  false  con- 
ception of  a  power  to  will,  it  insists  upon  the  power  to  act. 

It  is  this  mobilization  of  the  army  of  achievement  which  it  is 
sought  to  express  in  the  title  of  Part  I.  Until  there  is  movement 
there  can  be  no  achievement.  Movement  is  the  condition  to  achieve- 
ment, and  achiev^ement  is  the  means  to  improvement.  With  a  clear 
conception  of  the  logical  relations  of  these  three  terms  in  the  argu- 
ment the  entire  scheme  and  scope  of  applied  sociology  will  unfold, 
and  the  reader  will  be  put  in  position  at  least  to  understand  the 
work,  whether  or  not  he  accepts  its  general  conclusions. 


iv  PREFACE 

The  small  claim  made  for  applied  sociology  at  the  present  stage 
of  the  science  will  probably  disappoint  many,  and  it  will  be  said 
that  little  advance  is  made  beyond  the  position  taken  in  Dynamic 
Sociology;  but  the  world  has  made  little  progress  in  the  past  twenty- 
three  years,  although  they  have  been  years  of  great  social  unrest. 
And  every  attempt  to  take  a  step  forward,  with  its  virtual  failure 
to  do  so,  has  only  confirmed  the  view  there  set  forth  that  ends  can- 
not be  attained  directly,  but  only  through  means,  —  the  universal 
method  of  science.  It  has  also  become  more  and  more  apparent 
that  improvement  cannot  be  secured  through  the  increase  of  knowl- 
edge, but  only  through  its  socialization,  and  that  therefore  the  real 
and  practical  problem  of  applied  sociology  still  remains  the  dis- 
tribution of  the  intellectual  heritage  bequeathed  to  all  equally  by 
the  genius  of  mankind. 

I  take  great  pleasure  in  acknowledging  my  indebtedness  to  M.  H. 
Welter,  Librairie  Universitaire,  4,  Rue  Bernard-Palissy,  Paris,  pub- 
lisher of  M.  Odin's  great  work.  La  Genese  des  Grands  Hommes, 
for  his  courtesy  in  permitting  the  use  of  the  valuable  maps,  charts, 
and  tables  of  Chapter  IX,  and  I  sincerely  hope  that  this  may  have 
some  effect  in  making  this  work  known  to  a  larger  circle  of  readers. 

L.  F.  W. 

Washington,  March  30,  1906 


CONTENTS 


PART    I  — MOVEMENT 

CHAPTER   I 

RELATION    OF   PURE   TO   APPLIED    SOCIOLOGY 

Page 

General  remark 3 

Pure  Sociology 

Answers  the  questions  What,  Why,  and  How.  —  Stability  of  social  struc- 
tures. —  Applied  sociology  rests  on  pure  sociology.  —  Social  structures 
must  be  understood  before  they  can  be  modified 3 

Applied  Sociology 

Answers  the  question  What  for.  —  Essentially  practical.  —  Relates  to 
improvement.  —  Subjective.  —  Anthropocentric.  —  Egalitarian.  —  Presup- 
poses an  acquaintance  with  pure  sociology.  —  Science  versus  art.  —  Modi- 
fication of  phenomena.  —  Utility  of  science.  —  Applied  sociology  versus 
the  social  art 5 

Superiority  of  the.  Artificial 
Illustrations.  —  Language  as  an  example.  —  Justice  as  an  example    .     .     11 

CHAPTER    II 

THE   EFFICACY   OF   EFFORT 

The  laissez  /aire  school.  —  How  illogical.  —  Alleged  evils  of  interfer- 
ence.—  Benefits  of  interference.  —  The  fundamental  fallacy. —  Social 
initiative.  —  Social  achievement.  —  Faire  marcher 13 

CHAPTER    III 

END   OR    PURPOSE    OF   SOCIOLOGY 

Progress  versus  Evolution 

Views  of  Herbert  Spencer.  —  Definitions  of  progress  in  earlier  works. 
—  Its  relation  to  happiness.  —  The  paradox  of  hedonism 18 


vi  CONTENTS 

Weltschmerz 

Page 
Pessimism.  —  Position   of    Gumplowicz Views   of    the  socialists.  — 

Of  Huxley.  —  No  attempt  yet  made  to  cure 19 

Achievement  versus  I.mprovement 

Purpose  of  applied  sociology  to  harmonize  achievement  with  improve- 
ment.—  Theory  of  natural  inequality.  —  Achievement  never  duly  re- 
warded    21 

Definition  of  Justice 

Enforces  artificial  equality.  —  Long  resisted  and  denounced.  —  A  form 
of  social  interference.  —  Wholly  artificial 22 

The  Oligocentric  World  View 

Confined  to  the  intellectual  aspect.  —  Apotheosis  of  genius.  —  Sociology 
opposes  it       23 

Social  versus  Political  Justice 

Only  civil  and  political  justice  thus  far  attained.  —  Social  justice  still  to 
be  attained.  —  This  will  be  simply  another  step  in  the  same  direction        .     24 

Social  Welfare 

Happiness  an  active  state.  —  Ennui.  —  Normal  exercise  of  the  faculties. 
—  Not  a  question  of  intelligence  or  social  worth 25 

Social  Freedo.m 

The  three  kinds  of  freedom:  national,  political,  social.  —  National  free- 
dom, how  attained.- — Struggle  for  political  freedom.  —  Disappointed 
hopes.  —  Social  freedom  in  process  of  attainment. —  Difficulties  of  this 
problem.  —  It  belongs  to  applied  sociology 26 

The  New  Ethics 

How  it  differs  from  the  old.  —  Primitive  ethics  concerned  only  with  race 
safety.  —  Its  modern  degeneracy.  —  Aim  of  the  new  ethics.  —  Not  philan- 
thropy.—  The  luxury  of  altruism.  —  T\\q  S7tmmii/n  bonum 28 

The  Claims  of  Feeling 

Philosophy  of  license.  —  Feeling  versus  function.  —  Asceticism.  — 
Spiritual  pleasures.  —  Subjective  trend  of  modern  philosophy.  —  Puritan- 
ism.—  Utilitarianism.  —  Greatest  good  to  the  greatest  number.  —  Pursuit  of 
happiness.  —  Eudemonism.  —  Pain  economy.  —  Cruelty  of  nature. — The 
struggle  for  existence.  —  Savages  not  happy.  —  Fear  of  nature.  —  Perpetu- 
ally at  war.  —  Ethics  of  function.  —  The  deficit  of  life.  —  Its  removal  .     .     29 


CONTENTS  vii 

CHAPTER    IV 

SOCIAL  ACHIEVEMENT 

Page 

Usually  denied.  —  The  parable  of  Saint-Simon.  —  The  illogical  infer- 
ence.— The  social  order.  —  The  ameliorative  function  of  society. —  Social 
integration.  —  Social  intelligence 37 

CHAPTER  V 

WORLD   VIEWS 

In  what  sense  ideas  rule  the  world.  —  World  ideas.  —  Thought,  to  be 
effective,  must  be  possessed  by  society 40 

Interpretation  of  History 

Historical  materialism  and  intellectualism.  —  Economic  interpretation 
of  histor\-.  —  Ideological  interpretation  of  history 40 

Reconciliation  of  the  Economic  and  Ideological 
Interpretations  of  History 

Views  of  Comte  and  Spencer.  —  De  Greef  on  the  influence  of  ideas.  — 

Volkergedanken.  —  Zeitgeist. —  Public  opinion 41 

Idea  Forces.  —  Confusion  of  ideas  on  the  subject 44 

Beliefs.  —  Belief  versus  opinion.  —  Beliefs  rest  on  interest.  —  Grow  out 
of  desires.  —  World  views  due  to  economic  conditions.  —  Oriental  and 
occidental  ideas.  —  The  study  of  mind  versus  the  study  of  matter    ...     45 

CHAPTER    VI 
TRUTH  AND  ERROR 
Primitive  reasoning.  —  Based  on  interest.  —  Dominated  by  fear     ...     50 

Anthropomorphic  Ideas 

How  the  animal  mind  differs  from  the  rational  mind.  —  The  simplest 
phenomena  always  regarded  as  subject  to  natural  laws.  —  All  motion  ex- 
plained as  voluntary. —  Animism 51 

Religious  Ideas.  —  Anthropomorphic.  —  How  explained 52 

Spiritual  Beings.  —  Tylor's  minimum  definition  of  religion.  —  Causes  of 
belief  in  spiritual  beings.  —  Shadows.  —  Reflections. —  Echoes.  —  Dreams. 
—  Delirium.  —  Insanity.  —  Trance.  —  Death.  —  Universality  of  the  belief 
in  spirits.  —  Multiplication  of  spirits.  —  Ancestor-worship.  —  Objective  in- 
fluences. —  Fetishism.  —  Metamorphosis. —  Idea  of  cause.  —  Effect  of  the 


viii  CONTENTS 

Page 

phenomena  of  nature.  —  Continuance  theory.  —  Metempsychosis.  —  Im- 
mortality. —  Origin  of  gods.  —  Theological  conceptions.  —  Polytheism.  — 
Monotheism.  —  Dualism 53 

Religious  Structures 

Ecclesiastical  institutions.  —  The  church.  —  Fear  of  spiritual  beings.  — 
Origin  of  the  priesthood 62 

Error 

May  error  ever  be  useful?  —  Religious  ideas  and  structures  exclusively 
human. —  Ignorance  versus  error.  —  Error  a  product  of  reason.  —  Para- 
doxes of  nature.— Error  necessary. —  Reason  untrustworthy       ....     65 

Consequences  of  Error.  —  Sacrifices.  —  Not  practised  by  the  lowest 
races.  —  Waste  of  property  at  funerals.  —  Costly  tombs. —  Pyramids  of 
Egypt.  —  Other  examples.  —  Self-mutilation.  —  Superstition.  —  Asceti- 
cism. — -  Zoolatry.  —  Witchcraft.  —  Persecution.  —  Resistance  to  truth.  — 
Science  explains  phenomena  and  dispels  error.  —  Opposition  to  science. 

—  Science  corrects  its  own  errors.  —  Obscurantism.  —  Censorship  of  the 
press.  —  Indexes  of  prohibited  books.  —  Russian  and  German  censor- 
ship. —  The  androcentric  world  view.  —  False  views  of  motherhood     .     .     68 

Truth 

Error  a  kind  of  contagious  disease.  —  Prevalence  of  error  in  civilized 
communities.  —  Error  more  dangerous  than  ignorance.  —  The  charm  of 
error.  —  Truth  should  be  made  attractive.  —  World  views  should  embody 
truth  instead  of  error.  —  Human  progress  has  consisted  in  slowly  shedding 
the  primitive  error 80 

CHAPTER    VII 

SOCIAL  APPROPRIATION  OF  TRUTH 

Truth  leads  to  achievement,  but  not  necessarily  to  improvement.  — 
Material  civilization  on  the  whole  progressive.  —  The  real  moral  progress. 

—  Truth  not  assimilated 84 

Possession  of  Truth 

Truth  a  sure  antidote  to  error.  —  Mental  dualism.  —  Credulity  of  great 
men.  —  Evolutionary  teleology.  —  Scientific  faith.  —  The  law  of  causation. 

—  Causality.  —  False  causes.  —  Spiritual  beings  the  principal  false  causes. 

—  Identity  of  matter  and  spirit.  —  Adequacy  of  causation.  —  Imperfect 
conceptions  of  adequacy.  —  Examples 85 


CONTENTS  IX 

Relation  of  Knowledge  to  Truth 

Page 

Knowledge  defined.  —  Perception.  —  Error  due  to  conclusions  drawn 
from  insufificient  knowledge.  —  Intelligence.  —  The  intelligent  and  unin- 
telligent classes  of  society.  —  Intelligence  rules. —  Reforms  emanate  from 
the  intelligent  class.  —  Impotence  of  the  unintelligent  class.  —  Equali- 
zation of  intelligence  the  main  problem.  —  The  lower  classes  victims  more 
of  error  than  of  ignorance.  —  Dependence  of  the  lower  upon  the  upper 
classes 90 

Intellectual  Egalitarianism 

The  lower  classes  possess  the  same  degree  of  nati\e  intellectual  capacity 
as  the  higher.  —  Difference  consists  wholly  in  the  equipment.  —  The  social 
heritage.  —  Social  heredity.  —  The  intellectually  disinherited. —  Prevailing 
sophisms.  —  False  appearances.  —  The  Helvetian  doctrine 95 

Rise  of  the  Proletariat.  —  The  fourth  estate  originally  slaves  and  serfs. 
—  Evolution  of  the  third  estate.  —  That  of  the  proletariat  simply  another 
step. —  Intellectual  versus  emotional  development.  —  The  alleged  "ultra- 
rational  sanction."  —  The  "submerged  tenth."  —  Statement  of  the  egali- 
tarian doctrine.  —  Class  distinctions  wholly  artificial 97 

Capacity  for  Truth. — All  capable  of  occupying  the  highest  social 
position.  —  Truth  no  greater  burden  than  error.  —  All  important  truth 
within  the  grasp  of  all.  —  Education  of  nature.  —  Capacity  of  the  human 
mind  greater  than  supposed.  —  All  practical  truth  within  the  reach  of  all 
men.  —  Evils  of  wrangling.  —  Mathematics  no  test  of  mental  capacity. — 
Abstract  reasoning.  —  The  most  important  knowledge  is  of  concrete  facts 
easily  learned  even  by  primitive  men.  —  Intellectual  capacity  of  outlying 
races.  —  Race  equivalency.  —  Effect  of  race  mixture.  —  Race  differences 
mainly  a  question  of  social  efficiency.  —  All  races  capable  of  receiving  all 
truth.  —  Mobilization  of  society loi 


PART   II  — ACHIEVEMENT 

CHAPTER    VIII 

POTENTIAL  ACHIEVEMENT 

Need  of  increased  achievement.  —  Natural  inequalities.  —  Latent  ability. 
—  Difficulties  of  the  subject.  —  Moral  attributes  involved  in  genius  •   I'S 

Potential  Geniu.s 

Definition  of  genius.  —  Distinguished  from  ability,  intelligence,  etc.  — 

Hereditary  genius.  —  Alleged  irrepressibility  of  genius Effect  of  the 

environment 115 


X  CONTENTS 

Page 

Nature.  —  Claims  for  heredity.  —  Supposed  proofs  of  the  irrepressibility 
of  genius.  —  Impossibility  of  proving  the  contrary.  —  Fallacy  involved.  — 
Use  of  the  statistical  method.  —  Doctrine  of  hereditary  genius  not  sus- 
tained by  the  facts.  —  Neglected  factors.  —  Effect  of  crossing  strains. — 
Stirpiculture  or  eugenics.  —  Atavism.  —  The  stirp.  —  Atavistic  explanation 
of  hereditary  genius.  —  Mutation.  —  Heredity  beyond  the  reach  of  human 
control 1 16 

Nurture.  — ■  The  post-efficients  of  achievement.  —  Effect  of  the  environ- 
ment.—  Represents  opposition.  —  Competition  in  nature. —  Local  distri- 
bution of  plants.  —  Mutual  repulsion.  —  Adaptation.  —  Power  of  nurture 
in  plants.  —  Examples.  —  Relative  claims  of  genius  and  circumstances. — 
Latent  elements.  —  Genius  cannot  be  increased.  —  The  liberation  of 
genius.  —  The  actual  versus  the  possible 122 

CHAPTER    IX 

OPPORTUNITY 

Genius  a  fixed  quantity.  —  A  social  force  to  be  utilized.  —  Primary 
means  to  achievement 129 

Role  of  the  Environment 

Conflicting  schools.  —  Hero-worship  versus  nature-worship.  —  Civiliza- 
tion the  product  of  human  action.  —  The  environment  passive.  —  Man 
transforms  it.  —  Synergy        130 

The  Agents  of  Civilization 

The  agents  of  civilization  are  men.  —  They  are  few  in  number.  —  R61e 
of  great  men.  —  Their  absence  conceivable.  —  Effect  of  the  policy  of 
persecuting  great  men.  —  The  agents  of  civilization  not  men  of  action  but 
men  of  thought.  —  Men  of  action  always  present.  —  High  official  position 
no  test  of  greatness.  —  Public  officers  a  leisure  class 132 

The  Literature  of  Opportunity 

Includes  that  of  both  heredity  and  opportunity 135 

The  Method  of  Discussion.  —  The  three  methods  :  by  thesis,  by  hypoth- 
esis, and  by  synthesis.  —  The  statistical  method 135 

The  Discussion. — Works  of  Francis  Galton.  —  His  primary  thesis. — 
His  subsidiary  thesis.  —  De  Candolle's  History  of  the  Sciences  and  of 
Scientific  Men.  —  Ribot's  Psychological  Heredity.  —  Galton's  English 
Men  of  Science.  —  Papers  by  William  James,  John  Fiske,  and  Grant 
Allen.  —  Jacoby's  Selection  in  Man.  —  Joly's  Psychology  of  Great  Men. 
—  Ward's  Dynamic  Sociology.  —  Works  of  Lombroso.  —  Odin's  Genesis 


CONTENTS  xi 

Page 

of  Great  Men.  —  Cooky's  Genius  and  Fame.  —  Robertson's  Economics 

of  Genius 137 

^  Environmental  Factors 

De  Candolle  on  the  influence  of  the  environment.  —  His  twenty  causes 
favorable  to  the  development  of  men  of  science.  —  Classification  of  en- 
vironmental factors.  —  The  fallacy  of  statistics.  —  Scope  of  Odin's  work. 

—  Number  of  French  men  of  letters.  —  Merit,  talent,  and  genius      .     .     .    145 
The  Physical  Emnron;neiit.  —  Climate.  —  Mesology.  —  Physical  con- 
ditions of  France.  —  Distribution  of  men  of  letters  according  to  physical 
conditions.  —  Tabular  view  by  departments.  —  By  provinces.  —  By  regions. 

—  Small  effect  of  the  physical  environment 148 

The  Ethnological  Environment.  —  Race  influence  on  genius. —  Races 

of  France.  —  Gauls,  Cimbrians,  Iberians,  Ligurians,  Belgians.  —  Genius 
not  perceptibly  affected  by  this  race  distribution.  —  Races  speaking  other 

languages  than  French.  —  Basque,  Flemish,  Breton,  German,  Italian 

Result  still  negative.  —  Regions  outside  of  France.  —  Belgium,  Alsace- 
Lorraine. —  Genius  equal  in  all  races 156 

The  Religious  Environment.  —  Effect  of  different  religions  on  the  pro- 
duction of  great  men.  —  Christianity  and  Judaism.  —  Catholicism  and 
Protestantism.  —  Effect  of  religious  persecution.  —  Celibate  clergy.  — 
Great  men  who  were  sons  of  Protestant  clergymen.  —  Leisure  secured  by 
celibacy.  —  Effect  of  family  life.  —  Statistics  of  the  subject.  —  Discussion 
of  the  statistics 161 

The  Local  Enviro/i/nent.  —  Neglected  factors.  —  Density  of  popula- 
tion.—  Views  of  Comte,  Spencer,  Durkheim,  Coste,  Jacoby.  —  Jacoby's 
statistics.  —  Percentage  of  urban  population.  —  Tabular  view. —  Com- 
parison with  Odin's  table.  —  Discussion  of  Jacoby's  table. —  His  dis- 
appointment.—  His  illogical  speculations.  —  Failure  of  his  theory. — 
Wide-spread  belief  that  most  great  men  are  born  in  the  country.  —  Odin's 
tables.  —  Great  prevalence  of  city-born.  —  Number  born  in  chateaux.  — 
Comparisons  of  city-  and  country-born.  —  Number  of  men  of  letters  per 
100,000  inhabitants.  —  Influence  of  great  cities.  —  The  real  environmental 
factors.  —  Discussion  of  the  tables.  —  Women  of  letters.  —  Similar  results 
for  other  countries 169 

The  Economic  Environment.  —  Difficulty  of  determining  the  economic 
factor. —  Most  great  men  of  history  wealthy. — -Tendency  of  biographers 
to  exaggerate  the  hardships  undergone.  —  Economic  condition  of  great 
academicians. —  Prevalence  of  the  well-to-do.  —  French  men  of  letters. — 
Rich  and  poor  compared.  —  Numerical  insignificance  of  the  latter. — 
Wealth  no  bar  to  genius.  —  Genius  is  in  things 198 

The  Social  Environment.  —  Parallelism  of  the  economic  and  social 
environments.  —  Classification  of  occupations.  —  Gallon's  questions  and 


Xll  CONTENTS 

Pagb 
answers.  —  Odin's  classification.  —  Numerical   relations   of  the  different 

classes.  —  Preponderance    of   men  of   high   social   station.  —  Numerical 

insignificance  of  the  laboring  class.  —  Number  relative  to  population. — 

Similar  results  for  other  countries 204 

The  Educational  Environment.  —  False  views  prevailing. —  Influence 
of  cities  due  to  their  educational  facilities.  —  All  environments  favorable 
in  proportion  as  they  are  educational.  —  How  the  local,  economic,  and 
social  environments  become  educational.  —  False  views  of  Spencer  and 
Ribot.  —  Odin's  table  of  educated  and  uneducated  men  of  letters. —  Nu- 
merical insignificance  of  the  latter.  —  List  of  uneducated  men  of  letters.  — 
Shown  that  other  environments  were  substitutes  for  the  educational. — 
Similar  results  for  other  countries.  —  Possibility  of  creating  men  of  genius 
at  will  demonstrated 211- 

Prospective  Investigations.  —  Odin's  method  should  be  extended  to 
other  countries  and  other  kinds  of  genius.  —  Especially  to  scientific  inves- 
tigators.—  Suggestions  as  to  procedure. —  Defects  of  biography. —  Mer- 
cenary biographical  schemes.  —  Their  pernicious  effects.  —  Society  should 
undertake  the  work.  —  Other  institutions  that  might  conduct  it.  —  The 
Carnegie  Institution  of  Washington 221 

CHAPTER   X 

THE   LOGIC    OF   OPPORTUNITY 
The  factors  recapitulated.  —  They  are  all  neglected  factors      ....  224 

The  Resources  of  Society 

Native  ability  uniformly  distributed.  —  Most  of  it  latent.  —  Galton's 
estimate  of  the  number  of  men  of  genius  in  society. —  Number  as  shown 
by  Odin's  tables.  —  Great  inequalities  of  the  local  environment  indicate 
possibilities.  —  Compared  to  mineral  resources.  —  Great  range  in  fecundity. 
— Paris  and  the  chateaux.  —  The  maximum  the  test  of  the  possible.  — 
The  different  environments  considered.  —  Society  cannot  control  the  local, 
economic,  and  social  environments. —  It  can  control  the  educational  envi- 
ronment. —  Proof  that  the  fecundity  of  society  in  men  of  genius  can  be 
artificially  increased  a  hundredfold.  —  What  women  may  contribute. — 
There  are  all  gradations  in  human  abilities.  —  Negative  effects  of  environ- 
ments. —  Sporadic  character  of  achievement.  —  The  movement  should  be 
uniform  and  universal 224 

The  Fallacy  of  History 

Definition  of  history.  —  Ignores  causation. — ^  Appeals  to  curiosity. — 
Biography  a  form  of  history.  —  Deals  with  heroes  as  exceptional  beings.  — 


CONTENTS  xiii 

Page 
The  fallacy  of  history  is  the  same  as  that  of  statistics  and  of  super- 
stition      234 

Relativity  of  Genius.  —  Comparison  of  the  mind  at  birth  to  a  blank 
sheet  of  paper.  —  Role  of  experience.  —  Comparison  with  soil.  —  Abun- 
dance of  native  capacity.  —  Why  genius  seems  to  be  on  the  decline. — 
Appearance  of  transition  grades.  —  This  the  tendency  of  all  science     .     .  236 

Genius  present  in  all  Classes.  —  Rise  of  great  men  from  obscurity.  — 
Examples.  —  These  prove  that  genius  exists  in  all  classes.  —  Other 
proofs.  —  The  same  facts  prove  that  much  genius  is  latent     ....   239 

Not  Genius  but  Achievement.  —  The  prevailing  point  of  view  false. — 
Routine  work  important.  —  All  work  mental.  —  All  men  capable  of  doing 
good  work.  —  Its  value  proportional  to  intelligence.  —  Number  of  scien- 
tific authors.  —  Inadequacy  of  facilities  for  research.  —  Serious  investiga- 
tors needed 241 

Leisure  as  Opportunity 

Leisure  a  means  of  education.  —  The  leisure  class.  —  How  leisure  has 

been  attained.  —  Only  a  small  part  of  it  utilized 242 

The  Instinct  of  Workmanship.  —  Mr.  Veblen's  use  of  the  expression. 

—  The  dynamic  quality  of  leisure.  —  The  horrors  of  ennui.  —  A  certain 
amount  of  leisure  will  always  be  devoted  to  achievement.  —  Adversity  not 
needed  as  a  spur  to  activity 243 

Education  as  Opportunity 

Education  es.sential  to  a  literary  career.  —  For  a  scientific  career  it 
should  take  the  form  of  training.  —  Anthology  of  education.  —  Views  of 
Qalton,  Leibnitz,  Helvetius,  Condorcet,  Mazzinij,  KanJ,  Comte,  Broca, 
Macaulay,  Napoleon,  Washington,  Jefferson,  Kiddl-     -^ 246 

Success  implies  Opportunity 

All  who  have  attained  eminence  have  had  their  opportunity.  —  The 
wide-spread  belief  that  opportunity  presents  itself  once  to  all.  — Not  true. 

—  Involves  the  fallacy  of  history 251 

Alleged  Self-made   Men.  —  The    subject  greatly   exaggerated.  —  The 

number  small.  —  Examples  :  D'Alembert.  —  Scaliger.  —  Burns.  —  Bun- 
yan.  —  Haydn.  —  Opportunity  versus  accident  and  luck. —  Examples: 
Shakespeare,  IVIoliere,  Corneille,  Rousseau.  —  The  sixteen  uneducated 
French  men  of  letters.  —  The  eighteen  indigent  French  men  of  letters.— 
Shown  that  some  fortuitous  circumstance  constituted  the  opportunity  of 

each.  —  Case  of  Herbert  Spencer 252 

Privileged  Men.  —  Their  relative  abundance.  —  Typical  examples. — 
Descartes.  —  Newton.  —  Darwin.  —  Adam    Smith.  —  Galileo.  —  Hobbes.  • 

—  Harvey.  —  Buckle.  —  Cooley's  lists.  —  Other  examples.  —  They  have 


XIV  CONTENTS 

Page 
done  the  work  of  the  highest  grade.  —  The  finest  types  of  genius  will  not 

work  against  opposition.  —  They  require  that  opportunity  be  brought  to 
them.  —  Importance  of  giving  exceptional  persons  a  chance.  —  The  "  ex- 
ceptional man  "  theory.  —  Society  makes  no  effort  to  utilize  exceptional 
talent 261 

The  Power  of  Circumstances 

False  popular  ideas.  —  Mind  not  the  same  as  brain  or  intellect.  —  Intel- 
ligence. —  Mind  includes  its  contents.  —  Metaphorical  illustration.  —  Con- 
tents of  mind.  —  Mind  without  experience.  —  Wild  men.  —  Language  of 
nature. —  Experience  infinitely  varied.  —  Circumstances  determine  the 
contents  of  the  mind. —  Similarity  of  intellects.  —  Views  of  Adam  Smith, 
Helvetius,  de  CandoUe,  Mill.  —  The  factor  opportunity.  —  Ancients  ver- 
sus moderns 267 

The  Mother  of  Circutnstances.  —  The  expression  defined. —  Effect  of 
raising  children  of  civilized  parents  among  uncivilized  peoples.  —  Of 
different  environments  in  ciyilized  countries.  —  An  outlook  the  prime 
essential 274 

Equalization  of  Opportunity 

Differences  in  tastes  greater  than  in  talents.  —  Adaptability  to  distaste- 
ful pursuits  —  Economy  in  working  in  harmony  with  one's  tastes.  — 
Mediocrity  should  not  be  ignored.  —  The  plea  for  equal  opportunity 
usually  from  the  economic  standpoint.  —  Views  of  Sumner,  Topinard, 
Gunton,  Kidd.  —  The  economic  end. — Haste  to  deal  with  ends  to  the 
neglect  of  means.  —  Ends  attainable  only  through  means.  —  The  series  of 
means  to  the  ultimate  end.  —  The  initial  means. —  Equalization  of  oppor- 
tunity a  means.  —  Equalization  of  intelligence  the  means  to  all  other  equal- 
izations   276 

PART    III  — IMPROVEMENT 

CHAPTER    XI 

RECONCILIATION  OF  ACHIEVEMENT  WITH  IMPROVEMENT 

Achievement  versus  improvement.  —  Actual  achievement  belongs  to 
pure,  potential  to  applied  sociology.  —  Does  civilization  improve  society? 

—  Conflicting  views. —  How  society  improves.  —  Improvement  should  at 
least  equal  achievement.  —  Society  incapable  of  appreciating  achievement. 

—  Science  and  art  in  advance  of  popular  knowledge.  —  The  public 
interested  only  in  the  practical  advantages  of  science 285 


CONTENTS  XV 

Ethical  Character  of  all  Science 

Page 

The  purpose  of  science.  —  The  coldest  thinking  leads  to  the  warmest 
feeling.  —  Employment  of  the  indirect  method.  —  Views  of  Bacon,  Des- 
cartes, Huxley,  Adam  Smith,  Malthus,  Cunningham,  Comte,  Ratzenhofer, 
Schaeffle,  Durkheim,  Espinas,  Worms,  Coste.  —  Those  who  achieve 
intend  to  improve.  —  Why  society  fails  to  assimilate  achievement.  —  Altru- 
ism an  unreliable  principle.  —  Power  alone  effective 2S7 

Assimilation  of  Achievement 

A  plausible  objection.  —  If  society  cannot  assimilate  the  present  output 
what  could  it  do  with  a  greater?  —  The  "exceptional  man"  principle 
v/ould  increase  the  evil.  —  Social  inequalities  artificial.  —  The  several 
environments  wholly  artificial.  —  All  objections  based  on  the  current  false 
philosophy  of  genius.  —  The  great  need  is  a  market  for  achievement.  — 
The  case  similar  to  that  of  economic  production.  —  Fallacy  of  overpro- 
duction. —  More  consumers  wanted.  —  Equal  opportunities  would  secure 
this.  —  Consumption  of  intellectual  as  of  material  products  yields  satis- 
faction. —  Increased  satisfaction  is  improvement.  —  This  would  bring 
about  the  reconciliation  of  achievement  with  improvement 292 

CHAPTER   XII 

METHOD  OF  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 

Little  use  to  suggest  methods.  —  They  are  always  subject  to  trial.  — 
Unreasonable  demands  for  methods.  —  Certain  to  be  disappointed.  —  Treat- 
ment must  be  very  general.  —  Subject  dealt  with  in  earlier  works.  —  Grant 
Allen's  criticisms.  —  The  word  "education."  —  Restricted  meaning  given 
to  it. —  Former  treatment  synthetic.  —  Present  treatment  analytic. —  Har- 
mony of  the  two  methods. —  Positive  education 296 

Administration  of  the  Social  Estate 

The  problem  that  of  finding  the  heirs  to  human  achievement.  —  All 
entitled  to  share  alike.  —  The  share  of  each  is  the  whole  estate. —  Social 
continuity.  —  How  the  social  heritage  has  been  distributed. —  Parts  which 
are  equitably  divided.  —  Parts  which  are  not.  —  Classification.  —  The 
general  includes  the  special.  —  The  latter  need  not  be  attended  to.  — 
Minds  possessing  general  truths  can  dispose  of  special  ones 300 

The  Order  of  Nature.  —  The  most  general  knowledge  the  most  practical. 
—  Should  be  presented  in  its  logical  order.  —  The  logical  order  is  that  of 
causal  connection.  —  Causality.  —  Pedagogic  value  of  the  principle.  —  The 
sciences  are  so  many  general  truths.  —  They  should  be  taught  in  their 
natural   order.  —  The   six  sciences   which   embrace   all    truth.  —  Natural 


xvi  CONTENTS 

Page 

order  in  which  they  stand.  —  Should  be  studied  in  that  order.  —  Other 
sciences  fall  under  these.  —  Neglect  of  this  canon. —  Exceptions. — 
Mathematics    and    logic.  —  The    instruments    of    education.  —  Reading, 

writing,  calculus 302 

The  Diffusion  of  Ktiow ledge. —  Recapitulation  of  the  method.  —  Society 
cannot  be  expected  to  increase  the  amount  of  knowledge. —  Its  function 
is  to  distribute  existing  knowledge.  —  Value  of  knowledge  progressively 
greater  as  universality  is  approached.  —  Dangerous  in  the  hands  of  a 
few. —  Most  disputes  arise  over  things  known  to  some.  —  Mind  essentially 
altruistic.  —  How  intellectual  altruism  is  manifested. —  Private  institutions 
of  learning.  —  False  views  of  education. —  Insufficiency  of  educational 
institutions.  —  The  conferring  of  knowledge  not  considered  a  part  of 
education.  —  Definitions  of  education. —  Report  of  the  Committee  of 
Ten.  —  Vague,  meaningless  expressions. —  Erroneous  conceptions. — 
Educational  value  of  mathematics  and  history  exaggerated.  —  Value  of 
science.  —  Education  of  the  dangerous  classes.  —  Inhabitants  of  the 
slums  the  intellectual  equals  of  the  higher  classes.  —  Criminals  are  the 
geniuses  of  the  slums.  —  Difference  wholly  in  the  environment. —  Irra- 
tional methods  employed.  —  Slums  unnecessary.  —  Wild  men,  like  wild 
animals,  must  be  tamed  while  young.  —  The  problem  simply  calls  for 
social    ingenuity 307 

CHAPTER   XIII 

PROBLEMS  OF  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 

The  equalization  of  intelligence  the  only  live  problem. —  It  is  a 
practical  problem. —  If  solved  all  other  problems  would  solve  themselves. 
—  Yet  this  is  not  recognized  as  a  problem.  —  The  recognized  problems 
are  insoluble.  —  If  solved  they  would  not  stay  solved.  —  Why  then  discuss 
them? — Because  this  is  expected.  —  Pictures  of  the  future. —  Dangers 
involved  in  this.  —  Utopias. —  Danger  of  underestimating  the  future. — 
Certainty  of  misinterpreting  it. —  Moral  reforms.  —  The  real  moral  prog- 
ress.—  Looking  backward 314 

Ethical  Sociology 

Illogical  use  of  ethics  by  Comte  and  Spencer.  —  Not  a  science  of  the 
hierarchy. —  In  both  their  systems  ethics  is  simply  applied  sociology. — 
It  belongs  to  the  new  ethics. —  All  reformatory  schemes  based  on  the 
supposed  permanence  of  existing  intellectual  inequalities.  —  The  removal 
of  these  inequalities  the  only  remedy  that  sociology  can  offer       .     .     .     -317 

Privative  Ethics.  —  Ethics  now  chiefly  confined  to  the  phenomena  of 
privation.  —  The  economic  struggle  for  existence.  —  Current  fallacies  and 
their  refutation.  —  Man's  control  of  physical  and  of  social  forces  contrasted. 


CONTENTS  xvii 

Page 

—  The  competitive  system. —  Supposed  necessity  for  the  motive  of  gain. 

—  Superficial  character  of  this  view.  —  Other  things  to  struggle  for.  — 
Competition  on  a  higher  plane  becomes  emulation.  —  Social  classes  that 
are  now  free  from  the  economic  struggle.  —  The  biologic  law.  —  Creates 

a  surplus  only  to  destroy  it.  —  Mortality  of  rich  and  poor Statistics. — 

The  surplus  appear  to  die  of  disease.  —  Really  killed  by  privation. — 
Reproduction  in  inverse  ratio  to  intelligence.  —  Statistics.  —  Underlying 
causes.  —  Efforts  to  prevent  decline  in  population.  —  Such  decline  favors 
the  law  of  conquest  and  subjugation.  —  A  low  birthrate  a  mark  of  civiliza- 
tion.—  Chiefly  due  to  hard  social  conditions.  —  Removal  of  these  would 
restore  the  normal  fecundity  of  the  race.  —  To  what  extent  society  is 
responsible  for  privation.  —  Private  altruism  no  remedy.  —  Prevailing  idea 
that  the   majority  of  mankind  are  weaklings.  —  Their  legitimate  power 

the  true  remedy 318 

Positive  Ethics.  —  Little  attention  paid  to  it.  —  Attention  chiefly  centered 
on  negative  and  privative  ethics.  —  These  both  temporary  phases.  —  Posi- 
tive ethics  a  permanent  phase.  —  Society  now  in  a  pain  economy. —  Positive 
ethics  represents  a  pleasure  economy.  —  Dependence  of  human  happiness 
upon  material  conditions.  —  Demands  freedom  from  restraint. —  This 
largely  secured  through  material  goods. —  Demand  for  increased  produc- 
tion.—  Inadequacy  of  existing  wealth. —  Fallacy  of  overproduction. — 
Extent  to  which  production  should  be  increased. —  Increased  consump- 
tion the  real  desideratum.  —  Normal  versus  ostentatious  consumption. — 
The  standard  of  living  requires  to  be  raised.  —  Consumption  is  enjoyment. 

—  New  wants  and  their  satisfaction.  —  Function  of  the  fine  arts.  —  Greater 
fullness  of  life. —  No  necessary  limit  to  the  duration  of  this  higher  state. 

—  Youth  of  :he  planet. —  Comparison  with  the  planet  Mars.  —  Geologic 
time  limits.  —  Vast  possibilities  of  both  human  achievement  and  social 
improvement 326 

The  Principle  of  Attraction 

Applied  sociology  capable  of  reduction   to  rigid  scientific   principles. 

—  The  fundamental  principle  of  physical  investigation  is  attraction.  — 
Metaphysical  versus  practical  uses  of  the  word.  —  Action  at  a  distance. 

—  Attraction  common  to  all  phenomena. —  Constitutes  the  basis  of 
invention.  —  Applicable  to  animal  activities.  —  Psychics. — Social  exper- 
imentation   and    invention 331 

Attractive  Labor.  —  Views  of  Fourier,  Comte,  Mill,  Spencer.  —  Cause 
of  the  odium  of  labor. —  Normal  exercise  of  the  faculties.  —  Can  be 
secured  through  social  action 334 

Attractive  Legislation.  —  Treatment  of  the  subject  in  earlier  works 

This  its  systematic  place.  —  Efficiency  of  social  organization.  —  Auto- 
cratic  and  democratic  legislation.  —  Conditions  to  social  inventiveness. 


xvill  CONTENTS 

Page 
—  Scientific     legislation.  —  Sociological    laboratories.  —  Legislation    is 

properly  sociological  experimentation  and  invention.  —  Removal  of  social 

friction.  —  Avoidance  of  compulsion.  —  Relief  of  privations. —  Increase 

of  social  welfare.  —  Organization  of  happiness.  —  Conservation  of  social 

energy. —  Increased  production. —  Its  equitable  distribution.  —  Enhanced 

social  efficiency.  —  Social  improvement 337 

List  of  Authors  and  Titles  of  Works,  Articles,  and  Memoirs,  quoted  or 
cited,  with  critical  and  explanatory  Notes 341 

Index 367 


LIST  OF  PLATES 

Plate      I.    Map  showing  the  Fecundity  of  the  Departments  of  France 

in  Men  of  Letters 151 

Plate    II.    Map  showing  the  Fecundity  of  the  Provinces  of  France  in 

Men  of  Letters 153 

Plate  III.    Map  showing  the  Fecundity  of  the  seven  recognized  Regions 

of  France  in  Men  of  Letters 155 

Plate  IV.    Map  showing  the  Relative  Fecundity  of  the  Urban  and  Rural 

Population  of  France  in  Men  of  Letters 192 

Plate     V.    Chart  showing  the  Relative  Fecundity  of  the  Urban  and  Rural 

Population  of  France  in  Men  of  Letters 194 


APPLIED    SOCIOLOGY 

Part  I 
MOVEMENT 


Agir  par  affection  et  penser  pour 
agir.  —  AuGUSTE  Comte. 


CHAPTER  I 
RELATION   OF  PURE  TO  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 

Toute  science  a  deux  parties  :  une  partie  rationelle.  pure,  qui  ^tudie  la  forme 
la  plus  g^n^rale  et  abstraite  des  phenomenes  respectifs,  et  une  partie  appliquee 
qui  ^tudie  leur  forme  concrete  et  d^taillee.  La  distinction  rigoureuse  entre 
ces  deux  parties,  acceptee  dans  les  sciences  physiques,  tend  de  plus  en  plus  a 
s'introduire  dans  le  domaine  des  sciences  sociales.  —  Leon  Wini>rskv. 

The  terms  "pure"  and  "applied"  should  be  used  in  the  same 
sense  in  social  science  as  in  all  other  sciences.  Any  apparent  differ- 
ences should  be  such  only  as  grow  out  of  the  nature  of  social  science 
as  the  most  complex  of  all  sciences,  and  hence  the  most  difficult  to 
reduce  to  exact  formulas.  It  is  important,  therefore,  to  gain  at  the 
outset  a  clear  conception  of  what  is  meant  by  these  terms,  and  espe- 
cially of  the  essential  distinction  between  pure  and  applied  sociology. 
Before  proceeding,  therefore,  to  set  forth  the  principles  of  applied 
sociology  at  length,  it  may  be  well  briefly  to  define  the  two  branches 
with  the  special  object  of  rendering  this  distinction  clear. 

Pure  Sociology 

Pure  sociology  is  simply  a  scientific  inquiry  into  the  actual  con- 
dition of  society.  It  alone  can  yield  true  social  self-consciousness. 
It  answers  the  questions  What,  Why,  and  How,  by  furnishing 
the  facts,  the  causes,  and  the  principles  of  sociology.  It  is  a 
means  of  self-orientation.  When  men  know  what  they  are,  what 
forces  have  molded  them  into  their  present  shape  and  character, 
and  according  to  what  principles  of  nature  the  creative  and  trans- 
forming processes  have  operated,  they  begin  really  to  understand 
themselves.  Not  only  is  a  mantle  of  charity  thrown  over  every- 
thing that  exists,  such  as  virtually  to  preclude  all  blame,  but  a 
rational  basis  is  now  for  the  first  time  furnished  for  considering  to 
what  extent  and  in  what  manner  things  that  are  not  in  all  respects 
what  they   would  like   to  have  them   may  be  put   in  the  way  of 


4  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

such  modification  as  will  bring  them  more  into  harmony  with  the 
desired  state.  At  least  it  thus,  and  only  thus,  becomes  possible  to 
distinguish  between  those  social  conditions  which  are  susceptible 
of  modification  through  human  action  and  those  that  are  practically 
unalterable  or  are  beyond  the  reach  of  human  agency.  In  this  way 
an  enormous  amount  of  energy  otherwise  wasted  can  be  saved  and 
concentrated  upon  the  really  feasible." 

But  by  far  the  most  important  effect  of  the  knowledge  furnished 
by  pure  sociology  is  that  of  showing  the  difficulty  of  modifying 
certain  conditions  which  are  not  absolutely  unalterable,  but  which, 
without  such  knowledge,  are  supposed  capable  of  easy  alteration. 
In  most  such  cases  those  who  imagine  themselves  to  be  sufferers 
from  their  presence  believe  that  certain  others  have  them  under 
their  control  and  might  alter  or  abolish  them  if  they  were  willing 
to  do  so.  .This  is  the  source  of  the  greater  part  of  the  bitter  class 
animosity  in  society.  In  other  words,  the  most  important  lessoivthat 
j-mjP  '^nrinjnp^y^tparhps^qJJTgij^f  the  great  y^tabjlity  of  SOciaJ-StJ^«€- 
tures.  But  it  also  teaches  that  few  if  any  social  structures  arewholly 
incapable  of  modification,  and  the  further  truth  is  revealed  that  in 
mostcases  such  structures,  though  they  cannot  be  changed  by  the 
direct  methods  usually  applied,  may  be  at  least  gradually  transformed 
by  indirect  methods  and  the  adoption  of  the  appropriate  means. 

Applied  sociology,  therefore,  rests  upon  piure  sociology,.  If  it 
has  any  scientific  character  at  all,  it  presupposes  it  and  proceeds 
entirely  from  it.  In  so  far  as  the  idea  of  reform  inheres  in  applied 
sociology  it  can  bear  no  fruit  except  it  so  proceeds.  Reform_n2gy 
be  defined  as  the  desirablejnodification  of  social  struct_ures^  Any 
attempt  to  do  this  must  be  based  on  a  full  knowledge  of  the  nature 
of  such  structures,  otherwise  its  failure  is  certain.  Such  knowl- 
edge includes  an  acquaintance  with  the  history  of  the  structures 
to  be  affected.  This  history  must  go  back  to  a  time  when  the 
structures  were  not  injurious  but  useful.  It  must  go  back  to  the 
period  of  their  development  in  response  to  external  and  internal 
stimuli.  Such  a  period  there  must  have  been  in  every  case,  other- 
wise the  structures  could  never  have  come  into  existence.  In  the 
prosecution  of  such  a  research  it  will  not  do  to  be  deceiv^ed  by 
names.    The  names  of  institutions  change,  sometimes,  after  ceasing 


Ch.  I]     RELATION  OF  PURE  TO  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  5 

to  be  longer  in  harmony  with  social  conditions,  acquiring  forms 
descriptive  of  their  real  or  supposed  evil  character.  Applied  soci- 
ology looks  beneath  all  this  and  learns  from  pure  sociology  what 
was  their  origin,  what  has  been  their  complete  history,  and  what 
is  their  true  nature.  With  such  data  the  question  of  their  modifi- 
cation through  the  conscious  action  of  society  can  be  intelligently 
considered,  and  if,  as  is  usually  the  case,  they  cannot  be  immedi- 
ately abolished  or  abruptly  changed,  the  way  is  made  plain  for  the 
adoption  of  indirect  means  that  will  secure  their  gradual  transfor- 
mation and  the  elimination  of  their  anti-social  elements. 

All  this  would  mean  a  complete  changein  the  whole  method  of 
jieform.  With  the  idea  of  reform  has  always  thus  far  been  asso- 
ciated that  of  heat  rather  than  light.  Reforms  are  supposed  to 
emanate  from  the  red  end  of  the  social  spectrum  and  to  be  the 
product  of  its  thermic  and  not  of  its  luminous  rays.  But  the 
method  of  passion  and  vituperation  produces  no  effect.  It  is 
characteristic  of  the  unscientific  method  to  advocate  and  of  the 
scientific  method  to  investigate.  However  ardent  the  desire  for 
reform  may  be,  it  can  only  be  satisfied  by  dispassionate  inquiry,  and 
the  realization  of  the  warmest  sentiments  is  only  possible  through 
the  coldest  logic.  There  either  is  or  has  been  good  in  everything. 
No  institution  is  an  unmixed  evil.  Most  of  those  (such  as  slavery, 
for  example)  that  many  would  gladly  see  abolished  entirely,  are 
defended  by  some.  But  both  the  defenders  and  the  assailants 
of  such  institutions  usually  neglect  their  history  and  the  causes 
that  created  them.  The  hortatory  method  deals  with  theses  and 
antitheses,  while  the  scientific  method  deals  with  syntheses.  Only 
by  the  latter  method  is  it  possible  to  arrive  at  the  truth  common  to 
both.  Only  thus  can  a  rational  basis  be  reached  for  any  effective 
action  looking  to  the  amelioration  of  social  conditions. 

Applied  Sociology 

Just  as  pure  sociology  aims  to  answer  the  questions  What,  Why, 
and  How,  so  applied  sociology  aims  to  answer  the  question  What  for. 
The  former  deals  with  facts,  causes,  and  principles,  the  latter  with 
the  object,  end,  or  purpose.    The  one  treats  the  subject-matter  of 


6  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

sociology,  the  other  its  use.  However  theoretical  pure  sociology  may 
be  in  some  of  its  aspects,  applied  sociology  is  essentially  practical. 
It  appeals  directly  to  interest.  It  has  to  do  with  social  ideals,  with 
ethical  considerations,  with  what  ought  to  be.  While  pure  soci- 
ology treats  of  the  "spontaneous  development  of  society,"  applied 
sociology  "deals  with  artificial  means  of  accelerating  the  sponta- 
neous processes  of  nature."  ^  The  subject-matter  of  pure  sociology 
is  achievement,  that  of  applied  sociology  is  improvement.  The  for- 
mer relates  to  the  past  and  the  present,  the  latter  to  the  future. 
Achievement  is  individual,  improvement  is  social.  Applied  sociology 
takes  account  of  artificial  phenomena  consciously  and  intentionally 
directed  by  society  to  bettering  society.  Improvement  is  social 
achievement.  In  pure  sociology  the  point  of  view  is  wholly  objec- 
tive. It  may  be  said  to  relate  to  social  function.  In  applied  soci- 
ology the  point  of  view  is  subjective.  It  relates  to  feeling, — the 
collective  well-being.  In  pure  sociology  the  desires  and  wants  of 
men  are  considered  as  the  motor  agencies  of  society.  In  applied 
sociology  they  are  considered  as  sources  of  enjoyment  through  their 
satisfaction.  The  distinction  is  similar  to  that  between  production 
and  consumption  in  economics.  Indeed,  applied  sociology  may  be  said 
to  deal  with  social  utility  as  measured  by  the  satisfaction  of  desire. 

In  the  analysis  of  a  dynamic  action  made  in  Chapter  XI  of  Pure 
Sociology,  the  only  one  of  the  three  effects  upon  which  it  was 
found  necessary  to  dwell  was  the  direct  effect  of  the  action  in 
transforming  the  environment.  In  applied  sociology  the  only  one 
of  these  effects  considered  is  the  one  that  was  there  put  first,  viz., 
that  of  satisfying  the  desire  of  the  individual.  In  other  words, 
while  in  pure  sociology  the  constructive  direct  effects  of  human 
effort  only  were  dealt  with,  in  applied  sociology  it  is  the  success  of 
such  efforts  in  supplying  human  wants  that  is  taken  into  account. 

All  applied  science  is  necessarily  anthropocentric.  Sociology  is 
especially  so.  The  old  anthropocentric  theory  which  taught  that 
the  universe  was  specially  planned  in  the  interest  of  man  is  not 
only  false  but  pernicious  in  discouraging  human  effort.  But  true, 
scientific  anthropocentrism  is  highly  progressive,  since  it  teaches 
that   the   universe,   although   very  imperfectly  adapted   to   man's 

1  Pure  Sociology,  p.  431. 


Ch.  I]      RELATION  OF  PURE  TO  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  7 

interests,  can  be  so  adapted  by  man  himself.  Applied  sociology  is 
chiefly  concerned  with  enforcing  this  truth.  Throughout  the  theo- 
logical and  metaphysical  stages  of  human  thought  philosophy  was 
absorbed  in  the  contemplation  of  the  alleged  author  of  nature. 
Pure  science  produced  the  first  change  of  front,  viz.,  from  God  to 
nature.  Applied  scienre  constitutes  a  second  change  of  front,  viz., 
from  nature  to  man.  Nature  is  seen  to  embody  utilities  and  effort 
is  directed  to  the  practical  realization  of  these. 

Applied  sociology  differs  from  other  applied  sciences  in  em- 
bracing all  men  instead  of  a  few.  Most  of  the  philosophy  which 
claims  to  be  scientific,  if  it  is  not  actually  pessimistic  in  denying  the 
power  of  man  to  ameliorate  his  condition,  is  at  least  oligocentric  in 
concentrating  all  effort  on  a  few  of  the  supposed  elite  of  mankind 
and  ignoring  or  despising  the  great  mass  that  have  not  proved  their 
inherent  superiority.  The  question  of  superiority  in  general  will  be 
considered  later,  but  it  may  be  said  here  that  from  the  standpoint 
of  applied  sociology  all  men  are  really  equal.  Nor  is  this  in  the 
Jeffersonian  sense  precisely,  though  it  is  a  sense  akin  to  that,  viz., 
that,  whateverjnmy  be  the  differences  in  theu"  fnrnli-iVc;^  a]]  pien 
have  an  equal  right  to  the  exercise  and  enjoyment  of  the  faculties 
that_they  have.  Applied  sociology  is  egalitarian  to  the  extent  of 
aiming  to  secure_jhis  right  for^l  men  equally.  It  is  not  only 
ant^i ropocentric  but  pancentric . 

With  a  few  such  exceptions,  growing  out  of  the  nature  of  the 
science  (and  in  this  respect  it  does  not  differ  from  other  sciences), 
applied  sociology  is  entirely  analogous  to  other  applied  sciences.  No^ 
science  can  be  applied  unless  it  rests  on  exact  mechanical  princi- 
ples^ In  Pure  Sociology  (Chapters  l^X-OCI)  it  was  shown  that 
sociology  does  rest  on  such  principles.  Applied  sociology  assumes 
that  these  principles  are  true,  and  this  work  is  therefore  based  on 
that  one  and  cannot  even  be  understood  by  one  not  acquainted 
with  that.  It  does  not,  however,  follow  that  the  reader  must 
accept  as  true  all  the  principles  laid  down  in  that  work.  He  may 
question  their  validity  to  any  extent.  But  they  may  be  clearly 
understood  without  being  accepted,  and  all  that  is  maintained  here 
is  that  this  work  cannot  be  understood  unless  the  principles  set 
forth  in  that  one  are  also  understood. 


8  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

Science  is  never  exactly  the  same  thing  as  art.  Applied  science 
is  therefore  not  the  same  as  art.  If  it  is  art  it  is  not  science.  A 
science,  whether  pure  or  applied,  is  a  discipline  that  can  be  taught 
more  or  less  fully  in  a  class-room,  not  necessarily  from  books,  but 
from  books,  lectures,  and  object-lessons.  In  most  sciences,  even 
in  the  pure  stage,  field  studies  are  of  the  highest  importance,  and 
in  their  applied  stage  it  becomes  almost  essential  for  the  student 
to  apply  the  principles  directly  to  nature,  but  this  is  almost  always 
done  in  miniature,  or  on  a  small  scale,  for  practice  only,  and  with- 
out expectation  of  any  practical  result.  In  this  way  preparation 
may  be  made  for  all  the  practical  arts.  But  the  applied  sciences 
thus  taught  are  not  the  arts  themselves.  Applied  mathematics  is 
not  mensuration,  surveying,  or  engineering.  Applied  astronomy  is 
not  navigation.  Applied  physics  is  not  manufacture.  Applied  chem- 
istry is  not  agriculture.  Applied  biology  leads  to  a  great  number 
of  arts,  some  of  which  are  of  very  recent  origin. 

Comte  laid  down  two  principles,  which,  however  much  they  may 
fall  short  of  universality,  are  well  worthy  of  attention.  One  was 
that  the  practical  applications  of  the  sciences  increase  with  their 
complexity.  This  was  long  rejected  with  disdain  and  the  superior 
utiHty  of  the  physical  forces  over  any  of  the  applications  of  vital 
phenomena  was  pointed  to  as  its  conclusive  refutation.  But  are 
these  forces  more  useful  to  man  than  those  which  have  caused  the 
earth  to  yield  its  cereals  and  fruits  and  have  produced  domestic 
animals.''  And  now,  with  the  modern  discoveries  in  bacteriology 
and  kindred  branches  bringing  their  incalculable  benefits  to  man,  we 
may  well  doubt  whether  even  electricity  has  proved  a  greater  boon. 

The  other  principle  was  that  phenomena  grow  more  susceptible 
to  artificial  modification  with  the  increasing  complexity  of  the 
phenomena.  Comte  did  not  illustrate  this  as  fully  as  he  should 
have  done,  but  his  main  conclusion  from  it  was  that  social  phe- 
nomena are  the  most  susceptible  of  all  to  modification.  Doubts 
as  to  the  validity  of  .this  principle  have  been  less  freely  expressed 
than  in  case  of  the  one  last  considered.  But  it  seems  to  me  that 
they  are  even  more  justifiable.  Still,  it  depends  here  very  much 
upon  the  point  of  view.  The  modification  of  social  phenomena 
has  proved  very  difficult,  while  that  of  physical  phenomena  seems 


Ch.  I]      RELATION  OF  PURE  TO  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  9 

comparatively  easy.  But  this  is  a  superficial  view.  The  real  reason 
why  attempts  to  modify  social  phenomena  have  so  often  failed  is 
that  the  phenomena  were  not  understood.  It  is  equally  impossible 
to  modify  physical  phenomena  before  they  are  understood.  Comte 
did  not  say  that  the  complex  sciences  were  more  easily  understood 
than  the  simple  ones;  on  the  contrary,  he  constantly  insists  on  their 
greater  difficulty  of  comprehension.  The  principle  under  considera- 
tion, fully  stated,  would  be  that,  assuming  them  equally  well  under- 
stood, the  modifiability  of  phenomena  is  in  direct  proportion  to  their 
complexity.  Thus  stated,  it  may  be  regarded  as  open  to  discussion. 
No  adequate  attempt  has  yet  been  made  either  to  confirm  or  to 
disprove  it.  I  am  myself  disposed  to  accept  it  with  certain  reserves ; 
but  this  is  not  the  place  to'  discuss  it  in  full. 

But  the  degree  to  which  the  application  of  a  science  to  human 
uses  becomes  possible,  desirable,  or  prominent  depends  rather  on 
the  nature  of  the  science  than  on  its  position  in  the  hierarchy. 
Sidereal  astronomy  has  remained  for  the  most  part  a  science  of 
pure  contemplation,  but  there  are  great  possibilities  in  astrophysics. 
Nearly  all  branches  of  physics  have  proved  useful,  but  until  the  dis- 
covery of  the  X-rays  spectrum  analysis  remained  a  pure  science. 
Chemistry,  though  applicable  to  human  uses  in  nearly  all  its  depart- 
ments, has  probably  thus  far  contributed  less  in  this  direction  than 
has  physics  as  a  whole.  Biology  has  already  been  mentioned,  and 
its  possibilities  are  immense,  but  the  departments  now  found  to  be 
the  most  useful  are  the  ones  that  were  unknown  a  century  ago,  and 
long  remained  fields  of  mere  idle  curiosity,  regarded  as  the  farthest 
possible  removed  from  any  practical  utility.  In  this  respect  bac- 
teriology may  be  compared  to  electricity.  Psychology  is  now  almost 
exclusively  a  pure  science,  but  no  one  dares  to  say  that  it  will 
always  remain  such.  That  sociology  may  become  an  applied  sci- 
ence no  one  will  dispute  who  believes  that  it  is  a  science  at  all. 
And  although  its  phenomena  are  the  most  complex  of  all  and  the 
most  difficult  fully  to  understand,  when  understood,  if  they  ever  are, 
the  results  their  study  promises  in  the  direction  of  their  modifica- 
tion in  the  interest  of  man  are  beyond  calculation. 

But  applied  sociology  is  not  government  or  politics,  nor  civic 
or  social  reform.    It  does  not  itself  apply  sociological  principles; 


lO  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

it  seeks  only  to  show  how  they  may  be  apphed.  It  is  a  science, 
not  an  art.  The  most  that  it  claims  to  do  is  to  lay  down  certain 
general  principles  as  guides  to  social  and  political  action.  But  in 
this  it  must  be  exceedingly  cautious.  The  principles  can  consist 
only  of  the  highest  generalizations.  They  can  have  only  the  most 
general  bearing  on  current  events  and  the  popular  or  burning  ques- 
tions of  the  hour.  The  sociologist  who  undertakes  to  discuss 
these,  especially  to  take  sides  on  them,  abandons  his  science  and 
becomes  a  politician.  A  large  part  of  Herbert  Spencer's  writ- 
ings is  of  this  character.  Much  of  it  is  to  be  found  even  in  his  Syn- 
thetic Philosophy.  It  only  reflects  his  prejudices  and  his  feelings, 
and  is  not  scientific.  Moreover,  as  I  have  repeatedly  shown,  it  is 
not  in  harmony  with  his  system  as  a  whole,  but  rather  in  conflict 
with  it. 

The  same  may  of  course  be  said  of  nearly  the  whole  social 
reform  movement  embraced  under  the  general  term  "  socialism,"  and 
including  the  Utopian  schools  as  well  as  the  practical  ones  — 
Fourier  as  well  as  Karl  Marx.  They  all  seek  to  bring  about  modi- 
fications in  social  structures.  They  would  change  human  institu- 
tions more  or  less  radically  and  abruptly.  While  the  advocates 
themselves  do  not  attempt,  except  in  a  few  cases  on  a  small  scale, 
to  produce  these  changes,  they  seek  to  create  a  public  sentiment 
in  favor  of  such  changes  sufficiently  general  to  secure  them 
through  legislation.  In  so  far  as  they  actually  succeed  in  this  they 
accomplish  their  end.  The  changes  are  voted  or  decreed  and  the 
state  strives  to  realize  them.  But  often  the  institutions  fail  to 
yield  even  to  the  power  of  the  state,  and  a  long  struggle  follov/s, 
such  as  France  is  now  having  with  the  parochial  schools.  But  all 
know  in  how  few  cases  the  social  refor-m  party  acquires  political 
control.  This  is  on  account  of  the  stability  of  social  structures. 
In  old  settled  countries  with  definite  class  interests,  prescriptive 
rights,  and  large  vested  interests,  this  is  more  clearly  seen  than  in 
new  countries,  and  hence  it  is  in  these  latter  that  social  reform 
movements  are  most  successful.  But  the  statistics  show  that  the 
socialist  vote  is  increasing  in  all  countries  where  it  is  made  a 
political  issue,  and  the  time  may  arrive  when  the  party  will  come 
into  power  somewhat  generally. 


Ch.  I]  SUPERIORITY  OF  THE  ARTIFICIAL  1 1 

But  all  this  is  politics.  It  is  art  and  not  science.  The  sociolo- 
gist has  no  more  quarrel  with  any  of  these  movements  than  he  has 
with  any  other  political  parties,  —  Whig,  Tory,  Democrat,  Repub- 
lican. He  observes  them  all,  as  he  does  all  social  phenomena,  but 
they  only  constitute  data  for  his  science.  All  that  he  objects 
to  is  that  any  of  these  things  be  called  sociolog)'.  Misarchism, 
anarchism,  and  socialism  are  programs  of  political  action,  negative 
or  positive,  and  belong  to  the  social  art.  They  are  not  scientific 
theories  or  principles  and  do  not  belong  to  social  science. 

Superiority  of  the  Artificial 

Applied  sociology  proceeds  on  the  assumption  of  the  superiority 
of  the  artificial  to  the  natural.  In  this,  however,  it  does  not  differ 
from  any  other  applied  science.  What  is  the  meaning  of  applied 
science  if  it  be  not  that  it  teaches  how  natural  phenomena  may  be 
modified  by  artificial  means  so  as  to  render  them  more  useful  or 
less  injurious  to  man .''  The  wind  that  blows  over  the  land,  though 
sometimes  destructive,  may  be  useful  in  many  ways,  but  it  will  not 
grind  corn.  By  the  adoption  of  the  proper  artificial  means  it  may 
be  made  to  grind  corn.  As  it  blows  over  the  sea,  though  a  greater 
source  of  danger,  it  may  by  artificial  devices  be  made  to  propel 
vessels  and  even  to  guide  them.  Water,  coming  in  almost  inex- 
haustible quantities  from  the  mountains  or  highlands  of  the  interior 
of  large  continents,  is  useful  even  within  the  banks  of  rivers,  but 
by  the  use  of  the  proper  artificial  means  its  usefulness  can  be  mul- 
tiplied a  thousandfold.  The  same  is  true  of  every  other  element 
in  nature,  —  wood,  clay,  stone,  metals,  light,  heat,  electricity.  The 
last-named  element  represents  the  most  extreme  case.  Although 
it  pervades  all  space,  it  produces  no  appreciable  effect  except  in  its 
violent  manifestations  as  lightning,  where  the  effect  is  destructive 
of  everything  in  its  way.  The  whole  of  its  beneficial  influence  is 
due  to  artificial  devices.  These  have  been  secured  through  the 
prolonged  study  of  both  the  pure  and  the  applied  science. 

There  are  some  illustrations  of  the  superiority  of  the  artificial 
outside  of  the  arts  proper.  One  only  need  be  mentioned.  Modern 
languages  generally,  and  the  English  language  in  particular,  have 


12  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

their  individual  words  more  arbitrary  than  those  of  the  ancient  lan- 
guages. They  have  less  intrinsic  meaning  and  consist  more  com- 
pletely of  mere  symbols.  On  this  account  they  are  more  plastic 
and  capable  of  expressing  much  finer  shades  of  meaning.  But  an 
arbitrary  word  or  a  symbol  is  an  artificial  product.  It  is  a  tool  of 
the  mind,  devised  by  the  genius  of  man.  It  may  be  said  that  such 
words,  like  everything  else  in  language,  are  unconsciously  devel- 
oped, and  are  therefore  genetic  products.  This  may  be  admitted, 
but  it  forms  no  entire  exception  to  other  arts,  such,  for  example, 
as  pottery.  In  fact,  the  conquest  of  nature  as  sketched  in  the 
nineteenth  chapter  of  Pure  Sociology  was  mainly  a  genetic  proc- 
ess, but  was  only  possible  through  the  constant  exercise  of  the 
telic  faculty  of  man.  It  was  the  product  of  individual  telesis,  and 
this  has  always  been  at  work  in  the  formation  of  language  as  in 
all  other  civilizing  processes. 

A  single  example  may  also  be  adduced  in  the  domain  of  collective 
telesis.  Society  has  also  made  more  or  less  use  of  the  principle 
of  the  superiority  of  the  artificial.  In  the  animal  world  we  see  con- 
stant illustrations  of  what  is  commonly  called  natural  justice,  and 
jurists,  statesmen,  and  philosophers  habitually  contrast  this  with 
what  they  call  civil  justice.  But  natural  or  animal  justice  is  of 
course  no  justice  at  all,  but  the  absence  of  justice.  There  is  no 
natural  justice,  and  all  justice  is  artificial.  This  constitutes  one  of 
the  best  illustrations  of  the  principle  under  consideration,  and  it  is 
especially  appropriate  here  as  belonging  strictly  within  the  field  of 
applied  sociology. 


CHAPTER    II 

THE    EFFICACY    OF    EFFORT  ) 

Progress  is  not  automatic,  in  the  sense  that  if  we  were  all  to  be  cast  into  a 
deep  slumber  for  the  space  of  a  generation,  we  should  arouse  to  find  ourselves 
in  a  greatly  improved  social  state.  The  world  only  grows  better,  even  in  the 
moderate  degree  in  which  it  does  grow  better;  because  people  wish  that  it 
should,  and  take  the  right  steps  to  make  it  better.  —  John   Morley. 

In  the  eleventh  chapter  of  Pure  Sociology  it  is  shown  that  the 
most  important  principle  of  social  dynamics  is  ^f^ff;^'  But  its 
dynamic  effect,  from  the  standpoint  of  pure  sociology,  is  uncon- 
scious, unintended,  and  undesired.  The  social  development  that 
results  from  it  is  spontaneous.  Applied  sociology  assumes  thatL- 
effort  is  consciously  and  intentionally  directed  to  the  improvement 
fpf  social  conditions.  A  certain  school  maintains  that  all  such  effort 
is  ineffectual  ;  that  it  is  in  the  nature  of  interfering  with  the  forces 
that  are  causing  natural  or  spontaneous  social  development,  and  is 
therefore  detrimental.  It  is  rarely  stated  in  so  general  a  form  and 
is  usually  narrowed  down  to  the  question  of  interference  by  the 
state  with  the  efforts  of  individuals.  It  then  goes  by  the  name  of 
the  doctrine  of  laissez  faire.  The  usual  form  of  stating  this  doc- 
trine is  that  the  interest  of  the  individual  is  the  same  as  that  of  the 
public,  and  therefore  the  public  interest  is  only  secured  by  the  free 
activity  of  the  individual.  No  one  has  gone  to  the  extreme  length, 
however,  of  defending  criminal  action  under  this  rule,  and  therefore 
the  qualification  called  the  law  of  "equal  freedom"  is  always  made. 

The  defenders  of  this  doctrine  have  not  been  content  to  limit  it 
to  the  ordinary  cases  of  interference  with  the  activities  of  individ- 
uals, which  would  have  little  to  do  with  applied  sociology,  but  they 
extend  it  to  include  all  collective  action  except  that  which  is  mani- 
festly essential  to  the  protection  of  society.  All  initiative  on  the 
part  of  society  —  or,  as  they  usually  say,  the  state,  or  the  "  govern- 
ment "  —  is  condemned  as  involving  interference  with  the  activities 

'3 


14  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

of  individuals.  On  the  part  of  scientific  men  the  study  of  evolution 
in  general,  and  social  evolution  in  particular,  has  given  rise  to  a  sort 
of  scientific  pessimism.  The  prolonged  contemplation  of  purely 
spontaneous  processes  evolving  highly  developed  products  leads  to 
complete  distrust  of  all  claims  on  the  part  of  man  to  any  power  to 
accomplish  similar  results.  It  is  so  glaringly  obvious  that  no  human 
effort  can  create  even  the  simplest  form  of  organic  life  that  the 
conclusion  is  at  once  drawn  that  all  attempts  to  transform  nature 
artificially  are  vain  and  visionary.  The  latest  teachings  of  modern 
science  have  thus  thrown  a  sort  of  pall  over  the  human  mind  and 
introduced  a  new  philosophy,  —  a  philosophy  of  despair,  it  may  be 
called,  because  it  robs  its  adherents  of  all  hope  in  any  conscious 
alteration  of  the  course  of  nature  with  respect  to  man,  and  denies 
the  efficacy  of  effort. 

Those  who  take  the  narrower  view  and  condemn  the  efforts  of 
society  to  ameliorate  its  condition  do  not  content  themselves  with 
denying  all  efficacy  in  such  efforts.  This  would  at  least  be  logical 
and  would  compel  the  advocates  of  social  initiative  to  prove  that 
such  efforts  may  be  successful.  But  the  defenders  of  laissez  faire 
almost  uniformly  take  another  step,  fatal  to  their  fundamental 
position,  and  insist  that  the  interference  which  they  condemn  is 
injurious  and  pernicious  in  preventing  in  some  way  the  successful 
operation  of  the  benign  tendencies  of  spontaneous  natural  law. 
This  of  course  involves  the  admission  of  the  efficacy  of  effort,  and 
reduces  them  to  demonstrating  that  the  admitted  effects  must  neces- 
sarily be  injurious.  The  main  and  really  difficult  task  of  proving 
the  efficacy  of  social  effort  is  therefore  already  performed  by  the 
laissez  faire  school.  It  is  not  difficult  to  prove  that  social  effort^ 
may  have  beneficial  as  well  as  injurious  effects.  To  have  simply 
maintained  the  futilitx,  i.e.,  the  complete  inefficacy,  of  social  action 
would  have  been  hardly  worth  the  trouble  of  condemning  it.  If  it 
were  always  wholly  without  effect  and  things  remained  precisely 
the  same  after  as  before,  the  only  rational  attitude  would  be  to 
smile  at  it  as  simply  wasted  effort  on  the  part  of  deluded  people, 
the  same  as  we  smile  at  the  man  who  spends  his  whole  life  in  try- 
ing to  invent  nerpetual  raotion.  But  this  has  never  been  the  atti- 
tude of  the  laissez  faire    school.    They  have  always   condemned 


Ch.  II]  THE   EFFICACY  OF  EFFORT  1 5 

social  action  with  warmth  and  usually  denounced  it  with  vehe- 
mence as  something  calculated  to  do  great  harm.  Indeed,  a  long 
list  of  its  mischievous  effects  has  been  drawn  up  and  is  constantly 
appealed  to.  No  better  arguments  could  be  desired  by  the  defend- 
ers of  social  action.  The  fact  is  that  the  laissez  faire  doctrine  is 
an  ex  parte  doctrine.  It  looks  at  only  one  side  of  a  two-sided  fact. 
To  a  large  extent  it  is  arguing  without  an  opponent.  Most,  though 
by  no  means  all,  of  the  counts  of  its  indictment  are  admitted  by 
those  who  believe  in  social  action.  The  facts  on  the  other  side  are 
almost  too  familiar  to  be  enumerated  and  set  off  against  the  above- 
mentioned  list.  They  are  far  more  numerous  and  important,  and 
their  influence  for  good  is  immeasurably  greater,  than  the  sum  total 
of  evil  that  has  resulted  from  the  admittedly  frequent  mistakes  that 
society  has  made  in  its  attempts  to  control  social  phenomena  in 
its  interest.  For  it  is  such  mistakes  that  constitute  the  whole 
indictment  of  the  laisscz  faire  school.  I  know  of  no  one  who  has 
pointed  this  out  or  attempted  to  show  as  a  part  of  the  argument 
what  the  beneficial  effects  of  social  action  have  been. 

From  the  great  prominence  which  the  individualistic  philosophy 
has  assumed,  especially  in  France  and  England,  since  the  time  of 
the  French  physiocrats,  it  is  commonly  supposed  that  the  general 
class  of  ideas  upon  which  it  rests  has  become  the  prevailing  doc- 
trine in  these  countries  and  America.  There  could  be  no  greater 
mistake  than  this.  While  probably  the  great  majority  of  intelli- 
gent persons  either  avowedly  or  tacitly  subscribe  to  the  doctrine  in 
its  main  aspects,  the  fundamental,  or  as  it  may  be  called,  subcon- 
scious, opinion  is  everywhere  opposed  to  it.  This  is  proved  by  the 
entire  history  of  legislation  during  that  period.  The  doctrine  was 
undoubtedly  salutary  at  the  outset,  and  it  is  more  or  less  useful 
still.  It  was  primarily  directed  against  the  pretensions  of  a  class. 
The  action  taken  by  that  class  can  be  called  social  action  only  in 
the  sense  that  under  all  circumstances  "the  powers  that  be" 
actually  represent  society.  That  they  do  so  represent  it  in  one 
sense  must  be  admitted,  although,  as  everybody  knows,  in  view  of 
the  general  inertja  and  conservatism  of  mankind  and  of  the  advan- 
tage which  long  tenure  and  the  command  of  national  resources 
secures  to  the  ruling  class,  that  class  may  continue  in  power  long 


1 6  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I      5 

after  it  has  ceased  to  represent  society  in  a  more  literal  sense. 
The  social  action  against  which  the  new  economy  was  aimed  was 
largely  the  action  of  a  relatively  few  individuals.  It  was  egoistic 
and  not  social,  and  had  become  well-nigh  intolerable.  The  new 
economy  of  laissez  /aire,  laissez  passer  was  much  nearer  to  the 
social  idea  of  the  time,  and  it  succeeded,  though  not  without  a 
violent  revolution  in  France,  in  ultimately  embodying  itself  in  the 
state.  From  the  date  of  this  triumph  of  society  over  a  class,  state 
action  in  these  countries  and  in  all  those  that  have  grown  out  of 
them  has  approximated  true  social  action  as  nearly  as  could  well 
be  expected. 

The  fundamental  error  of  the  modern  laissez  f aire  school  has 
been  that  of  confounding  the  present  state  of  the  world  with  the 
state  of  the  world  in  the  eighteenth  century.  The  civilized  world, 
by  whatever  name  its  governments  may  be  called,  is  virtually 
democratic,  and  state  action,  in  the  long  run  at  least,  is  social 
action  in  a  nearly  literal  sense. 

Now  ever  since  society  thus  took  the  reins  into  its  own  hands, 
and  far  more  than  during  the  previous  period  when  it  placed  them 
in  the  hands  of  a  class,  it  has  steadily  been  taking  the  initiative, 
assuming  responsibilities,  undertaking  various  enterprises,  and  tak- 
ing over  into  its  own  control  one  after  another  a  great  array  of 
industries  and  functions  that  had  hitherto  been  intrusted  to  indi- 
viduals. Economists  who  have  been  studying  only  the  political 
economy  of  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century  are  alarmed  at 
this,  mistaking  it  for  the  usurpations  of  a  ruling  class,  and  over- 
looking the  fact  that  it  is  true  social  action.  Every  step  taken  in 
this  direction  is  in  response  to  a  public  demand.  Indeed,  society 
is  naturally  conservative,  and  no  such  step  is  taken  until  the 
demand  is  practically  unanimous  and  irresistible.  The  very  ones 
who  most  strongly  call  for  social  action  would  probably  admit  the 
laissez  faire  doctrine  in  the  abstract,  but  it  has  no  influence  on 
them  when  it  conflicts  with  their  interests. 

Nor  can  it  be  said  that  all  this  social  initiative  has  been  fruitless. 
Scarcely  a  step  taken  in  this  direction,  from  the  management  of 
the  public  finances  to  the  transmission  of  letters,  packages,  and 
messages,  has  ever  been  reversed,  and  the  greater  part  of  them 


Ch.  II]  THE   EFFICACY   OF   EFFORT  1 7 

have  proved  so  obviously  beneficial  that  they  are  looked  upon  as 
much  in  the  light  of  social  necessities  as  is  the  pubHc  administra- 
tion of  criminal  law,  once  also  left  to  "private  enterprise."  What 
the  laissez  fairc  economists  have  done  is  to  go  over  the  long  series 
of  these  social  achievements  and  cull  out  a  relatively  small  number 
of  relatively  vuiimportant  ones  which  they  declare  to  have  been 
failures  or  to  be  doing  harm  to  society.  These  are  held  up  as  the 
sul^cient  proof  of  the  evils  of  social  initiative.  Some  of  them  are 
doubtless  failures,  and  one  of  the  supposed  fatal  blows  against  the 
movement  is  the  number  of  laws  that  have  actually  been  repealed, 
as  not  accomplishing  their  purpose.  Do  not  these  rather  show  the 
wisdom  of  society  in  promptly  correcting  its  mistakes  when  they 
are  found  to  be  such  ? 

A  full  and  candid  survey  of  this  field,  however,  shows  that 
society  has  always  been  marching  forward  in  the  one  irreversible 
direction,  and  that  its  achievements  are  already  multitudinous  and 
of  the  utmost  importance.  Social  achievement  has  been  the  con- 
dition to  individual  achievement,  and  all  forms  of  achievement  are 
at  once  the  products  and  the  proofs  of  the  efficacy  of  effort.  The 
"  miserable  laissez-faire  "  ^  which  seeks  to  check  this  natural  flow 
of  social  energy  has  been  appropriately  called  "moral  curare"^ 
and  "social  Nirvana."^  Over  against  this  doctrine  of  laissez  faire, 
which  is  now  only  a  doctrine,  stands  that  oi  fair-e  viarcher,^  which 
has  always  been  a  policy,  and  without  the  recognition  of  which 
there  could  be  no  science  of  applied  sociology. 

'  Herbert  Spencer,  Justice,  p.  44. 

'■^Alfred  Fouillee,  L'fivolutionnisme  des  idees-forces,  Paris,  1890,  Introduction, 
p.  Ixxix. 

^  Ludwig  Stein,  Wesen  und  Aufgabe  der  Sociologie,  Berlin,  1898,  p.  26  (Abdruck 
a.d.  Archiv  f.  syst.  Philosophic,  Bd.  IV). 

*  This  expression  is  probably  as  old  as  the  laissez  /aire  of  De  Got|may.  I  have 
met  with  it  several  times  (see  Guizot,  Histoire  generale  de  la  civilisation  en 
Europe,  p.  27),  not  always  in  precisely  the  sense  in  which  it  is  used  here.  It  was 
revived  in  this  sense  by  Dr.  B.  E.  Femow  in  his  address  as  vice-president  of  Section  I 
of  the  American  Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science,  Springfield  meeting, 
1895  (see  the  Proceedings,  Vol.  XLIV,  pp.  332,  334  ;  Science,  N.S.,  Vol.  II,  August  30, 
1895,  pp.  257,  258). 


CHAPTER  III 
END    OR   PURPOSE  OF   SOCIOLOGY 

I  think  I  do  not  err  in  assuming  that,  however  diverse  their  views  on  philo- 
sophical and  religious  matters,  most  men  are  agreed  that  the  proportion  of  good 
and  evil  in  life  may  be  very  sensibly  affected  by  human  action.  I  never  heard 
anybody  doubt  that  the  evil  may  be  thus  increased,  or  diminished ;  and  it 
would  seem  to  follow  that  good  must  be  similarly  susceptible  of  addition  or 
subtraction.  Finally,  to  my  knowledge,  nobody  professes  to  doubt  that,  so  far 
forth  as  we  possess  a  power  of  bettering  things,  it  is  our  paramount  duty  to  use 
it  and  to  train  all  our  intellect  and  energy  to  this  supreme  service  of  our 
kind.  —  Huxley. 


Humanum  paucis  vivit  genus.  —  LuCAXUS. 


Progress  versus  Evolution 

We  have  already  seen  that  while  the  subject-matter  of  pure 
sociology  is  achievement,  the  subject-matter  of  applied  sociology 
is  improvement.  The  word  "  progress  "  is  ambiguous.  Learned  dis- 
sertations have  been  written  to  prove  that  the  idea  of  progress, 
either  organic  or  social,  is  a  purely  objective  conception  and  has 
no  reference  to  the  production  of  more  agreeable  states  of  feeling 
in  the  beings  considered.  This  is  the  burden  of  the  argument  of 
Spencer's  well-known  essay  on  Progress,  its  Law  and  Cause.  He 
says : 

Social  progress  is  supposed  to  consist  in  the  produce  of  a  greater  quantity 
and  variety  of  the  articles  required  for  satisfying  men's  wants  ;  in  the  increas- 
ing security  of  person  and  property  ;  in  the  widening  freedom  of  action 
enjoyed  :  whereas,  rightly  understood,  social  progress  consists  in  those  changes 
of  structure  in  the  social  organism  which  have  entailed  these  consequences. 
The  current  conception  is  a  teleological  one.  The  phenomena  are  contem- 
plated solely  as  bearing  on  human  happiness.  Only  those  changes  are  held  to 
constitute  progress  which  directly  or  indirectly  tend  to  heighten  human  happi- 
ness. And  they  are  thought  to  constitute  progress  simply  because  they  tend  to 
heighten  human  happiness.  But  rightly  to  understand  Progress,  we  must  inquire 
what  is  the  nature  of  these  changes,  considered  apart  from  our  interests. ^ 

1  Westminster  Review,  Vol.  LVII  (N.S.,  Vol.  XI),  April  i,  1857,  pp.  445-446. 


Ch.III]  WELTSCHMERZ  19^ 

He  goes  on  to  show  that  "organic  progress  consists  in  a  change 
from  the  homogeneous  to  the  heterogeneous,"  and  says  that 
"this  law  of  organic  progress  is  the  law  of  all  progress."  If  this 
and  not  the  other  be  the  true  definition  of  progress,  then  applied 
sociolog}'  does  not  deal  with  progress.  It  belongs  to  pure  sociology. 
In  dealing  with  that  branch  I  have  even  gone  farther  than  Spencer, 
and  shown  that  perfect iou  of  structure  is  only  a  means  to  the 
ulterior  end  of  converting  the  maximum  quantity  of  inorganic  into 
organic  matter. ^  It  seems  to  be  a  question  of  the  proper  meaning 
of  the  word  "progress."  I  should  say  that  development  or  evolu- 
tion would  here  suit  the  case  better,  and  social -progress  may  still 
have  as  at  least  one  of  its  definitions  the  one  I  gave  it  in  Dynamic 
Sociology,^  which  is  practically  that  to  which  Mr.  Spencer  objected. 

It  will  be  seen  that  Spencer  did  not  deny  that  structural  progress 
may  be  attended  by  an  increase  in  agreeable  states  of  sentient 
beings  inclujiing  men,  but  most  other  writers  of  his  school  do  very 
emphatically  deny  it.  It  would  be  easy  to  fill  a  volume  with 
citations  from  Adam  Smith,  Helvetius,  Comte,  Schopenhauer, 
Hartmann,  Tolstoi,  Durkheim,  and  others,  to  the  effect  that  the 
poor,  lowly,  and  undeveloped  classes  of  society  are  happier  than 
the  rich  and  intellectually  endowed.  The  "paradox  of  hedonism," 
or  the  formula  that  to  get  happiness  one  must  forget  it,  usually 
ascribed  to  John  Stuart  Mill,  but  clearly  expressed  by  Kant, 
belongs  to  the  same  class  of  ideas. 

Weltschmerz 

The  pessimists  (Schopenhauer,  Hartmann,  etc.)  deny  that  there 
is  any  remedy  for  the  woes  of  the  world,  and  as  misery  increases 
with  social  and  intellectual  development,  which  they  admit  to  be 
taking  place,  the  condition  of  the  world  will  continue  to  grow 
worse  indefinitely.  Some  sociologists  even  incline  to  that  view. 
Gumplowicz,  for  example,  while  admitting  the  possibility  of  some 
amelioration  in  the  condition  of  mankind  in  the  remote  future, 
thinks  that  future  so  remote  as  to  be  outside  of  all  practical 
considerations,    like    the    speculations    relative    to    the    ultimate 

1  Pure  Sociology,  pp.  113,  114.  2  Vol.  I,  p.  67  ;  Vol.  II,  pp.  161,  174. 


.20  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

withdrawal  of  the  sun's  heat  and  t4;,e  secular  destruction  of  all  life, 
—  a  sort  of  geological,  astronomical,  or  cosmical  speculation  about 
events  that  may  happen  millions  of  years  hence. ^  Even  this,  as 
private  letters  from  him  state,  is  only  his  public  declaration. 
Esoterically  he  goes  almost  as  far  as  Hartmann,  but  declines  to 
utter  his  whole  thought  to  the  world,  for  the  reason,  as  he  says, 
that  it  might  do  harm,  and  also  because  he  admits  the  possibility 
that  he  may  be  wrong,  —  noble' motives,  as  all  must  freely  confess. 

The  socialists  admit  the  most  that  is  claimed  by  the  pessimists, 
but  differ  from  them  chiefly  in  believing  that  the  bad  state  of 
things  can  be  remedied  by  their  various  specifics.  Unfortunately 
there  are  many  of  these,  and  each  school  claims  that  its  own  par- 
ticular specific  is  not  only  a  certain  cure  but  the  only  cure.  It  is 
not  probable  that  any  or  all  of  them  would  have  the  desired  effect 
if  tried,  and  society  does  not  seem  to  be  ready  to  give  any  of  them 
a  trial,  at  least  at  present.  That,  however,  is  no  argument  against 
them,  and  it  would  be  well  if  a  few  sincere  trials  of  them  could  be 
made  to  enable  scientific  sociologists  to  watch  the  result.  Just  as 
the  speculative  philosophers  tell  us  that  with  refinement  of  phys- 
ical and  mental  constitutions  the  capacity  for  pain  is  increased 
more  rapidly  than  the  capacity  for  pleasure,  while  the  unfavorable 
social  conditions  remain  the  same,  so  that  the  pain  element  con- 
stantly gains  upon  the  pleasure  element  and  the  world  grows  worse, 
so  the  socialists  tell  us  that  the  increase  of  wealth  is  attended  by 
the  increase  of  poverty  ;  the  rich  grow  richer  and  the  poor  poorer, 
and  the  number  who  have  diminishes,  while  the  number  who  have' 
nothing  increases,  whereby,  also7  the  world  grows  worse. 

I  am  familiar  with  all  the  arguments  of  both  of  these  classes  of 
people,  and  I  admit  the  force  of  them,  and  while  there  are  many 
other  considerations  which  greatly  diminish  the  effects  ascribed  to 
these  causes,  and  while  the  case  is  by  no  means  as  bad  as  it  is  repre- 
sented by  either  class,  still  it  must  be  candidly  admitted  to  be  bad 
enough,  and  I  can  almost  agree  with  Huxley  that  if  there  really  is 
no  remedy,  it  would  be  better  if  some  "kindly  comet  "  could  pass 
by  and  sweep  the  entire  phantasmagoria  out   of   existence.    But 

1  Die  Wage,  V.  Jahrgang,  Nos.  i6  and  i8,  April  13  and  27,  1902,  pp.  248-249, 
282-284. 


Ch.  Ill]         ACHIEVEMENT  VERSUS  IMPROVEMENT  2 1 

while  I  do  not  think  that  any  or  all  of  the  social  panaceas  proposed 
would  really  remedy  the  evil,  I  do  not  agree  with  the  pessimists 
that  there  is  no  remedy.  I  deny  that  society  has  ever  tried  to  cure 
itself  of  the  disease  called  Weltschnterz.  It  has  not  arrived  at  that 
state  of  self-consciousness  at  which  it  has  ever  seriously  considered 
the  question.  It  is  in  the  same  state  as  a  race  of  animals  relative 
to  its  true  condition.  Some  savage  races  are  scarcely  more  ad- 
vanced. Civilized  races  are  waking  up  to  these  purely  physical 
matters.  They  are  in  a  state  of  absolute  lethargy  with  regard  to 
social  matters.  What  the  human  race  requires  is  to  be  awakened 
to  a  realization  of  its  condition.  It  will  then  find  the  remedy  for 
its  woes.  This  must  be  something  more  than  the  feeble  plaints  of 
a  few  individuals.  It  must  amount  to  complete  race  consciousness. 
If  this  is  ever  brought  about  it  must  be  by  the  same  instrumental- 
ity that  produced  all  other  steps  in  human  progress,  viz.,  science. 

Achievement  versus  Improvement 

I  would  never  have  taken  any  interest  in  sociology  if   I   had 
not  conceived  that  it  had  this  mission.    Pure  sociology  gives  man- 
kind the  means  of  self-orientation.    It  teaches  man  what  he  is  and 
how  he  came  to  be  so.    With  this  information  to  start  with  he  is 
in  position  to  consider  his  future.    With  a  clear  comprehension  of        \ 
what  constitutes  achievement  he  is  able  to  see  what  will  constitute        / 
improvement.    The  purpos£  of  applied  sociology  is  to  harmonize    J 
achievement  with  improvement.    If  all  this  achievement  which  con-    ^ 
stitutes  civilization  has  really  been  wrought  without  producing  any 
improvement  in  the  condition  of  the  human  race,  it  is  time  that  the      / 
reason  for  this  was  investigated.    Applied  sociology  includes  among    / 
its  main  purposes  the  investigation  of  this  question.    The  difficulty 
lies  in  the  fact  that  achievement  is  not  socialized.    The  problem 
therefore  is  that  of  the  socialization  of  achievement. 

We  are  told  that  no  scheme  for  the  equalization  of  men  can  suc- 
ceed ;  that  at  first  it  was  physical  strength  that  determined  the 
inequalities ;  that  this  at  length  gave  way  to  the  power  of  cunning, 
and  that  still  later  it  became  mtelligence  in  general  that  determined 
the  place  of  individuals  in  society.    This  last,  it  is  maintained,  is 


22  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

now,  in  the  long  run,  in  the  most  civiHzed  races  and  the  most  en- 
lightened communities,  the  true  reason  why  some  occupy  lower  and 
others  higher  positions  in  the  natural  strata  of  society.  This,  it  is 
said,  is  the  natural  state,  and  is  as  it  should  be.  It  is  moreover 
affirmed  that  being  natural  there  is  no  possibility  of  altering  it. 
Of  course  all  this  falls  to  the  ground  on  the  least  analysis.  For 
example,  starting  from  the  standpoint  of  achievement,  it  would  nat- 
urally be  held  that  there  would  be  great  injustice  in  robbing  those 
who  by  their  superior  wisdom  had  achieved  the  great  results  upon 
which  civilization  rests  and  distributing  the  natural  rewards  among 
inferior  persons  who  had  achieved  nothing.  All  would  assent  to 
this.  And  yet  this  is  in  fact  practically  what  has  been  done.  The 
whole  history  of  the  world  shows  that  those  who  have  achieved' 
have  received  no  reward.  The  rewards  for  their  achievement  have 
fallen  to  persons  who  have  achieved  nothing.  They  have  simply 
for  the  most  part  profited  by  some  accident  of  position  in  a  com- 
plex, badly  organized  society,  whereby  they  have  been  permitted  to 
claim  and  appropriate  the  fruits  of  the  achievement  of  others.  But 
no  one  would  insist  that  these  fruits  should  all  go  to  those  who  had 
made  them  possible.  The  fruits  of  achievement  are  incalculable  in 
amount  and  endure  forever.  Their  authors  are  few  in  number  and 
soon  pass  away.  They  would  be  the  last  to  claim  an  undue  share. 
They  work  for  all  mankind  and  for  all  time,  and  all  they  ask  is  that 
all  mankind  shall  forever  benefit  by  their  work. 

Definition  of  Justice 

Those  who  maintain  that  existing  social  inequalities^  are  natural 
and  proper  and  the  result  of  theTecognition  by  society  that  intelli- 
gence, or  abilities,  or  superiority  of  any  kind,  deserves  to  be  thus 
rewarded,  are,  if  they  only  knew  it,  going  back  to  natural  justice, 
to  the  law  of  the  stron^gst,  that  prevails  in  the  animal  world.  The 
existence  of  civil  justice  in  human  society  has  already  been  alluded 
to  as  an  illustration  of  the  superiority  of  the  artificial  over  the  nat- 
ural. As  its  importance  is  admitted  by  all,  it  comes  in  here  as  a 
proof  of  the  inconsistency  of  all  the  popular  reasoning  about  social 
inequalities.    After  all  that  has  been  said  about  justice,  I  have 


Ch.  Ill]  THE  OLIGOCENTRIC  WORLD  VIEW 

never  yet  seen  a  statement  of  the  real  principle  that  underlies  it, 
nor  a  truly  philosophical  or  fundamental  definition  of  justice.  The 
true  definition  of  justice  is  that  it  is  the  enforcement  by  society  pf 
an  artificial  equality  in  social  conditions  which  are  naturally  unequal. 
By  it  the  strong  are  forcibly  shorn  of  their  power  to  exploit  the 
weak.  The  same  reasoning  which  defends  existing  social  inequal- 
ities would  logically  condemn  all  civil  justice.  As  a  matter  of 
fact  and  of  history,  the  enforcement  of  justice  by  society  has  always 
been  resisted  by  the  strong  and  denounced  as  an  outrage  upon 
their  right  to  reap  the  fruits  of  their  superior  physical  or  intellec- 
tual power.  It  is  no  longer  so  denounced,  at  least  in  the  abstract, 
simply  because  it  has  become  the  fixed  and  settled  policy  of  all 
civilized  nations.  Whenever  any  institution  becomes  thus  settled 
it  is  accepted  as  a  matter  of  course.  It  is  forgotten  that  its  adop- 
tion was  the  result  of  a  prolonged  struggle.  The  principle  under- 
lying it  is  lost  sight  of,  and  other  policies  involving  the  same 
principle  are  attacked  as  the  first  was  attacked,  the  same  principle 
being  invoked  against  them.  Thus  the  claim  that  the  superior 
intelligence  of  certain  members  of  society~~justifies^the  social  in- 
equal  it  ies^Jh^^]make~^p~most2o|3^ 

differ  in  any  respect  from  the  claim  of  the  physically  strongest  men 
in  a  barbaric  race  to  seize  and  possess  the" handsomest  women  and 
the^ finest^  oxen.  With  the  progress  of  civTTization  society  inter- 
jFered  in  this  policy  and  set  up  in  its  place  what  is  known  as  civil^ 
legal,  or  political  justice,  w]iich  is  a  reversal  of  the  law  of  nature 
and  a  wholly  ar<'ifif"'=^l  in<ttitution . 

The^ligqcentric  World  View 

All  reasoning  on  such  questions  is  also  always  permeated  by 
another  vice.  It  confounds  two  totally  different  things.  It  lays 
the  whole  stress  on  the  intellectual  aspect  and  ignores  the  moral 
asjiect.  I  use  the  word  "moral"  in  a  somewhat  unusual  sense, 
but  nevertheless  in  its  true  sense,  for  no  word  has  been  so  thor- 
oughly perverted  as  the  word  "  moral."  In  modern  times  social 
inequalittes  are  always  looked  upon  as  essentially  intellectual  in- 
equalities.   The  words   "superior"  and   "inferior"   always  mean 


24  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

intellectual  superiority  and  inferiority.  The  entire  philosophy  of 
the  present  age  revolves  about  these  distinctions  as  their  pivot. 
All  science,  art,  literature  centers  on  the  intellectual.  There  is  an 
apotheosis  of  genius,  of  ability,  of  talent,  of  mental  brilliancy.  So 
steeped  is  the  public  mind  in  this  world  view  that  all  who  do  not 
display  these  qualities  are  wholly  lost  sight  of.  The  worst  is  that 
such  only  are  considered  as  deserving  of  anything.  All  attention 
is  concentrated  upon  a  few  exceptions.  The  effect  is  to  limit  the 
number  even  of  these,  because  potential  ability  is  given  no  chance 
to  assert  itself.  This  oligocentric  philosophy,  which,  for  the  rea- 
sons given,  has  no  right  to  call  itself  aristoccntric,  is  exceedingly 
mischievous,  and  threatens  to  end  in  wide  intellectual  and  social 
demoralization.    It  is  the  out-Nietzscheing  of  Nietzsche. 

There  is  only  one  science  that  does  not  breathe  this  spirit,  and 
that  is  sociology.  Its  point  of  view  is  precisely  the  opposite.  It  is 
true  that  pure  sociology  takes  account  of  human  achievement,  but 
it  looks  upon  it  as  only  a  means  to  the  end  improvement.  All 
other  sciences  may  be  regarded  as  objective.  Sociology  is  sub- 
jective. It  recognizes  the  intellect  as  the  most  effective  of  all 
agencies,  but  the  intellect  was  created  by  the  will  as  a  servant  of 
the  will,  and  sociology  proposes  to  hold  it  to  its  primary  purpose 
as  a  means  to  its  primary  end,  —  the  well-being  of  its  possessors. 

Social  versus  Political  Justice 

Now  the  justice  of  which  we  have  been  speaking,  vast  as  its 
influence  has  been  in  securing  man's  moral  advance,  is  after  all 
only  civil  and  political  justice.  It  is  a  very  different  thing  from 
social  justice.  The  civil  and  political  inequalities  of  men  have 
been  fairly  well  removed  by  it.  Person  and  property  are  tolerably 
safe  under  its  rule.  It  was  a  great  step  in  social  achievement. 
But  society  must  take  another  step  in  the  same  direction.  It  must 
establish  social  justice.  The  present  social  inequalities  exist  for  the 
same  reason  that  civil  and  political  inequalities  once  existed.  They 
can  be  removed  by  an  extension  of  the  same  policy  by  which  the 
former  were  removed.  The  attempt  to  do  this  will  be  attacked  and 
denounced,  as  was  the  other,  but  the  principle  involved  is  the  same. 


€h.  Ill]  SOCIAL  WELFARE  25 

And  after  social  justice  shall  have  been  attained  and  shall  become 
the  settled  policy  of  society,  no  one  will  any  more  dare  to  question 
it  than  to  question  civil  justice. 


Social  Welfare 

Let  us  look  more  closely  into  the  nature  of  social  justice.  The 
welfare  or  happiness  of  mankind  consists  entirely  in  the  freedom 
to  exercise  the  natural  faculties.  The  old  idea  that  happiness  is  a 
negative  state  —  a  state  of  rest  or  repose  —  is  completely  exploded. 
It  may  have  grown  out  of  the  enslaved  and  overworked  condition 
of  the  mass  of  mankind  during  such  a  prolonged  period  of  human 
history.  But  everybody  knows  that  a  state  of  inactivity,  beyond 
that  needed  to  recuperate  from  the  effect  of  previous  fatigue, 
becomes  ennui,  a  state  more  intolerable  than  fatigue,  which  drives 
the  sufferer  to  some  form  of  activity,  no  matter  what.  The  physi- 
ology of  it  is  that  the  only  source  of  pleasure  is  the  exercise-of 
some  faculty.  Conversely,  the  normal  exercise  of  any  faculty  is 
always  and  necessarily  attended  with  pleasure.  Every  desire  is  at 
bottom  the  result  of  some  cause  that  temporarily  prevents  the  nor- 
mal exercise  of  a  faculty.  All  want  is  deprivation,  i.e.,  the  with- 
holding of  whatever  is  necessary  to  set  the  system  into  healthy 
operation.  Hunger  is  the  deprivation  of  the  stomach  of  the  food 
upon  which  it  expends  its  energy.  Love,  so  long  as  unsatisfied,  is 
the  deprivation  of  the  entire  reproductive  system  of  its  normal 
functioning.  These  are  the  types  of  the  whole  list,  and  the  same 
is  true  of  all.  Taking  all  the  faculties  together,  physical,  mental, 
spiritual,  so  far  as  these  can  be  separated,  and  their  joint  normal 
exercise  is  what  constitutes  happiness,  while  the  deprivation  of 
such  normal  exercise  is  what  constitutes  misery.  Complete  depri- 
vation would  of  course  be  immediately  fatal,  and  the  real  misery 
of  the  world  is  due  to  the  partial  deprivation  of  the  power  of  men 
to  exercise  the  faculties  by  which  nature  has  endowed  them.  On 
the  other  hand,  whatever  degree  of  happiness  men  enjoy  is  due  to 
the  power  to  exercise  their  faculties  and  to  no  other  source. 

The  problem  therefore  manifestly  is  how  to  secure  to  the  mem- 
bers of  society  the  maximum  power  of  exercising  their  natural 


26  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

faculties.  It  is  a  purely  subjective  problem  and  has  nothing  to 
do  with  the  relative  superiority  or  inferiority  of  men.  It  is  wholly 
independent  of  the  question  of  their  intelligence  or  ability  or  social 
value.  It  is  even  independent  of  their  capacity  to  enjoy  or  to 
suffer.  It  matters  not  how  much  satisfaction  they  are  capable  of 
deriving  from  the  exercise  of  their  faculties  ;  it  aims  only  to  enable 
them  to  enjoy  such  faculties  as  they  may  happen  to  have. 

Social  Freedom 

From  this  subjective  side  the  w^hole  upw^ard  movement  of  society 
has  been  in  the  direction  of  acquiring  freedom.  If  we  look  over 
the  history  of  this  movement,  we  shall  see  that  it  exhibits  three 
somewhat  distinct  stages,  which  may  be  called  in  their  historical 
order  national  freedom,  political  freedom,  and  social  freedom. 

The  first  and  prime  requisite  during  the  early  efforts  at  nation 
forming,  as  set  forth  in  the  tenth  chapter  of  Pure  Sociology,  fol- 
lowing upon  conquest  and  subjugation,  was  the  consolidation  of  the 
amalgamating  group  into  a  national  unit  capable  of  withstanding 
the  encroachments  and  attacks  of  other  outside  groups.  Until  this 
is  attained  none  of  the  subsequent  steps  can  be  taken.  But  it 
involves  the  elaboration  of  the  crude  and  antagonistic  materials 
into  the  only  kind  of  order  or  organization  of  which  they  are  capa- 
ble, viz.,  the  politico-military  organization.  The  salient  features  of 
such  an  organization,  as  was  shown  in  that  chapter,  are  extreme 
inequality,  caste,  slavery,  and  stern  military  domination.  It  is  dur- 
ing this  stage  that  the  industrial  system  is  sketched  on  the  broad 
lines  of  social  cleavage,  resulting  in  the  three  great  fundamental 
social  tissues,  —  the  ruling  class  or  ectoderm,  the  proletariat  or  endo- 
derm,  and  the  business  class  or  mesoderm  of  the  primitive  state. 
These  form  a  strong  bulwark  and  enable  the  inchoate  state  to 
defend  itself  against  hostile  elements  from  without  during  the  sub- 
sequent stages  in  social  assimilation.  They  secure  the  first  great 
prerequisite,  —  national  freedom. 

But  individual  liberty  is  at  its  minimum.  The  conquered  race, 
which  always  far  outnumbers  all  other  elements,  is  chiefly  in  bond- 
age, and  the  struggle  for  political  freedom  begins.    Ultimately,  as 


Ch.  Ill]  SOCIAL  FREEDOM  27 

the  history  of  the  world  shows,  this  is  in  large  measure  attained. 
Throughout  antiquity,  the  Middle  Ages,  and  down  to  the  middle 
of  the  nineteenth  century,  this  was  the  great,  all-absorbing  issue. 
One  after  another  the  bulwarks  of  oppression  —  slavery,  serfdom, 
feudalism,  despotism,  monarchy  in  its  true  sense,  nobility  and 
priestly  rule  —  fell ;  the  middle  or  business  class,  otherwise  called 
bourgeoisie  and  third  estate,  gained  the  ascendant,  which  it  still 
holds,  and  political  freedom  was  attained. 

So  all  important  did  this  issue  seem  that  throughout  the  eigh- 
teenth century  and  down  to  near  our  own  time  it  was  confidently 
believed  that,  with  the  overthrow  of  political  oppression  and  the 
attainment  of  political  freedom,  the  world  would  enter  upon  the 
great  millennium  of  universal  prosperity,  well-being,  and  happi- 
ness. But  this  was  far  from  being  the  case.  As  sages  predicted, 
events  have  proved  that  there  remains  another  step  to  be  taken. 
Another  stage  must  be  reached  before  any  considerable  degree  of 
the  hopes  that  were  entertained  can  be  realized.  This  stage  is  that 
of  social  freedom.  The  world  is  to-day  in  the  throes  of  this  third 
struggle.  Military  and  royal  oppression  have  been  overthrown. 
Slavery,  serfdom,  feudalism,  have  disappeared.  The  power  of  the 
nobility  and  the  priesthood  has  been  broken.  The  civilized  world 
is  democratic,  no  matter  by  what  name  its  governments  are  called. 
The  people  rule  themselves  by  their  sovereign  votes.  And  yet 
never  in  the  history  of  the  world  was  there  manifested  greater 
unrest  or  greater  dissatisfaction  with  the  state  of  things.  National 
freedom  and  political  freedom  have  been  achieved.  Social  freedom 
remains  to  be  achieved. 

But  the  problem  of  social  freedom  is  much  more  difficult  and 
subtle  than  cither  of  the  others.  It  was  a  comparatively  simple 
matter  to  deal  with  the  state  and  the  ruling  class.  These  were 
always  conspicuous  and  locally  circumscribed.  The  forces  that 
prevent  social  freedom,  on  the  contrary,  are  hidden  and  universally 
diffused  thi-oaigh  the  social  fabric.  They  are  largely  economic 
forces  guided  by  the  acute  sagacity  of  individual  interest,  and  they 
escape  detection  and  elude  pursuit.  They  give  rise  to  questions 
so  recondite  and  obscure  that. the  clearest  thinkers  differ  as  to 
their   solution.     These   questions   cannot    come    into  the  political 


28        ■  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

arena  until  there  is  a  certain  harmony  or  consensus  of  opinion  con- 
cerning them.  In  short,  they  are  the  proper  subjects  of  scientific 
investigation.  The  only  science  that  can  deal  with  them  is  sociol- 
ogy.   Their  study  and  solution  belong  to  applied  sociology. 

The  New  Ethics 

I  was  once  invited  to  attend  a  meeting  of  the  Ethical  Association. 
I  went  expecting  to  hear  all  about  right  and  wrong,  especially  wrong, 
about  duty  and  "  the  ought,"  about  conscience  and  the  categorical 
imperative.  I  was  agreeably  disappointed.  Every  paper,  as  I  re- 
member, breathed  the  spirit  of  the  new  ethics.  Dr.  Felix  Adler 
unfolded  the  new  doctrine  in  a  masterly  way,  making  a  wide  de- 
parture from  the  conventional  ethics,  and  the  other  speakers  with 
one  accord  dealt  with  different  methods  of  relieving  human  suffering 
and  promoting  human  welfare.  It  was  a  great  relief  and  a  hopeful 
sign  of  the  times.  In  fact,  as  unconsciously  as  M.  Jourdain  talked 
prose,  this  congress  from  first  to  last  talked  applied  sociology. 

Primitive  ethics,  as  I  have  shown,^  was  simply  race  morality.  It 
had,  as  the  word  "moral"  implies,  to  do  with  custom,  i.e.,  with 
those  social  restraints  to  conduct  which  the  group  sentiment  of  race 
safety  had  established  for  the  preservation  of  the  existence  of  the 
race.  It  had  nothing  to  do  with  sympathy  or  feeling,  happiness  or 
misery,  and  was  confined  exclusively  to  considerations  of  safety  or 
salvation.  And  even  throughout  the  widening  circles  of  ethical 
dualism'^  there  was  no  essential  change  in  its  character.  The  con- 
ventional ethics  upon  which  we  are  all  brought  up,  although  its 
expounders  know  nothing  of  these  things,  is  derived  from  primitive 
ethics,  but  is  a  degenerate  corruption  of  it  in  which  all  connection 
with  its  original  matrix  has  been  lost  sight  of,  and  in  its  place  has 
been  set  up  the  false  dogma  of  abstract  right.  It  has  enjoined 
restraint  and  curtailed  human  liberty,  and  has  proved  one  of  the 
chief  props  to  exploitation  and  cloaks  to  hypocrisy  from  which 
mankind  has  had  to  suffer. 

The  new  ethics  has  for  its  aim  the  minimization  of  pain  and  the 
maximization  of  pleasure.    For  the  present  it  is  obliged  to  devote 

1  Pure  Sociology,  p.  419.  2  /^/^/.^  p.  426. 


Ch.  Ill]  THE   CLAIMS  OF   FEELING  29 

itself  chiefly  to  the  former  of  these  objects.  The  amount  of  suffer- 
ing in  the  world  is  so  great  that  it  must  necessarily  receive  the 
chief  attention.  By  this  it  is  not  meant  to  imply  that  the  new 
ethics  is  the  same  as  philanthropy.  Most  philanthropy  belongs 
rather  to  the  old  conventional  ethics  of  which  it  is  a  sort  of  annex. 
According  to  that  there  are  two  kinds  of  conduct :  ordinary  moral 
conduct,  which  does  not  go  beyond  the  performance  of  duty;  and 
conduct  of  a  superior  order,  which  does  more  than  duty  requires 
and  confers  benefits  upon  others  for  which  no  equivalent  is  ren- 
dered. This  last,  which  is  called  benevolence,  has  its  egoistic 
return  in  the  form  of  a  high  moral  satisfaction,  which  has  been 
described  as  among  the  most  exalted  of  sentiments.  In  other 
words,  it  is  a  great  pleasure,  and  this  pleasure  is  the  motive  from 
which  the  action  proceeds.  It  is  not  less  egoistic  from  being 
altruistic,  and  may  be  called  the  luxury  of  altruism.  It  is  apt  to 
beget  egotism  and  give  the  doer  of  good  deeds  an  exalted  opinion 
of  himself,  and  a  pharisaical  idea  that  he  is  better  than  other  men. 
Most  philanthropy  is  also  mere  temporary  patchwork  which  has  to 
be  done  over  and  over  again.  It  does  not  aim  or  desire  to  do  that 
kind  of  good  that  will  prevent  the  recurrence  of  the  conditions 
that  have  made  it  necessary.     It  is  static,  not  dynamic. 

The  new  ethics,  on  the  contrary,  goes  to  the  root  and  deals  with 
conditions  and  causes  of  evil.  It  inquires  into  social  conditions 
and  seeks  to  introduce  modifications  that  will  prevent  existing  evils 
and  render  their  recurrence  impossible.  It  is  dynamic.  As  already 
said,  it  is  applied  sociology.  It  recognizes  that  the  sumniuvi  bonum 
is  the  social  weal,  and  aims,  as  light  is  vouchsafed,  to  labor  for 
that  end. 

The  Cl.\ims  of  Feeling 

The  origin  and  true  nature  of  feeling  were  fully  treated  in  Pure 
Sociology,  and  something  was  said  of  feeling  as  an  end.^  It  is 
just  here  that  applied  sociology  takes  up  the  subject  and  seeks  to 
show  its  full  significance  for  the  future  of  mankind.  Although  the 
orthodox  thought  of  all  ages  and  races  has  clung  to  the  doctrine  of 
restraint  and  sought  to  hush  every  whisper  that  feeling  has  any 

1  Page  126. 


30  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

rights  whatever  in  its  own  name,  still,  as  shown,  it  has  always  been 
breaking  through  these  barriers  and  spontaneously  realizing  itself. 
As  the  rational  faculty  matured  it  began  to  be  applied  to  this 
problem.  Over  against  the  philosophy  of  restraint  in  which  func- 
tion is  everything  there  has  dared  to  arise  a  philosophy  of  hcense 
in  which  the  claims  of  feeling  are  allowed. 

In  the  treatment  of  feeling  in  its  relations  to  function  it  was 
shown  that  the  two  things  are  in  and  of  themselves  utterly  unlike.^ 
They  bear  no  resemblance  to  each  other,  are  in  no  sense  opposites, 
or  in  any  way  antagonistic.  But  the  fact  that  the  satisfaction 
of  feeling,  though  normally  securing  the  performance  of  function, 
may  and  often  does  defeat  such  performance,  gave  rise  to  a  false 
conception  of  the  nature  of  feeling.  In  cases  where  function 
normally  follows  the  satisfaction  of  feeling,  attention  is  concen- 
trated on  the  former  and  the  satisfaction  is  not  attended  to.  But 
in  the  contrary  cases,  where  the  gratification  of  desire  endangers 
or  prevents  the  functional  effects,  attention  is  specially  directed 
to  feeling,  and  the  evil  effects  are  intimately  associated  with  it. 
The  frequent  recurrence  of  such  aberrations  and  wayward  tenden- 
cies makes  this  association  of  pleasure  with  evil  permanent,  and 
the  idea  becomes  general  that  all  pleasure  is  bad.  This  is  the  true 
explanation  and  origin  of  all  asceticism.  It  rests  on  the  false 
assumption  of  the  necessarily  antagonistic  character  of  feeling 
and  function.  Rational  analysis  shows  that  there  is  no  such 
necessary  relation,  and  that  there  are  thousands  of  pleasures 
which,  while  they  do  not  lead  to  the  performance  of  any  function, 
still  do  not  in  any  way  interfere  with  any  of  the  operations  of 
existence.  It  is  also  seen  that  this  class  increases  with  the  psychic 
development  of  man.  They  are  chiefly  those  pleasures  that  I  have 
characterized  as  "spiritual,"  without  giving  that  word  any  occult  or 
mystic  implications.  They  constitute  in  the  main  the  sociogenetic 
forces  or  attributes  of  the  soul,  and  were  treated  in  the  fifteenth 
chapter  of  Pure  Sociology. 

To  the  gradual  recognition  of  this  truth  is  due  the  fact  that 
since  the  origin  of  human  records  there  has  been  going  on  a  slow 
movement    in    human    thought    looking   more    and    more    to    the 

^  Pure  Sociology,  p.  126. 


Ch.  Ill]  THE   CLAIMS  OF   FEELING  3 1 

recognition  of  the  claims  of  feeling,  —  a  movement  which  I  have 
characterized  as  "the  subjective  trend  of  modern  philosophy. "i 
Descartes  declared  that  the  passions  "are  all  essentially  good,"^ 
and  Spinoza  3  echoed  this  sentiment.  Sir  Thomas  More  in  describ- 
ing his  Utopians  says  that  "they  thinke  no  kinde  of  pleasure 
forbydden  whereof  cometh  no  harme."*  Other  passages  might 
doubtless  be  found  scattered  at  rare  intervals  through  the  literature 
of  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  to  the  effect  that 
pleasure  is  not  bad  in  itself,  but  the  predominating  sentiment  was 
a  gloomy  asceticism,  typified  by  such  writers  as  Pascal,  and  this 
continued  to  prevail  far  into  the  nineteenth  century.  All  know 
what  a  strong  hold  it  had  on  the  minds  of  the  early  settlers  of 
America,  fittingly  described  by  our  word  "  puritanism."  It  is  still 
very  strong  everywhere,  and  it  is  only  within  recent  years  that 
business  and  professional  men  have  considered  it  proper  deliber- 
ately to  set  apart  any  portion  of  their  time  for  pleasure  and  recre- 
ation. This  they  have  been  practically  driven  to  by  the  alarming 
prevalence  of  brain  exhaustion  and  nervous  breakdowns. 

The  way  to  a  new  philosophy  from  the  moral  side  was  opened 
by  Francis  Hutcheson,  who  said,  "  That  action  is  best  which 
procures  the  greatest  happiness  for  the  greatest  numbers."^  The 
same  sentiment  is  embodied  in  the  saying  of  Beccaria,  —  ^^la  mas- 
sima  felicita  divisa  nel  maggior  ntimcro."^  Jeremy  Bentham  crys- 
tallized the  maxim  into  the  form,  "  The  greatest  happiness  of  the 
greatest  number."  "  He  is  usually  credited  with  the  maxim,  but  he 
expressly  attributes  it  to  Priestley  and  Beccaria.  Bentham  is  com- 
monly regarded  as  the  founder  of  utilitarianism,  an  ethical  doc- 
trine, which,  though  liable  to  be  both  misunderstood  and  abused, 
sums  up,  when  logically  defined,  the  general  result  toward  which 
all  these  influences  are  tending. 

1  American  Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  Ill,  No.  4,  January,  189S,  p.  535.  Compare 
also  an  earlier  statement  in  the  Political  Science  Quarterly,  Vol.  X,  No.  2,  June,  1895, 
p.  220,  and  the  Annales  de  I'lnstitut  international  de  sociologie,  Tome  IV,  Paris, 
1898,  p.  III. 

2  Les  passions  de  Tame,  Art.  211  (CEuvres,  p.  592). 

3  Ethics,  Prop.  XLI  (Opera,  1882,  p.  219). 

*  Utopia  (Robinson's  translation),  English  Reprints,  London,  1869,  No.  14,  p.  95. 

6  Concerning  Moral  Good  and  Evil,  1720. 

•>  Cesare  Beccaria,  Dei  Delitti  e  delle  Pene,  1764.         ^  Works,  1843,  ^°'-  ^'  P-  M^- 


32  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part! 

The  maxim  above  considered,  still  further  shortened  to  the  form, 
"The  greatest  good  to  the  greatest  number,"  has  passed  into  a 
political  phrase  much  used  in  the  United  States  as  embodying 
the  true  policy  of  democracy.  Our  Declaration  of  Independence 
posits  "the  pursuit  of  happiness"  as  one  of  the  "inalienable 
rights"  of  mankind.  The  entire  utilitarian  philosophy  is  stigma- 
tized by  the  moral  philosophers  as  "  hedonism."  If  we  allow  popular 
usage  to  restrict  this  term  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  coarser,  more 
physical,  and  more  essential  desires,  and  follow  Epicurus  in  apply- 
ing the  term  "eudemonism"  to  the  whole  range  of  pleasures,  in- 
cluding the  moral,  esthetic,  and  intellectual  ones,  we  have  in  this 
last  term  the  true  basis  of  the  subjective  movement  in  philosophy. 

The  animal  world  lives  in  a  pain  economy.  Function  is  every- 
thing and  feeling  nothing.  The  apparent  peace  in  nature  is  an 
illusion.  Behind  and  below  it  is  the  ever-present  "struggle  for 
existence."  I  am  not  disposed  to  exaggerate  the  meaning  of  this 
phrase.  I  admit  that  animals  are  largely  unconscious  of  any 
struggle,  and  that  it  may  not  greatly  lessen  their  enjoyment  of  life. 
They  do  not  suffer  from  imaginary  evils,  they  do  not  anticipate 
those  of  the  future,  and  they  may  not  vividly  remember  the  pains 
previously  experienced.  In  fact,  as  is  well  known,  they  fear  the 
ones  they  have  never  experienced  as  much  as  those  they  have 
actually  suffered.  Their  mental  states  are  chiefly  controlled  by 
instincts  made  up  of  the  inherited  experiences  of  their  ancestors. 
But  turn  it  as  you  may,  the  fact  remains  that  in  nearly  every 
natural  race  of  creatures,  in  order  to  hold  their  own  against  the 
buffets  of  the  world,  somewhere  from  ten  to  a  thousand  individ- 
uals have  to  be  born  for  every  one  that  lives  out  its  normal  period 
of  existence.  In  every  case  the  great  majority  succumb,  before 
the  age  of  reproduction,  to  enemies,  to  disease,  to  starvation,  or 
to  the  elements,  and  the  survivors,  throughout  their  entire  lives, 
are  incessantly  threatened  with  the  same  fate.  It  is,  therefore, 
no  wonder  that  animals  are  "  wild."  They  resort  to  every  conceiv- 
able device  to  escape  these  dangers,  and  nature  through  innumer- 
able instincts  aids  them  in  their  efforts.  Some  are  fleet  of  foot 
or  swift  of  wing;  others  have  delicate  senses  of  hearing,  sight,  or 
smell ;   others   have  wonderful   powers   of  concealment ;  and   still 


Ch.  Ill]  THE  CLAIMS  OF  FEELING  33 

others  are  endowed  with  numberless  arts  of  imitation,  feigning, 
and  deception.  All  this  is  independent  of  the  countless  organic 
devices  for  protection,  —  shells,  armors,  spines,  bristles,  musk-sacs, 
ink-bags,  and  all  the  forms  of  imitative  coloring.  Nearly  all 
animals  are  always  on  the  alert;  some,  as  hares,  sleep  with  their 
eyes  open.  Thousands  are  nocturnal  in  order  to  evade  diurnal 
enemies,  and  are  thus  denied  all  the  enjoyments  of  a  life  in  the 
open  daylight  and  sunshine.  All  are  constantly  ready  to  fly  at 
the  least  sign  of  danger,  and  even  those  that  prey  upon  others 
must  themselves  watch  lest  stronger  or  more  cunning  ones  deprive 
them  of  their  spoils.  Even  if  there  were  no  other  animal  to  fear, 
there  would  remain  the  fear  of  men,  "  ces  monstres,  nos  eternels 
etmemisy  ^  This  fact  that  one  half  of  the  animal  world  lives  by 
devouring  the  other  half,  has  perhaps  been  too  frequently  dwelt 
upon,  but  it  still  stands  in  all  its  sullen  hideousness  before  the 
defenders  of  a  moral  order. 

In  the  human  race  the  case  is  not  so  much  better  as  many 
suppose.  It  is  a  great  mistake  to  imagine  that  savages  are  happy 
in  their  wild  state  of  nature.  The  most  deluded  people  in  the 
world  are  the  sentimental  poets  who  paint  the  "poor  Indian  "  and 
the  native  races  of  countries  where  civilized  man  has  displaced 
them  as  having  been  robbed  of  a  paradise  of  freedom  and  joy. 
All  savage  races  are  abject  slaves  to  a  thousand  delusions  and  ^ 
superstitions,  and  are  prohibited  by  a  vast  network  of  ceremonials 
and  prescriptions  from  any  true  liberty  of  movement  or  action. 
These  multitudinous  prohibitions  and  restraints  are  enforced  by 
the  severest  penalties,  and  no  one  dares  to  infract  the  laws  of  a 
remorseless  custom  that  hedges  in  all  the  members  of  primitive 
society.    Bagehot  well  says: 

Dryden  had  a  dream  of  an  early  age  "  when  wild  in  woods  the  noble  savage 
ran,"  but  "when  lone  in  woods  the  cringing  savage  crept"  would  have  been 
more  like  all  we  know  of  that  early,  bare,  painful  period.  Not  only  had  they 
no  comfort,  no  convenience,  not  the  very  beginnings  of  an  epicurean  life,  but 
their  mind  within  was  as  painful  to  them  as  the  world  without.  It  was  full  of 
fear.  So  far  as  the  vestiges  inform  us,  they  were  afraid  of  everything ;  they 
were  afraid  of  animals,  of  certain  attacks  by  near  tribes,  and  of  possible 
inroads  from  far  tribes.    But,  above  all  things,  they  were  frightened  of  "  the 

1  Voltaire,  Le  Chapon  et  la  Poularde  (Dialogues,  etc.,  p.  100). 


C^>^ 


34  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

world";  the  spectacle  of  nature  filled  them  with  awe  and  dread.  They  fan- 
cied there  were  powers  behind  it  which  must  be  pleased,  soothed,  flattered, 
and  this  very  often  in  a  number  of  hideous  ways.^ 

To  the  same  effect  Sir  John  Lubbock  said  :  "  No  savage  is  free. 
All  over  the  world  his  daily  life  is  regulated  by  a  complicated  and 
apparently  most  inconvenient  set  of  customs  (as  forcible  as  laws)."^ 
As  in  the  animal  world,  so  in  primitive  man,  fear  is  the  perpetual 
nightmare  of  existence.  The  author  last  quoted,  in  an  earlier  work, 
says,  "  It  is  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  horrible  dread  of  un- 
known evil  hangs  like  a  thick  cloud  over  savage  life,  and  embitters 
every  pleasure."^  "It  is  impossible,"  says  Reade,  "to  describe, 
or  even  to  imagine,  the  tremulous  condition  of  the  savage  mind ; 
yet  the  traveler  can  see  from  their  aspect  and  manners  that  they 
dwell  in  a  state  of  never-ceasing  dread."  ^  This  dread  of  nature 
was  described  by  Humboldt  in  an  eloquent  passage  which  I  have 
reproduced  more  than  once.^  Dr.  Bucke  has  accurately  expressed 
this  truth  in  the  following  words  : 

The  aspects  of  nature  have  no  moral  significance  for  him  [the  savage] 
except  in  a  bad  sense.  Storm,  tempest,  night,  earthquakes,  eclipses,  and  all 
the  darker  phenomena  of  earth  and  air  fill  him  with  vague  fear,  which  is  often 
intense.  On  the  other  hand,  the  brighter  aspects  of  nature,  from  which  we 
derive  such  a  large  proportion  of  our  happiness,  awaken  in  him  no  enthusiasm. 
Sunshine,  flowers,  glancing  rivers,  lake  expanses,  and  all  that  to  us  in  nature  is 
so  beautiful,  is  not  beautiful  to  him.  If  the  aspects  of  nature  are  favorable 
to  his  pursuit  of  food,  he  is  satisfied,  no  more.  If  they  are  adverse  to  him, 
he  is  cast  down.  If  they  are  unusual,  he  is  terrified.  Terror,  indeed,  is  the 
most  prominent  of  the  moral  functions  in  the  mind  of  the  savage. '' 

Primitive  man,  too,  is  almost  always  at  war.  We  know  very  few 
races  in  a  stage  so  idyllic  that  the  era  of  conquest  and  subjugation 
has  not  already  been  ushered  in.  Every  tribe  is  thirsting  for  the 
blood  of  other  tribes.    A  state  of  peace  is  almost  unknown.    The 

1  Physics  and  Politics,  New  York,  1877,  p.  55. 

2  The  Origin  of  Civilisation  and  the  Primitive  Condition  of  Man,  New  York,  1871, 

P-  303- 

3  Prehistoric  Times,  by  Sir  John  Lubbock,  Bart,  (the  Right  Hon.  Lord  Avebury). 
Sixth  edition  revised  (edition  de  luxe),  New  York,  1904,  p.  449. 

*  Winwood  Reade,  Martyrdom  of  Man,  second  edition.  New  York,  1876,  p.  284. 

5  Dynamic  Sociology,  Vol.  I,  p.  684;  Pure  Sociology,  p.  109. 

6  Dr.  Richard  Maurice  Bucke,  Man's  Moral  Nature:  An  Essay,  New  York, 
1879,  P-  152- 


Ch.  Ill]  THE   CLAIMS  OF   FEELING  35 

gates  of  Janus  are  always  open.  No  matter  how  sparse  the  pop- 
ulation, there  is  no  spot  so  remote  and  sequestered  that  it  may 
not  at  any  moment  become  the  scene  of  a  sanguinary  battle.  It 
was  doubtless  the  sense  of  this  truth  that  prompted  Kipling  to 
speak  of  "the  desert  where  there  is  always  war."  All  through  the 
various  stages  of  barbarism  that  follow  those  of  true  savagery,  war 
is  the  prevailing  condition,  and  mankind  has  been  perpetually  rent 
by  every  form  of  strife,  external  and  internal.  When  it  is  not  open 
warfare  it  is  internecine  strife,  the  clash  of  clans  and  the  feuds  of 
families.  There  is  always  turmoil  and  trouble,  and  peace  and  com- 
fort are  unknown.  Even  after  the  advent  of  an  industrial  stage  of 
society  the  exploitation  of  the  weak  by  the  strong  causes  a  "  strug- 
gle for  existence  "  on  the  part  of  the  great  mass  of  mankind,  which 
is  not  masked,  as  in  the  animal  world,  by  any  semblance  of  peace. 
Excessive  toil,  poverty,  squalor,  and  misery  stare  the  observer  in 
the  face  in  every  corner  of  the  earth. 

Throughout  all  these  stages  and  conditions  of  pain  economy, 
animal  and  human,  the  claims  of  function  are  the  only  ones  recog- 
nized. Those  of  feeling  are  either  totally  ignored  or  vehemently 
denied.  Fear  and  terror  are  instruments  for  the  preservation  of 
the  race.  All  wars  are  holy  wars  waged  to  save  a  chosen  race 
or  people  from  outcast  races  and  peoples.  Codes  of  custom  and 
oppressive  ceremonials  are  the  means  of  prohibiting  deviations 
from  the  path  of  race  safety.  The  powers  that  be  are  ordained  of 
God  and  political  oppression  is  defended  as  the  decree  of  the  nation. 
Social  and  economic  inequalities  are  declared  to  be  natural  and 
hence  necessary  to  be  endured  in  the  interest  of  social  order.  Toil 
and  poverty  are  the  consequences  of  population,  and  population 
must  be  kept  up  or  the  race  is  endangered.  Everywhere  and 
always  it  is  function  that  is  appealed  to.  Moral  and  religious  teach- 
ers preach  resignation  to  all  the  woes  of  life,  the  reason,  expressed 
or  implied,  always  being  that  otherwise  existence  is  jeopardized, 
and  if  existence  is  lost  all  is  lost. 

There  is  only  one  way  of  meeting  this  argument.  In  a  pain 
economy,  by  the  terms  of  the  definition,  the  pains  exceed  the 
pleasures.  If  we  give  the  pains  the  minus  and  the  pleasures  the 
plus  sign,  the  algebraic  sum  is  minus.    If  a  man  in  his  business 


36  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

finds  that  the  debits  regularly  exceed  the  credits,  he  concludes  that 
he  is  conducting  his  business  at  a  loss.  Existence  may  be  looked 
upon  as  a  business.  If  its  debits  exceed  its  credits,  it  is  being  con- 
ducted at  a  loss.  What  value  then  has  existence  in  a  pain  economy 
that  such  strenuous  efforts  should  be  made  to  preserve  it  ?  It  is  a 
great  struggle,  not  simply  for  a  zero,  a  nothing,  but  for  a  worse 
than  nothing,  a  minus  quantity,  a  perpetual  and  hopeless  deficit. 
Consciously  or  unconsciously,  this  is  the  reasoning  of  the  whole 
pessimistic  world,  who  see  no  remedy  for  the  state  of  things.  In 
the  absence  of  all  hope  that  a  remedy  can  ever  be  found,  this  logic 
is  faultless. 

J  The  kernel  of  the  whole  question  therefore  is.  Can  a  remedy 
be  found,  a  way  out  of  pessimism  ?  For  one,  I  believe  that  there 
is  a  remedy,  and  that  it  consists  in  the  recop-nition  of  the  claims 
of  feeling.  Without  a  surplus  of  agreeable  over  disagreeable  feel^ 
ing  existence  is  worthless  or  worse  than  worthless.  With  such 
a  surplus  it  has  a  value  exactly  proportional  to  the  amount  of 
that  surplus.  The  purpose  of  applied  sociology  is  to  point  out  a 
way  of  first  getting  rid  of  this  long-standing  deficit,  and  then  of 
accumulating  the  maximum  possible  surplus. 


CHAPTER  IV 

SOCIAL  ACHIEVEMENT 

I  have  never  yet  had  the  good  fortune  to  hear  any  valid  reason  alleged  why 
that  corporation  of  individuals  we  call  the  State  may  not  do  what  voluntary 
effort  fails  in  doing,  either  from  want  of  intelligence  or  lack  of  will.  —  Huxley. 

Civilization  is  to  all  external  appearances  almost  exclusively  the 
result  of  individual  achievement.  Almost  every  great  advance  can 
be  directly  referred  to  some  one  or  more  individuals  whose  genius 
and  industry  have  made  it  possible,  and  although  each  step  can  in 
nearly  every  case  be  shown  to  proceed  from  an  earlier  step  without 
which  it  would  have  been  impossible,  still  this  particular  step,  how- 
ever short,  was  actually  taken  by  somebody,  and  his  name,  the 
date,  and  all  the  circumstances  are  in  most  cases  definitely  known. 
In  view  of  this,  it  is  the  common  attitude  of  scientific  men  to  deny 
that  there  has  been  any  social  achievement  at  all,  and  any  allusion 
to  social  action  of  a  useful  or  progressive  character  is  apt  to  pro- 
voke a  smile.  The  extreme  presentation  of  this  view  found  its 
expression  in  the  celebrated  "parable  of  Saint-Simon."^  Nearly 
everybody  subscribes  to  the  sentiment  embodied  in  that  document, 
and  I  for  one  certainly  do.  But  the  great  majority  supplement 
their  assent  to  its  letter  by  an  inference  which  is  wholly  unwar- 
ranted. It  is  possible  that  Saint-Simon  intended  and  expected  this 
inference  to  be  drawn  and  made  a  part  of  the  case  he  was  present- 
ing. This  inference  is  that  because  all  the  public  officers  that  he 
names  might  be  suddenly  blotted  out  of  existence  without  materi- 
ally affecting  the  march  of  civilization,  therefore  the  offices  held 

'  Si  la  France  perdait  subitement  sescinquante  premiers  savants,  ses  cinquante 
premiers  artistes,  ses  cinquante  premiers  fabricants,  ses  cinquante  premiers  cultiva- 
teurs,  la  nation  deviendrait  un  corps  sans  ame,  elle  serait  decapitee.  Si  elle  venait 
au  contraire  h  perdre  tout  son  personnel  officiel,  cette  evenement  affligerait  les  Fran- 
(pais  parce  qu'ils  sont  bons,  mais  il  n'en  resulterait  pour  le  pays  qu'un  faible  dommage. 
—  Samt-Simon,  I.ettres  de  Henri  Saint-Simon  k  MM.  les  jures,  "  La  Parabole,"  pp.  1-8 
(CEuvres  de  Saint-Simon). 

37 


38  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

by  them  and  the  duties  they  involved  have  no  value  or  significance 
for  civilization.  This  inference  is  false,  and  carried  to  its  logical 
conclusion  it  amounts  to  saying  that  the  whole  social  order  is  use- 
less. The  reason  why  the  particular  men  at  any  moment  holding 
these  offices  and  performing  these  public  functions  can  be  spared 
without  serious  loss  is  that  their  places  can  be  filled  without  diffi- 
culty and  the  social  operations  w^hich  are  under  their  direction  will 
go  on  as  before.  This  is  not  the  case  to  the  same  extent  with  the 
men  of  science,  art,  and  letters  that  he  sets  over  against  them. 
They  are  the  original  geniuses  who  are  building  up  the  civilization 
of  the  world,  and  their  loss  as  individuals  could  not  in  one  sense 
be  supplied.  The  difference  is  clear  and  the  contrast  is  striking. 
[  But  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  all  these  men  labor  within  the 
\  social  order,  and  that  without  the  help  of  the  social  order  they 
\  could  do  nothing,  "^inrial  arhipvp]-|Tpni-  has  consisted  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  social  order  under  and  within  which  individual  achieve- 
ment can  go  on  and  civilization  is  made  possible. 

It  belonged  to  pure  sociology  to  point  out  certain  of  the  great 

typical  steps  in  social  achievement,  and  this  was  attempted,  mainly 

with  reference  to  the  past.    It  was  shown  that,  over  and  above  the 

establishment  and  maintenance  of  the  social  order  as  a  condition  to 

all  individual  achievement,  society  had  done  considerable  original 

,work  looking  to  its  own  betterment.    This  is  as  far  as  pure  sociol- 

f  ogy  can  go  in  this  direction.     It  is  the  task  of  applied  sociology  to 

^\  indicate  as  fully  as  the  data  of  the  science  will  permit  how  much 

(jarther  society  can  and  should  go. 

Society,  considered  as  an  active  agent,  can  have  no  other  object 
than  its  own  preservation  and  advancement.  Its  functions  are 
reduced  to  two,  the  protective  and  the  ameliorative.  The  current 
philosophy  limits  it  to  the  first  and  denies  to  it  the  second.  But 
society  must  be  looked  upon  in  the  light  of  a  conscious  individual. 
In  so  far  as  it  is  conscious  and  in  proportion  to  the  completeness 
of  its  consciousness,  it  does  not  differ  from  an  individual.  No 
individual  ever  limits  his  activities  to  the  simple  sphere  of  self- 
preservation.  Every  individual  is  always  seeking  besides  to  benefit 
himself  in  every  possible  way.  Society  should  do  the  same,  and, 
in  fact,  has  always  sought  to  do  so  in  the  measure  of  its  power  to 


Ch.  IV]  SOCIAL  ACHIEVEMENT  39 

understand  itself.  The  extent  to  which  it  will  do  this  will  depend 
upon  the  collective  intelligence.  This  is  to  society  what  brain 
power  is  to  the  individual.  Brain  power  is  a  product  of  organic 
integration.  The  brain  itself,  even  of  the  lowest  creatures  possess- 
ing it,  is  a  measure  of  the  degree  of  integration  that  has  taken 
place  in  the  nervous  system.  From  this  to  the  most  highly  devel- 
oped human  brains  there  are  only  differences  of  degree.  It  is  all 
so  much  progress  in  the  integration  of  the  nervous  system. 

Now,  without  dealing  in  any  fanciful  analogies,  society  has  un- 
dergone and  is  undergoing  a  series  of  steps  in  integration  corre- 
sponding to  those  of  the  nervous  system  of  animals.  Evolution 
takes  place  in  the  social  world  according  to  the  same  laws  as  in  the 
organic  world.  And  just  as  increasing  brain  development  has  been 
accompanied  by  increasing  individual  consciousness  and  intelligence, 
so  social  integration  has  been  and  will  continue  to  be  attended 
with  increasing  social  consciousness  and  intelligence.  If  we  con- 
ceive social  intelligence  to  have  reached  the  stage  at  w^hich  it  can 
grasp  this  truth,  we  may  suppose  society  seriously  to  ask  itself  the 
question  whether  it  may  not  by  its  own  efforts  contribute  some- 
what to  increasing  its  own  intelligence.  This  is  what  individuals 
do.  When  they  find  that  the  objects  they  have  set  out  to  attain 
require  a  higher  intelligence  than  they  possess  they  proceed  to 
inform  themselves  and  put  themselves  in  possession  of  the  requisite 
intelligence.  Intelligence  is  a  compound  of  capacity  for  knowledge  ^ 
and  knowledge.  An  individual  at  this  stage  necessarily  possesses 
the  requisite  capacity  for  knowledge,  so  that  the  act  of  acquiring 
intelligence  is  reduced  to  that  of  acquiring  knowledge.  It  is  not 
otherwise  with  society.  That  degree  of  social  consciousness  which 
enables  society  to  perceive  that  it  needs  greater  intelligence  in 
order  to  further  its  own  interests  is  the  homologue  of  nativ^e 
capacity  in  the  individual,  and  the  problem  of  increasing  social 
intelligence  is  reduced,  as  in  the  individual,  to  that  of  acquiring 
knowledge. 


CHAPTER  V 

WORLD   VIEWS 

C'est  respnt^gujjgquv^rnej  et  Phomme  agit  selon  sa  pensee  bien  plus  souvent 
qu'il  ne  le  croit  lui-meme.  —  Guizox. 

It  is  often  said  that  ideas  rule  the  world,  but  this  is  true  only  of 
world  ideas.  The  highest  and  brightest  ideas,  the  most  profound 
and  important  thoughts  of  any  age  or  people,  have  scarcely  any 
influence  upon  the  world.  This  is  because  such  ideas  are  always 
confined  to  a  very  few  of  the  most  developed  minds  and  are  not 
shared  by  the  mass  of  mankind.  They  do  not  belong  to  the  world. 
There  is  supposed  to  be  no  way  by  which  they  can  be  conveyed  to 
mankind  at  large.  No  thought  has  any  appreciable  social  effect 
except  it  be  actually  possessed  by  society.  The  whole  of  society, 
i.e.,  all  sane  persons  of  mature  minds,  must  themselves  think  it, 
otherwise  it  is  socially  ineffective.  But  any  idea  that  permeates 
the  whole  mass  and  becomes  the  thought  of  society  itself  sways 
the  mass  and  shapes  the  action  of  society  in  its  entirety. 

Interpretation  of  History 

Two  distinct  modes  have  been  adopted  of  interpreting  human 
history,  —  the  material  and  the  intellectual.  The  first  has  been  un- 
happily called  "  historical  materialism."  As  the  antithesis  of  this  the 
other  has  been  called  "  historical  intellectualism."  ^  The  proper  name 
for  the  first  is  "  the  economic  interpretation  of  history,"  used  in  1888 
by  Thorold  Rogers  as  the  title  of  a  course  of  lectures,  and  by  De 
Greef  at  the  congress  of  the  Institut  International  de  Sociologie  in 

1  Rene  Worms,  Philosophie  des  sciences  sociales,  I,  1903,  p.  135.  Tarde  had 
previously  designated  it  as  tiie  ^'- these  iiitellectualiste"  (Revue  Internationale  de 
sociologie,  9*^  annee,  aoiit  septembre,  1901,  p.  664).  Dr.  Edward  A.  Ross  appears  to 
have  been  the  first  to  use  the  term  "intellectualism"  in  this  sense  in  English  (American 
Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  IX,  January,  1904,  p.  548). 

40 


Ch.  V]  INTERPRETATION   OF   HISTORY  41 

1900,  and  published  in  the  Annales.^  It  was  also  made  the  title 
of  the  address  of  Dr.  E.  R,  A.  Seligman  as  president  of  the 
American  Economic  Association,  delivered  at  Washington,  Decem- 
ber 30,  1 90 1,  since  expanded  into  a  book  by  that  title.  The  proper 
name  for  the  opposite  doctrine,  corresponding  in  form  to  this,  is 
the  ideological  interpretation  of  history. 

These  two  views,  when  thought  of  together  at  all,  have  usually 
been  regarded  as  wholly  opposed,  the  defenders  of  the  one  denying 
all  weight  to  the  other;  but  they  have  for  the  most  part  constituted 
two  schools  of  thought  so  different  that  neither  has  seemed  to  have 
any  knowledge  of  the  other.  Only  to  a  very  few  has  it  occurred 
that,  like  so  many  other  apparently  conflicting  doctrines,  they  may 
both  be  true,  and  that  a  full  analysis  of  both  might  show  that  there 
exists  some  common  ground  upon  which  both  may  stand. 

Reconciliation  of  the  Economic  and  Ideological 
Interpretations  of  History 

Although  it  is  possible  to  carry  back  the  general  proposition  that 
ideas  make  or  rule  the  world  as  far  at  least  as  Plato,  and  although 
Virgil  uttered  the  words,  ^^  inens  agitat  molent,'"^  still  sociologists 
are  usually  content  to  quote  the  well-known  passage  in  Comte's 
Positive  Philosophy.^  Herbert  Spencer,  though  far  from  being 
a  historical  materialist,  was  one  of  those  who  opposed  this  view. 
In  his  "  Reasons  for  dissenting  from  the  Philosophy  of  Comte  " 
he  quotes  this  passage  and  sets  over  against  it  in  the  parallel 
column  his  own  view,  as  follows: 

Ideas  do  not  govern  and  overthrow  the  world:  the  world  is  governed  or 
overthrown  by  feelings,  to  which  ideas  serve  only  as  guides.  The  social  mech- 
anism does  not  rest  finally  upon  opinions ;  but  almost  wholly  upon  character.* 

^  Tome  VIII,  Paris,  1902,  p.  165. 

2  .^neid,  Lib.  VI,  line  727. 

3  Vol.  I,  1830,  pp.  40-41.  "  Ce  n'est  pas  aux  lecteurs  de  cet  ouvrage  que  je  croirai 
jamais  devoir  prouver  que  les  ideas  gouvement  et  bouleversent  le  monde,  ou,  en 
d'autres  termes,  que  tout  le  mecanisme  social  repose  finalement  sur  des  opinions." 
Harriet  Martineau  translated  this  as  follows :  "  It  cannot  be  necessary  to  prove  to 
anybody  who  reads  this  work  that  Ideas  govern  the  world,  or  throw  it  into  chaos;  in 
other  words,  that  all  social  mechanism  rests  upon  opinions"  (London  edition,  1896, 
Vol.  I,  p.  15).  *  Essays,  etc.,  London,  1874,  p-  69. 


42 


APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 


He  did  not  know  till  he  was  afterwards  told  that  Comte  had 
expressed  a  view  practically  identical  with  his  own  as  quoted  above, 
and  he  then  supposed  that  this  must  have  been  in  his  Positive 
Polity,  and  inferred  that  Comte  had  later  abandoned  his  original 
position.  In  both  he  was  mistaken.  One  at  least  of  his  clearest 
expressions  of  this  view  is  to  be  found  in  the  Positive  Philosophy. 
It  is  as  follows  : 

Psychology,  or  ideology,  .  .  .  presents  to  us  at  the  outset  a  fundamental 
aberration  ...  by  a  false  appreciation  of  the  relations  between  the  affective 
and  the  intellectual  faculties.  Although  the  preponderance  of  the  latter  has 
been  maintained,  of  course  from  widely  divergent  points  of  view,  all  the  differ- 
ent metaphysicians  have  nevertheless  been  agreed  to  proclaim  it  as  their  princi- 
pal point  of  departure.  The  mind  {esprit)  has  become  the  almost  exclusive 
subject  of  their  speculations,  and  the  various  affective  faculties  have  been 
almost  entirely  neglected  by  them,  and  always  subordinated  to  the  intellect. 
Now  such  a  conception  represents  precisely  the  reverse  of  the  reality,  not  only 
for  animals  but  also  for  man.  For  daily  experience  shows,  on  the  contrary, 
in  the  most  unequivocal  manner,  that  the  affections,  the  inclinations,  the 
passions,  constitute  the  principal  motor  forces  {mobiles)  of  human  life.^ 

That  Comte  did  not  consider  this  as  inconsistent  with,  or  as  an 
abandonment  of,  the  view  expressed  in  the  first  volume  is  shown  by 
the  fact  that  he  virtually  reasserts  the  latter  in  the  fourth  volume 
(p.  460),  published  in  1839.  The  apparent  inconsistency  is  due  to 
a  confusion  of  ideas  on  the  part  of  the  critic,  and  a  failure  to  grasp 
the  spirit  and  meaning  of  Comte' s  philosophy.  The  passage  first 
quoted  occurs  in  his  opening  lecture,  in  which  he  first  sets  forth  his 
celebrated  law  of  the  three  stages  {trois  etats)  in  the  development 
of  human  thought,  and  the  "ideas"  or  "opinions"  to  which  he 
refers  are  the  theological,  metaphysical,  and  positive  ideas  respec- 
tively that  constitute  the  thought  of  the  world  during  each  of  these 
stages.  They  are  world  ideas  or  world  views,  and  they  do  govern 
the  world  and  have  governed  it  throughout  the  history  of  these 
stages.  What  appeared  to  Spencer,  and  has  appeared  to  others  to 
be  the  opposite  view,  viz.,  that  the  feelings  and  passions  of  man- 
kind have  constituted  the  motor  forces  of  society,  is  also  true,  and 
does  not  in  any  way  conflict  with  the  other.  This  view,  which  Comte 
entertained  from  the  first,  and  which  constitutes  the  foundation  of 

1  Philosophic  positive,  Vol.  Ill,  1838,  pp.  542-543. 


Ch.  V]  INTERPRETATION   OF   HISTORY  43 

his  Politique  Positive,  is  the  same  that  I  have  always  defended,  and 
is  neither  more  nor  less  than  the  theory  of  social  forces  underlying 
my  entire  philosophy.    It  represents  the  dynamic  agent. 

Theological  ideas  especially,  and  to  a  less  extent  metaphysical 
ideas,  in  Comte's  sense,  represent  true  world  conceptions,  and  their 
power  to  govern  mankind  was  just  what  Comte  so  clearly  saw. 
But  positive  ideas,  especially  in  his  day,  and  scarcely  more  in  our 
time,  do  not  answer  to  this  description.  They  are  entertained  by 
only  a  small  fraction  of  mankind  and  they  have  but  a  feeble  influ- 
ence in  controlling  human  action.  In  Comte's  mind  to  make  them 
do  so  was  the  supreme  desideratum.  His  final  scheme,  and  what 
he  regarded  as  his  greatest  achievement,  —  the  Politique  Positive, 
—  was  aimed  at  the  accomplishment  of  this  end.  It  might  have 
been  named:  A  Plan  for  the  Conversion  of  Positive  Ideas  into 
World  Ideas,  or,  in  more  popular  language,  A  Plan  for  making 
Scientific  Thought  as  Universal  as  Religious  Thought  has  been. 
But  Comte  is  not  the  only  one  who  has  conceived  this  idea,  and 
whatever  the  practical  difficulties  in  the  way  of  its  realization,  only 
superficial  minds  will  deny  its  ultimate  possibility. 

Dr.  De  Greef  is  another  writer  who  affects  to  repudiate  the  con- 
trolling influence  of  ideas,  and  he  has  placed  himself  on  record  as 
a  defender  of  historical  materialism,  with  certain  reserves.  He  has 
recently  said:  "We  do  not  belong  to  that  ancient  school  which 
maintains  that  ideas  (or  the  Idea)  govern  the  world  .  .  .  feelings 
and  emotions  exert  an  effect  more  intense  and  more  general  than 
ideas  .  .  .  ideas,  and  still  more,  theories,  usually  lag  far  behind 
facts."  ^  Here  the  fallacy  is  clear,  made  especially  so  by  the  last 
remark.  By  ideas  he  means  advanced  ideas,  or,  as  he  says  "  theo- 
ries," while  the  ideas  that  rule  the  world  are  universal  ideas,  the 
very  opposite  of  theories.  I  do  not  know  what  he  means  by  their 
lagging  behind  the  facts.  They  are  always  far  in  advance  of  real- 
ization. The  effective  ideas  are  the  Volkergedanken  of  Bastian, 
Post,  and  the  historical  school.  Ratzenhofer  calls  them  social  ideas, 
and  correctly  says  that  "  the  successful  heroes  of  history  are  only 
the  personification  of  political  and  social  ideas  that  have  sprung 

'  Revue  intemationale  de  sociologie,  ii^  annee,  decembre,  1903,  pp.  882,  883;  La 
Sociologie  economique,  Paris,  1904,  p.  53. 


44  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

from  the  political  and  social  needs  of  a  people."^  The  sum  of  such 
ideas  in  any  country  at  any  given  time  constitutes  the  Zeitgeist.  It 
is  that  part  of  human  thought  which  hes  below  all  doubt,  question, 
schism,  or  discussion.  This  is  true  of  even  the  most  advanced 
countries,  and  therefore  the  phrase  "  public  opinion "  does  not 
express  the  idea.  Public  opinion  means  the  sum  total  rather  of  the 
questions  which  are  under  discussion.  In  the  United  States,  for 
example,  public  opinion  is  concerned  with  all  the  questions  dividing 
political  parties  and  religious  sects,  but  such  ideas  as  those  of 
democracy  in  government,  of  the  separation  of  church  and  state, 
of  monogamy,  etc.,  are  Jiors  concouts.  They  are  settled,  and  any 
suggestion  to  the  contrary  is  social  heresy,  not  to  be  discussed 
but  to  be  exterminated. 

Idea  Forces.  —  If  intellect  is  not  a  force  but  only  a  guide,  it  may 
be  asked  how  ideas  can  move  anything.  This  is  the  second  stum- 
bling-block in  the  present  discussion.  The  question  was  definitively 
answered  in  Pure  Sociology,^  and  all  that  was  said  there  may  be 
considered  as  if  inserted  at  this  point.  If  the  reader  is  not  familiar 
with  it,  he  may  fail  to  understand  what  follows.  M.  Fouillee,  author 
of  the  phrase  "idea  forces  "  {idees-forces),  has  not,  so  far  as  I  am 
aware,  made  the  analysis  of  them  which  I  give  in  that  section,  but 
many  passages  in  his  works  show  that  he  conceives  them  some- 
what in  that  sense.  Discussing  Comte's  statements  and  Spencer's 
criticism,  he  says  :  "  Comte,  they  say,  went  back  to  the  idealistic 
philosophy  when  he  said  that  ideas  and  opinions  governed  the 
world.  .  .  .  But  it  is  not  a  question  of  pure  and  abstract  ideas, 
but  of  ideas  that  embody  feelings  {enveloppant  des  seiiti^nents).  It 
is  these  that  constitute  true  idea  forces."^  And  again,  in  his 
report  on  the  Bordin  prize,  published  as  an  appendix  to  the  work 
above  quoted,  he  says  : 

There  is  no  moral  sentiment,  no  human  art,  industry,  or  science  without 
intelligence  ;  it  is,  then,  intelligence  which  is  the  superior  and  directing  element 
of  human  society  ;  the  history  of  society  is  controlled  {reglee)  by  the  history 
of  thought.  .  .  .    The  author  of  the  memoir  has  not  seen  to  what  extent  this 

1  Gustav  Ratzenhofer,  Die  sociologische  Erkenntnis,  Leipzig,  1898,  pp.  173-174. 

2  Pages  472-474- 

3  Alfred  Fouillee,  Le  Mouvement  positiviste  et  la  conception  sociologique  du 
monde,  Paris,  1896,  p.  244. 


Ch.  V]  BELIEFS  45 

question  of  the  social  value  of  intelligence  is  essential.  He  has  not  examined, 
as  he  should  have  done,  the  objections  of  the  contemporary  naturalist  school. 
No,  says  this  school,  Mr.  Spencer  at  the  head,  it  is  not  ideas  that  lead  the 
world,  it  is  feelings.  But  no  one  imagines  that  pure  ideas  act  upon  the  march 
of  mankind ;  it  is  clear  that  the  ideas  must  become  feelings  in  order  to  be 
effective ;  light,  become  heat,  is  transformed  into  motion.^ 

All  this  is  very  fine,  and  no  one  can  say  it  is  not  true,  but  it  is  in- 
tuitive truth,  not  analytic.  To  say  that  an  idea  envelops  an  emotion 
is  to  indulge  in  poetry.  It  leaves  only  a  vague  sense  of  truth  in  the 
mind.  But  to  say  that  ideas  give  rise  to  feelings,  or  prompt,  cause,  or 
occasion  emotions,  is  to  say  what  everybody  can  verify  in  his  personal 
experience.  The  idea  forces,  then,  are  simply  feelings  prompted  by 
ideas  instead  of  by  external  stimuli.  The  resultant  actions  are  ideo- 
motor  actions  as  distinguished  from  sensori-motor  actions. 

Beliefs.  —  It  may  be  said  that  the  universal  world  ideas  which 
are  said  to  lead  or  rule  the  world  are  simply  beliefs.  This  is  very 
nearly  true,  and  therefore  we  need  to  inquire  specially  into  the 
nature  of  beliefs.  The  difference  between  belief  and  opinion  is 
slight,  at  least  in  popular  usage.  Belief  might  be  defined  as  fixed 
or  settled  opinion,  but  there  is  also  embraced  in  it  a  certain  disre- 
gard of  the  evidence  upon  which  it  rests,  while  in  opinion  a  certain 
amount  of  evidence  is  implied.  Opinions  admit  of  comparison  as 
regards  their  strength  depending  upon  the  evidence,  and  may  be 
very  feebly  held,  the  "weight"  of  evidence  in  their  favor  being 
nearly  balanced  by  that  against  them.  This  cannot  be  said  of 
beliefs.  In  these  the  evidence  is  not  thought  of.  They  are  abso- 
lute and  independent  of  all  proof.  Upon  what,  then,  do  they  rest .-' 
Here  we  reach  the  kernel  of  our  problem.  Beliefs  rest  on  interest. 
But  what  is  interest }  It  \'s,  feeling.  World  views  grow  out  of  feel- 
ings. They  are  the  bulwarks  of  race  safety.  You  cannot  argue 
men  out  of  them.  They  are  the  conditions  to  group  as  well  as  to 
individual  salvation. 

Now  it  is  just  this  element  of  interest  that  links  beliefs  to  de- 
sires and  reconciles  the  ideological  and  economic  interpretations  of 
history  ;  for  economics,  by  its  very  definition  of  value,  is  based  on 
desires  and  their  satisfaction.    Every  belief  embodies  a  desire,  or 

1  Ibid.,  p.  364. 


46  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

rather  a  great  mass  of  desires.  In  this  Ues  the  secret  of  its  power 
to  produce  effects.  The  behef  or  idea,  considered  as  a  purely  intel- 
lectual phenomenon,  is  not  a  force.  The  force  lies  in  the  desire. 
And  here  we  must  be  careful  not  to  invert  the  terms.  The  belief 
does  not  cause  the  desire.  The  reverse  is  much  nearer  the  truth. 
Desires  are  economic  demands  arising  out  of  the  nature  of  man 
and  the  conditions  of  existence.  They  are  demands  for  satisfaction, 
and  the  sum  total  of  the  influences,  internal  and  external,  acting 
upon  a  group  or  an  individual,  leads  to  the  conclusion,  belief,  or  idea 
that  a  certain  proposition  is  true.  That  proposition,  though  always 
reducible  to  the  indicative  form,  is  essentially  an  imperative,  and 
prompts  certain  actions  regarded  as  essential  to  the  preservation 
of  the  individual  or  the  group.  The  fact  that  the  interests  involved 
are  sometimes  transcendental  interests  and  become  increasingly  so 
with  the  intellectual  development  of  the  race,  does  not  affect  the 
truth  of  all  this.  All  interest  is  essentially  economic,  and  seen  in 
their  true  light  religious  interests  are  as  completely  economic  as  the 
so-called  material  interests.  All  conduct  enjoined  by  religion  —  not 
only  the  most  primitive  but  also  the  most  highly  developed  religions 
— aims  at  the  satisfaction  of  desire,  of  which  the  avoidance  of  pun- 
ishment is  only  a  form,  for  economic  considerations  are  always  both 
positive  and  negative  in  this  sense.  And  if  in  the  higher  religions 
the  positive  interests  come  to  predominate  over  the  negative  ones, 
this  only  renders  them  more  typically  economic  in  their  character. 

This  view  of  the  question  has  not  been  wholly  overlooked.  Dr. 
De  Greef  himself  has  written  a  clever  book  on  Political  Beliefs  and 
Doctrines,  in  which  he  ascribes  to  them  an  important  role  in 
human  history.  But  Tarde  has  perhaps  more  fully  illustrated  the 
relations  of  belief  to  desire  than  any  other  author.  Laying  the 
usual  stress  on  imitation  and  invention,  he  finally  asks  : 

"But  what  is  the  substance  or  the  social  force  by  which  this  act 
is  done  }  .  .  .  What  is  invented  or  imitated  is  always  an  idea  or  a 
wish,  a  judgment  or  a  design,  in  which  is  expressed  a  certain 
amount  of  belief  zwd  of  desire.  .  .  .  Belief  and  desire,  then,  are  the 
substance  and  the  force."  ^ 

1  G.  Tarde,  Les  Lois  de  I'imitation,  2e  edition,  Paris,  1895,  P'  ^57>  cf.  also 
pp.  159,  160. 


Ch.  V]  BELIEFS  47 

M.  Tarde  developed  his  ideas  on  this  subject  before  any  of  his 
principal  sociological  works  appeared  and  published  them  in  two 
articles  in  1880.^  He  returns  to  them  frequently,  however,  in 
these  works.2  It  is  significant  that  the  Germans  translate  Tarde's 
word  croyajice  by  their  Weltanschauung,'^  but  this  is  practically  the 
idea  conveyed  by  it  in  Tarde's  philosophy.  Ratzenhofer,  though 
he  uses  the  composite  or  mixed  expression  "  intellectual  force " 
{intcllcctnelicr  Tricb),  comparable  to  Fouillee's  idees-forces,  takes 
pains  to  explain  its  meaning.    He  says  : 

It  is  necessary  to  explain  at  the  outset  the  meaning  of  the  intellectual 
impulse  in  the  social  process,  all  the  more  as  it  was  the  great  error  of  the 
period  of  scientific  culture  just  passed  through  to  believe  in  a  power  of  ideas 
in  themselves,  and  to  gi\-e  to  knowledge  and  reason  in  social  development  a 
meaning  which  they  cannot  possess.* 

What  we  are  dealing  with,  therefore,  is  those  ideas,  opinions,  or 
beliefs  which  have  been  created  by  the  economic  conditions  of  exis- 
tence, using  the  term  "economic"  in  its  widest  sense,  and  which, 
being  regarded  as  essential  to  the  safety  or  existence  of  the  group 
or  of  society,  are  entertained  by  all  its  members  without  any 
attempt  to  inquire  into  their  objective  truth.  They  become  social 
forces  by  embodying  the  feelings  that  created  them,  and  it  is 
immaterial,  provided  we  understand  their  nature,  whether  we  say 
that  they  govern  the  world  or  whether  we  ascribe  this  power  to 
the  underlying  feelings,  or  even,  with  the  historical  materialists,  to 
the  economic  conditions  themselves.  The  true  order  of  the  phe- 
nomena is-that  the  conditions  arouse  the  feelings  and  the  feelings 
create  the  ideas  or  beliefs.  These  last  are  the  final  form  into 
which  the  whole  is  crystallized  in  the  human  mind,  constituting  the 
thought  of  the  age  and  people  in  which  they  prevail,  and  in  har- 
mony with  which  all  activity  takes  place.  This  may  seem  to  be 
the  reverse  of  the  case  of  true  idea  forces  as  defined,  in  which  the 

^  "  La  Croyance  et  le  Desir  at  la  Probabilite  de  leur  mesure,"  Revue  philosophique, 
aout  et  septembre,  1880 ;  "  La  Croyance  et  le  Desir,"  Essais  et  Melanges  sociologiques, 
par  G.  Tarde,  Lyon-Paris,  1895,  pp.  235-308. 

2  See  especially  La  Logique  sociale,  Paris,  1S95,  pp.  5,  12,  13,  15,  24,  2S1  ;  Les 
Lois  sociales,  Paris,  1898,  p-  31. 

*  Paul  Barth,  Die  Philosophic  der  Geschichte  als  Sociologie,  Leipzig,  1897,  p.  212. 

*  Die  sociologische  Erkenntnis,  p.  256. 


48  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

idea  produces  the  feeling  which  prompts  the  action,  then  called  an 
ideo-motor  action.  But  while  it  is  true  as  stated  that  the  eco- 
nomic conditions  create  the  feelings  which  in  turn  determine  the 
character  of  the  thought  of  a  group  or  a  people,  when  it  comes  to 
the  stage  of  action  it  is  these  fixed  and  settled  ideas  that  dictate 
that  action.  And  as  no  action  can  be  performed  without  a  motive, 
i.e.,  a  feeling,  a  desire,  as  its  immediate  cause,  so  these  w'orld  ideas 
must  and  do  suggest  and  thus  create  the  particular  impulses  that 
constitute  the  immediate  motor  forces  of  every  act.  These  are, 
therefore,  true  idea  forces. 

Now  although  the  economic  impulses  —  desires,  wants,  feelings — 
necessarily  precede  the  ideas  —  opinions,  beliefs,  world  conceptions, 
—  still  it  is  the  latter  that  determine  action,  and  the  purely  eco- 
nomic interpretation  of  history  is  utterly  inadequate.  There  are 
many  ways  by  which  this  might  be  illustrated.  A  single  example, 
however,  will  suffice.  This  is  the  well-understood  difference  between 
oriental  and  occidental  civilization.  Here  are  two  great  classes  of 
people  conducting  themselves  in  almost  diametrically  opposite  ways, 
with  the  result  with  which  all  are  familiar.  Half  a  century  ago 
this  difference  w^as  popularly  explained  by  saying  that  Asiatic 
peoples  were  intellectually  inferior  to  European  peoples.  A  few  of 
course  knew  better  even  then,  but  now  every  intelligent  or  well- 
read  person  knows  better.  In  the  exercise  of  the  pure  intellect, 
what  is  called  abstract  reasoning  but  is  really  much  more  truly 
philosophic  generalization,  and  which  is  the  faculty  most  vaunted 
as  indicating  the  superiority  of  the  human  race  to  the  brute  creation 
and  also  the  superiority  of  man  over  woman,  — in  this  faculty  the 
Orientals  have  always  proved  themselves  the  superiors  of  the 
European  races.  In  every  other  intellectual  faculty  that  we  might 
compare  they  are  at  least  fully  equal  to  the  best  minds  of  the  w^est- 
ern  world.  The  difference  in  the  two  civilizations  is  wholly  due  to 
the  difference  in  their  world  views.  Asia  has  pinned  its  faith 
exclusively  to  mind  and  exists  in  an  atmosphere  of  pure  thought. 
Europe  has  to  a  large  extent  during  the  last  three  or  four  centu- 
ries been  acting  upon  a  belief  in  matter.  But,  as  I  have  shown  in 
Pure  Sociology,^  matter  is  dynamic,  and  this  alone  explains  the 

1  Pages  20,  32,  254,  255. 


Ch.  V]  BELIEFS  49 

difference  between  oriental  and  occidental  civilization.  Until 
lately  we  had  no  experimental  proof  that  a  change  in  the  world 
views  would  produce  a  change  in  the  civilization,  but  now  we  have 
such  a  proof.  One  Asiatic  race  has  awakened  to  the  truth  that 
the  eternal  study  of  mind  does  not  yield  national  strength  and 
that  the  study  of  matter  docs  yield  it,  and  has  acted  upon  the 
changed  belief  with  the  most  astonishing  results.  I  do  not  refer 
merely  to  the  military  power  thus  acquired,  which,  whatever  views 
we  may  entertain  with  regard  to  war,  has  always  been  the  first 
requisite  to  national  greatness,  but  there  is  not  a  department  of 
science  in  which  this  race  does  not  now  excel  and  is  not  march- 
ing abreast  of  the  rest  of  the  scientific  world.  Ten  years  ago  two 
members  of  this  race  made  discoveries  that  revolutionized  the 
classification  of  plants  and  opened  up  new  vistas  in  botany,^  and  I 
understand  they  are  doing  splendid  work  in  every  other  depart- 
ment, especially  in  the  practical  sciences  and  their  application  to 
the  arts.  If  this  had  happened  in  India  it  would  have  been  ascribed 
to  Arvan  blood,  but  this  is  a  Mongolian  race,  and  there  is  nothing 
to  which  the  result  can  be  attributed  but  simply  and  solely  a 
change  in  their  world  views.  No  better  example  is  needed  to  show 
that  ideas  do  really  make,  lead,  and  move  the  world,  and  that  if 
mankind  can  only  be  put  into  the  right  mental  attitude  economic 
conditions  and  all  else  can  be  safely  left  to  take  care  of  themselves. 

1  I  called  attention  to  this  in  Pure  Sociology,  p.  319. 


CHAPTER  VI 

TRUTH  AND  ERROR. 

Es  gibt  nothwendjge  Irrthiimer,  durch  die  der  Weg  zur  Wahrheit  geht. — 
Weismanx. 

In  seinen  Gottern  malt  sich  der  Mensch.  —  Schiller. 

All  religions ^rejalse,  although  all  are  probably  useful.  —  Averroes. 

Any  one  living  in  the  twentieth  century  and  pos^ssing  the  best 
part  of  the  knowledge  of  nature,  man,  and  society  that  has  thus 
far  been  brought  to  light,  is  in  a  favorable  position  for  picturing  to 
himself  the  natural  course  that  the  human  mind  must  pursue  in  its 
development  out  of  an  original  state  of  complete  non-rationality 
through  all  the  stages  of  rationality  up  to  that  of  such  a  degree 
of  intelligence  as  he  himself  possesses.  Before  the  state  of  ration- 
ality was  reached  all  the  other  faculties  were  well  developed.  The 
senses  were  quite  as  keen  as  they  are  now,  perhaps  more  so.  The 
non-rational  being  from  which  man  descended  could  see,  hear,  feel, 
taste,  and  smell  as  well  as  the  most  enlightened  person  in  the  world 
to-day.  All  the  phenomena  of  nature  were  therefore  appealing  to 
him  as  strongly  as  they  appeal  to  civilized  men.  We  can  suppose 
him  to  take  the  same  notice  of  them  and  no  more,  as  do  the  animals 
with  which  we  are  familiar.  But  the  germ  of  reason  at  last  gradually 
sprouts  and  there  arise  dim  ideas  of  the  meaning  of  phenomena. 
What  a  dog  thinks  when  he  bays  the  moon  we  do  not  know,  or 
whether  he  really  thinks  at  all.  But  ipchoate  man  certainly  did 
at  length  reach  the  stage  at  which  he  could  think,  however  feeble 
his  thinking  may  have  been.  It  is  difficult  to  conceive  of  the 
slowness  of  this  dawning  of  the  rational  faculty  and  of  the  effect 
of  this  slowness  itself  in  shaping  ideas.  It  was  a  differential  process, 
like  all  the  other  genetic  processes  of  nature,  and  the  kinetographic 
picture  of  it  which  we  form  necessarily  leaves  long  intervals  un- 
represented.    But  at  last  we  have  in  view  a  rational  being  in  the 

5° 


Ch.  VI]  ANTHROPOMORPHIC   IDEAS  5 1 

full  presence  of  nature.  It  must  not  be  supposed  that  this  being 
begins  at  once  to  philosophize  or  even  really  to  contemplate  nature. 
The  animal  considers  nature  solely  in  relation  to  its  wants  and 
their  satisfaction.  The  prehuman  creature  did  the  same,  and  the 
earliest  man  cou^d  only  take  a  short  step  beyond  this.  He  still 
considered' 'nature  solely  from  the  standpoint  of  his  interests.  It 
was  even  then,  and  then  much  more  than  at  laterstages,  the 
economic  conditions  that  shaped  his  thought.  But,  just  emerging 
froirTthe  animal  stage,  like  animals  in  general,  he'was  wild.  Living 
in  a  pain  ec'onomy,  as  all  wild  animals  do,  his  chief  business  was 
self-preservation,  and  the  ruling  motive  was  fear.  His  primary 
attitude  toward  nature,  therefore,  was  fear  of  it. 

Anthropomorphic  Idfas  '. 

It  is  difficult  for  one  with  such  an  acquaintance  as  nearly  every- 
body now  has  of  the  causes  of  the  ordinary  natural  phenomena  to 
form  an  idea  of  a  human  being  or  race  of  men  utterly  devoid  of 
all  such  knowledge.  The  study  of  animals  does  not  help  much  in 
conceiving  of  this  because  they  are  not  rational  beings  in  the  sense 
of  even  the  most  primitive  men.  Animals  act  naturally  in  the 
presence  of  phenomena.  They  are  controlled  entirely  by  their 
wants  and  fears  and  do  about  what  is  naturally  expected  of  them 
in  each  case.  A  horse  has  the  same  fear  of  a  railroad  train  when 
standing  beside  the  track  as  when  standing  on  the  track,  while 
a  human  being  will  stand  beside  the  track  as  the  train  passes 
wholly  without  fear.  The  difference  is  due  to  the  presence  in  the 
latter  of  a  r^ional  facjolty  and  its  absence  in  the  former.  A  fact 
as  simple  as  that  a  train  cannot  well  leave  the  rail  would  probably 
be  within  the  comprehension  of  primitive  man,  and  there  are  thou- 
sands of  natural  phenomena  coming  within  that  class,  and  about 
which  the  savage  reasons  with  sufficient  clearness  to  avoid  danger 
in  most  cases.  Comte  remarked  that  •'  for  all_orders_oLplienom.enii 
whatever,  the  simplest  and  commonest  facts  have  always  been 
regarded  as  essentially  subject  to  natural  laws,  instead  of  being 
attributed  to  the  arbitrary  will  of  supernatural  agents."  ^ 

'  I'hilosophie  positive,  Vol.  IV,  p.  4^1. 


52  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

But  this  is  true  only  of  simple  phenomena,  such,  for  example, 
as  the  effects  of  gravitation  on  stones  loosened  on  a  hillside, 
branches  torn  from  trees,  or  water  in  brooks.  As  regards  all  the 
more  obscure  phenomena,  such  as  wind,  night  and  day,  the  sun, 
moon,  and  stars,  instead  of  ignoring  them,  or  simply  adapting  them- 
selves to  them,  as  animals  seem  to  do,  the  primitive  man  could  not 
avoid  reasoning  about  them,  trying  to  explain  them.  It  is  here 
that  religion  and  science  are  said  to  have  a  common  base  in  the 
effort  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  nature.  The  fact  first  to  appeal 
to  the  mind  was  that  of  movement,  or  activity.  While  most  objects 
seemed  to  be  at  rest,  there  were  many  that  were  in  motion  at  least 
a  part  of  the  time.  It  was  easy  to  move  a  small  object  with  the 
hand,  to  roll  or  throw  a  stone,  to  swing  a  branch  or  a  club.  Men 
and  animals  were  constantly  moving  their  own  limbs  and  going 
from  place  to  place.  All  this  seemed  perfectly  intelligible,  as  it 
was  clearly  within  the  power  and  experience  of  every  living  thing. 
But  this  was  the  only  kind  of  activity  that  could  be  explained  by 
the  primitive  mind.  It  is  therefore  natural,  and  was  in  fact  unavoid- 
able, that  all  motion  should  be  explained  on  the  same  principle  as 
animal  movement.  In  short,  it  was  inevitable  that  all  nature 
should  be  regarded  as  animated.  This  is  the  basis  of  the  universal 
animism  of  savage  philosophy.  Ideas  of  this  class  are  called 
anthropomorphic  ideas.  The  expression  is  quite  correct,  because, 
although  inorganic  movements  are  assimilated  to  animal  move- 
ments, still  the  latter  are  as  much  inferences  from  human  move- 
ments as  are  the  former.  The  reasoning  in  both  cases  proceeds 
from  observation  of  self,  but  in  the  one  case  the  inference  is  true 
and  in  the  other  it  is  false. 

Religions  Ideas.  —  Most  early  religious  ideas  are  anthropomor- 
phic. Reason  begins  to  work  upon  surrounding  phenomena  and 
to  interpret  them  in  terms  of  self.  The  leaves  and  grass  tremble 
and  quake  in  the  wind,  but  the  wind  is  invisible.  The  waves  dash 
upon  the  shore,  but  the  power  behind  them  is  unseen.  The  river 
rolls  on  forever  past  the  camp,  but  nothing  is  there  to  make  it  do 
so.  The  clouds  fly  across  the  sky,  changing  their  form  at  every 
movement  and  assuming  fantastic  shapes.  Ever  and  anon  lines 
of  fire  streak  the  horizon  accompanied  by  loud  detonations  and 


4 


Ch.  VI]  SPIRITUAL  BEINGS  53 

a  prolonged  roar,  and  occasionally  a  tree  near  by  is  riven  into 
fragments.  Every  day  a  round  blazing  orb  rises  out  of  the  sea 
or  the  plain,  describes  a  great  arc  above,  and  plunges  back  into  the 
earth  on  the  opposite  side.  The  moon  and  the  stars  do  the  same 
at  night,  but  the  moon  changes  its  form  and  times  of  appearance, 
and  some  of  the  stars  wander.  The  savage,  mostly  without  a 
shelter  by  day  and  lying  out  under  the  canopy  of  heaven  by  night, 
sees  all  this  much  more  vividly  than  civilized  man,  and  while  we 
know  that  he  does  not  wonder  at  it  any  more  than  a  rustic  wonders 
at  a  rainbow,  still  he  tries  to  explain  it  and  has  very  little  difficulty 
in  doing  so.  All  these  elements  of  nature,  to  be  capable  of  moving 
and  changing  their  forms,  must  be  alive,  i.e.,  ensouled.  They  must 
therefore  themselves  be  living  beings,  endowed  not  only  with 
spontaneous  activity  but  with  some  degree  of  intelligence  similar 
to  his  own.  This  conception  is  the  essence  of  fetishism,  —  the 
earliest  form  of  religion  in  the  sense  of  a  belief.  Out  of  this  grew 
all  other  religious  ideas,  —  not  simply  primitive  beliefs,  but  the  whole 
series  of  theological  conceptions  and  all  beliefs  respecting  soul 
and  spirit. 

Spiritual  Beings.  — Tylor's  "minimum  definition  "  of  religion  is 
the  belief  in  spiritual  beings.  He  and  others  have  traced  the  origin 
of  such  a  belief.  A  very  brief  sketch  is  all  that  is  needed  here.  In 
its  simplest  form  the  problem  is  to  explain  the  conception  of  spirit 
as  it  exists  in  the  minds  of  primitive  men.  We  find  it  in  tribes  so 
widely  separated  as  to  preclude  the  possibility  of  derivation,  and  it 
is  safe  to  conclude  that  it  is  a  conception  at  which  all  minds  must 
necessarily  arrive  under  the  conditions  of  existence  to  which  every 
race  of  men  has  been  subjected.  Given  these  conditions  and  an 
incipient  rational  faculty  and  the  idea  of  spiritual  existence  is  a 
logical  necessity. 

The  primary  causes  of  the  belief  in  a  spiritual  existence  and 
spiritual  beings  are  twofold,  or  belong  to  two  somewhat  different 
groups.  One  of  these  groups  of  causes  may  be  distinguished  as 
subjective,  in  the  sense  of  affecting  each  individual  personally  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  lead  him  to  the  conclusion  that  he  possesses  an 
invisible  or  intangible  double  or  spiritual  part,  which,  for  a  portion 
of  the  time,  at  least,  is  detached  and  separated  from  his  original 


54  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

corporeal  self.  The  other  group  of  causes  may  be  called  objective, 
being  calculated  to  lead  the  primitive  man  to  the  conclusion  that 
there  are  intelligent  agencies  which  are  devoid  of  any  material 
attributes,  existing  independent  of  himself  and  of  human  beings  in 
general.  The  phenomena  of  this  latter  class  have  already  been 
alluded  to. 

To  the  subjective  group  belong  shadows,  reflections,  echoes, 
dreams,  delirium,  insanity,  epilepsy,  swooning,  trance,  and  death. 
It  is  difficult  for  the  well-informed  reader  to  conceive  how  utterly 
devoid  the  savage  mind  is  of  all  knowledge  of  the  true  nature  of 
any  of  these  phenomena.  There  is  no  greater  mistake  than  to  sup- 
pose that  well-developed  mental  faculties  are  any  help  in  under- 
standing such  things.  There  is  no  degree  of  intellectual  power 
conceivable  which,  unaided  by  science,  would  be  capable  of  furnish- 
ing a  correct  interpretation  of  any  of  them.  The  enlightened  world 
understands  them  simply  and  solely  because  it  has  been  taught 
what  science,  in  the  face  of  appearances  to  the  contrary,  has  labo- 
riously investigated  and  explained. 

In  contemplating  his  shadow  the  savage  has  no  conception  of 
the  nature  and  effect  of  light.  He  simply  sees  his  own  form,  more 
or  less  distorted  by  perspective,  without  substance,  thickness,  or 
tangibility,  moving  as  he  moves,  and  changing  its  shape  with  the 
altitude  of  the  sun  or  the  angle  of  the  object  against  which  it  is 
cast.  He  readily  perceives  that  he  is  the  cause  of  it,  that  it  is  in 
some  way  a  product  of  himself.  He  can  only  conclude  that  there 
is  something  in  him,  or  belonging  to  him,  which  can  go  out  and 
occupy  another  part  of  space  from  that  occupied  by  his  real  original 
self,  —  another  self,  a  double,  but  devoid  of  flesh  and  blood,  a  spir- 
itual nature.  And  thus  we  find  throughout  all  mytholog}^  even 
that  of  the  cultured  Greeks  and  Romans,  the  terms  "shadow"  and 
"spirit"  inextricably  confounded. 

When  the  savage  looks  into  a  pool  of  still  water  he  sees  this 
other  self  there,  only  far  more  distinctly.  Instead  of  being  a  mere 
form  it  now  possesses  color  and  recognizable  features.  Others  who 
see  it  inform  him  that  all  the  lineaments  are  his  own.  He  sees 
the  images  of  others,  which  agree  in  all  respects  with  the  originals. 
But  when  he  plunges  his  hand  into   the   pool  there   is  nothing 


Ch.  VI]  SPIRITUAL   BEINGS  55 

there.  What  he  sees  must  be  immaterial,  and  this  conception  does 
not  differ  in  any  essential  respect  from  that  of  spirit.  It  is  true 
that  animals  and  inanimate  objects  also  cast  their  shadows  and 
reflect  their  images  ;  but  every  one  knows  that  these,  as  well  as 
human  beings,  are  endowed  by  savages  with  a  double  existence  and 
a  spiritual  part.  The  reasoning  is  rigidly  logical  from  the  prem- 
ises, far  more  so  than  much  of  the  reasoning  of  the  higher  races. 

The  lessons  from  sight  are  confirmed  by  those  from  sound.  A 
chieftain  shouts  in  a  mountain  gorge  and  his  whoop  is  repeated 
from  the  surrounding  hills.  It  is  not  an  answer;  it  is  his  own  voice 
uttering  his  own  words,  but  from  a  distant  point.  He  knows  that 
he  is  not  himself  far  up  on  the  rocky  cliff  whence  the  sound  pro- 
ceeds, and  yet  he  cannot  doubt  that  he  is  its  author.  It  must  be 
his  other  self  through  which  he  has  the  power  of  speaking. 

The  warrior  sleeps,  and  while  sleeping  he  wanders  far  awa}', 
meets  other  men  and  other  scenes,  performs  feats  of  prowess,  or 
enjoys  pleasures  never  before  tasted.  He  awakes,  and  every  cir- 
cumstance tells  him  that  he  has  all  this  time  lain  quietly  in  one 
place.  Yet  he  recollects  all  these  exploits,  and  he  knows  that  he 
has  himself  experienced  them.  He  is  obliged  to  conclude  that  the 
immaterial  part  of  himself  has  actually  been  absent,  has  seen 
the  objects,  performed  the  deeds,  felt  the  pleasures,  and  witnessed 
the  events  enacted  in  his  dream. 

Suppose  that  disease  lays  him  low,  fever  racks  his  brain,  and  he 
becomes  delirious.  Again  he  wanders,  experiences,  suffers,  but  he 
may  not  be  able  to  recall  these  scenes  and  states.  He  performs 
strange  actions,  which  others  subsequently  describe  to  him.  Both 
he  and  his  friends  know  that  he  would  not  himself  have  acted  thus, 
and  the  conclusion  is  natural  that  the  spirit  of  another  must  have 
entered  into  and  possessed  him.  Hence  we  find  that  everywhere 
efforts  are  made  to  drive  out  the  evil  spirit.  Catalepsy,  insanity, 
and  all  pathologic  states  affecting  the  mind  fall  under  this  general 
class,  and  receive  this  explanation.  And  thus  it  happens,  as  every 
one  knows,  that  exorcism  practically  constitutes  the  healing  art  of 
primitive  peoples. 

In  trance  the  spirit  assumes  another  state,  which  by  practice  and 
fasting  may  sometimes  be  voluntarily  superinduced,  and  we  thus 


56  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

hav^e  the  widespread  phenomenon  known  as  ecstasy.  This  is  ex- 
plained as  the  intentional  replacing  of  the  one's  own  spirit  by 
another  presumably  superior  one.  Of  this  we  have  a  survival  in 
modern  mediumship.  In  the  complete  trance,  and  in  swooning  or 
syncope,  in  so  far  as  these  differ,  there  is  complete  temporary  aban- 
donment of  the  body  by  the  soul.  The  latter  is  supposed  to  go 
away,  and  there  is  usually  nothing  to  indicate  where  it  has  gone  or 
what  it  is  doing.  The  inference  is  common  that  it  has  gone  to  take 
possession  for  the  time  being  of  some  other  body. 

But  swoons,  and  especially  cataleptic  trance,  may  have  consider- 
able duration,  and  the  transition  from  this  to  death  is,  to  the  savage 
mind,  very  easy  and  natural.  Death  is  simply  a  permanent  swoon. 
The  double  has  gone,  this  time  never  to  return.  Where  has  it 
gone  ?  This  question  is  variously  answered,  but  in  most  tribes  of 
low  rank  the  idea  of  any  distant  abode  for  these  departed  spirits  is 
entirely  wanting.  They  are  usually  supposed  to  remain  near  the 
spot  where  they  left  the  body  or  where  the  body  is  finally  placed, 
and  an  immense  number  and  variety  of  mortuary  and  burial  cus- 
toms attest  the  universality  of  this  general  belief.  These  all  point 
to  one  notion  common  to  all  races,  namely,  that  of  the  continued 
existence  after  death  of  the  incorporeal  part  of  man. 

The  above  constitutes  the  genesis  of  the  universal  belief  in  a 
spiritual  existence  and  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  its  universality. 
It  is  the  necessary  conclusion  which  the  primitive  man  must  draw, 
as  soon  as  he  can  reason  at  all,  from  the  phenomena  which  nature 
always  presents.  The  belief  of  an  after-life  in  general  is  due  to  the 
simple  fact  that  from  identical  phenomena  the  reasoning  faculty- 
which  is  everywhere  the  same,  will  uniformly  deduce  the  same 
conclusion. 

The  idea  of  the  survival  of  the  spirits  of  individuals  that  die 
could  not  fail  to  exert  a  profound  influence  upon  the  living.  Con- 
ceiving, as  savages  do,  that  the  spirit  remains  near  the  scene  of  its 
career  during  life,  they  could  not  stop  short  of  peopling  every  spot 
with  innumerable  spirits.  With  few  exceptions  these  spirits  are 
regarded  as  evil  disposed,  and  to  them  are  attributed  most  of  the 
misfortunes  that  befall  the  living.  All  space  thus  becomes  filled 
with  myriads  of  spiritual  beings,  the  manes  of  departed  men,  and 


Ch.  VI]  SPIRITUAL  BEINCxS  57 

these  have  been  feared,  worshiped,  implored,  and  propitiated  under 
a  variety  of  names. 

A  still  more  important  consequence  of  this  belief  is  that  which 
follows  on  the  death  of  great  chieftains  or  mighty  rulers.  They, 
too,  linger  round  the  places  of  their  glorious  achievements,  and  are 
the  invisible  spectators  of  the  doings  of  their  former  subjects.  For 
a  while  elaborate  ceremonies  are  performed  over  the  tomb  of  the 
dead  hero.  His  weapons  are  usually  buried  with  him  to  arm  him 
in  the  next  life.  His  possessions  are  frequently  placed  in  his 
grave  to  be  used  again  ;  too  often  slaves  and  wives  are  sacrificed 
to  accompany  him  and  minister  to  his  wants.  As  time  goes  on  his 
earthly  exploits  are  more  and  more  exaggerated,  until  they  become 
marvels  and  miracles.  Complete  apotheosis  is  the  ultimate  result. 
This  takes  the  form  of  ancestor-worship,  regarded  by  some  as  the 
basis  and  beginning  of  all  theological  conceptions. 

The  above  are  fair  samples  of  the  subjective  influences  which 
have  led  the  primitive  man  to  a  belief  in  the  existence  of  spirit,  of 
a  spiritual  part  in  man,  and  of  spiritual  beings  in  general.  They 
might  in  themselves  seem  adequate  to  account  for  such  a  belief 
and  for  its  universality ;  but  to  them  we  have  now  to  add  the 
causes  which  I  have  distinguished  as  objective,  strengthening  and 
confirming  the  subjective  causes,  and  swelling  the  stream  of  evi- 
dence poured  into  the  receptive  mind  of  untutored  man. 

Under  the  head  of  anthropomorphic  ideas  last  treated  a  few  of 
these  influences  were  enumerated.  We  saw  that  early  man,  unac- 
quainted with  the  operation  of  natural  forces,  accounted  for  all 
movements  in  the  inanimate  world  on  the  principle  of  an  indwell- 
ing consciousness.  The  subjective  influences  that  we  have  now 
passed  in  review  were  in  perfect  harmony  with  this  belief,  since 
now,  with  the  vast  accumulating  hosts  of  liberated  human  doubles, 
there  was  no  lack  of  material  for  animating  every  object  in  nature. 
We  thus  have  a  rational  basis  for  fetishism  as  well  as  for  animal- 
worship. 

As  we  have  already  seen,  early  ideas  are  necessarily  anthropo- 
morphic. They  are  based  on  the  individual's  experience  of  his  own 
powers.  The  most  fundamental  of  all  such  experiences  are  those 
connected  with  the  power  of  spontaneous  movement.    The  savage's 


58  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

idea  of  life  is  ability  to  move,  and  whatever  moves  without  being 
visibly  moved  by  some  living  creature  is  supposed  to  be  itself 
alive.  Hence  one  of  the  first  results  of  human  reasoning  is  to 
attribute  life  to  certain  inanimate  objects.  The  activities  of  inani- 
mate things  are,  moreover,  generally  conceived  as  conscious  and 
intentional, — as  manifestations  of  will  and  intelligence. 

Akin  to  this  conception  is  that  of  the  presumed  power  of  meta- 
morphosis which  a  certain  class  of  phenomena  led  primitive  man 
to  ascribe  to  almost  every  object  in  nature.  Not  only  can  material 
objects  move,  but  they  can  also  change,  become  other  things,  van- 
ish and  dissolve  entirely,  ceasing  longer  to  exist,  or  they  can 
reappear  at  will  in  the  same  or  in  some  altered  form  or  guise. 

When  we  say  that  -early  man  reasons  logically,  it  must  not  be 
inferred  that  this  involves  a  recognition  of  the  laws  of  causation  as 
understood  by  scientific  men.  He  indeed  requires  and  insists  upon 
a  cause,  but  it  is  rarely  a  true  cause  or  causa  cfficiens.  It  is  usu- 
ally a  final  cause  or  causa  fiiialis,  and  this  serves  his  purpose 
equally  well.  He  always  demands  a  reason,  but  it  is  rarely  or 
never  what  is  technically  called  a  "  sufficient  reason  "  {ratio  suffi- 
ciens).  Yet  the  efficient  cause  is  the  only  cause  and  the  sufificient 
reason  is  the  only  reason  that  modern  science  recognizes;  and  this 
is  now  so  well  understood  that  it  has  become  customary  to  call 
that  a  logical  mind  which  insists  upon  a  strictly  mechanical  ante- 
cedent for  the  explanation  of  every  phenomenon.  This  is  not  the 
primitive  sense  of  either  the  term  "logical"  or  "rational,"  and  it 
is  not  the  sense  in  which  it  can  be  applied  to  the  aboriginal  mind 
of  man.  The  recognition  of  a  will  to  move  or  a  will  to  change  is 
all  that  most  minds,  even  among  somewhat  advanced  races,  require  ; 
and  the  great  weft  of  mythology  and  folk-lore  of  such  races  — 
the  Arabian  Nights'  Entertainments,  the  Homeric  and  Ossianic 
poems,  and  the  mass  of  mythic  lore  and  legend  that  .makes  up  the 
early  literature  of  every  cultured  nation,  with  its  diluted  and  degen- 
erate remains  that  are  taught  to  our  children  in  the  nursery,  and 
the  ease  and  interest  with  which  it  is  all  absorbed  by  the  latter  — 
amply  attests  the  adequacy  of  what  may  be  distinguished  as  the 
logic  of  magic  for  all  minds  not  thoroughly  trained  in  the  logic  of 
law. 


Ch.  VI]  SPIRITUAL  BEINGS  59 

The  power  of  natural  objects  to  change  their  form  at  will  is 
constantly  forced  upon  the  mind  of  early  man.  The  formation  and 
dissipation  of  clouds  ;  the  succession  of  daylight,  darkness,  and  the 
seasons  ;  the  changes  of  the  moon  ;  the  movements  of  the  planets  ; 
the  apparent  revolutions  of  the  sun,  moon,  and  stars  ;  the  appear- 
ance of  comets,  meteors,  auroras,  rainbows,  halos,  lightning  flashes; 
the  slower  processes  of  vegetable  and  animal  growth  and  decay  ;  the 
emerging  of  birds  from  eggs,  of  moths  from  chrysalids  ;  indeed, 
the  phenomena  of  reproduction  in  general,  as  well  as  of  life  and 
death,  — all  these  must  have  rendered  the  conception  of  indefinite 
transmutability  at  will  throughout  all  nature  a  familiar  one  to  the 
savage  mind. 

The  manifestations  of  power  inherent  in  nature  through  earth- 
quakes, tornadoes,  and  thunderbolts  forced  these  ideas  home  with 
a  terrible  sanction.  The  most  typical  of  all  these  influences  is  that 
of  wind.  It  is  the  embodiment  of  power  without  visible  cause. 
The  savage  never  thinks  of  air  as  a  material  substance.  To  him  it 
is  simply  a  manifestation  of  will,  —  the  expression  of  a  purpose  or 
wish  by  a  spiritual  agent.  Hence  the  frequent  identification  of  the 
terms  "wind"  and  "spirit"  (iTvevfia). 

The  savage  knows  nothing  of  causes  except  as  they  are  exem- 
plified in  his  own  muscular  actions.  With  this  narrow  induction  he 
can  only  reason  that  all  effects  are  produced  by  such  causes.  His 
reasoning  is  in  all  cases  teleological.  Not  a  leaf  trembles  in  the 
breeze,  not  a  wave  washes  the  shore,  but  that  in  his  mind  it  is  the 
result  of  will.  ^Eolus  and  Neptune  are  but  the  refined  embodi- 
ments, in  a  more  civilized  people,  of  these  crude  primitive  concep- 
tions. All  the  imaginary  beings  conceived  as  exerting  this  will 
power  are  highly  anthropomorphic  in  their  character,  and  differ 
from  the  spiritual  part  of  man  only  in  being  detached  from  the 
animal  body. 

There  exists,  therefore,  overwhelming  evidence,  both  of  the  sub- 
jective and  objective  kind,  to  show  that  a  rational  being  placed  in 
a  world  like  this  must  necessarily  conclude  that  there  is  such  a 
thing  as  spirit,  —  an  invisible,  intangible,  conscious  power,  not 
occupying  space,  and  wholly  independent  of  the  conditions  that 
restrict  the  actions  of  embodied  beings.    Not  less  irresistible  are 


6o  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

the  proofs  that  the  conscious,  intelligent  motive  power  of  bodily 
action  in  each  individual  is  in  fact  such  a  spirit,  and  is  capable 
under  certain  circumstances  of  quitting  the  body  for  a  longer  or 
shorter  period,  of  entering  another  body  temporarily  or  perma- 
nently, or  of  abandoning  the  body  altogether. 

The  facts  above  enumerated  constitute  the  basis  of  all  religious 
ideas.  They  developed  naturally  along  two  somewhat  different  lines. 
From  a  notion  of  the  temporary  continuance  of  the  spiritual  life  to 
that  of  its  permanent  continuance  is  but  a  step,  since  the  spiritual 
part  is  naturally  conceived  as  indestructible.  The  ideas  that  grew 
up  with  regard  to  metamorphosis  in  nature,  coupled  with  the  belief 
that  animals,  too,  have  spirits,  and  that  spirits  may  pass  from  one 
body  into  another,  led  unavoidably  to  the  idea  that  the  spirits  of 
men  might  have  previously  occupied  the  bodies  of  animals.  Most 
of  the  wide-spread  animal  totemism  is  probably  due  to  this  belief. 
At  a  higher  stage  in  intellectual  development  this  gradually  passed 
into  the  well-known  doctrine  of  the  transmigration  of  souls,  or 
metempsychosis.  Thus  far  the  reasoning  was  faultless,  considering 
the  premises,  from  the  standpoint  of  logicality.  It  lost  this  char- 
acter only  when,  in  the  two  great  religions  latest  to  develop, 
Christianity  and  Mohammedanism,  the  possibility  of  the  origination 
of  a  spirit  at  some  given  point  of  time  was  coupled  with  the  notion 
of  its  infinite  continuance  after  that  point  of  time.  I  confine  this 
to  the  two  religions  named  not  without  being  fully  aware  that 
learned  men  maintain  that  the  doctrine  was  taught  by  Plato  and 
accepted  by  many  Greeks  and  Romans  prior  to  the  Christian  era. 
A  careful  study  of  this  question  shows  that  it  was  never  taught  in 
this  crude  form  by  the  ancients.  Plato's  statement  of  it,  most  fully 
elaborated  in  his  Phaedon,  is  distinctly  tinged  with  the  Pythagorean 
element  borrowed  from  India,  and  spirit  is  conceived  by  Plato  as 
something  wholly  independent  of  time.  The  anomalous  absence 
of  a  belief  in  a  continued  personal  existence  among  the  Hebrews 
has  been  explained  on  the  theory  that  it  was  regarded  by  them 
as  barbaric,  and  was  rejected  largely  because  it  formed  a  part  of 
the  religion  of  the  Babylonians  and  Chaldeans,  with  whom  they 
were  at  war  and  whom  they  took  pains  not  to  imitate  in  any 
respect. 


Ch.  VI]  SPIRITUAL  BEINGS  6 1 

The  other,  or  objective,  line  along  which  the  early  religious  ideas 
developed  took  the  form  of  creating  a  great  number  of  powerful 
spiritual  beings,  or  gods.  The  general  direction  was  that  of  dimin- 
ishing their  number  and  increasing  their  power.  Mr.  Spencer  has 
argued  that  the  basis  of  the  whole  is  to  be  found  in  ancestor- 
worship.  This,  in  so  far  as  true,  links  the  objective  closely  to  the 
subjective  movement,  since  the  gods  are  then  simply  the  disem- 
bodied spirits  of  the  great  chieftains  and  heroes  of  each  race  of 
men.  It  is  impossible  to  disentangle  such  intricate  threads  of 
evidence,  and  while  there  is  much  to  be  said  for  this  view,  it  is 
probable  that  in  the  total  absence  of  ancestor-worship  there  would 
still  be  no  lack  of  all  manner  of  deities  in  any  race  of  men.  The 
more  striking  inanimate  objects  are  early  personified  and  deified. 
The  most  striking  of  all  objects  in  nature  is  the  sun,  and  sun- 
worship  is  one  of  the  most  widely  diffused  religions  of  the  world. 
But  animals,  plants,  stocks,  and  stones  are  also  worshiped,  and 
scarcely  anything  can  be  named  that  has  not  at  some  time  and 
place  been  the  subject  of  adoration.  These  fetishistic  religions 
were  followed  in  more  developed  races  by  those  in  which  a  great 
multitude  of  deities  presided  over  the  different  objects  of  nature 
and  finally  over  all  the  varied  fields  of  human  activity.  Such  was 
polytheism,  of  which  the  Greek  theogony  presents  us  with  the 
most  elaborate  example.  But  here  and  everywhere  there  is  seen 
a  tendency  toward  the  establishment  of  a  hierarchy  of  superior 
and  subordinate  deities.  Attempts  have  been  made  to  trace  this 
tendency  through  successive  stages  in  which  the  inferior  deities 
were  gradually  eliminated  until  only  one  supreme  being  remained. 
With  all  the  vicissitudes  of  human  history  this  cannot  be  success- 
fully done,  and  it  can  only  be  regarded  as  indicating  the  theoretical 
course  of  the  progress  of  theological  conceptions.  That  there  was, 
however,  an  intermediate  stage  of  dualism,  in  which  the  spiritual 
power  was  somewhat  evenly  divided  between  two  great  antago- 
nistic deities,  one  of  good  or  light,  and  the  other  of  evil  or  dark- 
ness, is  attested  by  the  Persian  religion ;  and  the  Christian  Satan 
seems  to  be  a  mere  modification  of  Ahriman. 


62  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

Religious  Structures 

I  prefer  this  expression  to  that  of  "ecclesiastical  institutions," 
because  the  meaning  of  the  latter  phrase  requires  to  be  so  greatly 
stretched  in  order  to  make  it  include  the  earliest  forms.  It  implies 
the  existence  of  something  that  can  be  properly  called  a  church, 
and  nothing  to  which  this  term  will  apply  occurs  either  in  any 
primitive  race  of  men,  nor,  indeed,  in  any  of  the  great  more  or 
less  civilized  Asiatic  peoples.  I  do  not  mean  that  a  church  neces- 
sarily implies  a  building  such  as  those  to  which  the  name  is  now 
applied,  for  it  has  also  quite  as  often  meant  worship  in  the  open 
air  beneath  the  shade  of  the  oak.  Early  worship  was  of  course  in 
the  open  air,  because  men  worshiped  long  before  they  learned 
to  construct  even  the  simplest  forms  of  shelter.  And  not  only 
among  rude  peoples  but  among  some  far  advanced  temples  of 
worship  preceded  domestic  habitations  and  far  outstripped  them 
in  size,  beauty,  and  elaborate  design.  But  it  is  also  true  that 
religious  organization,  taking  the  whole  world  and  all  time  into 
the  account,  deserves  the  appellation  "  ecclesiastical "  only  within 
restricted  areas  and  during  a  comparatively  brief  period.  The 
term  "priesthood,"  used  objectively  and  historically,  and  stripped  of 
that  depreciatory  tincture  that  a  single  sect  has  sought  to  give 
it,  properly  applies  to  the  entire  religious  organization  of  the  world, 
from  the  simplest  to  the  most  complex  and  elaborate.  This  is 
therefore  the  proper  substitute  for  the  word  "  church  "  in  any  work 
that  seeks  to  portray  the  religious  movement  of  the  world,  and 
"  sacerdotal  institutions  "  is  a  phrase  that  possesses  the  requisite 
breadth  for  embracing  this  vast  field.  These  are  true  religious 
structures,  the  origin  and  nature  of  which  we  have  now  to 
consider. 

We  have  already  seen  that  primitive  man,  living,  as  he  must, 
in  a  pain  economy,  is  and  always  has  been  a  prey  to  innumerable 
fears.  Fear  of  nature  at  large  and  the  elements,  fear  of  wild 
animals,  and  fear  of  other  men  make  him  wild  like  the  wild 
beasts,  which  are  so  for  like  reasons,  and  cause  him  perpetually 
to  cringe  and  watch  and  fly,  or  fight  if  brought  to  bay.  A  com- 
plete slave  to  these  fears,  he  scarce  ever  enjoys  a  moment  of  peace, 


Ch.  VI]  RELIGIOUS  STRUCTURES  63 

or  rest,  or  true  happiness.  But  all  these  sources  of  fear  combined, 
which  are  common  to  him  and  the  animal  world,  are  as  nothing 
compared  to  another  source,  unknown  to  animals,  —  the  fear  of 
spiritual  beings.  This  great  overshadowing  awe  he  has  created  for 
himself  by  the  exercise  of  his  reason.  No  creature  devoid  of  reason 
can  become  the  victim  of  it.  Religion  is  a  product  of  reason. 
From  the  other  sources  of  fear  there  are  modes  of  escape.  From 
the  elements  he  can  protect  himself  to  some  degree  by  finding 
or  digging  holes  in  the  earth,  or,  as  the  inventive  faculty  develops, 
by  constructing  rude  habitations  and  the  simplest  forms  of  cloth- 
ing. Wild  animals  he  can  learn  to  destroy  by  contriving  weapons 
and  snares.  The  assaults  of  men  he  can  meet  with  counter -assaults, 
and  the  most  powerful  or  best  equipped  can  escape.  But  from 
spiritual  powers  there  is  no  escape.  Though  ever  present,  they 
are  invisible,  intangible,  and  inscrutable.  Their  acts  are  arbitrary, 
capricious,  and  unpredictable.  Their  will  is  unknown,  and  there 
is  no  conceivable  way  of  averting  their  wrath  if  once  it  is  directed 
against  a  hopeless  mortal. 

In  such  a  dire  predicament  it  is  easy  to  see  that  anything  in  any 
way  promising  relief  would  be  eagerly  seized  upon.  But  from  what 
source  could  relief  be  conceived  to  come.-'  The  only  possible  hope 
is  some  means  of  learning  the  wishes  of  spirits,  gods,  deities,  and 
adapting  conduct  to  such  wishes.  But  how  can  those  wishes  be 
made  known.?  Only  by  some  mediator  who  is  endowed  with  the 
gift  or  power  of  communicating  with  them.  This  mediator  must 
be  a  man,  otherwise  he  could  not  also  communicate  with  men.  Is 
it  possible  that  there  are  any  men  who  differ  from  the  rest  of  men 
in  possessing  this  gift  or  power .''  Under  such  circumstances  the 
slenderest  claim  to  such  a  prerogative  would  be  eagerly  listened  to. 
When  we  reflect  that  even  in  the  most  enlightened  countries  in  the 
twentieth  century  divine  healers  and  self-styled  prophets  readily 
attract  multitudes  of  adherents  and  believers,  we  can  imagine  the 
credulity  of  primitive  men  in  constant  terror  of  dire  visitations 
from  malignant  spirits.  It  amounted  almost  to  a  case  of  economic 
demand  and  supply.  The  demand  for  a  mediator  was  intense  and 
incessant.  Such  a  demand  could  scarcely  remain  unsupplied.  Some 
one  would  surely  have  the  wit,  from  purely  egoistic  motives  if  from 


64  APPLIED    SOCIOLOGY  [Fart  I 

no  other,  to  claim  the  power  of  communicating  with  the  invisible 
world.  But  when  we  remember  that  all  were  alike  under  the  spell 
we  can  well  imagine  that  the  egoistic  motive  was  not  the  only  one. 
It  is  doubtful  whether  any  one  claiming  divine  inspiration  ever  did 
so  in  pure  fraud.  There  is  at  bottom  an  unqualified  belief  in  the 
existence  of  supernatural  beings,  and  such  is  the  nature  of  the 
human  mind  that  it  can  and  does  create  within  itself  a  conviction 
that  it  actually  is  in  communication  with  such  beings. 

But  whatever  the  motives,  the  fact  is  that  there  always  have 
been  men  in  every  group,  tribe,  or  race  who  insist  that  they  have 
relations  with  the  spiritual  world,  that  they  know  or  can  learn  the 
will  of  spirits  or  gods,  and  that  with  these  gifts  they  can  warn  men 
against  acts  that  excite  the  divine  wrath.  The  more  respectable  of 
those  putting  forth  such  claims  are  recognized  by  the  group.  It  is 
just  at  this  stage  that  the  group  most  needs  help.  The  growing 
reason  of  its  members  is  leading  them  more  and  more  astray  from 
the  path  of  race  safety.  This  faculty  was  created  as  a  guide  to  the 
better  satisfaction  of  desire,  which  at  the  outset  meant  the  more 
complete  performance  of  function  and  the  greater  certainty  of  self- 
preservation.  But  it  soon  ov^erstepped  the  narrow  limits  of  this 
primordial  duty,  and  began  to  guide  men  to  the  satisfaction  of 
desires  which  were  disconnected  with  function  and  even  destruc- 
tive of  it.  The  group  sentiment  of  race  safety  rose  against  this, 
but  was  powerless  to  arrest  it.  It  established  customs  calculated 
to  preserve  the  existence  of  the  group,  but  how  could  the  obser- 
vance of  these  customs  be  enforced.-'  It  is  clear  that  at  that  stage 
neither  moral  suasion  nor  argument  could  avail.  The  only  motive 
to  which  there  was  any  use  of  appealing  was  fear.  But  the  politi- 
cal organization  was  weak  or  scarcely  existed,  and  the  number  of 
transgressors  w^as  large.  Penalties  more  terrible  than  the  group 
could  inflict  must  be  threatened  against  those  who  would  disrupt 
society.  But  there  was  one  source  of  fear  sufficiently  terrible  to 
be  effective,  and  that  was  the  fear  of  the  gods.  If  there  was  any 
one  capable  of  assuring  the  wayward  that  their  course  would  bring 
down  upon  them  the  wrath  of  offended  deities  or  disembodied 
spirits,  this  would  be  listened  to.  Those  therefore  claiming  to 
possess  the  divine  favor  and  who  were  willing  to  use  their  power 


Ch.  VI]  ERROR  65 

in  the  interest  of  group  safety,  were  welcomed  and  given  every 
opportunity  to  exert  their  influence  in  the  most  effective  manner. 
In  short  they  were  erected  into  a  priesthood  and  enabled  to  coop- 
erate with  the  political  power,  whatever  it  might  be,  in  preserving 
the  social  order.  Such  was  the  origin  of  sacerdotal  institutions 
or  religious  structures,  which  have  existed  in  all  societies  at  all 
developed,  and  which  still  continue  to  exert  an  influence  at  least 
equal  to  that  of  any  other  class  of  social  structures. 

Error 

As  the  religious  ideas  thus  far  considered  consist  entirely  of 
error,  there  being  no  objective  truth  corresponding  to  spiritual 
beings,  and  as  religious  structures  are  based  directly  and  exclusively 
upon  religious  ideas,  if  the  latter  really  served  the  useful  purpose 
above  described,  it  seems  to  follow  that  error  may  be  useful.  This 
may  be  a  shock  to  some  minds,  but  it  serves  to  show  the  futility  of 
most  abstract  theories,  such  as  that  truth  is  always  necessarily  use- 
ful and  error  necessarily  injurious.  Until  we  rid  oiu*selves  of  these 
and  are  content  to  rest  our  case  upon  observed  facts,  we  have  no 
real  standing  in  court.  What  the  course  of  human  evolution  would 
have  been  had  there  been  no  religious  ideas  and  no  religious  struc- 
tures, it  is  perhaps  idle  to  speculate,  because  there  are  no  facts  to 
support  any  theory,  the  existence  of  both  being,  as  we  have  seen, 
a  necessity  in  the  nature  of  things.  We  cannot  even  conceive  of 
the  development  of  a  race  of  rational  beings  in  a  world  like  ours 
Vithout  having  to  pass  through  the  whole  religious  stage  as  described. 

Religious  ideas  and  structures  are  an  exclusively  human  because 
an  exclusively  rational  condition.  The  whole  animal  world  is  with- 
out either.  Animals,  including  the  prehuman  ancestor  of  man,  are 
as  completely  devoid  of  all  knowledge  of  the  laws  and  principles  of 
nature  as  was  the  most  primitive  human  being,  or,  if  possible,  more 
so.  But  this  is  only  ignorance;  it  is  not  error.  Error  is  a  pure 
product  of  reason.  It  arises  from  an  effort  on  the  part  of  a  rational 
being  to  interpret  phenomena.  It  consists  in  a  false  interpretation 
of  phenomena  due  to  insufficient  knowledge.  It  could  not  be  avoided 
because  appearances  in  nature  are  always  different  from  the  reality 


66  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

and  usually  nearly  or  quite  the  opposite  of  it.  I  dealt  with  this  truth 
in  Dynamic  Sociology  ^  under  the  head  of  the  "  paradoxes  of  nature," 
and  need  not  go  again  over  that  ground.  But  in  consequence  of  the 
facts  there  enumerated  and  innumerable  others  that  might  be  set 
down,  it  is  absolutely  impossible  for  a  race  of  beings  to  emerge  out 
of  the  non-rational  and  pass  into  the  rational  state  without  accumu- 
lating a  vast  load  of  error. 

That  reasoning  from  inadequate  data  is  always  misleading  has 
been  seen  by  the  greatest  logicians.    Thus  Kant  says: 

There  have  been  so  many  unfounded  assumptions  of  the  possibility  of  extend- 
ing our  knowledge  through  pure  reason  that  it  has  to  be  made  a  general  rule 
thoroughly  to  distrust  it  and  to  believe  or  accept  nothing,  even  if  proved  by  the 
clearest  reasoning,  without  documentary  evidence  capable  of  fully  supporting 
the  deduction.^ 

Lamarck  saw  the  same  truth  when  he  said: 

I  could  show  that  while  man  derives  great  advantages  from  his  well-developed 
intellectual  faculties,  the  human  species  generally  considered  experiences  at 
the  same  time  great  inconveniences  from  them.^ 

In  an  earlier  work  he  wrote  : 

Were  it  not  for  the  picture  that  so  many  celebrated  men  have  drawn  of  the 
weakness  and  lack  of  human  reason  ;  were  it  not  that,  independently  of  all  the 
freaks  into  which  the  passions  of  man  almost  constantly  allure  him,  the  igno- 
rance which  makes  him  the  opinionated  slave  of  custom  and  the  continual  dupe 
of  those  who  wish  to  deceive  him;  were  it  not  that  his  reason  has  led  him  into 
the  most  revolting  errors,  since  we  actually  see  him  so  debase  himself  as  to 
worship  animals,  even  the  meanest,  addressing  to  them  his  prayers,  and  implor- 
ing their  aid;  were  it  not,  I  say.  for  these  considerations,  should  we  feel  author- 
ized to  raise  any  doubts  as  to  the  excellence  of  this  special  light  which  is  the 
attribute  of  man?^ 

That  these  errors  of  the  reason  are  due  to  the  attempt  to  phi- 
losophize about  nature  is  well  stated  by  Condorcet. 

All  errors  in  politics  or  in  morals  have  philosophical  errors  as  their  basis, 
and  these  in  turn  are  founded  on  physical  errors.  There  does  not  exist  a  reli- 
gious system  nor  a  supernatural  extravagance  which  is  not  based  on  ignorance 
of  the  laws  of  nature.  The  inventors  and  defenders  of  these  absurdities  could 
not  foresee  the  future  development  of  the  human  mind.    Persuaded  that  men 

1  Vol.  I,  pp.  47-53- 

2  Kritik  der  reinen  Vemunft,  ed.  Hartenstein,  Leipzig,  i86S,  p.  i86. 

3  Philosophic  zoologique,  Paris,  1S73,  Vol.  II,  pp.  315-316.    Original  edition,  1809. 
*  Recherches  sur  I'organisation  des  corps  vivans,  etc.,  Paris,  1802,  pp.  124-125. 


Ch.  VI]  ERROR  67 

knew  at  their  time  all  that  they  could  ever  know,  and  would  always  believe 
what  they  then  believed,  they  confidently  rested  their  illusions  upon  the  general 
ideas  of  their  country  and  their  age.^ 

Sir  John  Lubbock  (Lord  Avebury),  on  the  same  page  as  that 
last  cited,  speaking  of  the  dread  of  sorcerers  or  wizards,  says: 

Savages  never  know  but  what  they  may  be  placing  themselves  in  the  power 
of  these  terrible  enemies.  .  .  .  The  mental  sufferings  which  they  thus  undergo, 
the  horrible  tortures  which  they  sometimes  inflict  on  themselves,  and  the  crimes 
which  they  are  led  to  commit,  are  melancholy  in  the  extreme.'^ 

Coste,  in  a  charming  httle  book  written  in  his  leisure  hours,  truly 

said  : 

False  ideas  in  a  healthy  brain  which  has  no  opportunity  to  correct  them,  dis- 
proportionate ideas  in  a  weak  brain  incapable  of  experimentation,  may  engender 
sophisms  of  action,  may  lead  to  blind,  foolhardy  conduct  and  to  fanaticism 
approaching  insanity.^ 

As  further  distinguishing  ignorance  from  error  Kant  says:  "  the 
senses  do  not  err,  not  because  they  always  reason  {urtJieilen) 
correctly,  but  because  they  do  not  reason  at  all."*  And  Spencer, 
speaking  of  these  misleading  beliefs,  remarks: 

These  cannot  be  primary  beliefs,  but  must  be  secondary  beliefs  into  which 
the  primitive  man  is  betrayed  during  his  early  attempts  to  understand  the  sur- 
rounding world.  The  incipiently  speculative  stage  must  come  after  a  stage  in 
which  there  is  no  speculation  —  a  stage  in  which  there  yet  exists  no  sufficient 
language  for  carrying  on  speculation.  During  this  stage  the  primitive  man  no 
more  tends  to  confound  animate  and  inanimate  than  inferior  creatures  do.  If 
in  his  first  efforts  at  interpretation,  he  forms  conceptions  inconsistent  with  this 
preestablished  distinction  between  animate  and  inanimate,  it  must  be  that  some 
striking  experience  misleads  him  —  introduces  a  germ  of  error  which  develops 
into  an  erroneous  set  of  interpretations. ^ 

In  explanation  of  the  demonstrated  fact  that  "fetichism  arises 
only  when  a  certain  stage  of  mental  and  social  evolution  has  been 
reached,"  the  same  author  says  that  "in  proportion  as  the  reasoning 
faculty  is  good  will  be  the  number  of  erroneous  conclusions  drawn 
from  erroneous  premises."  *" 

1  Tableau  historique  des  progr^s  de  I'esprit  humain,  Paris,  1900,  p.  152. 

2  Prehistoric  Times,  New  York,  1904,  p.  449. 
^  Dieu  et  I'Ame,  2^  ed.,  Paris,  1903,  p.  ('>S. 

*  Kritik  der  reinen  Vemunft,  p.  244. 

6  Principles  of  Sociology,  Vol.  I,  p.  146,  §  67. 

6  /^/i/.,  p.  342,  §    162. 


68  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

Bacon  beautifully  expressed  the  hopeless  condition  of  the  primi- 
tive intellect  in  this  vast  maze  of  nature,^  and  no  attitude  is  more 
unphilosophical  in  dealing  with  the  subject  of  primitive  error  than 
the  attitude  of  censure  or  condemnation. 

Consequences  of  Error.  —  Only  a  brief  and  partial  enumeration 
of  the  consequences  of  the  universal  belief  in  spiritual  beings  can 
be  attempted  here,  but  in  most  cases  they  are  already  so  familiar  to 
all  well-read  persons  that  a  mere  mention  of  them  is  sufficient.  Iiie_^ 
important  point  is  to  show  that  the  greater  part  of  the  evils  from 
which  the  human  race  has  suffered,  evils  unknown  to  animal  races, 
are  really  due  to  error,  i.e.,  to  false  conclusions  drawn  from  inade- 
quate premises.  The  most  shocking  of  all  these  consequences  un- 
questionably is  the  wide-spread  custom  of  sacrificing  human  victims 
at  the  funerals  of  chieftains.  I  dealt  with  this  general  as  well  as 
with  this  special  subject  in  Dynamic  Sociology,^  and  referred  to  some 
of  the  sources  of  information  relative  to  the  latter,  but  many  works 
have  appeared  since  that  time,  and  the  reader  with  a  penchant  in 
that  direction  can  now  follow  it  to  almost  any  desired  length.  The 
works  of  Letourneau  alone  furnish  an  almost  inexhaustible  store- 
house of  this  class  of  facts. 

A  survey  of  this  field  shows  that  this  horrid  practice  is  compara- 
tively rare  among  the  very  lowest  races,  and  reaches  its  maximum 
in  races  quite  well  advanced  toward  or  fairly  into  the  status  called 
barbarism.    Spencer  says: 

This  practice  develops  as  society  advances  through  its  earlier  stages,  and 
the  theory  of  another  life  becomes  more  definite.  Among  the  Fuegians,  the 
Andamanese,  the  Australians,  the  Tasmanians,  with  their  rudimentary  social 
organizations,  the  sacrifice  of  wives  to  accompany  dead  husbands,  if  it  occurs 
at  all,  is  not  general  enough  to  be  specified  in  the  accounts  given  of  them.  But 
it  is  a  practice  shown  us  by  more  advanced  peoples:  in  Polynesia,  by  the  New 
Caledonians,  by  the  Fijians,  and  occasionally  by  the  less  barbarous  Tongans 
—  in  America,  by  the  Chinooks,  the  Caribs,  the  Dakotahs  —  in  Africa,  by  the 
Congo  people,  the  Inland  Negroes,  the  Coast  Negroes,  and  most  extensively 
by  the  Dahomans.  .  .  .  It  was,  however,  in  the  considerably-advanced  societies 
of  ancient  America  that  arrangements  for  the  future  convenience  of  the  dead 

^  .itdificium  autem  hujus  universi  structura  sua,  intellectui  humano  contemplanti, 
instar  labyrinthi  est;  ubi  tot  ambigua  viarum,  tarn  fallaces  rerum  et  signorum  simili- 
tudines,  tarn  obliquae  et  implexae  naturarum  spirae  et  nodi,  undequaque  se  ostendunt 
(Instauratio  Magna,  Prsefatio.   Works,  1869,  Vol.  I,  p.  205). 

2  Vol.  II,  pp.  2S7-292. 


ch.vi]  consequences  of  error  69 

were  carried  out  with  the  greatest  care.  ...  By  the  Mexicans  "the  number 
of  the  victims  was  proportioned  to  the  grandeur  of  the  funeral,  and  amounted 
sometimes,  as  several  historians  affirm,  to  200  "  ;  and  in  Peru,  when  an  Ynca 
died,  "  his  attendants  and  favorite  concubines,  amounting  sometimes,  it  is  said, 
to  a  thousand,  were  immolated  on  his  tomb."  ^ 

Speaking  of  these  same  ancient  Mexicans,  Letourneau  says  : 

The  favorite  god,  the  great  god  of  the  Mexicans,  was  the  god  of  war,  the 
ferocious  Huitzilopochtli.  Almost  all  the  religious  festivals  of  Mexico  required 
human  sacrifices;  never  was  religious  madness  more  bloody  than  in  that 
country.  ...  At  every  great  event  it  was  necessary-  to  murder  many  thousand 
slaves,  sufficient  to  form  a  little  lake  of  human  blood  capable  of  floating  a 
boat.  ...  On  the  occasion  of  the  dedication  of  the  great  temple  to  that  divinity 
[Huitzilopochtli],  at  Mexico,  not  less  than  80,000  human  victims  were  sacrificed.^ 

Letourneau  speaks  of  this  as  taking  place  "  in  spite  of  the  ad- 
vanced state  of  Mexican  civilization."  It  really  took  place  in  con- 
sequence of  that  advanced  state,  i.e.,  in  consequence  of  the  fully 
developed  reasoning  powers  of  that  people,  by  means  of  which  they 
were  capable  of  elaborating  a  systematic  doctrine  relative  to  the 
spirits  of  the  dead.  This  body  of  doctrine  is  crystallized  into  a 
universal  belief  that  these  spirits  exist  and  will  follow  their  master 
into  the  next  world  and  there  minister  to  his  wants.  As  Spencer 
says ; 

The  intensity  of  the  faith  prompting  such  customs,  we  shall  the  better  con- 
ceive on  finding  proof  that  the  victims  are  often  willing,  and  occasionally  anxious, 
to  die.  .  .  .  Garcilasso  says  that  a  dead  Ynca's  wives  "  volunteered  to  be  killed, 
and  their  number  was  often  such  that  the  officers  were  obliged  to  interfere,  say- 
ing that  enough  had  gone  at  present."  ^ 

This  belief  is  a  typical  world  view.  It  is  universal  not  only  in 
the  sense  that  it  exists  in  all  human  races  at  the  proper  stage  in  the 
development  of  the  rational  faculty,  but  also  in  the  sense  that  it 
is  shared  by  every  member  of  the  group  without  exception.  Some 
one  has  well  said  that  there  are  no  dissenters  among  savages.  Comte 
has  been  criticized  for  saying  that  fetishism  represents  "the  most 
intense  theological  state,"  *  but  it  is  perfectly  true  from  our  present 

1  Principles  of  Sociology,  Vol.  T,  pp.  204-205,  §  104. 

2  La  Sociologie  d'apres  I'Ethnographie,  par  Charles  Letourneau,  30  ed.,  Paris, 
1892,  p.  291. 

3  Spencer,  //'/(/.,  p.  205,  §  104. 

*  Philosophic  positive,  Vol.  V,  p.  39. 


^o 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 


point  of  view,  which  is  that  from  which  Comte  viewed  it,  as  the 
context  shows.  Such  ideas  are  an  integral  part  of  the  mental 
existence  of  a  people;  they  permeate  the  society  and  sway  the 
entire  mass.  Every  act,  public  or  private,  is  determined  by  them, 
and  no  act  is  too  shocking  or  terrible  to  be  shrunk  from  if  dictated 
by  the  logic  of  the  dominant  idea. 

The  practice  of  placing  the  belongings  of  a  dead  person  in  his 
grave  for  his  use  in  the  next  world  is  a  simple  corollary  from  the 
general  reasoning  of  primitive  peoples  relative  to  the  nature  of 
the  soul.  Like  everything  else  in  savage  life,  it  was  carried  to  the 
greatest  extremes  and  ultimately  resulted  in  some  tribes  in  an 
enormous  destruction  of  property.  The  few  examples  that  I  culled 
in  1883  1  from  the  great  mass  that  had  been  collected  at  that  date, 
and  which  have  gone  on  accumulating  to  the  present  time,  will  suffice 
for  the  present  purpose,  which  is  simply  to  illustrate  the  legitimate 
consequences  of  universally  accepted  errors.  But,  as  I  then  stated, 
it  is  in  fact  a  more  serious  evil  than  the  sacrifice  of  human  victims, 
because  it  is  practised  by  persons  of  all  classes,  whereas  sacrifices 
are  mainly  confined  to  royal  funerals.  In  many  cases  all  that  a  man 
has  is  either  buried  with  him  or  destroyed  in  one  way  or  another, 
it  often  being  regarded  as  sacrilegious  to  make  any  further  use  of  a 
man's  property  after  he  has  passed  away.  This  pra'ctice  also  lasted 
much  longer  in  the  history  of  the  mental  development  of  a  people 
than  that  of  sacrificing.  Long  after  the  latter  has  been  discontinued 
the  former  is  kept  up,  partly  as  a  substitute,  and  we  find  it  persist- 
ing among  half-civilized  peoples  down  almost  to  our  own  time.  In 
some  parts  of  China,  for  example,  a  wealthy  family  is  sometimes 
completely  ruined  by  a  costly  funeral.  Indeed,  the  funerals  among 
civilized  peoples  are  often  extravagantly  expensive,  and  this  waste 
of  property  may  be  regarded  as  a  survival  of  the  barbaric  practice 
of  burying  or  destroying  all  the  property  of  a  dead  person. 

Another  direction  which  this  same  class  of  primitive  logic  took 
was  that  of  the  erection  of  costly  tombs  for  the  remains  of  great 
warriors  and  rulers.  This  has  also  been  an  almost  universal  practice, 
and  one  that  extended  far  down  into  the  latest  stages  of  barbarism. 
These  tombs  are  scattered  all  over  the  world  and  are  often  about 

1  Dynamic  Sociologj-,  Vol.  II,  pp.  293-296. 


Ch.  Vlj  CONSEQUENCES  OF   ERROR  7 1 

all  that  remains  of  an  extinct  civilization.  An  enormous  amount  of 
labor  has  been  expended  upon  them,  —  labor  thus  withdrawn  from 
productive  industry  and  of  course  involving  a  corresponding  amount 
of  misery  among  the  people.  The  pyramids  of  Egypt  represent  the 
highest  pomt  to  which  this  practice  was  ever  carried,  for  they  are 
neither  more  nor  less  than  the  tombs  of  the  great  kings  of  that 
country.  Those  who  visit  them  are  usually  profoundly  impressed 
with  them  as  achievements  of  human  art  at  so  early  a  period,  and 
rarely  reflect  upon  their  significance  from  the  economic  and  socio- 
logical standpoint.  There  has  been,  however,  one  exception  to 
this  in  the  case  of  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  who,  as  we  might  expect 
of  him,  reflected  upon  the  conditions  that  could  have  brought 
such  remarkable  objects  into  existence.  In  his  autobiography  he 
describes  his  visit  to  them,  and  says: 

With  the  one  memorial  is  associated  the  name  of  Cheops,  or,  as  he  is  now 
called,  Shufu  or  Koofoo  —  a  king  who,  if  we  may  believe  Herodotus,  kept  a 
hundred  thousand  men  at  work  for  twenty  years  building  his  tomb ;  and  who, 
whether  these  figures  are  or  are  not  correct,  must  have  imposed  forced  labor 
on  enormous  numbers  of  men  for  periods  during  which  tens  of  thousands  had 
to  bear  great  pains,  and  thousands  upon  thousands  died  of  their  sufferings.  If 
the  amounts  of  miserj'  and  mortality  inflicted  are  used  as  measures,  this  king, 
held  in  such  detestation  by  later  generations  that  statues  of  him  were  defaced  by 
them,  ought  to  be  numbered  among  the  few  most  accursed  of  men.^ 

Under  the  head  of  Consequences  of  Error  I  had  planned  to 
treat  in  this  work  somewhat  at  length  some  dozen  other  illustrations, 
for  all  of  which  I  have  been  collecting  materials  for  many  years; 
but  I  realize  that  this  would  unduly  expand  this  chapter,  while 
most  of  the  data  are  accessible  to  the  reading  public,  and  I  have 
decided  that  it  will  be  sufficient  simply  to  enumerate  the  principal 
heads.  This  I  shall  do  in  something  like  the  order  in  which  the 
practices  occur  in  the  course  of  the  general  development  of  the 
reasoning  powers  and  intelligence  of  mankind.  This  chronological 
order  is  also  the  logical  order;  but  I  would  not  wish  to  imply  that 
it  relates  to  historical  chronology,  but  simply  to  the  successive 
stages  attained  by  peoples,  irrespective  of  the  absolute  times  at 
which  such  stages  were  reached.  Comte  has  been  severely  attacked 
by  persons  who,  if  they  had  read  his  works  at  all,  had  read  them 

*  An  Autobiography.  By  Herbert  Spencer,  New  York,  1904,  Vol.  II,  pp.  403-404. 


72  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

carelessly,  and  who  accused  him  of  maintaining  that  the  "  three 
stages"  followed  one  another  in  strict  chronological  order.  He 
made  no  such  claims,  and  repeatedly  explained  that  two  or  more 
of  the  great  leading  world  conceptions  always  coexisted,  not  only  in 
different  parts  of  the  world  but  also  among  the  same  people  and 
even  in  the  same  mind.  In  all  such  discussions  it  is  necessary  to 
abstract  the  conditions  or  states  of  mind  and  consider  them  by  them- 
selves and  independent  of  dates  and  other  human  events.  In  the 
following  enumeration  this  is  all  that  is  meant  by  the  order  in  which 
the  practices  or  customs  are  arranged. 

1.  Self-mutilation.  This  is  a  wide-spread  custom,  performed 
chiefly  at  funerals,  or  often  prolonged  for  days  as  a  token  of  grief, 
and  believed  in  some  way  to  please  the  departed  spirit  or  appease 
angry  gods.  It  takes  a  variety  of  forms,  but  usually  consists  in  the 
mourners  cutting  and  gashing  themselves  with  whatever  sharp 
instruments  they  may  possess. 

2.  Superstition.  This  term  is  much  too  general  for  convenient 
use.  It  really  embraces  all  the  forms  of  error  that  have  been  or 
are  to  be  enumerated.  But  by  its  use  here  it  is  meant  to  group 
under  it  a  great  mass  of  customs  and  practices  which  do  not  usually 
involve  the  destruction  of  human  life,  but  which-  have  for  their 
principal  effect  to  restrict  the  liberty  of  action  and  fill  the  minds 
of  men  with  a  thousand  ungrounded  fears  and  terrors.  It  also  serves 
as  an  effective  bar  to  all  intellectual  or  material  progress,  and  as  it 
continues  on  through  all  the  stages  of  barbarism  into  that  of  civil- 
ization, this  latter  aspect  becomes  more  serious.  As  an  example 
may  be  mentioned  the  fact,  alleged  at  least,  and  probably  real,  that 
the  chief  objection  to  the  construction  of  railroads  in  China  was  that 
the  noise  and  jar  of  the  trains  would  disturb  the  dead. 

3.  Asceticism.  This  is  unknown  in  savagery  and  is  scarcely 
possible  in  any  stage  of  true  barbarism.  It  was  reserved  for  a  high 
state  of  intellectual  development,  but  it  is  based,  as  truly  as  human 
sacrifice,  upon  the  belief  in  spiritual  beings  and  a  future  spiritual 
existence.  Though  based  like  the  rest  mainly  on  fear,  it  contains 
an  element  of  hope.  As  Sir  Thomas  More  admitted,  the  real  end 
sought  by  it  is  pleasure  to  self,^  and  Hartmann  declares  that  it  is 

1  Utopia  (i  516).    Murray's  English  reprints,  London,  1869,  No.  14,  p.  116. 


Ch.  VI]  CONSEQUENCES  OF  ERROR  73 

thoroughly  egoistic.^  The  horrible  self-tortures  that  have  been 
practised  by  thousands  of  people  in  all  ages  under  this  delusion 
have  been  vividly  portrayed,  and  it  would  be  easy  to  fill  a  volume 
with  their  recital.  The  milder  forms  that  have  long  prevailed  in  the 
leading  civilized  countries,  called  puritanism  in  America,  are  danger- 
ous to  health  and  destructive  of  happiness  and  of  progress. 

4.  Zoolatry.  Animal  totemism  among  savage  and  barbarous 
tribes,  which  is  itself  a  form  of  animal-worship,  but  is  compara- 
tively harmless,  becomes  a  serious  matter  when  in  more  civilized 
peoples  like  those  of  India  it  makes  vermin,  serpents,  and  danger- 
ous wild  beasts  sacred  and  interdicts  their  destruction.  The  logic  of 
these  practices  grows  out  of  the  belief  in  the  transmigration  of  souls 
through  the  bodies  of  these  animals  into  those  of  men  and  back 
from  men  to  animals.  Reference  was  made  to  this  in  Dynamic 
Sociology  (Vol.  II,  p.  271),  but  it  still  continues,  and  the  high 
rewards  offered  by  the  British  government  seem  scarcely  to  tempt 
the  superstitious  natives  of  that  country.  Statistics  of  mortality 
from  these  sources  are  annually  collected,  but  they  must  fall  far 
short  of  the  true  figures.  In  1899,  24,621  persons  died  in  India 
from  snake  bite  alone,  while  in  1901  the  number  was  23,166. 
Tigers,  leopards,  bears,  wolves,  and  h}enas  destroy  between  2000 
and  3000  more  each  year.  The  cobra,  the  tiger,  the  leopard,  and 
other  dangerous  snakes  and  animals  are  sacred  and  occupied  by  the 
souls  of  men. 

5.  Witchcraft.  The  belief  in  the  power  of  certain  persons  to  pro- 
ject their  spirits  into  other  persons  and  "possess"  them  is  almost 
universal  among  all  but  the  most  enlightened  peoples.  Some  form 
of  sorcery  is  believed  to  be  practised  by  all  savage  and  barbaric 
races.  Both  sexes  have  this  power,  but  the  tendency  was  to  limit 
it  more  and  more  to  women.  In  the  Middle  Ages  it  took  the  form 
of  witchcraft  and  lasted  until  into  the  eighteenth  century.  Indeed, 
it  is  not  over  now,  and  is  still  jMactised  in  Mexico,  a  witch  having 
been  burned  at  Camargo  in  i860.  A  suit  was  brought  in  1902  at 
Chicago  against  a  woman  for  bewitching  another  and  causing  her 
hair  to  fall   out.^    Witchcraft    was   fully  believed    in   by   Luther, 

^  Philosophic  des  Unbewussten,  Bd.  II,  pp.  366,  373. 
2  See  the  newspapers  of  about  July  29,  1902. 


74  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

Melanchthon,  John  Wesley,  and  Lafitau,  and  was  declared  to  be  a 
fact  by  Blackstone.^  It  is  now  completely  discountenanced  by  all 
enlightened  persons  regardless  of  their  creed,  and  they  all  agree 
that  there  never  was  any  such  thing  as  the  bewitching  of  one  per- 
son by  another.  The  thousands  of  witches  who  have  been  put  to 
death,  often  burned  at  the  stake  or  horribly  tortured,  must  there- 
fore have  all  been  innocent  victims  of  this  hideous  error  that  seized 
and  held  fast  the  minds  of  men  through  so  many  centuries.  One 
would  suppose  that  a  fact  like  this  would  cause  everybody  to  doubt 
every  opinion  held  without  the  most  convincing  proof,  but  in  the 
face  of  it  the  world  still  clings  to  hundreds  of  scarcely  less  absurd 
ideas,  though  most  of  them  are  incapable  of  leading  to  such  shock- 
ing consequences. 

6.  Persecution.  I  confine  this  for  the  present  to  religious  perse- 
cution, i.e.,  to  the  persecution  of  so-called  heretics.  A  heretic  is  a 
person  who  has  a  somewhat,  often  only  slightly,  different  religious 
belief  from  a  larger  body  of  persons  in  the  country  in  which  he  lives, 
and  who  have  acquired  power  over  the  lives  and  liberties  of  citizens. 
This  is  confined  to  what  are  called  civilized  countries,  because,  as 
we  have  just  seen,  there  are  no  differences  in  the  belief  of  savages. 
A  difference  of  belief  is  a  mark  of  civilization;  and  it  has  always 
happened  that  the  dissenters  were  the  more  civilized.  Their  perse- 
cution, therefore,  and  wholesale  destruction,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
Inquisition,  means  the  slaughter  of  the  elite  of  mankind.  Those 
who  can  escape  fly  to  other  lands,  and  the  persecuting  country  is 
emasculated  of  all  its  vigorous  and  virile  elements.  The  object  is 
to  make  belief  absolutely  uniform,  i.e.,  to  reduce  a  civilized  to  the 
condition  of  a  savage  people.  This  has  been  repeatedly  done,  nota- 
bly in  Spain,  and  history  has  recorded  the  consequences.  A  people 
that  tolerates  no  differences  of  opinion  is  degenerate  and  must  take 
a  second  or  lower  place. 

7.  Resistance  to  Truth.  More  serious  probably  for  mankind  at 
large  than  any  other  one  of  the  consequences  of  error,  or  perhaps 
than  all  of  them  combined,  is  the  opposition  that  error  always  offers 
to  the  advance  of  truth.  In  the  earliest  stages  there  was  no  possi- 
bility for  the  truth  to  emerge  at  all  from  the  mass  of  error.    The 

1  Commentaries,  Book  IV,  p.  60. 


Ch.  VI]  CONSEQUENCES  OF  ERROR  75 

error  was  accepted  by  all  without  any  single  one  ever  so  much  as 
thinking  of  questioning  it.  All  the  steps  toward  truth  were  taken 
at  later  stages,  chiefly  in  peoples  that  ethnologists  class  as  civilized. 
Every  heresy,  however  slightly  the  belief  may  differ  from  the  domi- 
nant or  orthodox  belief,  is  a  step  toward  the  truth,  a  greater  or  less 
reduction  in  the  amount  of  error  in  the  belief.  Persecution  for 
heresy,  therefore,  w^hich  was  considered  under  the  last  head,  was 
the  first  form  that  resistance  to  truth  assumed.  The  present  head 
is  meant  to  include  other  forms,  most  of  which  involved  persecution, 
but  some  of  which  were  somewhat  independent  of  persons.  The 
most  of  them  may  be  included  under  the  general  designation  of 
opposition  to  science. 

We  saw  that  the  whole  mass  of  primitive  error  was  the  result  of 
a  false  interpretation  of  natural  phenomena.  The  true  interpretation 
of  the  same  phenomena  was  the  work  of  thousands  of  patient  investi- 
gators continued  through  centuries,  and  was  usually  practically  the 
reverse  of  the  prevailing  false  interpretation.  Thus  shadows  and 
reflections  were  found  to  be  due  to  the  nature  of  light  and  the  laws 
.of  radiation  after  the  science  of  optics  had  been  founded;  echoes 
were  explained  on  the  now  familiar  principles  of  acoustics ;  dreams, 
delirium,  insanity,  epilepsy,  trance,  and  even  death  are  explainable 
on  natural  principles  contained  in  the  sciences  of  psychology,  physi- 
ology, pathology,  and  psychiatry ;  and  although  many  things  are  still 
obscure  in  relation  to  them,  no  specialist  in  any  of  those  sciences 
ever  thinks  of  calling  in  the  aid  of  indwelling  spirits  to  account 
for  any  of  the  facts. 

All  the  anthropomorphic  ideas  upon  which  primitive  error  rests 
are  dl^elled  by  science.  Astronomy  has  taught  the  nature  of  the 
hea\'enly  bodies  and  the  laws  of  their  motions.  Air  is  understood, 
and  is  nothing  like  the  primitive  idea  of  spirit,  but  is  a  mixture  of 
gases  in  nearly  uniform  proportions.  Lightning  is  as  well  under- 
stood as  are  any  of  the  manifestations  of  electricity.  And  so  with 
the  whole  series  of  physical  phenomena  upon  which  primitive  man 
built  his  superstructure  of  life,  will,  and  intelligence  in  inorganic 
nature. 

All  this  truth  that  science  revealed  had  to  struggle  against  the 
dense  mass  of  primitive  error  which  it  was  destined  to  overthrow, 


76  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

and  the  resistance  was  enormous.  The  discov^erers  of  truth  have 
been  the  victims  of  all  forms  of  persecution,  and  the  truth  revealed 
has  been  formally  condemned  and  anathematized.  Truth  has  never 
been  welcome,  and  its  utterance  was  for  ages  fraught  with  per- 
sonal danger.  Fontenelle  advised  those  who  possessed  new  truths 
to  hold  on  to  them,  because  the  world  would  only  punish  them 
for  their  utterance.  Nearly  everybody  acted  upon  this  principle, 
and  either  refrained  from  investigating  or  from  promulgating  new 
ideas.  Descartes  wrote  his  Trait e  du  Monde,  but  suppressed  it 
for  these  reasons.^  The  chief  effect  was  that  of  deterring  tal- 
ented men  from  trying  to  discover  truth,  and  the  greater  part  of 
all  intellectual  energy  has  been  diverted  into  safer  but  compara- 
tively useless  channels. 

The  history  of  the  later  phases  of  this  opposition  to  the  progress 
of  science  has  been  so  ably  presented  by  numerous  writers  that  it 
would  be  superfluous  to  enter  into  it  here,  even  if  space  would 
permit.  I  scarcely  need  draw  special  attention  to  the  contributions 
of  two  Americans  to  this  subject,  so  familiar  are  their  works. ^ 

This  opposition  to  science  may  be  supposed  to  have  some  value 
in  rendering  it  necessary  that  the  discoverers  of  truth  assure  them- 
selves beyond  a  peradventure  of  the  correctness  of  their  position 
before  venturing  to  promulgate  their  ideas.  Some  have  partially 
excused  it  on  this  ground.  But  for  this  to  be  true  it  would  be  neces- 
sary to  suppose  that  anything  that  was  absolutely  demonstrated 
would  be  accepted.  This  has  never  been  the  case.  There  has  never 
been  any  attempt  to  verify  discovery.  The  opposition  has  always 
been  dogmatic.  It  cannot  be  true  because  opposed  to  the  current 
world  view.  No  amount  of  demonstration  would  avail.  Those  who 
believe  things  because  they  are  impossible  are  not  going  to  believe 
anything  because  it  is  proved. 

But  there  is  no  need  of  this  kind  of  illegitimate  opposition  to  the 
discovery  of  truth.  There  is  always  an  abundance  of  legitimate 
opposition  to  it.    This  was  shown  in  Pure  Sociology  under  the  head 

1  CEuvres  de  Descartes,  Paris,  1844,  pp.  38,  47. 

2  History  of  the  Conflict  between  Religion  and  Science,  by  John  Wilham  Draper, 
fifth  edition,  New  York,  1875  (International  Scientific  Series,  No.  12).  A  Histoiy 
of  the  Warfare  of  Science  with  Theology  in  Christendom,  by  Andrew  Dickson 
White,  in  two  volumes.  New  York,  1897. 


Ch.  VI]  CONSEQUENCES  OF  ERROR  77 

of  "  How  Science  Advances."  ^  There  is  no  danger  of  any  error  in 
science  gaining  a  permanent  foothold.  Every  proposition  is  immedi- 
ately doubted  and  attacked,  but  it  is  attacked  with  the  legitimate 
weapons  of  scientific  experimentation  and  not  with  the  rack  and 
thumb-screw.  In  other  words,  it  is  reinvestigated  by  others  and  either 
confirmed  or  rejected.  Usually  a  part  is  confirmed  and  a  part  re- 
jected, but  at  any  rate  the  opposition  is  always  compelled  to  admit 
all  that  is  true  and  the  original  discoverer  is  compelled  to  abandon 
all  that  is  not  true.  The  difference  is  the  amount  of  established 
truth  contained  in  the  discovery.  In  the  kind  of  opposition  to 
science  that  we  have  been  considering  it  is  all  loss  and  no  gain. 

8.  Obscurantism.  This  is  another  form  of  persecution,  only  a 
little  more  subtle  than  the  form  last  considered.  Indeed,  it  is  only 
a  case  of  this  latter,  and  might  have  been  treated  under  the  general 
head  of  resistance  to  truth.  But  by  it  is  meant  certain  refined 
phases  of  this  resistance  practised  by  nations  claiming  to  be  civil- 
ized. Its  principal  method  consists  in  the  prohibition  or  suppression 
of  books  and  writings  and  the  general  censorship  of  the  press.  This 
has  been  chiefly  practised  by  the  Christian  church,  both  the  Catho- 
lic Church  and  the  Greek  Church.  It  is  still  practised  by  both  these 
churches,  but  so  far  as  the  former  is  concerned  it  is  now  chiefly  a 
matter  pour  rire.  Still,  within  the  church  itself  it  is  somewhat 
effective.  With  the  Greek  Church  it  is  more  serious  because  sanc- 
tioned by  the  government  of  the  nation  of  which  that  is  the  state 
church.  But  for  several  centuries  it  was  effective  in  the  Catholic 
Church,  and  most  of  the  progressive  literature  of  that  period  was 
rendered  inaccessible  to  the  general  public.  For  it  is  with  books  as 
with  men ;  those  that  dissent  from  the  current  world  views  are  the 
ones  that  contain  truth.  As  Helvetius  said  in  a  book  that  he  refused 
to  publish  during  his  lifetime,  "it  is  only  in  the  prohibited  books 
that  the  truth  is  found."  "^ 

It  is  interesting  to  glance  over  the  papal  Index  Librorum 
Prohibitorum.  There  are  to  be  found  the  majority  of  the  works 
that  the  world  recognizes  as  great  or  epoch-making.    This  Index 

1  Pages  8-12. 

2  "  Ce  n'est  plus  maintenant  que  dans  les  Livres  defendus  qu'on  trouve  la  verite  : 
on  ment  dans  les  autres.  .  .  .  Le  bon  livre  est  presque  partout  le  livre  defendu  "  (De 
rilomme,  etc.,  London,  1773,  Vol.  I,  pp.  iv,  6.    Cf.  p.  62). 


jS  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

continues  to  be  issued  periodically,  and  I  have  recently  amused 
myself  in  scanning  the  pages  of  the  latest  volume.  The  Russian 
government  publishes  a  similar  Index.  One  of  its  numbers  has 
lately  appeared  containing  the  books  condemned  between  1872  and 
1 891.  It  contains  works  by  Herbert  Spencer,  Ernst  Haeckel,  Lecky, 
Zola,  Ribot,  etc.^  The  prohibition  is  made  effective  by  not  allowing 
Russian  translations  to  appear  at  all.  The  great  mass  of  the  people 
are  thus  effectually  prevented  from  ever  reading  a  book.  I  have 
never  doubted  that  many  of  the  books  condemned  by  the  Russian 
censors  were  so  treated  on  account  of  other  than  religious  senti- 
ments contained  in  them.  If  it  is  feared  that  they  may  tend  to 
render  the  people  discontented  with  their  lot  or  dissatisfied  with 
the  government,  it  is  easy  to  find  passages  that  can  be  objected  to 
on  religious  grounds,  and  to  allege  these  as  the  reasons  for  prohibit- 
ing a  work.  In  the  light  of  prevailing  political  opinion  the  ministers 
would  scarcely  dare  to  assign  political  reasons.  This  was  attempted 
in  Germany  at  the  time  of  the  publication  of  Frederick's  diary  with 
rather  unsatisfactory  results.  The  numbers  of  the  Deutsche  Rund- 
schau containing  the  article  came  to  America  with  the  pages  cut 
out.  I  went  to  a  bookstore  and  bought  for  ten  cents  a  small  duo- 
decimo pamphlet  containing  the  English  translation.  Probably  thou- 
sands read  it  that  never  would  have  done  so  if  it  had  not  been 
prohibited,  at  least  in  other  countries  than  Germany.  In  a  free 
country  any  such  attempt  at  obscurantism  is  in  the  nature  of  an 
advertisement,  and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  time  will  soon  come 
when  it  will  be  no  longer  possible  to  dam  up  the  stream  of  truth. 

Nevertheless,  in  the  darker  ages  of  the  world,  and  still  at  pres- 
ent, in  the  darker  lands,  where  political  liberty  has  not  yet  been 
achieved,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  human  progress  has  been  and 
is  being  greatly  retarded  by  cutting  off  the  light  and  not  allowing 
it  to  penetrate  into  places  where  it  would  be  seen  and  welcomed  if 
it  could  be  admitted.    There  are  certain  forms  of  falsehood  which 

1  I  am  indebted  to  Mr.  George  Kennan  for  these  facts,  he  having  obtained  a  copy 
of  the  work.  He  informs  me  that  Djrnamic  Sociology  is  No.  86  in  the  list,  and  that 
the  reason  assigned  is  as  follows :  "  Condemned  and  publication  forbidden  by  the 
Committee  of  Ministers,  March  26,  1891  [Old  Style].  The  book  is  saturated  with  the 
rankest  materialism."  The  reader  may  remember  the  account  given  in  the  preface 
to  the  second  edition  of  the  seizure  of  the  Russian  translation. 


Ch.  VI]  CONSEQUENCES  OF  ERROR  79 

are  justified  on  grounds  not  widely  different  from  the  Jesuitical 
doctrine  that  the  end  sanctifies  the  means.  There  is  an  old 
proverb  which  in  its  French  form  says  :  Calomniez,  il  en  rcstera 
qiielque  chose}  It  is  a  kind  of  obscurantism.  A  slander  or  a  false- 
hood, as  Oliver  Wendell  Holmes  said,  "  makes  a  great  deal  of  lee- 
way in  proportion  to  its  headway."  The  official  reports  of  the 
Russian  generals  in  the  war  that  has  just  been  waged  between 
Japan  and  Russia  seemed  to  embody  the  proverb  above  quoted. 
The  bad  news  was  not  given  out.  The  driving  in  of  pickets  pre- 
ceding a  battle  was  loudly  proclaimed  as  a  Russian  victory,  but  the 
defeat  that  followed  was  suppressed  and  the  world  did  not  learn 
the  truth  until  the  Japanese  generals  were  ready  to  make  their  report. 
This  could  always  be  depended  upon,  never  exaggerating  the  gains 
and  often  seeming  to  exaggerate  the  losses.  On  the  Russian  re- 
ports no  dependence  whatever  could  be  placed. 

This  enumeration  of  the  consequences  of  error  growing  out  of 
religious  ideas  might  of  course  be  greatly  prolonged,  but  the 
examples  given  are  sufificient  to  indicate  its  character.  There  are, 
however,  other  consequences  of  error  which  do  not  come  exactly 
under  this  head,  but  which  are  often  equally  serious.  They  consist  of 
erroneous  world  views  which  cannot  be  directly,  or  at  least  can  only 
be  partially,  ascribed  to  the  belief  in  spiritual  beings.  Among  these 
I  would  put  first,  as  having  exerted  the  most  baneful  influence  on  the 
human  race,  that  which  I  have  described  in  Pure  Sociology  as  the 
Androcentric  World  View.^  It  is  not  so  much  the  terrible  suffer- 
ings that  womankind  has  had  to  endure  in  consequence  of  this 
gigantic  error  as  it  is  the  dwarfing  and  stunting  influence  that  it 
has  exerted  throughout  such  a  prolonged  period.  We  can  scarcely 
form  any  idea  of  what  the  human  race  would  have  been  if  a  true 
and  just  conception  of  both  man  and  woman  had  always  prevailed. 
And  as  this  false  world  view  still  prevails  so  universally  as  to  ren- 
der it  a  veritable  world  view  still  even  to-day,  we  can  realize  that 
there  is  something  for  applied  sociology  to  do. 

^  For  a  full  history  of  this  proverb,  see  King's  Classical  and  Foreign  Quotations, 
third  edition,  London,  1904,  No.  241,  p.  ^^. 

2  The  theory  is  stated  on  pages  291-296,  and  the  influence  exerted  by  it  is 
shown  on  pages  341-377. 


8o  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

As  growing  directly  out  of  the  androcentric  world  view  and  the 
institutions  founded  upon  it  may  be  mentioned  the  prevailing  error 
with  regard  to  motherhood.  The  bringing  of  a  new  human  being 
into  the  world  is  universally  recognized  as  among  the  noblest  and 
holiest  of  duties,  but  there  is  the  proviso  which  is  agreed  to  with 
equal  unanimity  that  unless  it  takes  place  under  the  sanction  of 
civil  or  ecclesiastical  law  it  is  not  a  duty  but  a  crime,  to  be  punished 
with  the  severest  penalties  that  society  can  devise.  The  amount 
of  misery  that  this  false  theory  of  life  entails  upon  humanity  is 
beyond  all  calculation.  A  young  woman  has  a  child  outside  of 
wedlock ;  it  may  have  been  the  consequence  of  love  as  pure  as  ever 
animated  the  human  breast.  She  is  disgraced  and  drowns  her  off- 
spring in  a  pool.  The  maternal  instinct  haunts  her,  and  she  goes 
back  and  frantically  recovers  and  embraces  the  body  of  her  dead 
child.  The  officers  of  the  law  discover  her  and  she  is  seized, 
imprisoned,  tried,  condemned,  and  hung.^  What  a  series  of  horrors 
growing  out  of  the  most  innocent,  natural,  and  noble  of  all  human 
actions !  All  due  to  a  false  world  view,  to  a  great  human  error 
hanging  over  the  civilized  world. 

Truth 

Mr.  Robert  G.  Ingersoll,  when  asked  if  he  could  suggest  any 
way  by  which,  if  he  had  the  power,  he  could  improve  the  universe, 
replied  that  he  would  first  make  health  "catching"  instead  of 
disease.  All  this  error  of  which  we  have  been  speaking  may  be 
looked  upon  as  so  much  social  disease,  which,  under  the  laws  of 
imitation  so  ably  worked  out  by  M.  Tarde,  is  contagious,  and  is 
passed  on  from  mind  to  mind  and  from  age  to  age.  And  just  as  the 
mission  of  medical  science  is  to  do  away  with  disease  and  replace  it 
by  health,  so  the  mission  of  social  science  is  to  do  away  with  error 
and  replace  it  by  truth.  It  may  be  said  that  this  is  the  mission  of 
all  science,  and  so  it  is.  But  all  the  science  in  the  world  has  failed 
to  remove  any  of  the  great  world  errors.  They  still  stand  in  the 
face  of  it  and  are  shared  by  the  mass  of  mankind.  The  false  ideas 
have,  indeed,  been  disproved,  and  the  true  explanations  of  natural 

1  This  assumed  case  has  been  nearly  paralleled  by  a  recorded  fact.  See  J.  Novi- 
cow,  L'Affranchissement  de  la  femme,  Paris,  1903,  p.  i. 


Ch.  VI]  TRUTH  8 1 

phenomena  have  been  furnished,  but  all  this  has  little  social  value. 
The  number  who  know  the  truth  is  relatively  insignificant  even  in  the 
most  enlightened  countries.  The  business  world  takes  up  the  scien- 
tific discoveries  and  utilizes  them,  and  the  mass  avail  themselves  of 
the  resultant  advantages,  but  they  have  no  idea  of  the  true  significance 
of  scientific  discovery.  The  great  bulk  of  every  population  on  the 
globe  is  steeped  in  error.  A  wholly  emancipated  person  finds  him- 
self almost  completely  alone  in  the  world.  There  is  not  one  perhaps 
in  a  whole  city  in  which  he  lives  with  whom  he  can  converse  five 
minutes,  because  the  moment  any  one  begins  to  talk  he  reveals  the 
fact  that  his  mind  is  a  bundle  of  errors,  of  false  conceits,  of  super- 
stitions, and- of  prejudices  that  render  him  utterly  uninteresting. 
The  great  majority  are  running  off  after  some  popular  fad.  Of 
course  the  most  have  already  abrogated  their  reasoning  powers 
entirely  by  accepting  some  creed.  The  few  that  have  begun  to 
doubt  their  creed  are  looking  for  another.  They  may  think  they 
are  progressing,  but  their  credulity  is  as  complete  as  ever,  and  they 
are  utterly  devoid  of  any  knowledge  by  which  to  test  the  credibility 
of  their  behefs.  And  yet  these  may  be  what  pass  for  "educated  " 
persons,  for,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  education  that  is  afforded  by 
the  systems  of  the  world  not  only  does  not  furnish  any  knowledge 
but  expressly  disclaims  doing  this,  and  aims  only  to  "  draw  out  " 
some  supposed  inherent  .powers  or  talents.  But,  as  we  have  already 
seen,  these  native  powers,  deprived  of  all  the  materials  upon  which 
to  exert  themselves,  are  not  merely  useless  but  are  in  a  high  degree 
dangerous  and  pernicious.  Ignorance  is  comparatively  safe.  It  is 
error  that  does  the  mischief,  and  the  stronger  the  reasoning  facul- 
ties working  upon  meager  materials  the  more  misleading  and  dis- 
astrous the  erroneous  conclusions  thus  drawn  are  for  mankind. 

Of  course  the  great  desideratum  is  to  supply  the  data  for  think- 
ing, and  to  supply  them  to  all  mankind  and  not  merely  to  a  hand- 
ful of  the  ^lite,  but  the  problem  is  how  to  do  this.  Truth  is 
unattractive.  Error  charms.  It  holds  out  all  manner  of  false  hopes. 
It  is  a  siren  song  that  lures  frail  mariners  upon  desert  isles,  where 
with  nothing  to  nourish  the  soul  they  perish  and  leave  their  bones 
to  bleach  upon  the  barren  strand.  All  the  shores  of  the  great  ocean 
of  time   are  strewn  with  these  whitened  skeletons  of  misguided 


82  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

thought.  Truth  furnishes  the  only  real  hope.  It  is  truth  that  should 
be  made  attractive,  alluring,  contagious,  to  such  a  degree  that  it  shall 
penetrate  the  whole  mass  of  mankind,  crowding  out  and  replacing 
the  error  that  now  fills  the  world. 

It  is  recognized  by  all  who  accept  the  ideological  interpretation 
of  history,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  does  not  conflict  with  the 
economic  interpretation,  that  world  ideas  are  what  determine  and 
control  human  action ;  that  action  therefore  depends  upon  the 
nature  of  these  ideas.  The  principal  quality  of  ideas  as  affecting 
action  is  the  relative  amount  of  truth  and  error  that  they  embody. 
As  we  have  seen,  early  ideas  consist  chiefly  of  error,  and  we  have 
enumerated  some  of  the  consequences  of  this  error.  All  progress 
in  ideas  has  consisted  in  the  gradual  elimination  of  the  error  and 
substitution  of  truth.  The  several  steps  in  religious  ideas,  from 
fetishism  to  monotheism,  have  been  in  this  direction.  All  heresies 
have  been  attempts  to  get  rid  of  some  small  part  of  the  error  of 
the  orthodox  t^^pe  of  beliefs.  The  Protestant  Reformation  was 
another  such  a  step.  The  deism  of  Voltaire  and  Thomas  Paine 
was  still  another.  Although  these  steps  may  seem  small  to  the 
fully  emancipated,  still  they  represent  progress.  It  is  character- 
istic of  the  human  mind  to  take  short  steps.  Few  are  capable  of 
throwing  off  all  error  at  once  as  a  snake  casts  its  skin.  A  part 
must  be  clung  to  and  cherished  a  while  longer.  In  this  respect, 
speaking  generally,  the  peoples  of  the  north  of  Europe  differ  from 
those  of  the  south.  The  former  are  satisfied  with  the  surrender  of 
a  part,  while  the  latter  cling  to  the  whole  until  they  can  hold  it  no 
longer  and  pass  by  a  single  leap  from  complete  orthodoxy  to  com- 
plete freedom  of  religious  thought.  This  is  the  true  reason  why 
the  Reformation  never  could  gain  a  foothold  among  the  Latin  races, 
and  not,  as  some  suppose,  because  the  latter  are  naturally  more 
superstitious.  There  are  many  liberal  minds  among  the  Latin 
races,  but  there  are  few  Protestants. 

Error  believed  with  sufficient  force  to  determine  action  is  retro- 
gressive in  its  effects.  The  progressive  character  of  any  age 
depends  upon  the  amount  of  truth  embodied  in  its  philosophy,  i.e., 
in  its  world  views.  The  natural  tendency  of  truth  is  to  cause  pro- 
gressive action.    In  other  words,  the  dynamic  quality  of  human 


Ch.  VI]  TRUTH  83 

ideas  is  strictly  proportional  to  the  degree  to  which  they  harmonize 
with  objective  reality.  It  follows  that  all  the  progress"  that  has 
taken  place  in  the  world  as  the  result  of  human  thought  has  been 
due  to  the  truth  that  has  been  brought  to  light.  This  accounts  for 
the  relatively  small  amount  of  human  progress  that  is  due  to  this 
cause.  The  greater  part,  as  shown  in  Pure  Sociology,  Chapter 
XI,  has  been  of  the  purely  unconscious,  genetic  sort,  with  which 
ideas  have  nothing  to  do.  But  most  of  the  progress  due  to  ideas 
is  of  that  superficial  kind  which  merely  produces  material  civiliza- 
tion through  the  conquest  of  nature,  and  does  not  penetrate  to 
the  lower  strata  of  society  at  all.  This  is  because  the  truth  is  pos- 
sessed by  only  a  minute  fraction  of  society.  It  therefore  has  great 
economic  value  but  very  little  social  value.  What  the  progress 
of  the  world  would  be  if  all  this  truth  were  socially  appropriated 
no  one  can  foresee,  but  its  effect  would  probably  be  proportional  to 
the  number  possessing  it. 


CHAPTER   VII 
SOCIAL  APPROPRIATION   OF   TRUTH 

The  totality  of  human  actions  is  governed  by  the  totality  of  human 
knowledge.  —  Buckle. 

That  which  the  best  human  nature  is  capable  of  is  within  the  reach  of 
human  nature  at  large.  —  Herbert  Spencer. 

Assis  soit  sur  le  trone,  soit  sur  un  escabeau,  on  n'est  jamais  assis  que  sur 
son  cul.  —  Montaigne. 

Nostra  vero  inveniendi  scientias  ea  est  ratio,  ut  non  multum  ingeniorum 
acumini  et  robori  relinquatur ;  sed  quae  ingenia  et  intellectus  fere  exaequet. — 
Bacon. 

The  discovery  of  truth  leads  to  achievement ;  it  does  not  neces- 
sarily lead  to  improvement.     John  Stuart  Mill  has  well  remarked: 

The  words  Progress  and  Progressiveness  are  not  here  to  be  understood  as 
synonymous  with  improvement.  It  is  conceivable  that  the  laws  of  human  nature 
might  determine,  and  even  necessitate,  a  certain  series  of  changes  in  man  and 
society,  which  might  not  in  every  case,  or  which  might  not  on  the  whole,  be 
improvements.  It  is  my  belief,  indeed,  that  the  general  tendency  is,  and  will  con- 
tinue to  be,  one  of  improvement ;  a  tendency  toward  a  better  and  happier  state. ^ 

I,  too,  have  argued  in  favor  of  the  general  proposition  that 
material  civilization  is  on  the  whole  progressive,  using  the  term 
"progressive"  in  the  sense  of  tending  toward  improvement.^  The 
survey  made  in  the  fifteenth  chapter  of  Pure  Sociology  of  the 
sociogenetic  forces  showed  clearly  enough  that  the  human  race  is 
improving  along  many  lines,  while  the  last  section  of  that  chapter, 
devoted  to  the  sociological  perspective,  points  out  in  what  the  real 
moral  progress  of  mankind  has  consisted.  Moreover,  the  section  of 
Chapter  III  of  the  present  work  entitled  "The  New  Ethics,"  shows 
that  the  trend  of  things  is  in  the  direction  of  abandoning  the  old 
ethics  of  restraint  and  sacrifice  and  adopting  an  ethics  of  liberation 
and  social  betterment. 

1  A  System  of  Logic,  Ratiocinative  and  Inductive,  etc.,  eighth  edition.  New  York, 
1900,  p.  632. 

2  Dynamic  Sociology,  Vol.  II,  pp.  175,  206. 

84 


Ch.  VII]  POSSESSION  OF  TRUTH  85 

The  view  is  therefore  not  at  all  pessimistic.  It  is  melioristic,  one 
of  the  maxims  of  which  is  that  le  plus  grand  cnnenii  dii  micnx, 
c  est  le  bic7i.  But  the  spontaneous  improvement  of  society,  even 
when  aided  by  science,  is  very  slow.  No  one  would  disparage  this 
discovery  of  new  truth,  but  enough  has  already  been  discovered  to 
dispel  the  greater  part  of  the  error  in  the  world.  It  is  not  that  the 
truth  is  not  in  the  world,  too,  but  that  it  is  not  assimilated  by 
society  at  large.  Nothing  can  check  the  discovery  of  new  truth, 
but  with  this  the  sociologist  has  nothing  to  do.  He  is  only  con- 
cerned with  the  social  appropriation  of  the  truth  already  discovered. 
The  new  truth  being  discovered  leads  to  the  further  conquest  of 
nature,  which  belongs  to  pure  sociology.  Applied  sociology  aims 
at  the  complete  social  transformation  which  will  follow  the  assimi- 
lation of  discovered  truth. 

Possession  of  Truth 

None  of  the  great  errors  of  the  world  which  are  so  effective  in 
holding  civilization  back  could  stand  for  a  moment  if  those  who  now 
entertain  them  were  really  in  possession  of  the  truth  which  is  their 
natural  antidote.  It  is  said  "that  many  well-informed  persons  never- 
theless entertain  these  errors.  There  is  what  has  been  called 
"  dualism  "  of  the  human  mind  which  enables  some  to  hold  at 
one  and  the  same  time  wholly  incompatible  opinions.  Kepler,  for 
example,  could  believe  that  there  existed  in  each  planet  a  spirit 
that  unerringly  guided  it  to  revolve  around  the  sun  in  an  ellipse, 
its  radius  vector  describing  equal  areas  in  equal  times.  Cuvier, 
Richard  Owen,  and  Louis  Agassiz,  with  their  profound  knowledge 
of  the  laws  of  life,  still  believed  in  special  creation  and  a  divine 
plan.  Kant,  while  forced  to  admit  determinism  in  history  and  in 
society  at  large,  taught  free  will  for  the  individual.  Dana  said  that 
"the  evolution  of  the  system  of  life  went  forward  through  the 
derivation  of  species  from  species,  according  to  natural  methods  not 
yet  clearly  understood,  and  with  few  occasions  for  supernatural 
intervention."  ^    Faraday  is  reported  as  saying  that  he   kept  his 

^  Manual  of  Geology,  by  J.  D.  Dana,  second  edition,  New  York,  1874,  pp.  603- 
604.  Compare  also  Am.  Journ.  of  Science,  third  series,  Vol.  XII,  October,  1876, 
pp.  250-251. 


86  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  i 

science  in  one  pocket  and  his  religion  in  the  other.  Descartes, 
with  all  his  wisdom,  was  credulous  in  the  extreme.  In  his  Princi- 
ples of  Philosophy  he  said  : 

I  do  not  doubt  that  the  world  was  created  in  the  beginning  with  as  great 
perfection  as  it  now  has,  so  that  the  sun,  the  earth,  the  moon,  the  stars,  were 
already  there;  and  that  the  earth  not  only  had  within  it  the  seeds  of  plants, 
but  that  the  plants  themselves  covered  a  part  of  it,  that  Adam  and  Eve  were 
not  created  children  but  with  the  age  of  perfect  men,  etc.^ 

His  whole  philosophy  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  uni- 
verse is  wholly  a  product  of  the  divine  will,  and  that  it  might  have 
been  anything  else  than  it  is  if  it  had  been  willed  to  be  so.  What 
Dr.  Asa  Gray  called  "evolutionary  teleology"^  was  clearly  out- 
lined by  Descartes,^  and  has  been  the  refuge  of  many  truly  great 
minds  that  clearly  conceived  the  invariability  of  nature's  laws  but 
could  not  wholly  give  up  their  supernatural  beliefs. 

But  the  true  motives  underlying  all  these  inconsistencies  are 
much  entangled  and  difficult  to  understand.  In  so  far  as  they  are 
honest  and  not  due  to  fear  of  persecution  (in  which  case  they 
are  not  opinions  at  all  but  false  statements  of  opinion),  they  are 
chiefly  due  to  the  mental  atmosphere  in  which  men  live.  In  other 
words,  they  are  due  to  the  prevailing  world  views  of  the  time.  The 
half -discovered  truth  is  at  variance  with  the  world  view.  This  is  an 
error,  but  it  cannot  be  given  up.  The  truth  must  be  reconciled 
with  it,  or  at  least  some  modus  vivendi  must  be  devised  that  will 
enable  them  to  exist  together.  Persons  holding  truths  under  such 
conditions  can  scarcely  be  said  to  possess  them.  Their  tenure  is 
so  feeble  that  they  can  produce  very  little  effect.  They  have  no 
vital  force,  and  the  slightest  objection  or  opposition  causes  them 
to  be  abandoned. 

What  is  needed  as  a  guide  to  action  and  a  condition  to  progress 
as  well  as  to  happiness  is  complete  possession  of  truth,  absolute 
faitJi  in  the  laws  of  nature.  The  admission  of  the  possibiUty  of  an 
exception  is  fatal  to  all  the  calculations  that  can  be  made  looking  to 
improvement.  If  an  engineer  were  to  suppose  that  the  laws  of 
stress  and  strain  were  arbitrary  and  might  change  at  any  moment, 

1  Principes  de  la  philosophie,  Paris,  1724,  p.  168. 

2  Darwiniana,  Art.  XIII. 

3  Discours  de  la  methode,  Oiuvres  de  Descartes,  Paris,  1S44,  pp.  28,  29. 


Ch.  VII]  POSSESSION  OF  TRUTH  87 

he  would   never  dare  to  build  a  bridge  or  a  tower.    But  he  has 
absolute  faith  in  those  laws,  and  he  builds  with  confidence.    So  it 
must  ultimately  be  with  every  act  of  life.    The  laws  of  nature_and- 
of  life  must  first  be  learned  as  are  those  of  stress  and  strain,  and 
then  each  step  in  conformity  with  those  laws  is  certain. 

The  most  fundamental  and  important  of  all  the  laws  of  the 
universe  is  the  law  of  causation.  As  has  already  been  said  in  this 
work,  this  law  is  acted  upon  by  animals.  By  the  lowest  races  of 
men  it  is  also  chiefly  acted  upon,  and  neither  animals  nor  the  lowest 
savages  err  except  under  a  changed  environment  which  they  no 
longer  understand.  Philosophy,  i.e.,  the  exercise  of  the  reason, 
seems  to  ignore  this  law  and  leads  to  all  the  error  that  we  have  been 
considering.  But  really  it  does  not  ignore  the  law  of  causation  ; 
it  only  invents  false  causes.  Causes  it  must  have,  and  if  the  true 
causes  are  beyond  its  power  to  perceive,  false  causes  are  devised. 
The  later  philosophers  have  also  recognized  the  law  of  causation. 
They  called  it  simply  the  "sufficient  reason."  This  they  finally 
contrasted  with  causation  through  will  or  design  and  made  the  dis- 
tinction the  same  as  that  between  efficient  and  final  causes.  But 
in  all  cases  causation  was  recognized,  and  it  is  in  fact  a  condition 
of  all  thought.  One  modern  writer,  who  rejects  the  doctrine  of 
innate  ideas  in  general,  considers  the  idea  of  causation  as  innate.^ 
This  is  virtually  Schopenhauer's  position,  as  set  forth  in  his  first 
work  devoted  to  the  subject.^    In  one  of  his  latest  works  he  says  : 

My  philosophy  began  with  the  proposition  that  there  is  nothing  in  the  world 
but  causes  and  effects,  and  that  the  sufficient  reason  in  its  four  aspects  is 
simply  the  most  general  form  of  the  intellect.''' 

What  is  thus  universal,  therefore,  is  the  faculty  of  causality,  and 
there  is  no  occasion  for  trying  to  strengthen  that  faculty.  What  it 
is  needful  to  enforce  is  the  distinction  between  true  causes  and 
false  causes.  The  stronger  the  faculty  of  causality,  the  greater  will 
be  the  error  in  the  absence  of  adequate  data  for  exercising  it. 
Most  of  the  false  causes  invented  to  explain  phenomena  grow  out 

1  Gustav  Ratzenhofer,  Kritik  des  Intellects,  Leipzig,  1902,  II,  III. 

2  Ueber  die  vierfache  Wurzel  des  Satzes  vom  zureichenden  Grunde,  Rudolstadt, 
1813.    See  p.  107. 

8  Parerga  und  Paralipomena,  seventh  edition,  Leipzig,  1891,  Vol.  I,  p.  141. 


88  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

of  the  belief  in  spiritual  beings.  Even  those  believed  in  by  civilized 
peoples  and  by  some  of  the  most  highly  cultured  among  these  are 
easily  traceable  to  this  source.  All  superstition  rests  on  this  basis, 
for  the  events  are  alleged  to  take  place  without  any  natural  cause  ; 
therefore  the  cause  is  supernatural,  for  a  cause  of  some  kind  is 
always  assumed.  And  what  is  a  supernatural  cause  but  the  agency 
of  spiritual  beings  .-*  The  case  is  not  altered  when  the  spiritual  beings 
are  reduced  to  one,  and  it  is  assumed  that  nature  is  presided  over 
by  a  supreme  intelligence  directing  all  movements  and  events. 
That  intelligence  must  have  the  character  of  spirit  precisely  as 
conceived  by  the  savage.  Needless  to  say  that  if  such  were  the 
case  there  could  be  no  science,  or  that  under  such  a  world  view,  if 
fully  believed  in,  there  would  be  no  attempt  to  control  phenomena. 
If  it  be  said  that  all  the  science  we  have  has  grown  up  under  this 
world  view,  the  answer  is  that  this  is  because,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
it  has  not  been  believed  in.  Since  the  scientific  era  began  there 
has  been  no  such  faith  in  the  supernatural  as  exists  among  savages. 
Science  was  made  possible  by  the  diminution  of  this  kind  of  faith 
and  the  concomitant  increase  of  faith  in  natural  causes.  The  history 
of  science  shows  that  those  who  still  possessed  a  large  amount  of 
the  faith  of  primitive  man  opposed  science  and  stubbornly  resisted 
its  advance.  The  history  of  the  Middle  Ages  is  that  of  a  period 
during  which  faith  in  spiritual  causes  was  almost  as  great  as  it  is 
among  primitive  peoples.  During  that  period  there  was  practically 
no  science. 

The  world  emerged  from  that  condition  through  the  growth  of 
heresy.  As  already  remarked,  heresy  is  a  step  out  of  error  into 
truth.  It  is  a  form  of  doubt.  As  Buckle  said,  "  until  doubt  began 
progress  was  impossible."  Descartes,  with  all  his  credulity,  made\ 
doubt  the  condition  to  the  discovery  of  truth.  But  he  excepted 
from  doubt  the  very  thing  that  he  should  have  doubted  most,  viz., 
the  supernatural.  Science  became  possible  when  doubt  of  the 
supernatural  had  become  somewhat  general,  sufficiently  so  to  cheeky 
the  persecuting  spirit.  It  has  advanced  exactly  in  proportion  to  the 
spread  of  this  class  of  doubt,  which  was  in  turn  directly  propor- 
tional to  the  spread  of  faith  in  natural  causes.  Both  these  move- 
ments went  on   in  a  geometrical  ratio.    Science  proved  itself  so 


Ch.  VII]  POSSESSION  OF  TRUTH  89 

useful  to  man  that  it  was  its  own  vindication.  Its  superiority  made 
it  the  object  of  imitation,  and  the  faith  in  matter  and  force  rapidly 
spread.  It  gave  rise  to  industry  and  the  use  of  mechanical  appli- 
ances. These  obey  exact  and  invariable  laws,  and  familiarity  with 
them  accustoms  the  mind  to  expect  like  effects  from  like  causes. 
This  has  no  doubt  been  a  powerful  influence  in  the  progress  of 
rationalism,  and  the  fact  has  been  recognized  by  more  than  one 
writer.^  It  is  not,  then,  denied  that  the  world  has  already  come  a 
long  way  out  of  the  night  of  error  into  the  hght  of  truth.  It  is 
only  claimed  that  it  still  has  a  long  journey  before  it  on  this  same 
road. 

The  idea  of  causation  which  it  is  necessary  to  entertain  in  order 
to  secure  progressive  action  on  the  part  of  man  is  first,  that  the 
cause  of  any  phenomenon  is  a  true  cause,  and  second,  that  it  is  an 
adequate  cause.  A  true  cause  is  an  efficient  cause.  It  is  a  force, 
and  force  must  be  conceived  as  impact  or  as  pressure.  If  the  wind 
tears  the  branches  from  trees,  unroofs  houses,  or  fills  the  sails  of 
vessels,  it  must  be  realized  that  air  is  a  material  substance  that  is 
set  in  violent  motion  by  meteorological  conditions  and  acts  directly 
upon  other  substances  producing  the  observed  effects.  If  we  can- 
not see  this  so  plainly  in  the  forces  of  heat,  light,  electricity,  and 
gravitation,  our  faith  in  them  as  true  forces  must  not  be  diminished 
thereby.  This  does  not  preclude  us  from  speculating  as  to  the  true 
nature  of  these  subtle  agencies,  only  it  must  not  carry  us  so  far  as 
to  invest  them  with  supernatural  attributes.  We  may  even  go  so 
far  as  to  maintain  that  matter  is  spirit,  but  not  in  the  sense  that  it 
is  endowed  with  intelligence  and  will.  The  view  that  matter  and 
spirit  are  the  same  is  true  monism  and  I  believe  it  is  true  science, 
but  it  means  only  that  the  material  world  contains  all  the  elements 
of  intelligence  and  will,  and  can  and  does  take  that  form  when 
organized  in  the  appointed  way  and  to  the  required  degree.  But 
will  and  intelligence  themselves  are  subject  to  law  and  are  in  fact 
as  rigidly  determined  as  are  the  winds  or  the  electric  currents.^ 

^  Adolphe  Coste,  L'Experience  des  peuples  et  les  previsions  qu'elle  autorise, 
Paris,  1900,  pp.  366,  395  ff. ;  Thorstein  Veblen,  The  Theory  of  Business  Enterprise, 
New  York,  1904,  Chap.  IX. 

2  See  the  section  Psychics  in  Pure  Sociology,  Chap.  IX,  pp.  150-159. 


90  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

With  regard  to  the  adequacy  of  causes,  I  cannot  better  ilkistrate 
it  than  by  a  personal  experience.  When  collecting  around  Fish 
Lake,  Utah,  in  the  Wasatch  Range  in  1875,  a  party  of  Pai-Ute 
Indians  were  encamped  at  the  outlet  of  the  lake.  The  chief  was 
sick,  and  supposing  me  to  be  a  "medicine-man,"  they  appealed  to 
me  to  cure  him.  I  promised  to  send  him  some  medicine,  gathered 
some  of  the  juniper  berries  abundant  there,  roasted  and  pulverized 
them,  put  the  powder  in  a  cap  box  and  sent  it  to  the  chief,  knowing 
that  it  would  be  practically  inert  and  certainly  harmless.  It  was 
returned  from  fear  that  it  might  be  poison.  I  told  the  messenger 
that  I  would  throw  it  into  the  lake.  The  next  morning  the  Indian 
camp  was  in  an  uproar  from  fear  that  I  had  thrown  the  medicine 
into  the  lake  and  poisoned  all  the  water  of  the  lake.  Fortunately  I 
had  not  }'et  destroyed  it,  and  calmed  their  fears  by  letting  them 
see  me  burn  it  up  in  the  camp-fire.  This  little  incident  showed 
that  those  Indians  had  no  conception  of  the  quantitative  relations 
of  cause  and  effect.  A  single  gram  of  poison  in  a  whole  lake  would 
have  alarmed  them  as  much  as  the  half-ounce  that  I  had  prepared. 
I  have  often  met  people  that  showed  the  same  inability  to  see  that 
quantity  had  any  relation  to  effect  in  the  matter  of  poisons.  This 
is  very  largely  true  in  other  matters  in  undisciplined  minds,  and  a 
large  part  of  the  error  and  consequent  misguided  action  of  mankind 
is  the  result  of  a  lack  of  power  to  perceive  the  inadequacy  of  many 
causes  to  produce  the  effects  ascribed  to  them.  The  world  must 
learn  not  only  to  distinguish  a  true  from  a  false  cause  but  also  to 
judge  of  the  adequacy  of  a  cause  to  produce  an  effect. 

Relation  of  Knowledge  to  Truth 

Both  error  and  truth  are  in  the  nature  of  ideas,  i.e.,  they  are  con- 
clusions drawn  from  facts.  They  are  deductions.  Error  is  false 
deduction,  truth  is  correct  deduction.  Now  in  both  cases  the  facts 
are  in  a  sense  known  and  therefore  constitute  knowledge.  Phenom- 
ena are  directly  perceived  by  the  senses,  and  the  sensations  they 
produce  are  at  least  real.  The  term  "perception"  in  psychology 
should  be  so  restricted  that  all  perceptions  would  also  be  real,  but 
the  psychologists  habitually  expand  the  meaning  of  that  term  so  as 


Ch.  VII]       RELATION   OF   KNOWLEDGE  TO  TRUTH  91 

to  include  considerable  true  reasoning,  and  then  they  prove  that  the 
faculty  of  perception  is  unreliable  and  leads  to  a  great  number  of 
errors,  such  as  optical  illusions.  This  is  simply  bad  terminolog}-. 
They  have  ruined  the  word  "perception"  and  have  no  term  for 
the  simple  fact. 

With  the  same  reasoning  power  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  con- 
clusions will  depend  upon  the  amount  of  knowledge.  But,  as  we 
have  seen,  for  the  simplest  phenomena  a  small  amount  of  knowledge 
is  sufficient  to  insure  correct  conclusions  and  consequent  safe  actions. 
The  more  complex  and  obscure  the  phenomena,  the  greater  the 
amount  of  knowledge  required  for  this.  But  mankind  has  never 
waited  for  more  knowledge.  False  conclusions  are  always  drawn 
from  little  knowledge  and  error  has  been  the  sole  guide  to  action. 
This  is  not  confined  to  primitive  man,  and  the  mountain  of  error 
involved  in  the  belief  in  spiritual  beings  is  not  the  only  error.  While 
that  form  of  error  still  permeates  the  most  advanced  societies,  it 
is  supplemented  by  a  mass  of  error  of  other  forms,  all  due  to  the 
same  cause,  viz.,  that  of  drawing  false  conclusions  from  insufficient 
knowledge. 

In  general  this  is  called  ignorance  or  lack  of  intelligence.  To 
realize  the  social  import  of  this,  it  is  only  necessary  to  contrast  the 
condition  of  the  members  of  society  classed  as  intelligent  with  that 
of  the  members  classed  as  unintelligent  or  ignorant.  In  even  the 
most  advanced  societies  the  latter  always  exceed  the  former  numer- 
ically, usually  constituting  at  least  three  fourths  or  four  fifths  of  the 
population.  They  are  as  a  rule  very  poor,  often  indigent,  but  in- 
dustrious and  overworked.  The  others  are  as  a  rule  well-to-do,  and 
if  they  work  at  all,  as  most  of  them  do,  it  is  at  the  lighter  kinds  of 
labor,  mostly  intellectual.  This  is  considered  by  many  as  a  natural, 
proper,  and  advantageous  spontaneous  classification  of  the  popu- 
lation. The  control  of  society  is  also  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the 
intelligent  few,  and  the  ignorant  mass  can  only  submit  to  whatever 
regulations  their  superiors  choose  to  impose.  Of  course  these  regu- 
lations are  always  in  the  interest  of  the  intelligent  class,  and  the 
ignorant  mass  is  made  to  bear  the  chief  burdens.  In  democratic 
communities  where  the  uninformed  have  votes  it  is  found  easy  to 
deceive  them  and  cause  them  to  vote  against  their  own  interests 


92  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

and  for  the  interests  of  the  well-informed,  so  that  this  vaunted  right 
does  them  quite  as  much  harm  as  good.  If  any  one  protests  against 
any  of  these  things,  the  answer  is  that  it  is  a  law  of  nature  that 
intelligence  shall  rule,  and  this  usually  closes  the  argument. 

It  is  to  be  specially  noted  that  all  this  is  habitually  looked  upon 
as  a  natural  and  necessary  condition  of  things.  The  uninformed 
class  is  regarded  as  an  inferior  class.  It  is  assumed  that  their 
ignorance  is  a  natural  condition  and  something  that  could  not  be 
otherwise.  Their  stupidity,  gullibility,  and  susceptibility  to  decep- 
tion and  exploitation  are  supposed  to  be  attributes  inherent  in  their 
individual  natures,  which  render  them  the  natural  dupes,  tools,  and 
servants  of  the  intelligent  class.  Among  all  the  writers  on  social 
questions  with  whom  I  am  acquainted,  however  sympathetic  or 
humanitarian  they  may  be  and  often  are,  I  have  never  met  with 
but  one  who  took  a  different  view  of  the  subject,  and  that  writer 
is  almost  wholly  unknown,  and  expressed  his  views  in  a  book  the 
publication  of  which  during  his  lifetime  he  expressly  prohibited.  I 
have  seen  a  number  of  attacks  upon  his  doctrines,  probably  in  all 
cases  from  persons  who  had  never  read  the  book,  and  who  did  so 
simply  because  this  has  become  somewhat  fashionable.  Mr.  Benja- 
min Kidd,  who  has  perhaps  the  clearest  insight  of  any  living  author 
into  social  conditions,  who  believes  that  the  elite  of  modern  society 
is  intellectually  inferior  to  that  of  antiquity  and  scarcely  superior 
to  that  of  the  native  Maoris  of  New  Zealand,  not  only  regards  con- 
temporary social  inequalities  as  normal  and  unavoidable  but  sees 
the  only  possible  mitigation  of  the  attendant  evils  of  them  in  the 
still  more  complete  submission  and  resignation  of  the  masses  to 
"ultra-rational  sanctions." 

The  intelligent  classes  of  modern  society  possess  a  certain  amount 
of  knowledge  of  a  highly  practical  character,  which  serves  them  as 
a  guide  to  conduct  looking  to  their  personal  advantage.  It  is  for 
the  most  part  superficial  knowledge,  it  is  true,  but  this  is  all  that  is 
required  for  the  purpose.  They  have  the  tools  necessary  to  keep 
familiar  with  current  events,  to  look  after  their  business  interests, 
and  to  forecast  such  future  prospects  as  are  needful  in  determining 
their  action  from  day  to  day.  They  know  enough  of  human  nature 
to  see  how  the  uninformed  class  can  be  utilized  in  promoting  their 


Ch.  VII]       RELATION   OF   KNOWLEDGE  TO  TRUTH  93 

interests.  They  care  nothing  for  reform  except  in  their  own  affairs 
and  are  usually  quite  satisfied  with  the  existing  condition  of  things. 
They  have  complete  control  of  the  machinery  of  society  and  easily 
thrive  on  the  productive  labor  of  the  much  larger  unintelligent 
classes.  But  they  are  not  all  alike,  and  there  are  always  exceptional 
spirits  among  them  who  would  change  these  relations  and  bring 
about  a  more  equitable  state  of  society.  In  fact  nearly  all  the  real 
amelioration,  and  it  is  considerable,  that  has  taken  place  in  the 
condition  of  the  lower  classes  has  been  due  to  this  dismterested 
sympathy  on  the  part  of  members  of  the  upper  classes  who  have 
more  to  lose  than  to  gain  by  it.  The  lower  classes  are  so  unintelli- 
gent, maladroit,  unorganized,  and  generally  inefficient  that  they 
cannot  formulate  a  rational  demand,  and  have  no  idea  how  to  pro- 
ceed in  the  effort  to  secure  what  they  want.^  All  attempts,  therefore, 
on  their  part  to  bring  about  an  amelioration  of  their  condition  usually 
do  them  more  harm  than  good.  Their  recent  attempts  to  organize, 
while  emphasizing  this  fact,  have  not  been  wholly  fruitless,  and 
should  have  the  hearty  support  of  all  truly  sympathetic  persons; 
but  it  is  painful  to  see  them  constantly  resorting  to  violence  and 
injustice,  which  alienate  thousands  who  are  naturally  friendly  to 
them. 

For  these  and  other  reasons  I  have  never  cherished  much  hope 
for  any  permanent  social  reform  so  long  as  society  consists  of  the 
two  classes  described  in  this  section — an  intelligent  or  well-informed 
class  and  an  ignorant  or  uninformed  class.  There  is  too  much  truth 
in  the  dictum  that  intelligence  will  rule.  Inequality  of  intelligence 
necessarily  results  in  the  cleavage  of  society  into  an  exploiting  and 
an  exploited  class.  If  there  is  no  way  of  equalizing  intelligence, 
social  reform  in  this  direction  seems  out  of  the  question. 

The  unhappy  condition  of  the  lower  classes  of  society  is  due  as 
much  to  error  as  to  ignorance.  When  any  one  talks  with  them  he 
finds  that  their  minds  are  full  of  false  ideas.  They  arc  nearly  all 
superstitious  and  are  slaves  to  a  creed  and  to  the  priesthood  whom 
they  arc  supporting  out  of  their  hard  earnings  in  the  condition  of  a 
leisure  class.  This  is  true  for  all  religious  sects,  in  some  of  which 
the  terms  in  use  are  different  from  these.  From  this  source  they 
1  Compare  Sombart,  Socialism,  etc.,  New  York,  189S,  pp.  37,  38. 


94  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  i 

are  haunted  and  oppressed  by  nearly  the  same  fears  and  terrors  as 
the  savage.  Indeed,  in  some  respects  by  worse  ones,  for  the  later, 
more  ingenious  priesthoods  have  invented  at  least  one  more  terrible 
punishment  than  any  savage  priesthood  has  ever  devised,  viz.,  that 
known  as  "eternal  damnation,"  or  a  future  state  of  endless  pain. 
This  diabolical  doctrine  has  been  the  cause  of  more  suffering  than 
all  other  religious  errors  combined,  but  it  has  been  the  main  depend- 
ence in  keeping  the  masses  under  complete  spiritual  subjection. 

But  the  false  ideas  of  the  lower  classes  are  by  no  means  all 
religious  errors.  Among  others  may  be  specially  mentioned  undue 
faith  in  men,  usually  in  the  men  that  are  chiefly  exploiting  them. 
Great  loyalty  to  some  particular  man  of  the  upper  class  is  the 
characteristic  of  nearly  all  the  members  of  the  lower  class.  It  is 
probably  best  that  this  should  be  so,  because  in  the  benighted  state 
of  their  minds  they  are  really  dependent  upon  individuals  of  the 
upper  class.  They  could  not  take  care  of  themselves  without  the 
help  of  a  sort  of  master,  and  although  they  may  be  in  a  country 
which  does  not  allow  slavery  they  are  virtually  slaves.  Their  .out- 
look over  the  world  is  so  narrow  that  they  would  not  know  where 
to  go  or  what  to  do.  They  miist  stay  where  they  are  and  do  what 
they  are  bidden.  On  the  other  hand,  ihe  exploiter  has  scarcely  any 
other  course  before  him.  He  may  be  and  often  is  sympathetic,  and 
tries  to  make  those  below  him  as  comfortable  and  happy  as  pos- 
sible. But  he  cannot  cause  them  to  rise  because  they  have  nothing 
to  hold  them  up  if  they  should  be  lifted  up. 

This  of  course  is  an  exaggeration  of  the  average  condition  of  the 
lower  classes  in  most  civilized  communities,  but  probably  every  one 
knows  cases  of  which  it  is  no  exaggeration,  and  between  these  and 
those  in  which  the  line  between  the  upper  and  lower  classes  is 
nearly  obliterated  there  are  all  gradations.  But  after  all  possible 
allowance  is  made  for  exceptional  cases  and  enlightened  communities, 
the  general  fact  remains  that  in  the  world  at  large  a  few  dominate 
society  and  make  it,  if  not  an  "aristocracy  of  brains,"  at  least  an 
oligarchy  of  intelligence. 

These  false  and  narrow  ideas  which  make  the  mass  of  mankind 
dependent  upon  a  few  enlightened  citizens  and  keep  them  in  sub- 
jection, in  poverty,  toil,  and  misery,  are  of  course  the  result  of  the 


Ch.  vil]  INTELLECTUAL  EGALITARIANISM 


95 


emptiness  of  their  minds  —  in  a  word,  to  the  limited  amount  and 
poor  quality  of  the  knowledge  they  possess.  They  reason  as  well 
as  they  can  with  the  materials  they  have.  Their  conclusions  are, 
as  in  the  case  of  the  savage,  either  false  or  practically  useless  as 
guides  to  action.  These  conclusions  constitute  their  stock  of  ideas 
and  determine  their  social  condition. 


Intellectual  Egalitarianism 

The  proposition  that  the  lower  classes  of  society  are  the  intellect- 
ual equals  of  the  upper  classes  will  probably  shock  most  minds. 
At  least  it  will  be  almost  unanimously  rejected  as  altogether  false. 
Yet  I  do  not  hesitate  to  maintain  and  defend  it  as  an  abstract  propo- 
sition. But  of  course  we  must  understand  what  is  meant  by  intel- 
lectual equality.  I  have  taken  some  pains  to  show  that  the  difference 
in  the  intelligence  of  the  two  classes  is  immense.  What  I  insist 
upon  is  that  this  difference  in  intelligence  is  not  due  to  any 
difference  in  intellect.  It  is  due  entirely  to  difference  in  mental 
equipment.  It  is  chiefly  due  to  difference  in  knowledge,  if  we 
include  in  knowledge  a  familiarity  with  the  tools  of  the  mind  and 
an  acquired  ability  to  utilize  the  products  of  human  achievement, 
as  I  have  defined  this  term  in  Pure  Sociology  (Chapter  III).  It 
was  there  shown  that  each  age  of  the  world's  history  stands  on  a 
platform  erected  by  all  past  ages.  It  is  true  that  all  the  mem- 
bers of  society  have  the  use  to  a  certain  extent  of  the  products 
of  past  achievement,  but  in  no  other  sense  do  those  members 
stand  on  the  elevated  platform  who  do  not  actually  possess  the 
heritage  of  the  past.  Now,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  it  is  only  what  I 
have  called  the  intelligent  class  who  really  possess  this  heritage. 
They  of  course  possess  it  in  varying  degrees,  but  most  of  them 
possess  enough  of  it  to  give  them  dominion  over  those  who  do 
not  possess  it. 

I  have  shown  in  the  same  work  (p.  573)  that  social  heredity  is 
not  a  process  of  organic  transmission,  that  no  part  of  the  social 
germ-plasm  passes  from  one  individual  to  another,  but  that  all 
knowledge  must  be  separately  acquired  by  every  individual.  The 
social  organization  must  be  such  as  to  infuse  it  into  the  members 


96  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

of  society  as  fast  as  they  are  capable  of  receiving  it.  This  infu- 
sion of  it  is  social  transmission,  and  unless  it  is  infused  it  is  not 
transmitted.  The  only  way  in  which  products  of  past  achievement 
have  been  preserved  has  been  through  such  a  degree  of  social 
organization  as  is  sufficient  to  infuse  them  into  a  certain  number 
of  the  members  of  society.  This  number  has  always,  in  the  his- 
torical races,  been  large  enough  to  prevent  their  being  lost,  and 
most  or  all  human  achievement  has  been  preserved.  But  it  is 
easy  to  imagine  this  great  social  duty  to  be  neglected  and  all 
human  achievement  lost.  There  are  parts  of  the  world  in  which 
this  has  virtually  happened,  and  this  is  the  way  in  which  races 
degenerate. 

PlTt^cnripty   ]]?<=■    nfT'^g^    ^nrl    nnvvViprp    \}^^n    ^p    organized    aS  _tO 

transmit  the  products_ofachievement  to  more  than  a  small  frac- 
tioiT  of  its  members.  These  constitute  the  intelligenFclass.  The 
rest~are  all liitellectually  disinheritedTaiid  while  the  intellectually 
disinherited  always  include  and  are  nearly  coextensive  with  the 
materially  disinherited,  the  former  is  much  the  more  serious  con- 
dition. For  the  intellectual  inheritance  would  bring  with  it  the 
material  inheritance  and  all  the  other  advantages  that  are  enjoyed 
by  the  intelligent  class.  Of  all  the  problems  of  applied  sociology 
that  which  towers  above  all  others  is  the  problem  of  the  organiza- 
tion of  society  so  that  the  heritage  of  the  past  shall  be  transmitted 
to  all  its  members  alike.  Until  this  problem  is  solved  there  is 
scarcely  any  use  in  trying  to  solve  other  problems.  Not  only  are 
most  of  them  otherwise  incapable  of  solution,  but  this  primary 
problem  once  solved  all  others  will  solve  themselves. 

But  here  we  encounter  the  great  sullen,  stubborn  error,  so  uni- 
versal and  ingrained  as  to  constitute  a  world  view,  that  the  differ- 
ence between  the  upper  and  lower  classes  of  society  is  due  to  a 
difference  in  their  intellectual  capacity,  something  existing  in  the 
nature  of  things,  something  preordained  and  inherently  inevitable. 
Every  form  of  sophistry  is  employed  to  uphold  this  view.  We  are 
told  that  there  must  be  social  classes,  that  they  are  a  necessary  part 
of  the  social  order.  There  must  be  laborers  and  unskilled  work- 
men to  do  the  drudgery  work  of  the  world.  There  must  be  menial 
servants  to  wait  upon  us      What  would  society  do  without  the 


Ch.  VII]  RISE   OF  THE   PROLETARIAT  97 

scavenger?^  All  of  which,  while  clearly  showing  that  the  persons 
who  thus  argucnot  only  fear  but  believe  that  the  lower  classes  are 
capable  of  being  raised  to  their  own  level,  reveals  a  lack  of  reflec- 
tion and  an  incapacity  for  logical  reasoning  scarcely  to  be  met  with 
elsewhere.  It  recalls  the  remark  of  the  Scotch  engineer  whom  some 
fortune  transported  to  the  plains  of  Kansas  before  the  days  of 
Pacific  railroads,  that  there  could  be  no  railroads  in  that  country,  for 
"  where  are  the  hills  to  put  the  tunnels  through  ?  " 

As  just  remarked,  only  one  man  among  all  the  thinkers  of  the 
world  has  ever  thought  or  dared  to  combat  this  universal  error. 
His  position  was  stated  and  briefly  discussed  in  Pure  Sociology,^ 
and  certain  qualifications  of  it  were  made,  to  which  I  would  still 
adhere  ;  but  with  these  qualifications  the  doctrine  of  the  equal 
intellectual  capacity  of  all  men  is  a  perfectly  sound  doctrine,  and 
is  the  doctrine  upon  which  the  applied  sociologist  must  stand.  It 
is  true  that  this  view  has  appearances  against  it,  but,  as  I  have 
often  .shown,  there  is  no  great  truth  in  any  department  of  science 
that  did  not  at  first  have  appearances  against  it.  The  whole  march 
of  truth  has  consisted  in  substituting  the  hidden  and  obscure  reality 
for  the  falsely  apparent.  With  this  uniform  trend  of  history  before 
us,  we  ought  by  this  time  to  have  learned  to  suspect  everything 
that  seems  on  the  face  of  it  to  be  true.  Let  us  glance  at  some  of 
the  evidence  in  favor  of  the  Helvetian  doctrine  and  against  the 
current  belief. 

Rise  of  the  Proletariat.  — The  history  of  social  classes  furnishes 
to  the  philosophical  student  of  society  the  most  convincing  proof 
that  the  lower  grades  of  mankind  have  never  occupied  those  positions 

'  I  can  scarcely  refrain  from  quoting  the  following  from  a  little  l)ook  that  it  would 
harm  no  one  to  read :  "  I  have  seldom  heard  an  argument  or  read  an  adverse  letter 
or  speech  against  the  claims  of  justice  in  social  matters,  but  our  friend  the  scavenger 
played  a  prominent  part  therein.  Truly  this  scavenger  is  a  most  important  person. 
\'et  one  would  not  suppose  that  the  whole  cosniic  scheme  revolved  on  him  as  on  an 
a.xis  ;  one  would  not  imggin^him  to  be  the  keystone  of  European  society — at  least 
his  appearance  and  his  wages  would  not  justify  such  an  assumption.  But  I  begin  to 
believe  that  the  fear  of  the  scavenger  is  really  the  source  and  fountain  head,  the  life 
and  blood  and  breath  of  all  conservatism.  (lood  old  scavenger.  His  ash-pan  i.s_the 
bulwark  of^apitahsm,  and  his  besom  the  sta^idard  around  whicii  rally  the  pride  and  the 
cuTTure  and  the  opulence  of  HrTnslTsociety  "  (^lerrie  England,  by  Robert  Blatchford 
(Nunquam),  "People's  edition,  London,  1894,  pp.  1S7-1S8). 

-  Pages  447-448. 


98  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

on  account  of  any  inherent  incapacity  to  occupy  higher  ones. 
Throughout  antiquity  and  well  down  through  the  Middle  Ages  the 
great  mass  of  mankind  were  slaves.  A  little  later  they  were  serfs 
bound  to  the  soil.  Finally,  with  the  abolition  of  slavery,  the  fall  of 
the  feudal  system,  and  the  establishment  of  the  industrial  system, 
this  great  mass  took  the  form  of  a  proletariat,  the  fourth  estate, 
considered  of  so  little  consequence  that  they  are  seldom  mentioned 
by  the  great  historians  of  Europe.  Even  at  the  close  of  the  eigh- 
teenth century,  when  the  greatest  of  all  political  revolutions  occurred, 
it  was  only  the  third  estate  that  was  at  all  in  evidence  —  the  busi- 
ness class,  bourgeoisie,  or  social  mesoderm.  This  class  had  been 
looked  down  upon  and  considered  inferior,  and  only  the  lords  spir- 
itual and  temporal  were  regarded  as  capable  of  controlling  social 
and  national  affairs.  This  class  is  now  at  the  top.  It  has  furnished 
the  world's  brains  for  two  centuries,  and  if  there  is  any  intellectual 
inferiority  it  is  to  be  found  in  the  poor  remnant  that  still  calls  itself 
the  nobility  in  some  countries. 

The  movement  that  is  now  agitating  society  is  different  from  any 
of  the  previous  movements,  but  it  differs  from  them  only  as  they 
differed  from  one  another.  It  is  nothing  less  than  the  coming  to 
consciousness  of  the  proletariat.  The  class  who  for  ages  were  slaves 
or  serfs  are  now  voters  in  enlightened  states.  They  have  risen  to 
where  they  can  begin  to  see  out,  and  they  are  rising  still  higher. 
When  a  new  truth  begins  to  dawn  and  replace  an  old  error  it  is 
always  found  that  the  weightiest  facts  in  support  of  the  truth  have 
been  furnished  by  the  defenders  of  the  error.  The  best  arguments 
for  organic  evolution  were  supplied  by  such  anti-evolutionists  as 
Baer,  Agassiz,  and  Virchow.  Nearly  all  the  facts  needed  to  estab- 
lish the  gynaecocentric  theory  were  drawn  from  writings  specially 
designed  to  support  the  androcentric  theory.  And  now  we  find  one 
of  the  strongest  believers  in  the  essential  distinction  between  social 
classes  unconsciously  arguing  for  intellectual  egalitarianism.  Says 
Mr.  Benjamin  Kidd  : 

One  of  the  most  striking  and  significant  signs  of  the  times  is  the  spectacle 
of  Demos,  with  these  new  battle-cries  ringing  in  his  ears,  gradually  emerging 
from  the  long  silence  of  social  and  political  serfdom.  Not  now  does  he  come 
with  the  violence  of  revolution  foredoomed  to  failure,  but  with  the  slow  and 


Ch.  VII]  RISE   OF  THE   PROLETARIAT  99 

majestic  progress  which  marks  a  natural  evolution.  He  is  no  longer  unwashed 
and  illiterate,  tor  we  have  universal  education.  He  is  no  longer  muzzled  and 
without  political  power,  for  we  have  universal  suffrage.  .  .  .  The  advance 
towards  more  equal  conditions  of  life  has  been  so  great,  that  amongst  the  more 
progressive  nations  such  terms  as  lower  orders,  common  people,  and  working 
classes  are  losing  much  of  their  old  meaning,  the  masses  of  the  people  are  being 
slowly  raised,  and  the  barriers  of  birth,  class,  and  privilege  are  everywhere 
being  broken  through.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the  pulses  of  life  have  not 
slackened  amongst  us  ;  the  rivalry  is  keener,  the  stress  severer,  and  the  pace 
quicker  than  ever  before.  .  .  .  The  power-holding  classes  are  in  full  conscious 
retreat  before  the  incoming  people.^ 

All  this  is  true,  though  somewhat  overdrawn,  but  Kidcl  is  so 
blinded  by  the  current  world  view  that  he  will  not  attribute  it  to 
the  slowly  growing  intelligence  of  the  masses.  He  attributes  it  to 
the  rise  and  spread  of  humanitarianism,  which  by  an  obvious  bid 
for  the  applause  of  the  religious  world  he  falsely  calls  religion,  and 
repeats  Comte's  saying  that  man  is  becoming  more  and  more 
religious.2  Fie  dimly  perceives  the  fact  that  there  has  been  emo- 
tional development  as  well  as  brain  development,  and  properly 
enough  emphasizes  the  truth  that  this  growth  of  sympathy  on  the 
part  of  the  upper  classes  has  greatly  accelerated  the  rise  of  the 
lower  classes.  But  he  attributes  it  all  to  such  agencies  and 
strangely  confounds  the  ethical  with  the  religious  and  super- 
natural, virtually  arguing  that  the  less  rational  the  people  are  the 
faster  they  will  rise,  and  ascribing  all  human  progress  to  the 
influence  of  "ultra-rational  sanctions,"  i.e.,  to  superstition.  He 
flatly  denies  that  intelligence  has  anything  to  do  with  the  matter, 
saying  : 

Another  explanation,  currently  offered,  is  that  the  result  is  caused  by  the 
growing  strength  and  intelligence  of  the  people's  party  which  render  the  attack 
irresistilile.  But  we  may  readily  perceive  that  the  increasing  strength  and 
intelligence  of  the  lower  classes  of  the  community  is  the  result  of  the  change 
which  is  in  progress,  and  that  it  cannot,  therefore,  be  by  itself  the  cause.^ 

I  ought  perhaps  to  apologize  for  giving  so  prominent  a  place  to 
a  book  which  is  so  obviously  written  for  applause;  but  Mr.  Kidd 
has  a  really  keen  insight  into  social  questions  and  has  contributed 
much  to  their  elucidation,  still,  by  trimming  his  sails  to  catch  every 

1  Social  Evolution,  pp.  10,  55,  300.  ^  Social  Evolution,  p.  176. 

2  Testament  d'Auguste  Comte,  Paris,  1884,  p.  90. 


lOO  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

breeze,  he  has  made  his  book  a  tissue  of  inconsistencies.  It  has 
had  a  wide  influence  for  both  good  and  evil,  and  it  is  doing  much 
to  prop  up  and  perpetuate  the  error  we  are  here  combating  and  to 
postpone  the  acceptance  of  the  truth  that  is  destined  ultimately 
to  replace  it.  But  he  has  not  himself  been  able  to  shut  his  eyes 
entirely  to  the  native  capacity  of  the  lower  classes  for  education, 
and  in  at  least  one  passage  he  practically  admits  their  substantial 
equaUty  with  the  upper  classes  in  this  respect : 

It  is  not  yet  clearly  perceived  by  the  people  that  there  is  not  any  more 
natural  and  lasting  distinction  between  the  educated  and  the  uneducaUd  classes 
of  which  we  hear  so  much  nowadays,  than  there  has  been  between  the  other 
classes  in  the  past.  Citizen  and  slave,  patrician  and  plebeian,  feudal  lord  and 
serf,  privileged  classes  and  common  people,  leisured  classes  and  working 
masses,  have  been  steps  in  a  process  of  development.^ 

What  has  actually  taken  place  in  the  history  of  the  world  has 
been  a  gradual  upward  movement  of  the  mass  from  the  condition 
of  mere  slaves  to  that  of  more  or  less  skilled  laborers  with  some 
general  ideas  about  the  land  they  live  in  and  the  world  at  large, 
until  from  a  state  in  which  at  least  nine  tenths  were  submerged 
there  is  now  in  enlightened  countries  only  a  completely  "sub- 
merged tenth."  But  there  nevertheless  exists  in  fact  only  a  com- 
pletely emerged  tenth.  The  essential  fact,  however,  is  that  there 
is  no  valid  reason  why  not  only  the  other  partially  emerged  eight 
tenths  but  the  completely  submerged  tenth  should  not  all  com- 
pletely emerge.  They  are  all  equally  capable  of  it.  This  does  not 
at  all  imply  that  all  men  are  equal  intellectually.  It  only  insists 
that  intellectual  inequality  is  common  to  all  classes,  and  is  as  great 
among  the  members  of  the  completely  emerged  tenth  as  it  is 
between  that  class  and  the  completely  submerged  tenth.  Or,  to 
state  it  more  clearly,  if  the  same  individuals  who  constitute  the 
intelligent  class  at  any  time  or  place  had  been  surrounded  from 
their  birth  by  exactly  the  same  conditions  that  have  surrounded 
the  lowest  stratum  of  society,  they  would  have  inevitably  found 
themselves  in  that  stratum ;  and  if  an  equal  number  taken  at  ran- 
dom of  the  lowest  stratum  of  society  had  been  surrounded  from 
their  birth  by  exactly  the  same  conditions  by  which  the  intelligent 

1  Social  Evolution,  pp.  234-235. 


Ch.  VII]  CAPACITY  FOR  TRUTH  lOl 

class  have  been  surrounded,  they  would  in  fact  have  constituted  the 
intelligent  class  instead  of  the  particular  individuals  who  happen 
actually  to  constitute  it.  In  other  words,  class  distinctions  in 
society  are  wholly  artificial,  depend  entirely  on  environing  condi- 
tions, and  are  in  no  sense  due  to  differences  in  native  capacity. 
Differences  in  native  capacity  exist  and  are  as  great  as  they  have 
ever  been  pictured,  but  they  exist  in  all  classes  alike. 

Capacity  for  TnitJi. — This  brings  us  to  the  most  important  of 
all  the  considerations  involved  in  this  problem,  viz.,  the  fact  that 
the  difference  in  the  native  capacity  of  individuals  is  never  suffi- 
cient to  exclude  any  person  from  the  highest  social  class.  Nothing 
short  of  congenital  mental  imbecility,  feeble-mindedness,  or  idiocy 
can  take  an  individual  out  of  the  social  class  to  which  his  conditions 
of  existence  have  assigned  him,  and  this,  as  we  all  know,  does  not 
remand  him  to  a  lower  social  class,  but  only  to  the  class  of  depen- 
dents or  wards  of  society;  all  of  which  proves  that  it  does  not 
require  any  great  or  towering  native  abilities  to  enable  an  individ- 
ual to  maintain  his  place  in  the  vanguard  of  society.  The  minimum 
natural  abilities  above  the  stage  of  pathological  imbecility  suffice 
for  this.  Herein  lies  the  hope  of  the  world,  because  it  shows  that 
the  social  heritage  is  no  such  burden  as  to  require  an  Atlas  to  hold 
it  up,  but  is  readily  adjusted  to  the  feeblest  shoulders  and  easily 
borne  by  all.  It  consists  simply  in  the  possession  of  the  truth  that 
has  been  brought  into  the  world  through  the  prolonged  labors  of 
thousands  of  zealous  investigators,  and  which  when  possessed  neces- 
sarily drives  out  the  error  which  it  replaces.  The  truth  is  no  harder 
to  carry  than  was  the  error  ;  in  many  ways  it  is  the  lighter  load. 

This  has  been  perceived,  dimly  for  the  most  part,  sometimes 
clearly,  but  never  in  such  a  broad  and  vital  connection  as  to  indicate 
that  its  utterers  at  all  grasped  its  momentous  import.  A  few  of 
these  adumbrations  may  not  be  out  of  place.  Bacon  saw  it,  at  least 
for  his  own  peculiar  method.^  Speaking  of  positive  ideas  as  con- 
trasted with  theological  and  metaphysical  ideas,  which  is  almost  the 
same  as  the  contrast  between  truth  and  error,  Comte  said: 

At  any  given  point  in  thi.s  slow,  spontaneous  preparation,  if  a  happy  external 
circumstance  succeeds  in  introducing  positive  conceptions  before  their  time,  the 

1  Novum  Organum,  Part  II,  Aph.  LXI;  Works,  1869,  Vol.  I,  p.  264. 


I02  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

eager  haste  with  which  they  are  everywhere  welcomed  sufficiently  shows  that 
the  primitive  attachment  of  our  intelligence  to  theological  and  metaphysical 
explanations  was  due  solely  to  the  evident  impossibility  of  any  better  nourish- 
ment, and  had  not  at  all  changed  the  inherent  character  of  our  true  cerebral 
appetites,  as  daily  experience  both  individual  and  collective  shows. ^ 

Condorcet  remarks  that  "  the  truths  whose  discovery  has  cost  the 
greatest  effort,  which  were  only  understood  at  first  by  men  capable 
of  profound  meditation,  are  soon  after  developed  and  proved  by 
methods  which  are  no  longer  above  an  ordinary  intelligence."  ^  And 
even  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century  he  could  say : 

To-day  a  young  man  on  leaving  our  schools  knows  more  about  mathematics 
than  Newton  had  learned  by  his  profound  studies  or  discovered  by  his  genius; 
he  knows  how  to  handle  the  calculus  with  a  facility  then  unknown.  The  same 
observation  may  be  applied  to  all  the  sciences.^ 

How  much  more  true  is  this  in  our  day !  The  absurd  idea  of 
Herbert  Spencer  that  education  should  "  be  a  repetition  of  civiliza- 
tion in  little,"*  which  is  only  a  modification  of  Rousseau's  education 
of  nature,  was  combated  by  Comte  in  the  following  terms: 

It  is  clear  that,  although  it  is  infinitely  easier  and  shorter  to  learn  than  to 
discover,  it  would  certainly  be  impossible  to  attain  the  end  proposed  if  we  were 
to  require  each  individual  m,ind  to  pass  successively  through  the  same  stages 
that  the  collective  genius  of  the  human  race  has  been  obliged  to  follow.^ 

John  Stuart  Mill  in  one  place  exclaimed:  "I  am  amazed  at 
the  limited  conception  which  many  educational  reformers  have 
formed  to  themselves  of  a  human  being's  power  of  acquisition."^ 
Almost  always  this  power  of  acquisition  is  confounded  with  the 
power  which  it  required  to  discover  the  truth  to  be  acquired,  as 
though  the  one  bore  any  fixed  relation  to  the  other.  On  this  point 
Professor  Ernst  Mach  says: 

We  are  astounded  often  to  note  that  it  required  the  combined  labors  of  many 
eminent  thinkers  for  a  full  centurj*  to  reach  a  truth  which  it  takes  us  only  a  few 
hours  to  master,  and  which,  once  acquired,  seems  extremely  easy  to  reach  under 
the  right  sort  of  circumstances.^ 

^  Philosophic  positive,  Vol.  VI,  p.  629. 
2  Tableau,  etc.,  p.  173.  3  Jhid,^  p.  183. 

*  Education,  Intellectual,  Moral,  and  Physical,  New  York,  1866,  p.  153. 
^  Philosophie  positive.  Vol.  I,  pp.  62-63. 

^  Inaugural  Address  delivered  to  the  University  of  St.  Andrews,  February  i,  1867, 
by  John  Stuart  Mill,  Rector  of  the  University,  London,  1867,  p.  13. 
"^  The  Monist,  Vol.  VI,  p.  175. 


Ch.  VII]  CAPACITY  FOR  TRUTH 


103 


But  Professor  Martin  was  of  the  opinion  that  even  original 
research  and  discovery  in  science  do  not  require  talents  above  the 
average.    He  says: 

One  hear§  a  good  deal  talked  nowadays  of  scientific  researcli,  and  among 
it  a  good  deal  of  what  I  cannot  but  think  mischievous  nonsense  about  the 
peculiar  powers  required  by  scientific  investigators.  To  listen  to  many,  one 
would  suppose  that  the  faculty  of  adding  anything  whatever  to  natural  knowl- 
edge was  one  possessed  by  extremely  few  persons.  I  believe,  on  the  contrarv, 
that  any  man  possessed  of  average  ability  and  somewhat  more  than  average 
perseverance,  is  capable,  if  he  will,  of  doing  good  original  scientific  work.' 

Helvetius  maintained  that  all  truth  is  within  the  reach  of  all 
men.  This  is  certainly  true  for  all  practical  truth.  Any  truth  that 
is  so  subtle  or  involved  that  it  cannot  be  grasped  not  only  by  the 
average  mind  but  by  minds  of  the  minimum  power,  pro\dded  their 
interest  and  attention  can  be  concentrated  upon  it,  is  likely  to  be 
of  little  practical  value  as  a  guide  to  conduct  and  an  aid  to  success 
in  life.  This  is  all  that  can  concern  the  sociologist.  Most  of  this 
so-called  knowledge  so  difficult  to  acquire  is  not  in  fact  knowledge 
or  truth  at  all,  but  fine-spun  theory,  hair-splitting  metaphysical 
disquisition,  and  mere  mental  gymnastic,  by  which  the  mind  is 
violently  exercised  over  problems  without  objective  content.  It  is 
largely  "abstract  reasoning,"  by  which  is  meant  reasoning  without 
anything  to  reason  about.  This  is  and  ought  to  be  difficult,  because 
it  is  useless.  But  as  soon  as  a  real  something  (it  need  not  neces- 
sarily be  material  or  concrete)  is  furnished  to  the  mind  it  is  not 
only  readily  perceived  but  easily  reasoned  about  by  all  sane  minds. 
And  such  knowledge  and  truth  arc  always  useful.  The  study  of 
the  so-called  "humanities"  is  much  more  difficult  than  the  study 
of  nature,  and  yet  the  latter  is  much  the  more  important.  Capacity 
is  often  falsely  judged  by  testing  the  mind  with  classical  and  gram- 
matical subtleties.    Professor  Joseph  Leidy  once  said : 

The  information  possessed  by  a  country  boy,  gained  by  intelligent  observa- 
tion of  the  birds  or  plants  of  his  neighborhood,  is  viewed  by  the  so-called 
educated  community  as  insignificant  in  comparison  with  that  of  the  college  boy 
who  can  relate  stories  from  classical  history  of  persons  who  never  existed  and 
events  that  never  occurred.^ 

'  Popular  Science  Monthly,  Vol.  X,  p.  300. 
2    Ibid.,  Vol.  XVI,  pp.  C12-613. 


104 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 


It  is  probable  that  all  the  university  wrangling,  which  is  supposed 
to  test  the  relative  abilities  of  students,  does  far  more  harm  than 
good,  even  to  the  successful,  and  it  certainly  tends  powerfully  to 
discourage  not  only  the  unsuccessful  competitors  but  all  the  non- 
competitors,  and  to  deter  them  from  trying  to  do  anything.  Yet 
few  senior  wranglers  have  ever  attained  to  eminence,  while  many 
who  were  rated  quite  low  have  so  attained,  not  to  speak  of  those 
who  never  had  an  opportunity  to  wrangle.  The  chief  laurels  that 
have  been  won  by  wranglers  have  been  in  the  field  of  mathematics, 
i.e.,  in  that  of  "abstract  reasoning"  about  what  has  no  concrete 
existence.  Most  of  Mr.  Galton's  illustrations  are  drawn  from  this 
department.  A  writer  of  Galton's  school,  Mr.  Grant  Allen,  in  a 
review  of  Dynamic  Sociology,  in  which  this  subject  was  discussed, 
made  this  remark : 

In  a  class  of  fifteen  boys  of  fifteen  years  old,  taken  from  the  exceptionally 
intelligent  English  upper  and  middle  classes,  it  may  be  safely  asserted  that  only 
three  on  an  average  can  ever  be  taught  really  to  understand,  we  do  not  say  the 
fifth,  but  the  first,  proposition  of  the  first  book  of  Euclid.  Of  the  remaining 
twelve,  some  six  might  be  taught  it  so  far  by  rote  that  they  could  repeat  it 
correctly  even  if  the  letters  in  the  figure  were  transposed  ;  three  could  probably 
learn  it  by  heart,  but  without  being  able  to  repeat  it  with  variations  in  the  letters  ; 
and  three  more  would  be  incapable  of  repeating  it  at  all  in  any  way.  When  this 
is  the  case  even  in  congenitally  intelligent  classes  (relatively  speaking),  what  can 
we  expect  that  education  will  do  with  the  less  developed  intellects  of  the  ignorant 
masses  ?  ^ 

Though,  as  Mr.  Allen  rightly  inferred,  I  had  "had  no  practical 
personal  experience  in  the  work  of  teaching"  geometry,  still  I  was 
so  much  surprised  at  this  statement  that  I  copied  it  and  sent  it  to 
Mr.  J.  Ormond  Wilson,  then  superintendent  of  the  public  schools 
of  Washington,  D.C.,  with  the  request  that  he  inform  me  whether 
it  was  true  of  the  pupils  of  this  city.  Mr.  Wilson  turned  it  over  to 
Mr.  E.  A.  Paul,  principal  of  the  high  school,  who  had  been  actively 
engaged  in  teaching  geometry  for  several  years.  Mr.  Paul's  reply 
was  as  follows  : 

Mr.  J.  Ormoxd  Wilson,  Superintendent  of  Public  Schools. 

Dear  Sir  :  I  have  carefully  read  the  letter  you  have  referred  to  me,  of 
Professor  Lester  F.  Ward,  in  which  he  quotes  the  opinion  of  Professor 
Grant  Allen  relative  to  the  abilitv  of  a  number  of  boys  of  a  given  age,  in  a 

1  Mind,  London,  Vol.  IX,  April,  1884,  pp.  309-310. 


Ch.  VII]  CAPACITY  FOR  TRUTH  I05 

class,  to  understand  the  demonstrations  of  geometry  ;  and  as  you  request  my 
views  on  the  subject,  I  beg  leave  to  say  that  my  own  experience  as  a  student, 
and  as  a  teacher  for  a  period  of  seven  years  of  both  geometry  and  trigonometry, 
does  not  enable  me  to  concur  in  the  opinion  of  Professor  Allen.  The  pupils 
under  my  instruction  in  these  branches  answer  the  description  of  those  in  the 
class  cited  by  Professor  Alien,  and  were  I  to  divide  up  a  class  of  fifteen  as  he 
does,  I  should  say  that  twelve  could  be  taught  "really  to  understand"  any 
ordinary  proposition  of  Euclid,  and  that  the  remaining  three  could  all  be  taught 
it  so  far  as  to  be  able  to  "  repeat  it  correctly  even  if  the  letters  in  the  figure 
were  transposed,"  and  that  there  would  be  none  in  the  class  "  incapable  of 
repeating  it  at  all  in  any  way." 

During  the  school  year  just  closed  there  have  been  one  hundred  and  forty- 
five  pupils  —  sixty  boys,  eighty-five  girls  —  of  an  average  age  somewhat  under 
sixteen,  in  our  classes  in  geometry.  All  of  those  who  have  continued  in  school 
have  pursued  the  study  to  the  end,  not  one  even  making  request  to  give  the 
study  up,  though  requests  to  drop  certain  other  studies  have  been  made  fre- 
quently. This  fact  would  seem  to  show  that  pupils  have  met  with  no  special 
discouragements  in  the  pursuit  of  the  study. 

Another  evidence  of  the  ability  of  our  pupils  to  understand  the  truths  of 
geometry  and  to  follow  the  reasoning  of  a  proposition  is  the  uniformity  with 
which  they  have  worked  out  original  demonstrations  of  theorems  entirely  new 
to  them.  Only  the  brighter  pupils,  to  be  sure,  have  succeeded  with  the  more 
difficult  theorems,  but  there  have  been  numerous  instances  where  demonstrations, 
some  of  course  more  satisfactory  than  others,  have  been  obtained  by  all  of 
the  class.  Very  truly  yours, 

Washington,  D.C.  E.  A.  Paul,  Principal. 

June  23,  18S4. 

Mr.  Wilson  sent  me  the  above  letter  with  the  following  note  : 

Mr.  Lester  F.  \V.\rd. 

Dear  Sir:  Your  favor  of  the  12th  instant  was  duly  received.  I  thought 
it  advisable  to  refer  it  to  Mr.  Paul,  the  principal  of  our  high  school,  who 
is  and  has  been  actively  engaged  in  teaching  geometry  for  several  years  past. 
I  inclose  herewith  a  statement  of  his  views,  with  which  my  own  experience 
and  observation  lead  me  fully  to  coincide. 

Very  truly  yours, 
Washington,  D.C.  J-  Ormond  Wilso.v. 

June  23,  1884. 

It  is  not  probable  that  there  is  any  such  difference  as  this  would 
imply  between  English  and  American  pupils,  and  the  only  conclu- 
sion possible  seems  to  be  that  Mr.  Grant  Allen  was  wholly  mistaken 
with  regard  to  the  former,  and  that  the  truths  of  geometry  are 
within  the  easy  grasp  of  all  normally  developed  minds  irrespective 
of  .social  station.     I  vividly  recall  that  when  myself  a  pupil  in  the 


I06  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

public  schools  of  my  own  village  there  were  some  boys  in  attendance 
who  belonged  to  the  lowest  classes.  They  were  poorly  clad  and 
their  parents  were  day  laborers  living  in  remote,  httle  frequented 
quarters  of  the  town.  There  were  also  in  attendance  some  of  the 
sons  of  the  wealthy  men  of  the  place.  All  were  placed  on  a  common 
level  in  the  school,  and  the  only  test  of  merit  was  ability  to  recite 
the  lessons  given  out.  And  I  remember  the  genuine  satisfaction 
that  it  afforded  me  frequently  to  see  the  poor  boys  "beat  "  the  rich 
ones  and  "go  to  the  head."  And  I  began  to  see,  even  at  that 
tender  age,  that  all  was  not  gold  that  glittered. 

But  the  abstract  sciences  are  not  the  proper  test.  They  of  course 
require  a  higher  mental  power.  Many  minds  possess  very  little 
talent  for  abstract  thinking,  but  all  minds  are  capable  of  acquiring 
knowledge.  This  comes  from  the  observation  of  concrete  facts. 
Everybody  can  see  an  object  when  it  is  placed  before  him.  All 
can  observe  phenomena,  i.e.,  objects  in  motion  or  in  relation.  The 
knowledge  of  most  worth  is  knowledge  of  the  environment,  and 
this  is  also  the  knowledge  most  easily  acquired.  The  things  most 
essential  to  know  are  precisely  the  things  that  the  primitive  man 
sees,  and  out  of  which  he  elaborates  all  the  error  of  the  world. 
The  reasoning  powers  of  the  savage  are  much  too  keen  for  his 
good.  They  are,  however,  abundantly  ample  to  understand  the 
true  meaning  of  facts  when  it  is  properly  presented  to  him.  If  any 
one  says  that  the  savage  cannot  be  made  to  accept  the  true  mean- 
ing of  facts,  this  is  because  the  false  meaning  has  taken  the  form 
of  a  belief  in  his  mind,  and  the  difficulty  is  not  to  explain  the  fact 
but  to  dislodge  the  belief.  If  he  could  be  taken  before  the  forma- 
tion of  the  belief,  there  would  be  no  difficulty  in  explaining  the  facts. 
Still  easier  is  it  to  explain  the  facts  and  phenomena  of  nature  to  the 
child  in  an  advanced  social  state.  There  is  nothing  in  any  of  them 
that  transcends  the  powers  of  a  child  to  grasp. 

Civilization  has  been  brought  about  through  human  achievement, 
and  human  achievement  consists  almost  entirely  in  knowledge. 
This  knowledge  is  that  of  the  surrounding  world,  chiefly  of  famil- 
iar things,  at  least  of  things  that  are  within  the  range  of  the  facul- 
ties of  all  men.  All  the  important  part  of  it  is  of  easy  acquisition, 
but  very  little  of  it  is  such  that  it  can  be  acquired  by  simple,  unaided 


Ch.  VII]  CAPACITY  FOR  TRUTH  107 

observation.  Most  of  it  is  contrary  to  appearances,  and  has  had  to 
be  learned  by  systematic  research  in  the  face  of  false  appearances. 
Hence  it  must  be  acquired  by  each  separate  individual.  Social 
heredity  differs  from  organic  heredity  chiefly  in  this  fact.  The 
difference  between  social  classes  is  a  difference  only  in  the  extent 
to  which  the  social  heritage  has  been  transmitted,  not  at  all  in  the 
capacity  to  inherit.  Society  at  present  is  organized  under  a  sort  of 
law  of  primogeniture.  Only  the  first-born,  i.e.,  the  specially  favored, 
receive  the  legacy  ;  the  rest  are  disinherited,  although  they  may 
embrace  the  flower  of  the  family. 

In  defending  the  average  intellectual  equality  of  all  men  with  the 
necessary  quaUfications,  or  rather  explanations,  of  the  meaning  of 
the  phrase,  only  the  civilized  peoples  of  the  world  have  been  con- 
templated, and  chiefly  the  so-called  historical  races,  or  that  great 
stream  of  mankind  that  has  swept  from  southern  and  western  Asia 
and  northern  Africa  across  the  whole  breadth  of  Europe,  and  thence 
in  comparatively  recent  times  to  America  and  Australasia.  This 
great  swarm  of  men,  whether  Aryan  or  Semitic,  and  chiefly  with 
a  white  skin,  has  held  closely  enough  together  for  all  to  profit 
by  the  achievement  of  any,  so  that  it  forms  a  continuous  and  un- 
broken line  of  social  heredity  and  has  maintained  the  continuity 
of  the  social  germ-plasm.  Of  this  entire  race  at  least  it  has  been 
shown  that  intellectual  equality  in  the  sense  explained  can  with 
safety  be  predicated.  What,  then,  can  be  said,  from  this  point  of 
view,  of  the  other  races  of  men  lying  outside  of  this  great  current 
of  culture,  chiefly  of  a  different  color  from  the  other,  —  yellow,  red, 
black,  or  some  shade  between  these,  —  and  who  have  not  to  any 
marked  degree  received  the  social  heritage  of  achievement  which 
constitutes  western  civilization  .''  Doubtless  within  each  such  race, 
for  there  are  many,  intellectual  equality,  in  the  same  sense  as  it 
exists  in  the  white  race,  can  be  safely  affirmed,  but  the  question  is 
whether  it  can  also  be  posited  as  between  the  colored  races  and  the 
white  race.  Most  persons  will,  of  course,  unhesitatingly  reject  such 
a  proposition.  It  not  only  appears  to  be  false  for  any  of  them, 
but  there  seem  to  be  great  differences  among  these  races  them- 
selves. Only  occasionally  has  any  one  ventured  to  express  a 
different  view. 


I08  APPIJED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

Except  from  the  purely  oligocentric  standpoint,  namely  that  of 
intellect-worship,  or  noolatry,  this  question  is  not  the  same  as  that 
of  the  relative  worth  of  different  races.  Comte  maintained  the 
equivalency  of  races  from  this  point  of  view.  Classifying  them 
roughly  into  white,  black,  and  yellow,  he  said  that  "  the  blacks  are 
as  much  superior  to  the  whites  in  feeling  {sentiment)  as  they  are 
below  them  in  intelligence,"  and  that  "the  yellow  race  seems  as 
superior  to  the  two  others  in  activity  as  these  are  in  intelligence 
and  feeling."  ^  "  Some  anthropologists,  as,  for  example,  Quatrefages, 
have  seriously  proposed  the.mixture  of  races  as  a  means  of  utilizing 
the  intellectual  gifts  of  a  superior  race  in  countries  and  in  employ- 
ments better  suited  to  inferior  races."  ^  I  have  maintained  that  in 
the  great  final  blending  of  all  races  into  one  "the  less  forceful  ele- 
ments will  enter  into  it  as  modifiers.  They  represent  qualities  that 
in  moderate  proportions  will  improve  and  enrich  the  whole.  The 
final  great  united  world-race  will  be  comparable  to  a  composite 
photograph  in  which  certain  strong  faces  dominate  the  group,  but 
in  which  may  also  be  detected  the  softening  influence  of  faces 
characterized  by  those  refining  moral  qualities  which  reflect  the 
soul  rather  than  the  intellect."  '^ 

But  Mr.  Kidd  has  called  in  question  even  the  intellectual  superi- 
ority of  the  white  race.  He  argues  with  much  force  that  the  great 
apparent  difference  in  the  intellectual  capacity  of  civilized  and  sav- 
age races  can  mostly  be  explained  as  a  simple  difference  in  mental 
equipment.    He  says : 

Even  those  races  which  are  melting  away  at  the  mere  contact  of  European 
civiHsation  supply  evidence  which  appears  quite  irreconcilable  with  the  prevail- 
ing view  as  to  their  great  intellectual  inferiority.  The  Maoris  in  New  Zealand, 
though  they  are  slowly  disappearing  before  the  race  of  higher  social  efficiency 
with  which  they  have  come  into  contact,  do  not  appear  to  show  any  intellectual 
incapacity  for  assimilating  European  ideas,  or  for  acquiring  proficiency  and  dis- 
tinction in  any  branch  of  European  learning.* 

His  discussion  of  this  whole  question  (Chapter  IX)  is  by  far  the 
ablest  part  of  his  book.   The  question  is  worthy  of  thorough  scientific 

1  Politique  positive,  Vol.  II,  pp.  461,  462. 

2  Daniel  Folkmar,  Lemons  d'Anthropologie  philosophique,  Paris,  1900,  p.  152. 

3  Annales  de  I'lnstitut  international  de  sociologie,  Tome  IX,  Paris,  1903,  p.  67; 
American  Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  VIII,  May,  1903,  p.  733.  *  Social  Evolution,  p.  273. 


Ch.  VII]  CAPACITY   FOR  TRUTH  109 

treatment  based  chiefly  on  the  practical  experience  of  education- 
ahsts  who  have  devoted  their  lives  to  the  education  of  the  lower 
races.  The  results  would,  of  course,  be  found  to  vary  greatly  with 
different  races,  and  different  teachers  would  have  contrary  opinions 
on  many  points.  The  general  investigator  must  therefore  take  very 
broad  ground.  Not  only  must  he  generalize  all  the  facts,  but  he 
must  go  farther  and  recognize  that  mere  school  study  cannot  cover 
all  points.  The  assimilation  of  an  alien  civilization  involves  much 
more  and  cannot  be  accomplished  in  a  single  generation,  no  matter 
how  favorable  the  conditions  may  be.  Indeed,  nothing  short  of  the 
practical  absorption  of  a  race  into  another  during  a  long  series  of 
generations,  during  which  all  primitive  influences  and  tendencies 
are  definitively  eliminated,  can  be  expected  fully  to  prepare  such  a 
race  for  a  comparison  of  its  intellectual  capacities  with  those  of 
civilized  races.  No  one  now  doubts  that  the  Japanese  at  least  are 
intellectually  equal  to  the  peoples  of  the  West.  But  the  Japanese 
used  to  consider  themselves  inferior  to  the  Chinese,  whose  civiliza- 
tion they  introduced  in  the  seventh  century  of  our  era.  They  are 
superior  to  the  Chinese  now  only  in  the  sense  that  having  adopted 
western  methods  they  have  acquired  greater  social  efficiency.  It  is 
clearly  here  a  simple  question  of  equipment  and  not  of  mental 
capacity.  What  other  races  would  be  capable  of,  if  they  were  to 
introduce  western  civilization,  cannot  be  told  until  after  trial.  But 
the  question  is  a  complex  one,  and  while  there  is  no  doubt  that 
repeated  social  assimilations,  as  explained  in  Pure  Sociology,^  tend 
really  to  strengthen  the  intellect,  still  this  is  such  a  small  factor 
compared  to  the  increased  social  efficiency  gained  thereby,  that  it 
may  almost  be  neglected.  And  yet  this  prime  factor  is  the  one  that 
is  really  neglected,  as  shown  by  the  following,  which  is  a  fair  sample 
of  the  current  reasoning  on  this  question : 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  we  ought  not  to  assert  that  the  lower  races  have 
not  the  capacity  for  social  evolution,  because  we  do  not  know  what  they  could 
do  if  they  had  opportunity.  They  have  been  in  existence,  however,  much  longer 
than  the  European  races,  and  have  accomplished  immeasurably  less.  We  are, 
therefore,  warranted  in  saying  that  they  have  not  the  same  inherent  abilities.'^ 

1  Pages  212-215. 

2  F.  H.  Giddings,  Principles  of  Sociology,  New  York,  1896,  p.  328. 


no  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  I 

It  is  not  therefore  proved  that  intellectual  equality,  which  can  be 
safely  predicated  of  all  classes  in  the  white  race,  in  the  yellow  race, 
or  in  the  black  race,  each  taken  by  itself,  cannot  also  be  predicated 
of  all  races  taken  together,  and  it  is  still  more  clear  that  there  is  no 
race  and  no  class  of  human  beings  who  are  incapable  of  assimilating 
the  social  achievement  of  mankind  and  of  profitably  employing  the 
social  heritage. 

The  seven  chapters  now  completed  aim  at  scarcely  more  than 
an  enumeration  of  the  principal  conditions  to  social  motion.  In 
the  present  state  of  the  world  the  wheels  of  human  progress  are 
in  a  large  measure  clogged  by  the  various  impediments  and  obstruc- 
tions that  have  been  described.  These  consist  mainly  in  error  in 
one  or  other  of  its  many  forms  and  in  those  repressive  social  struc- 
tures which  are  its  natural  product.  Only  through  the  removal  of 
the  greater  part  of  both  the  error  and  its  resultant  institutions  can 
that  degree  of  liberation  be  attained  which  shall  render  possible 
the  mobilization  of  society,  or  social  movement. 


Part    II 
ACHIEVEMENT 


Multum  adhuc  restat  opens,  multumque 
restabit ;  nee  ulli  nato  post  mille  saecula 
praecludetur  occasio  aliquid  adhuc  ad- 
jiciendi.  —  Seneca. 


CHAPTER   VIII 
POTENTIAL  ACHIEVEMENT 

Perhaps  in  this  neglected  spot  is  laid 

Some  heart  once  pregnant  with  celestial  fire  ; 

Hands  that  the  rod  of  empire  might  have  sway'd, 
Or  waked  to  ecstasy  the  living  lyre. 

But  Knowledge  to  their  eyes  her  ample  page, 
Rich  with  the  spoils  of  time,  did  ne'er  unroll ; 

Chill  Penury  repress'd  their  noble  rage, 
And  froze  the  genial  current  of  the  soul. 

Some  village  Hampden,  that  with  dauntless  breast 
The  little  tyrant  of  his  fields  withstood 

Some  mute  inglorious  Milton  here  may  rest. 

Some  Cromwell,  guiltless  of  his  country's  blood. 


Gray, 


While  applied  sociology  has  to  do  with  improvement  rather  than 
achievement,  still  it  is  evident  that  improvement  must  largely  come 
through  a  great  extension  of  achievement,  and  especially  through 
the  multipUcation  of  those  who  take  part  in  the  work  of  achieve- 
ment. It  is  therefore  of  the  utmost  importance  to  inquire  whether 
this  is  possible,  and  if  so,  to  what  extent.  Along  with  the  intel- 
lectual equality  recognized  and  demonstrated  in  the  last  chapter 
must  go  the  frank  acknowledgment  of  the  great  individual  inequal- 
ity existing  in  the  mental  attributes  and  capacities  of  the  mem- 
bers of  every  class  and  group.  Indeed,  it  must  be  admitted  that 
mediocrity  is  the  normal  condition,  and  working  efficiency  compara- 
tively rare.  The  question  therefore  is  whether  society  has  ever  had 
or  has  now  its  maximum  working  efficiency.  There  is  a  school  of 
philosophers  who  maintain  that  such  is  the  case,  and  the  mass  of 
mankind  entertain  this  view  without  ever  suspecting  that  there  can 
be  any  other.  Appearances  all  favor  it  and  it  scarcely  needs  to  be 
defended.  Most  of  the  paradoxes  of  nature,  i.e.,  the  truths  of 
science,  are  of  such  a  character  that  they  never  enter  the  minds  of 

"3 


114  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

the  average  man  or  of  mankind  in  general,  and  are  only  suspected 
by  exceptional,  ingenious,  inquiring  minds.  The  existence  of  latent 
ability  in  society  belongs  to  this  class.  It  requires  no  great  inge- 
nuity to  descant  upon  feats  of  genius  and  the  achievements  of  those 
who  have  had  both  ability  and  opportunity,  for  such  are  the  only 
ones  who  have  achieved  or  who  by  any  possibility  can  achieve.  But 
to  look  behind  and  below  all  this  and  discover  latent  energies,  i.e., 
ability  for  which  there  is  no  corresponding  opportunity,  requires 
penetration,  the  spirit  of  scientific  inquiry,  and  emancipation  from 
the  current  conventional  beliefs  on  the  subject. 

As  achievement  is  the  work  of  individuals,  potential  achievement 
implies  potential  ability  on  the  part  of  individuals,  and  the  investiga- 
tion takes  the  form  of  an  inquiry  into  the  conditions  under  which 
men  work.  As  the  potential  geniuses,  if  there  be  such,  are  wholly 
unknown,  lost  in  the  great  mass  of  mediocre  people  who  merely 
imitate  and  carry  on  the  static  operations  of  society,  it  would  be 
hopeless  to  search  for  them.  The  investigator  is  therefore  at  a 
great  disadvantage,  since  he  must  restrict  the  inquiry  to  those  who 
have  actually  achieved,  and  from  the  conditions  under  which  they 
have  worked  draw  inferences  with  regard  both  to  what  they  would 
have  accomplished  under  different  conditions  and  also  with  regard 
to  what  other  men  would  have  accomplished  under  similar  condi- 
tions. But  both  character  and  conditions  are  so  complex  that 
safe  conclusions  are  very  difficult  to  draw.  Conditions  that  would 
effectually  debar  certain  characters  from  achievement  would  be 
easily  surmounted  by  other  types,  so  that  what  would  be  oppor- 
tunity to  one  would  not  be  opportunity  to  another,  and  a  classi- 
fication either  of  types  of  character  or  of  conditions  is  next  to 
impossible.  Genius,  talent,  ability,  efficiency,  are  all  highly  com- 
plex qualities.  They  all  involve  something  more  than  the  simple 
intellectual  capacity  for  a  given  work.  Moral  qualities  must  be 
present,  —  will,  resolution,  application,  prolonged  attention,  perse- 
verance, clear  conceptions  of  the  end  and  purpose.  For  the  in- 
tellectual capacity  there  is  absolutely  no  substitute,  but  for  many 
of  the  moral  qualities  exceptional  opportunities  may  often  be 
substituted.  This  problem  will  form  the  subject  of  the  next 
chapter. 


Ch.  VIII]  POTENTIAL  GENIUS  1 15 

Potential  Genius 

I  use  the  word  "  genius  "  in  the  same  sense  in  which  Galton  used  it 
in  his  work,  Hereditary  Genius,  viz.,  in  the  sense  of  "  mental  power 
or  faculties  ;  disposition  of  nature  by  which  any  one  is  qualified  for 
some  peculiar  employment,"  as  defined  in  Johnson's  Dictionary,  not 
agreeing  with  Galton  that  there  is  anything  to  be  gained  by  substi- 
tuting "ability"^  for  it  merely  because  some  captious  critic  objects 
to  the  use  of  genius  in  this  broad  sense.  Indeed,  genius  is  much 
the  better  word,  for  the  very  reason  that  he  gives,  viz.,  that  it 
excludes  the  effects  of  education,  which  ability  does  not,  and  there- 
fore is  hereditary,  i.e.,  congenital,  while  a  large  part  of  ability  is 
acquired  and  not  transmissible.  Genius  is  the  sum  of  intellect  and 
character,  while  ability  implies  in  addition  knowledge  and  experi- 
ence. Intellect  has  been  called  the  coefficient  of  intelligence.  But 
genius  is  something  more  than  intelligence.  Intelligence  is  intel- 
lect plus  knowledge.  Genius  is  intellect  plus  character.  Ability  is 
intelligence  plus  character.  The  difference  between  genius  and 
ability  is  the  unknown  quantity  that  we  are  seeking. 

In  all  considerations  of  human  efficiency  it  has  always  been  so 
obvious  that  the  first  thing  to  be  determined  is  this  inherent  sub- 
stratum that  the  search  for  it  has  enlisted  a  considerable  number 
of  able  investigators,  until  there  now  exists  quite  a  literature  of  the 
subject.  Of  course  each  investigator  has  had  a  theory,  i.e.,  a  work- 
ing hypothesis,  to  guide  him  in  his  labors.  That  of  Galton  is  that 
genius  is  hereditary.  Notwithstanding  the  difficulty  of  the  subject 
and  the  consequent  defects  in  the  e\idence,  he  has,  as  I  believe, 
sufficiently  proved  his  thesis.  The  weak  point  in  his  argument  is 
not  in  this  main  issue,  but  in  another  collateral  thesis,  if  it  can  be 
so  designated,  which  he  seems  to  think  essentially  bound  up  with 
the  first,  viz.,  that  the  actual  genius  is  the  only  genius.  I  do  not 
regard  this  as  at  all  essential  to  the  other,  and  I  challenge  the  truth 
of  it.  It  is  only  apparently  true,  but  really  false.  It  is  the  current 
popular  belief,  almost  a  world  view,  and  he  did  not  need  to  defend 
it  so  strenuously,  as  in  doing  so  he  is  practically  arguing  without 

1  Hereditary  Genius,  London,  1892,  Prefatory  Chapter,  p.  ix. 


Il6  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

an  opponent.  His  defense  of  it,  however,  has  had  a  salutary  effect. 
It  has  stimulated  others  who  would  have  otherwise  probably  never 
thought  of  questioning  it  to  think  deeply  about  it,  and  has  led  a 
few  to  investigate  it  by  his  own  statistical  methods.  Such  investiga- 
tions have  not  sustained  it,  but  have  in  fact  disproved  it,  and  have 
led  to  the  discovery  of  another  recondite  scientific  truth,  opposed, 
as  are  all  scientific  truths  in  their  infancy,  to  the  appearances,  the 
truth  of  the  existence  of  potential  genius.  This  conclusion  has  been 
reached  by  directing  the  attention  to  another  factor  than  simple 
heredity,  viz.,  to  that  of  the  environment.  It  has  been  shown  that 
we  know  really  very  little  about  genius  ;  that  fame,  success,  achieve- 
ment, furnish  no  adequate  index  to  it ;  and  that  the  only  true  test 
of  it  is  trial.  But  unless  the  conditions  for  trial  are  present  there 
can  be  no  trial,  and  without  trial  under  favorable  conditions  there 
is  no  basis  for  judging,  no  means  of  determining  whether  there  be 
genius  or  no.  The  two  factors  in  achievement,  then,  are  first, 
genius  itself,  i.e.,  intellectual  capacity  plus  moral  character  (the 
term  "moral"  not  being  taken  in  the  sense  of  goodness,  but  of 
those  elements  of  efficiency  that  were  enumerated  on  page  1 14),  and 
second,  opportunity,  that  is,  an  environment  favorable  to  the  exer- 
cise of  native  powers  and  adapted  in  any  given  case  to  the  particu- 
lar quality,  shade,  or  timbre  that  those  powers  may  possess. 

Nature.  —  We  will  consider  first  the  claims  that  have  been  made 
for  heredity  pure  and  simple  as  the  sole  and  all-sufficient  factor  in 
achievement.  We  waive  the  whole  question  of  transmissibility, 
because  it  does  not  concern  us  here,  and  use  the  word  "heredity" 
rather  for  the  purpose  of  emphasizing  the  idea  that  those  qualities 
only  are  implied  that  have  been  implanted  in  the  agent  before  his 
birth  and  belong  to  his  nature.  This  is  the  sense  in  which  Galton 
uses  the  word  "  nature,"  over  against  which  he  has  happily  set  the 
word  "nurture,"  as  designating  all  other  influences.  Now  he  and 
those  of  his  school  maintain  that  this  factor  of  heredity,  or  nature, 
is  the  only  one  that  need  be  considered,  because  all  other  factors 
or  influences  are  merely  apparent,  being  simply  the  creations  of  this 
one  ;  in  other  words,  that  genius  creates  its  opportunities,  and  that 
the  apparent  opportunities  are  only  the  necessary  consequences  of 
genius.     Thus  Galton  says  : 


Ch.  VIII]  NATURE  1 1 7 

I  believe,  and  shall  do  my  best  to  show,  that  if  the  "eminent"  men  of  any 
period  had  been  changelings  when  babies,  a  very  fair  proportion  of  those  who 
survived  and  retained  their  health  up  to  fifty  years  of  age  would,  notwithstand- 
ing their  altered  circumstances,  have  equally  risen  to  eminence.^ 

On  the  next  page  he  says  : 

If  a  man  is  gifted  with  vast  intellectual  ability,  eagerness  to  work,  and  power 
of  working,  I  cannot  comprehend  how  such  a  man  should  be  repressed. 

He  instances  a  considerable  number  of  men,  notably  Scaliger, 
Lord  Hardwicke,  Lord  Eldon,  Lord  Tenterden,  etc.,  who  had  risen 
from  humble  antecedents  to  considerable  fame,  and  everybody 
knows  that  such  cases  are  common,  much  more  so  in  America 
than  in  England. 

Of  course  it  would  be  easy  to  fill  pages  with  expressions  of  this 
general  theory  by  hundreds  of  writers,  because  it  is,  and  in  fact 
always  has  been,  the  general  mental  attitude  on  the  subject.  All 
the  appearances  are  in  favor  of  it,  and  the  only  examples  possible  to 
collect  are  those  that  support  it.  There  cannot  in  the  nature  of 
things  be  an  example  on  the  other  side.  It  would  be  useless,  for 
example,  to  assert  that  any  particular  person  who  never  did  attain 
to  eminence  possessed  all  the  "pre-efficients,"  as  Galton  calls  them,^ 
for  doing  so.  It  would  be  impossible  to  prove  that  such  was  the 
case.  And  no  matter  how  many  such  there  may  be,  the  fact  could 
not  be  established  in  a  single  case.  We  are  confronted  by  the  same 
condition  of  things  that  is  described  in  the  story  told  of  Diogenes  the 
Cynic  by  Diogenes  Laertius,  that  when  shown  in  a  temple  the  votive 
tablets  su.spended  by  such  as  had  escaped  the  peril  of  shipwreck 
because  they  had  made  their  vows,  as  a  proof  of  the  power  of  the 
gods,  he  inquired,  "Where  are  the  portraits  of  those  who  perished 
in  spite  of  their  vows."  And  the  fallacy  involved  in  this  faith  in 
heredity  is  precisely  the  same  as  that  involved  in  the  faith  in  the 
gods.  As  Bacon  said,  "  Men  mark  when  they  hit,  but  never  mark 
when  they  miss."    "Men  of  mark"  are  simply  "hits." 

Galton  lays  great  stress  on  the  superiority  of  nature  over  nurture, 
and  virtually  denies  all  influence  whatever  to  the  latter,  going  so 
far  as  to  say  in  one  of  his  articles  devoted  to  the  subject  of  twins  : 

*  Hereditary  Genius,  London,  1892,  p.  34. 

2  English  Men  of  Science,  London,  1874,  Preface,  p.  vL 


Il8  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  il 

"  The  impression  that  all  this  evidence  leaves  on  the  mind  is  one 
of  some  wonder  whether  nurture  can  do  anything  at  all."  ^  He  seems 
to  have  much  of  the  time  an  imaginary  opponent  in  his  mind  who 
maintains  that  under  favorable  conditions  men  who  possess  no 
genius  at  all  may  rise  to  eminence.  It  certainly  is  true  that  cir- 
cumstances of  birth  and  social  position  do  often  enough  put  such 
men  into  high  places,  but  all  they  can  do  is  to  hold  such  places. 
Most  high  places  require  no  genius  to  fill  them.  If  this  is  "emi- 
nence," then  is  it  quite  unnecessary  that  it  be  accompanied  by  any 
special  powers.  The  great  stress  that  he  lays  on  the  judges  of 
England,  born  for  the  most  part  to  their  profession  and  requiring 
only  mediocre  talents  in  its  practice,  seems  to  show  that  he  enter- 
tains some  such  idea.  But,  so  far  as  I  am  aware,  no  one  seriously 
maintains  that  true  eminence  is  attainable  without  special  natural 
gifts,  whatever  may  be  the  other  elements  of  success.  This  is  not 
therefore  the  question  at  all,  and  is  a  point  on  which  all  are  agreed. 
The  only  serious  question  is  whether  there  are  not  many  possessing 
such  natural  gifts  who  are  not  eminent. 

Galton  uses  the  statistical  method.  He  gives  long  lists  of  emi- 
nent men  in  various  fields  of  achievement,  accompanied  by  some 
account  in  each  case  of  their  antecedents  and  successors  in  lineal  re- 
lationship, —  fathers,  grandfathers,  mothers,  grandmothers,  uncles, 
aunts,  brothers,  sisters,  sons,  daughters,  grandsons,  granddaughters, 
and  sometimes  cousins.  From  the  standpoint  of  heredity  of  course 
this  is  the  proper  method.  But  is  it  altogether  satisfactory.?  The 
central  figure  must  always  naturally  be  the  particular  eminent  man 
selected  for  the  illustration.  If  genius  were  hereditary,  as  he  main- 
tains, there  would  always  be  an  ascending  series  increasing  in  emi- 
nence until  the  maximum  was  reached,  and  then  an  indefinite  line 
of  persons  maintaining  this  maximum  and  never  falling  below  it. 
That  would  be  an  entirely  different  world  from  what  we  have  or 
from  the  one  his  tables  represent.  In  a  few  cases  —  the  Jussieus, 
the  Herschels,  the  Adamses,  etc.  —  the  maximum  is  maintained 
during  two  or  three  generations,  but  it  then  either  declines  slowly 
or  is  cut  off  abruptly.  But  in  the  great  majority  of  cases  the  emi- 
nent man  stands  wholly  alone,  neither  his  parents  nor  his  children 

1  Fraser's  Magazine,  Vol.  XCII  (N.  S.,  Vol.  XII),  November,  1875,  pp.  575-576. 


Ch.viii]  nature  119 

attaining  to  any  eminence  at  all.  I  do  not  think  this  wholly  dis- 
proves the  transmissibility  of  talents,  but  it  shows  that  some  impor- 
tant factors  have  been  neglected  in  Galton's  scheme. 

The  most  important  of  these  omitted  factors  is  that  of  the  cross- 
ing of  stirps.  The  children  of  an  eminent  man  are  only  half  his. 
Half  of  every  one  of  them  belongs  to  his  wife.  And  who  is  his 
wife .''  A  person  from  an  entirely  different  stock.  As  geniuses  are 
rare  at  best,  the  chances  are  enormously  against  her  being  a  genius 
too.  But  there  is  a  law  of  nature  that  partners  choose  their  oppo- 
sites.  Galton  is  not  ignorant  of  this  law,  but  he  questions  it.  In 
his  English  Men  of  Science  (pp.  27-33)  he  gives  some  statistics 
bearing  on  this  point,  based  on  less  than  a  hundred  cases,  which 
seem  to  show  "that  the  love  of  contrast  does  not  prevail  over  that 
of  harmony."  The  qualities  considered  are  physical  with  the  excep- 
tion of  that  of  "temperament."  The  results  are  not  striking  and 
the  induction  is  too  narrow  to  be  at  all  conclusive.  Statistics  are 
akin  to  mathematics,  and  the  alleged  proofs  from  them  are  often 
worse  than  no  proof  at  all.  Their  use  in  cases  where  they  are  in- 
adequate is  simply  pedantic.  That  there  are  forces  of  nature,  too 
subtle  for  our  clumsy  methods,  working  to  prevent  one-sidedness 
in  all  organic  beings,  there  can  be  little  doubt. ^  It  is  much  safer 
to  trust  these  forces  than  any  art  of  "stirpiculture  "  or  "eugenics  " 
that  man  is  as  yet  able  to  apply.  Genius  is  not  the  only  useful  gift, 
and  if  Galton's  devices  could  be  applied  there  would  be  danger  of 
producing  a  race,  or  at  least  a  class,  such  as  that  described  by 
Mr.  Wells,  all  head  and  no  body.  This  is  the  tendency  of  the 
oligocentric  world  view,  which  happily  cannot  realize  itself. 

In  his  Hereditary  Genius  and  English  Men  of  Science  Galton 
says  very  little  about  atavism,  although  he  was  one  of  the  earliest 
writers  to  call  special  attention  to  it.  In  a  paper  presented  by  him 
on  June  13,  1872,  to  the  Royal  Society  of  London,  "  On  Blood 
Relationship,"  he  laid  special  stress  on  what  he  called  the  "  latent " 
elements  in  heredity,  and  argued  from  the  facts  of  reversion  and 
atavism  that  the  greater  part  of  the  parental  elements  are  latent  in 
the  germ,  but  prepared  to  express  themselves  in  more  or  less  remote 
descendants.    In  another  paper,  entitled  "A  Theory  of  Heredity," 

1  Cf.  Pure  Sociology,  pp.  397,  398. 


I20  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

read  before  the  Anthropological  Institute  of  Great  Britain  on 
November  9,  1875,  and  which  appeared  in  the  Journal  of  the  Insti- 
tute (Vol.  V,  p.  329),  and  in  an  abridged  form  in  the  Contemporary 
Review  for  December,  1875,  he  expands  the  views  previously 
expressed,  and  says : 

The  facts  for  which  a  complete  theory  of  heredity  must  account  may  con- 
veniently be  divided  into  two  groups  ;  the  one  refers  to  those  inborn  or  congeni- 
tal peculiarities  that  were  also  congenital  in  one  or  more  ancestors,  the  other  to 
those  that  were  not  congenital  in  the  ancestors,  but  were  acquired  for  the  first 
time  by  one  or  more  of  them  during  their  lifetime,  owing  to  some  change  in  the 
conditions  of  their  life.  The  first  of  these  two  groups  is  of  predominant  impor- 
tance, in  respect  to  the  number  of  well-ascertained  facts  that  it  contains,  many 
of  which  it  is  possible  to  explain,  in  a  broad  and  general  way,  by  more  than 
one  theory  based  on  the  hypothesis  of  organic  units. 

He  employs  the  term  "stirp  "  in  a  special  sense,  "to  express  the 
sum-total  of  the  germs,  gemmules,  or  whatever  they  may  be  called, 
which  are  to  be  found,  according  to  every  theory  of  organic  units,  in 
the  newly  fertilized  ovum  —  that  is,  in  its  earliest  preembryonic 
stage."  The  paper  is  an  exceedingly  luminous  contribution  to  the 
subject,  and  the  theory  advanced  may  be  designated  in  general  terms 
as  the  doctrine  of  natural  selection  or  survival  of  the  fittest  among 
the  organic  units  constituting  the  stirp,  to  determine  which  shall 
become  manifest  in  the  offspring  and  which  shall  lie  latent  to  appear 
or  not  in  later  generations.  As  the  stirp  contains  organic  units  that 
have  lain  latent  in  previous  generations  and  may  become  patent  in  the 
generation  in  question,  the  theory  accounts  for  reversion,  atavism, 
and  the  whole  train  of  facts  in  heredity  that  have  so  long  puzzled 
the  scientific  investigator.  Galton  lays  much  more  stress  on  these 
latent  elements  than  on  the  patent  ones,  or  supposed  acquired  char- 
acters, which  he  believes  to  be  only  "faintly  heritable,"  and  thus 
he  anticipated  by  some  eight  years  the  principal  theories  of  Weis- 
mann,  as  he  also  anticipated  Roux's  doctrine  of  the  struggle  among 
the  parts.  In  an  address  ^  as  president  of  the  Biological  Society  of 
Washington,  delivered  January  24,  1891,  I  drew  attention  to  these 
papers  of  Galton,  which  Weismann  had  overlooked.  He  appears  to 
have  learned  of  them  only  through  this  address  which  I  took  pains 

1  Neo-Darwinism  and  Neo-Lamarckism,  Proc.  Biol.  Sec.  of  Washington,  Vol.  VI, 
pp.  1 1-7 1  (see  pp.  29-33). 


Ch.  VIII]  NATURE  121 

to  place  in  his  hands,  and  in  his  Germ-Plasm  ^  he  acknowledged 
Galton's  services  and  also  mentioned  my  address  (p.  536  of  the 
German,  p.  408  of  the  English  edition). 

It  has  appeared  to  me  that  Galton  might  have  presented  the 
subject  of  hereditary  genius  in  a  much  more  satisfactory  way  if  he 
had  based  his  argument  on  the  conclusions  reached  in  these  papers 
instead  of  trying  to  prove  that  talents  are  always  directly  trans- 
mitted. The  facts  given  in  his  books  prove  conclusively  that  this 
is  not  the  case,  and  leave  the  reader  disappointed  with  his  argu- 
ment. But  if  he  had  explained  that  the  examples  of  towering  talents 
here  and  there  presenting  themselves  in  a  single  generation,  some- 
times extending  through  two,  rarely  through  three  generations,  but 
always  ceasing  to  do  so  very  early  in  the  same  line,  were  due  to 
atavism,  as  he  so  clearly  defined  that  phenomenon,  there  w^ould  have 
been  no  disappointment  and  the  results  would  have  been  about  what 
would  be  naturally  expected.  In  the  light  of  subsequent  investiga- 
tions, and  especially  of  the  researches  of  Hugo  de  Vries  into  the 
behavior  of  plants,  on  which  he  bases  his  theory  of  "  mutation," 
the  whole  philosophy  of  heredity  is  receiving  a  new  impetus.  What- 
ever de  Vries  may  believe  to  be  the  fundamental  principle  under- 
lying mutation,  the  thinking  world  is  becoming  convinced  that 
atavism  lies  at  the  foundation  of  it,  and  is  applying  it  to  other  and 
broader  fields. 

If  the  bearers  of  heredity  are  truly  "immortal,"  as  Weismann 
says,  they  are  not  lost  by  every  cross,  but  persist  somewhere  and 
are  liable  to  reappear  at  any  time.  It  is  natural  that  the  latest 
combinations  due  to  such  crosses  should  usually  be  so  prepotent  that 
the  offspring  generally  resemble  their  parents  more  closely  than  any 
of  their  more  remote  ancestors,  but  it  is  to  be  expected  that  oc- 
casionally some  of  the  antecedent  stirps,  holding  over  from  the 
earlier  stages  of  one  or  the  other  of  the  two  lines  that  blend  at  each 
new  union,  should  gain  the  ascendant  and  dominate  the  product. 
We  should  thus  have  "new  species"  of  plants  and  animals,  and  in 
human  life  we  should  sometimes  have  divergent  types  of  both  body 
and  mind.    As  the  product  of  every  union  is  a  combination  of  the 

1  Das  Keimplasma.  Eine  Theorie  der  Vererbung,  Jena,  1892.  Kap.  VI.  English 
translation,  New  York,  1893. 


122  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

Anlagen  of  both  parents  it  is  liable  to  embody  high  qualities  from 
either  or  both.  In  most  cases  such  qualities  come  from  only  one 
side  and  are  diluted  by  mediocre  qualities  from  the  other,  but  in 
rare  cases  exceptional  qualities  may  happen  to  converge  from  both, 
thus  heightening  those  of  the  product.  In  very  exceptional  cases  of 
this  class  the  result  may  be  something  extraordinary,  and  we  should 
have  true  geniuses.  The  high  qualities  thus  converging  from  the 
two  lines  need  not  be  the  same.  There  are  many  different  ele- 
ments which  might  combine  and  produce  a  greater  result  than  that 
which  the  combination  of  identical  ones  would  secure.  If,  for 
example,  high  intellectual  powers  coming  from  one  of  the  lines,  no 
matter  how  far  back  in  its  history,  should  chance  to  -coincide  with 
great  power  of  will,  sterling  traits  of  character,  and  moral  balance, 
the  product  would  be  much  more  efficient  than  if  it  consisted  of 
doubled  intellectual  elements.  In  this  way,  considering  the  almost 
infinite  possibilities  of  these  combinations  and  permutations,  it  is  not 
diflficult  to  account  for  all  the  genius  the  world  has  produced  and  for 
the  immense  range  in  the  qualities  of  great  minds.  If  this  is  the 
true  explanation  of  genius,  although  it  is  clearly  a  phenomenon  of 
heredity,  we  should  not  expect  long  lines  of  geniuses.  We  should 
expect  just  what  we  in  fact  have,  occasional  and  apparently  sporadic 
examples,  shooting  up  like  rockets  in  a  single  generation  and  dis- 
appearing almost  immediately. 

This  view  also  has  its  hopeful  or  optimistic  side,  for,  as  we  have 
seen,  nothing  is  ever  wholly  lost,  and  the  accumulations  of  un- 
numbered generations  continue  to  exist,  albeit  long  latent,  but  liable, 
and  perhaps  in  fact  destined,  ultimately  to  come  forth  and  exert 
their  due  influence  upon  the  world.  Another  corollary  from  this 
theory  of  hereditary  genius  seems  to  be  that  we  need  not  concern 
ourselves  as  to  the  result,  as  it  will  come  to  the  same  thing  in  the 
end  however  we  may  shape  events.  Galton  seems  to  labor  under 
a  condition  of  chronic  alarm  lest  the  race  degenerate  unless  some 
artificial  method  of  human  propagation  be  adopted  to  prevent  it. 
It  may  turn  out  that  all  his  labors  to  this  end  will  prove  to  have 
been  vain. 

Nicrtiire.  —  This  term  will  of  course  be  employed  in  Galton 's  sense 
of  all  the  elements  of  success  not  belonging  to  "nature,"  because, 


Ch.  VIII]  NURTURE  123 

separated  from  his  phrase  "nature  and  nurture,"  which  he  char- 
acterizes as  a  "convenient  jingle  of  words,"  ^  its  meaning  would  be 
much  too  narrow.  And  just  as  he  makes  the  first  of  these  words 
embrace  all  the  "pre-efficients,"  so  we  may  make  the  second  em- 
brace all  the  post-efficients  of  achievement.  As  the  first  represents 
heredity,  so  the  second  represents  the  environment.  There  are  no 
biologists  who  ascribe  all  effects  to  heredity.  All  recognize  the 
role  of  the  environment,  and  life  itself  is  an  adjustment  of  internal 
to  external  relations.  And  so  it  is  with  man  in  his  intellectual  and 
social  development.  In  M.  Tarde's  system  the  social  homologue  of 
heredity  is  imitation,  while  that  of  the  environment  is  opposition. 

That  the  environment  represents  opposition  in  the  organic  world 
also  I  have  always  believed  and  have  made  several  attempts  to  prove 
it.  In  my  early  botanical  field  studies  the  subject  that  most  strongly 
attracted  my  attention  was  the  habitat  of  plants.  As  everybody 
knows,  particular  kinds  of  plants  are  to  be  found  in  particular 
habitats  and  not  elsewhere.  Some  grow  in  swamps,  some  in  dry 
ground,  some  along  streams,  some  on  hills,  some  in  shady  places, 
some  in  sunshine,  etc.,  etc.  They  are  habitually  described  as 
"loving"  these  special  situations,  or  at  least  as  being  specially 
adapted  to  them.  That  any  one  should  doubt  this  seems  strange, 
and  yet  there  were  indications  that  led  me  to  doubt  it.  I  was  par- 
ticularly interested  in  weeds,  and  I  noticed  that  besides  the  well- 
known  Old  World  weeds  that  constitute  the  pests  of  the  farmer 
and  gardener  there  are  many  indigenous  plants  that  assume  the 
role  of  weeds  and  overrun  cultivated  fields.  Comparing  these  with 
the  same  plants  in  their  native  habitats  I  found  that  they  flourished 
much  more  luxuriantly  as  weeds  than  as  wild  plants.  In  other 
words  they  "love"  their  new,  or,  as  we  may  say,  artificial  habitat 
better  than  their  old  natural  ones.  It  required  no  very  strong 
reasoning  to  perceive  that  this  was  because  in  cultivated  fields  they 
were  largely  removed  from  the  competition  which  exists  in  nature. 

Introduced  plants  formed  another  subject  for  special  study.  I 
observed  that  certain  exotics  would  not  only  overrun  the  waste 
places,  but  would  often  invade  the  pristine  regions,  crowd  out 
the  native  vegetation,  and  monopolize  large  areas.    I  was  greatly 

1  English  Men  of  Science,  p.  12. 


124  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

interested  in  the  account  given  by  Darwin  of  the  manner  in  which 
the  cardoon  had  invaded  great  tracts  of  country  in  South  America 
and  almost  completely  replaced  the  native  fiora.^  I  brought  in  all 
kinds  of  wild  plants  and  planted  them  in  my  garden  (a  very  unfavor- 
able place  because  much  shaded  by  buildings  and  having  a  poor 
clayey  soil),  and  I  always  put  the  earth  that  clung  to  the  roots  of 
my  specimens  on  the  garden  soil  to  see  what  species  would  come 
up  the  next  year  from  the  contained  seeds.  These  represented 
plants  from  nearly  every  kind  of  habitat,  and  I  observed  that 
many  different  kinds  of  plants  did  well  under  these  circumstances, 
which  were  certainly  very  different  from  those  to  which  they  were 
accustomed.  After  a  number  of  years  of  such  observations  I  felt 
justified  in  formulating  something  like  a  general  law,  and  my  first 
serious  contribution  to  botanical  philosophy  was  devoted  to  the  state- 
ment of  this  law  supported  by  a  few  of  the  principal  facts.^  If  the 
reader  is  interested  in  the  facts  he  can  consult  that  paper,  but  I  have 
continued  to  accumulate  them  ever  since  and  could  now  easily  fill  a 
volume  with  them.  The  principle,  however,  it  is  important  to  state, 
because  it  is  a  comprehensive  principle  that  applies  not  only  to  the 
whole  organic  world  but  also  to  man  and  human  society.  Notwith- 
standing the  early  date  of  that  now  wholly  forgotten  essay,  I  do  not 
see  that  I  can  better  formulate  the  principle  than  by  quoting  from  it : 

The  modification  of  the  adaptation  theory,  or  rather  the  substitute  for  it 
which,  in  the  light  of  these  facts,  I  would  propose,  might  be  called  the  law  of 
mutual  repulsion,  by  which  every  individual,  to  the  extent  of  its  influence, 
repels  the  approach  of  every  other  and  seeks  the  sole  possession  of  the 
inorganic  conditions  surrounding  it.  This  mutual  repulsion  results  at  length  in 
a  statical  condition  which  is  always  brought  about  through  the  action  of  the 
vital  forces  themselves,  and  which,  as  soon  as  reached,  determines  absolutely 
the  exact  place  and  degree  of  development  of  each  species  and  each  individual. 
It  is  this  statical  condition  which  is  apt  to  be  lost  sight  of  in  the  modern  philos- 
ophy of  evolution.  .  .  .  Yet,  without  a  clear  recognition  of  this  statical  law, 
it  is  impossible  to  account  for  the  facts  presented  by  the  distribution  of  plants, 
and  it  will  doubtless  be  found  equally  essential  to  the  full  comprehension  of 
many  other  phenomena  of  nature.  But  when  we  recognize  this  law,  the  whole 
aspect  of  our  question  is  changed.    Plants  appear  to  be  no  longer  in  a  state  of 

1  Journal  of  Researches,  New  York,  1871,  p.  119. 

2  "The  Local  Distribution  of  Plants  and  the  Theory  of  Adaptation,"  Popular- 
Science  Monthly,   Vol.  IX,  October,  1876,  pp.  676-684. 


Ch.  VIII]  NURTURE 


125 


perfect  adaptation  to  their  surroundings.  There  is  no  longer  a  necessary  cor- 
respondence and  correlation  between  organism  and  habitat,  no  longer  necessary 
that  rhythmical  (almost  preestablished)  harmony  between  species  and  environ- 
ment. This  need  only  exist  so  far  as  is  necessary  to  render  the  life  of  the 
species  possible.  Beyond  this  the  greatest  inharmony  and  inadaptation  may 
be  conceived  to  reign  in  nature.  Each  plant  may  be  regarded  as  a  reservoir  of 
vital  force,  as  containing  within  it  a  potential  energy  far  beyond  and  wholly  out 
of  consonance  with  the  contracted  conditions  imposed  upon  it  by  its  environ- 
ment, and  by  which  it  is  compelled  to  possess  the  comparatively  imperfect 
organization  with  which  we  find  it  endowed.  Each  individual  is  where  it  is  and 
what  it  is  by  reason  of  the  combined  forces  which  hedge  it  in  and  determine  its 
very  form.  ...  It  stands  in  its  fixed  position,  locked  in  the  embrace  of  forces 
which  permit  it  neither  to  advance  nor  retreat. 

Such  is  the  state  of  equilibrium  which  is  always  and  necessarily  reached  in  a 
state  of  nature,  and  in  which  man  first  finds  each  newly  discovered  flora.  But 
let  these  statical  conditions  be  once  changed,  whether  by  the  advent  of  man  or 
from  whatever  cause,  and  this  equilibrium  is  immediately  disturbed.  The  chained 
forces  are  set  free  ;  a  general  swarming  begins  ;  some  individuals  are  destroyed, 
others  are  liberated  ;  each  pushes  its  advantage  to  the  utmost,  and  all  move  for- 
ward in  the  direction  of  least  resistance,  till  at  length  they  again  mutually  neu- 
tralize each  other,  and  again  come,  under  new  conditions  and  modified  forms,  into 
the  former  state  of  quiescence. 

The  mo.st  frequent  and  prominent  cause  of  these  disturbances  of  the  natural 
fixity  of  vegetation  is  the  influence  of  man.  .  .  .  The  fruit  trees,  the  cereals, 
and  the  roses  reach  those  wonderful  heights  of  development  under  man's  care, 
because  he  not  only  proves  their  friend,  but  wards  off  their  enemies.  ...  It  is 
not  the  special  adaptation  of  a  plant  for  the  spot  on  which  it  grows,  so  much  as 
the  hostile  attitude  of  other  plants  around  it,  which  restricts  and  determines  its 
range.  The  elements  which  decide  where  plants  shall  grow  are  to  be  found  in 
vegetation  itself,  and  not  in  inorganic  conditions.  The  power  of  self-adaptation 
which  they  possess  is  sufficient  to  habituate  almost  any  species  to  almost  anv 
inorganic  conditions.  Each  species,  therefore,  keeps  within  its  own  restricted 
limits,  not  because  it  cannot  live  in  other  soils,  but  because  prior  occupants  for- 
bid it  to  come. 

The  law  of  adaptation  may  tlierefore  be  reduced  to  this  :  that  every  plant 
possesses  the  power  of  self-adaptation  to  such  a  degree  that,  no  matter  under 
what  conditions  it  may  be  compelled,  by  tlie  higher  law  of  mutual  repulsion,  to 
live,  it  will  mold  its  own  organism  into  harmony  with  those  conditions,  and  thus 
continue  its  existence :  and  this,  whether  it  is  required  to  adopt  a  more  perfect 
or  a  less  perfect  form. 

But  what  it  actually  is,  is  no  criterion  of  what  it  is  capable  of  becoming,  and 
the  locality  in  which  it  is  found  is  no  evidence  that  it  is  best  adapted  to  such  a 
locality.  These  data  only  prove  that  in  the  final  balance  of  forces  to  which  it  is 
subjected  it  was  assigned  such  a  degree  of  development  and  such  a  habitat. 

Galton  in  his  English  Men  of  Science  (Preface,  p.  ix)  quotes 
approvingly  a  passage  from  Carlyle's  Sartor  Resartus  which  has 


126  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

some  bearing    on  the  theory  above  stated,  and  which   it  seems 
appropriate  to  reproduce  at  this  point  : 

It  is  maintained  by  Helvetius  and  his  set,  that  an  infant  of  genius  is  quite 
the  same  as  any  other  infant,  only  tliat  certain  surprisingly  favorable  influences 
accompany  him  through  life,  especially  through  childhood,  and  expand  him, 
while  others  lie  close  folded  and  continue  dunces.  ..."  With  which  opinion," 
cries  Teufelsdrockh,  "  I  should  as  soon  agree  as  with  this  other,  that  an  acorn 
might,  by  favorable  or  unfavorable  influences  of  soil  and  climate,  be  nursed 
into  a  cabbage,  or  the  cabbage-seed  into  an  oak.  Nevertheless,"  continues  he, 
"  I  too  acknowledge  the  all  but  omnipotence  of  early  culture  and  nurture  :  hereby 
we  have  either  a  doddered  dwarf  bush,  or  a  high-towering,  wide-shadowing  tree  ; 
either  a  sick  yellow  cabbage,  or  an  edible  luxuriant  green  one.  Of  a  truth,  it  is 
the  duty  of  all  men,  especially  of  all  philosophers,  to  note  down  with  accuracy 
the  characteristic  circumstances  of  their  Education,  what  furthered,  what  hin- 
dered, what  in  any  way  modified  it."^ 

In  a  lecture  on  "  Nature  and  Nurture,"  which  I  have  many  times 
delivered  to  American  audiences,  I  give  two  illustrations  of  the 
power  of  "  nurture  "  that  are  appropriate  here,  but  I  must  ask  the 
reader  to  make  the  proper  allowance  for  the  rostrum  style  in  which 
they  are  presented  : 

There  is  a  certain  rather  large  monoecious  grass  native  of  the  warmer  parts 
of  America,  attaining  a  height  of  about  two  feet  and  bearing  at  its  summit  a 
handsome  panicle  of  male  flowers,  and  on  the  culm  below  one  or  two  fertile 
spikes  three  inches  long  and  half  an  inch  in  diameter,  having  the  seeds  arranged 
around  the  elongated  rachis.  Its  botanical  name  is  Zea  Mays,  and  the  abo- 
rigines of  tropical  America  used  these  seeds  for  food  and  cultivated  the  plant 
in  their  imperfect  way.  The  Europeans  after  the  discovery  of  America  carried 
this  process  of  cultivation  much  farther,  accustomed  the  plant  to  more  northern 
regions,  to  which  it  readily  adapted  itself,  and  at  length,  on  the  principle  which 
I  have  been  explaining,  enabled  it  to  develop  into  our  maize,  or  Indian  corn. 
The  grass  I  have  described  represented  all  that  stature  could  do.  The  vast 
cornfields  of  the  West,  the  stalks  fifteen  feet  in  height  loaded  with  three  or  four 
ears  each  nearly  a  foot  iti  length  and  two  or  three  inches  in  diameter,  represent 
what  nurture  has  done,  and  this  is  a  fair  example  of  the  relative  influence  of 
nature  and  nurture  in  all  departments  of  life. 

Many  years  ago  when  I  was  an  enthusiastic  amateur  botanist  I  was  out  on 
one  of  mv  rambles  herborizing  in  a  rather  solitary  and  neglected  spot  not  many 
miles  from  the  National  Capital,  and  I  passed  over  a  little  area  that  was  made 
green  and  striking:  by  the  presence  of  a  peculiar  and  to  me  wholly  unfamiliar 
grass.  I  examined  it  attentively,  and  though  tolerably  well  acquainted  with  the 
native  grasses  of  that  vicinity,  I  was  altogether  puzzled  with  this  little  stranger. 
It  was  very  green  and  well  in  flower  and  fruit,  but  it  had  a  certain  unnatural  and 

1  Sartor  Resartus,  Book  Second,  Chap.  II. 


Ch.  VIII]  NURTURE  127 

disheveled  appearance  indicative  of  bard  times  and  a  severe  struggle  for  exist- 
ence. I  gathered  a  goodly  quantity  of  it,  carefully  placed  it  in  my  portfolio,  and 
carried  it  home  with  my  other  trophies.  At  my  leisure,  and  with  all  needful 
appliances,  1  proceeded  to  analyze  it.  I  was  then  skilled  in  plant  dissection, 
and  in  a  moment  I  compelled  my  little  grass  to  reveal  its  name.  To  my  astonish- 
ment it  announced  itself  as  Tf-iticmn  cEstivtim.  As  most  of  you  know,  Triticum 
cestiviim  is  that  noble  cereal  that  furnishes  the  larger  part  of  the  breadstuff  of 
the-  world.  Can  this  be  wheat.?  I  said,  half  doubting  my  accuracy.  Again  I 
put  it  to  the  test,  and  again  the  answer  was  :  Triticum  (Estivum.  Yet  a  third 
time  I  interrogated  it,  but  like  some  stubborn  spirit-rapping  it  still  spelled  out 
the  same  words  :  Triticum  cestivum.  There  was  no  mistake.  This  poor  depau- 
perate little  grass  had  sprung  from  grains  of  wheat  that  had  by  some  unexplained 
accident  been  sown  or  spilled  on  this  wild  deserted  spot  in  the  midst  of  the  native 
vegetation.  There  it  had  sprouted  and  grown  and  soughtto  rise  into  that  majesty 
and  beauty  that  is  seen  in  a  field  of  waving  grain.  But  alas  !  it  could  not.  At 
every  step  it  felt  the  combined  resistance  of  an  environment  no  longer  regulated 
by  intelligence.  It  missed  the  fostering  care  of  man  who  removes  competition, 
destroys  enemies,  and  creates  conditions  favorable  to  the  highest  development. 
Man  gives  to  the  cultivated  plant  an  opportunity  to  progress,  and  the  difference 
between  my  little  starveling  grass  and  the  wheat  of  the  well-tilled  field  is  a  differ- 
ence of  cultivation  only  and  not  at  all  of  native  capacity.  In  short  it  is  the 
difference  between  nature  and  nurture. 

The  lecture  from  which  I  make  the  above  extract  is  devoted  to 
the  defense  of  the  general  doctrine  of  potential  achievement.  It 
was  written  before  I  had  read  any  of  Galton's  works,  and  its  origi- 
nal title  was  "Heredity  and  Opportunity."  The  title  "Nature  and 
Nurture"  was  given  to  it  at  a  later  date,  after  I  had  read  Hereditary 
Genius,  when  the  lecture  was  entirely  rewritten,  but  the  illustrations 
from  botany  were  contained  in  the  original  draft.  The  central  idea 
is  one  that  dates  back  farther  in  my  personal  history  than  any  other 
of  the  leading  ideas  of  my  general  philosophy.  In  the  debating 
societies  of  which  I  had  been  a  member  in  my  academic  days  the 
question  of  the  relative  claims  of  genius  and  circumstances,  as  the 
zealous  young  students  with  whom  I  associated  usually  preferred  to 
express  it,  was  frequently  discussed,  and  I  always  volunteered  to 
take  the  weak  side,  partly  because  it  was  found  difficult  to  secure 
disputants  willing  to  combat  the  claims  of  genius,  and  partly  because 
I  instinctively  felt  that  these  claims  were  usually  exaggerated  and 
those  of  the  environment  underestimated.  In  writing  the  article, 
however,  in  which  I  formulated  the  law  of  biological  statics  and 
the  universal  growth  force  of  nature,  I  only  faintly  perceived  the 


128  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  ll 

connection  between  the  principle  there  laid  down  and  that  which  I 
had  always  defended  on  the  human  plane.  And  yet  the  substantial 
identity  of  the  two  ideas  is  clear.  The  essential  thing  in  both  is 
latent  power,  suppressed  energy,  lost  labor,  waste  caused  by  ob- 
structions to  normal  activities.  The  forces  of  nature  are,  as  it  were, 
chained.  The  channels  of  energy  are  everywhere  choked.  The  new 
gospel,  therefore,  to  which  I  found  myself  committed  was  a  gospel 
of  liberation.  Nurture  does  not  consist  in  the  mere  coddling  of 
the  weak.  It  consists  in  freeing  the  strong.  It  is  emancipation.. 
It  becomes  a  practical  question  and  not  a  futile  speculation.  The 
important  thing  is  not  genius  itself  but  the  products  of  genius,  and 
it  becomes  evident  that  these  will  depend  upon  the  degree  of  free- 
dom with  which  genius  is  allowed  to  act.  If  genius  is  innate  and  a 
constant  quantity,  no  effort  expended  upon  it  can  affect  the  result. 
The  only  way  in  which  effort  can  be  profitably  expended  is  upon 
the  environment.  This  is  plastic.  It  can  be  indefinitely  modified  or 
completely  transformed.  Genius  corresponds  to  the  natural  forces 
of  the  physical  world.  It  can  be  neither  increased  nor  diminished. 
Invention  and  art  do  not  consist  in  extolling  the  forces  of  nature. 
They  make  no  attempt  to  increase  them.  They  deal  exclusively 
with  the  environment.  They  remove  the  obstructions  to  their 
full  and  free  action.  They  direct  them  into  prescribed  chan- 
nels and  prevent  them  from  doing  harm  or  uselessly  expending 
themselves.  But  if  they  are  to  accomplish  any  result  they  must 
be  freed.  It  is  the  same  with  the  forces  of  mind.  They  are  ever 
pressing  and  only  need  to  be  freed  in  order  to  achieve.  But  that 
from  which  they  must  be  freed  is  the  environment.  Tarde  was 
right.  The  environment  represents  opposition.  The  material  sur- 
roundings are  perpetually  checking  and  repressing  the  spontaneous 
efforts  of  mind.  We  have  seen  that  in  the  world  of  plant  life  the 
degree  of  development  actually  attained  is  far  below  that  which  is 
attained  whenever  the  opposition  of  the  environment  is  removed. 
We  have  seen  what  the  possibilities  of  plant  life  are  when  the 
natural  growth  force  is  once  Hberated.  And  it  is  the  same  with  all 
forces.  It  is  so  with  the  human  mind.  We  must  not  be  content 
with  the  actual.  We  must  imagine  the  possible  and  strive  to  attain 
it.  Actual  achievement,  however  great,  is  small  compared  to  poten- 
tial achievement. 


CHAPTER    IX 

OPPORTUNITY 

Si  nous  laissons  de  cote  les  causes  indirectes  .  .  ,  imaginees  par  les  philo- 
sophes,  il  ne  nous  reste  plus  comme  agents  imniddiats  du  developpement  histo- 
rique  que  les  hommes  eux-memes.  —  Alfred  Odix. 

Nescio  quomodo,  nihil  tam  absurde  dici  potest,  quod  non  dicatur  ab  aliquo 
philosophorum. —  Cicero. 

La  nature  faitle  merite  etla  fortune  le  met  en  ceuvre.  —  La  Rochefoucauld. 

Lex  urbis  lex  orbis.  —  Roman  Proverb. 

Le  gdnie  est  dans  les  choses  et  non  dans  I'homme.  L'homme  n'est  que 
I'accident  qui  permet  au  genie  de  se  d^gager.  —  Alfred  Odin. 

We  have  seen  that  genius,  i.e.,  the  intellectual  and  moral  nature  of 
man  in  so  far  as  it  relates  to  human  achievement,  is  to  all  intents  and 
purposes  a  fixed  quantity  which  cannot  be  affected  by  any  artificial 
devices  that  man  can  adopt.  With  it,  therefore,  the  sociologist  has 
no  more  to  do  than  has  the  electrician  with  the  supply  of  electricity. 
And  just  as  the  electrician  concentrates  his  attention  exclusively 
upon  the  most  effective  means  of  utilizing  the  constant  quantity  of 
that  element  or  force  that  exists  in  the  universe,  so  the  sociologist 
should  concentrate  his  attention  exclusively  upon  the  most  effective 
means  of  utilizing  those  constants  of  nature  which  consist  in  the 
intellectual  and  moral  elements  of  society.  This  can  be  done  in 
the  one  case  as  in  the  other  only  by  appropriate  adjustments  in  the 
surrounding  conditions.  These  conditions  are  not  fixed  and  immov- 
able but  plastic  and  adjustable.  We  may  consider  genius  as  a  force, 
because  it  consists,  as  has  been  shown,  of  intellect  and  will.  Will 
is  a  true  natural  force,  and  we  have  in  this  combination  both  the 
dynamic  and  the  directive  agents  of  society,  as  these  terms  were 
defined  in  Pure  Sociology.  The  intellect  guides  the  will  to  the 
extent  of  the  individual's  power,  and  nearly  all  human  achievement 
has  been  the  result  of  the  cooperation  of  these  two  agents  in  indi- 
vidual minds.    Considering  genius  as  a  force  guided  by  intelligence, 

129 


130  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

we  may  treat  the  above  parallel  as  practically  complete.  The 
environment  in  both  cases  represents  opposition,  and  the  problem 
is  to  remove  the  opposition  and  permit  the  force  to  operate  freely 
along  lines  which  intelligence  perceives  to  be  advantageous.  Phys- 
ical forces  thus  freed  and  directed  accomplish  the  grand  results 
which  we  call  art  or  the  arts,  including  the  great  industries.  The 
means  through  which  this  is  all  brought  about  are  variously  desig- 
nated as  apparatus,  tools,  mechanisms,  machinery,  factories,  etc. 
These  are  much  more  obviously  material  than  the  means  by  which 
the  human  will  is  liberated  and  directed,  but  the  principle  is  the 
same.  In  a  certain  sense  all  these  mechanical  adjustments  may  be 
regarded  as  furnishing  opportunities  for  the  forces  of  nature  to  do 
useful  work  which  they  could  not  and  do  not  do  under  the  unregu- 
lated conditions  of  the  physical  environment.  This  conception  fur- 
nishes the  key  to  the  problem  in  both  fields,  and  in  that  of  psychic 
forces  it  becomes  obvious  that  the  generalized  form  under  which 
they  are  liberated  and  enabled  to  work  in  the  interest  of  society 
is  opportunity.  Using  that  term  in  this  broad  sense  of  every  form 
of  social  adjustment  that  sets  free  and  sets  to  work  the  psychic 
forces  of  man,  we  may  now  attempt  a  somewhat  closer  analysis 
of  this  primary  means  of  achievement. 

Role  of  the  Environment 

The  tendency  of  thinking  men  to  divide  up  into  opposing  schools 
is  well  known.  In  philosophy  as  in  politics  there  is  rarely  any 
middle  ground.  It  is  a  part  of  the  universal  polarization  in  nature 
that  was  treated  in  the  tenth  chapter  of  Pure  Sociology.  But  the 
truth  is  always  a  synthesis  of  the  contending  views.  It  is  so  in  the 
great  dispute  as  to  the  relative  claims  of  men  and  the  environment. 
One  school,  the  hero-worshipers,  claims  that  men  do  it  all,  and 
that  the  environment  is  merely  the  raw  material  with  which  they 
work.  The  other  school  insists  that  men  are  only  the  instruments 
with  which  nature  works.  With  all  their  zeal,  energy,  activity,  and 
effort,  they  are  merely  marionettes.  Great  unperceived  but  irresisti- 
ble laws  are  what  accomplish  the  results.  What  is  the  synthesis  of 
these  two  antinomies  ? 


Ch.  IX]  ROLE  OF  THE  ENVIRONMENT 


131 


We  are  really  here  confronted  with  the  same  problem  that  we 
encountered  in  Chapter  II,  the  problem  of  the  efficacy  of  effort. 
It  is  the  same  "fool's  puzzle,"  and  if  it  was  solved  at  that  stage  it 
remains  solved  for  our  present  purpose.  When  we  speak  of  civili- 
zation we  refer  to  the  human  inhabitants  of  this  planet.  We  do 
not  mean  the  land  and  sea,  the  hills  and  valleys,  the  mountains  and 
streams,  the  climate  and  seasons.  These  were  here  before  man 
came,  and  however  much  they  may  have  affected  man,  it  is  not 
these  effects  that  constitute  civilization.  It  is  man's  combined 
influence  on  his  environment  and  on  himself  that  chiefly  consti- 
tutes civilization.  In  other  words,  it  is  his  action,  and  without 
such  action  on  his  part  there  could  be  no  civilization.  To  use 
Mr.  Morley's  illustration,  if  all  men  were  to  fall  into  a  deep  sleep 
for  ages,  and  then  awake,  they  would  find  that  the  environment  had 
done  nothing  for  them  during  that  time.  Whatever  might  have 
been  the  civilizing  movements  in  process  when  they  ceased  action 
these  would  cease  when  their  action  ceased  and  could  not  be 
resumed  until  their  action  was  resumed. 

The  role  of  the  environment  then  is  not  to  produce  or  to  deter- 
mine civilization.  It  is  not  an  active  agent  but  a  passive  condition. 
Indeed,  as  has  already  been  said,  it  represents  opposition.  This 
opposition  is  not  an  active  antagonism.  It  is  in  the  nature  of  a 
passive  obstruction  to  man's  activities.  It  is  man  that  is  active. 
His  will  guided  by  his  intellect  is  ever  pressing  against  the  environ- 
ment. In  proportion  to  the  development  of  the  guiding  faculty  man 
removes  the  obstruction  presented  by  the  environment.  In  the 
more  advanced  stages  he  transforms  it,  utilizes  it,  subjects  it  to 
his  service,  and  compels  the  very  powers  that  at  first  opposed  his 
progress  to  serve  his  interests  and  supplement  his  own  powers.  It 
is  this  that  constitutes  civilization,  and  to  the  original  natural  envi- 
rrmmcnt  there  is  now  added  an  artificial  environment  of  his  own 
creation.  This,  as  we  shall  soon  see,  is  of  far  greater  vital  impor- 
tance to  him  than  his  natural  environment,  the  physical  world  into 
which  he  is  born.  Yet  to  this  human  action  the  environment 
opposes  its  reaction,  and  it  is  this  interaction  of  man  and  his  envi- 
ronment, or  synergy}  that  accomplishes  the  results. 

1  See  Pure  Sociology,  pp.  1 71-184. 


132  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

The  Agents  of  Civilization 

Civilization  is  something  that  is  produced  by  some  kind  of  agency, 
and  we  have  seen  that  that  agency  is  not  to  be  found  in  the  phys- 
ical surroundings  of  man,  which  are  passive  and  inert.  And  as  the 
only  elements  in  existence  are  men  and  things  the  agents  of  civili- 
zation must  be  men.  The  idea  that  they  consist  in  things,  although 
it  passes  in  some  quarters  for  the  scientific  view  par  excellence,  is 
really  a  metaphysical  conception  worthy  of  medieval  times.  It  arose 
as  a  reaction  against  that  form  of  hero-worship  which  deified  a  few 
individuals  and  ignored  the  mass  of  mankind  and  their  most  essential 
activities.  Civilization  is  the  result  of  the  activities  of  all  men  during 
all  time,  struggling  against  the  environment  and  slowly  conquering 
nature.  While  therefore  the  oligocentric  world  view  that  has  pre- 
vailed throughout  the  past  and  still  prevails  is  false,  the  mesocentric 
theory  that  claims  to  correct  it  is  equally  false,  and  the  truth  is  to 
be  sought  elsewhere.  This  much  is  certainly  true,  that  the  agents 
of  civilization  are  men,  and  the  question  is  narrow^ed  down  to  that 
of  determining  what  men,  and  in  what  manner  they  have  brought 
it  about. 

Even  a  cursory  glance  at  human  history  reveals  the  fact  that 
there  are  immense  differences  among  men  in  this  respect.  It  was 
shown  in  Pure  Sociology  that  human  achievement  has  been  the  work 
of  a  very  small  number  of  individuals.  Whatever  the  great  mass 
may  have  done  in  the  way  of  preserving,  perpetuating,  and  multi- 
plying copies  —  in  a  word,  through  imitation  —  the  number  who 
originate  and  invent,  who  investigate  and  discover,  is  surpassing 
small.  And  yet  it  is  these  that  are  the  proper  agents  of  civilization. 
If  we  combine  all  departments  of  achievement  and  embrace  all  time, 
the  aggregate  number  of  these  agents  is  of  course  considerable,  yet 
it  forms  a  very  small  fraction  of  the  entire  human  race.  But  the 
social  value  of  these  few  agents  must  not  be  underestimated.  If  it 
is  foolish  to  worship  them  as  heroes,  it  is  equally  unwise  to  ignore 
their  true  significance  in  the  history  of  the  world. 

We  are  confronted  by  the  old  question  of  the  role  of  great  men. 
We  have  seen  that  by  certain  subtle  and  obscure  processes  of  nature 
such  rare  combinations  of  ancestral  qualities  are  occasionally  formed 


Ch.  IX]  THE  AGENTS  OF  CIVILIZATION  I  33 

in  the  process  of  generation  in  the  human  race  as  to  produce  extraor- 
dinary minds.  It  is  such  minds  when  afforded  the  proper  oppor- 
tunity that  have  produced  all  the  results  that  the  world  values. 
How  many  such  minds  there  may  be  at  any  given  time  it  is 
impossible  to  determine,  because  those  that  are  known  to  exist 
are  only  such  as  have  been  permitted  by  the  environment  to  assert 
themselves.  Great  men,  then,  are  the  mentally  endowed  who  have 
had  a  chance  to  use  their  talents.  There  is  reason  to  believe  that 
this  is  only  a  small  percentage  of  those  who  possess  talents.  Oppor- 
tunity alone  can  show  what  the  true  number  of  mentally  endowed 
individuals  is  in  human  society.  But  the  few  that  we  have  and  have 
had  constitute  the  real  living  force  of  human  society.  Human 
achievement  is  due  to  them,  and  but  for  them  there  would  have 
been  no  achievement.  It  is  absurd  to  talk  about  civilization  as  the 
product  of  blind  natural  forces  and  general  environmental  conditions 
unless  the  men  who  have  chiefly  produced  it  are  included  among 
such  forces  and  conditions.  We  can  readily  conceive  of  their 
absence,  but  we  cannot  conceive  of  the  same  results  being  accom- 
plished in  their  absence.  Without  them  there  would  be  no  results. 
If  by  any  force  of  circumstances  the  elite  of  any  country  were  to  be 
removed,  that  country  would  be  left  in  a  state  of  intellectual  stagna- 
tion. Indeed,  history  has  demonstrated  this  on  more  than  one 
occasion.  When  Spain  killed  off  and  drove  out  its  elite  it  fell 
into  decadence  and  never  has  recovered  its  vigor.  Italy  suffered 
immensely  from  the  same  cause  and  is  to-day  far  behind  the  lead- 
ing nations  of  the  world.  And  these  are  not  the  only  instances. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  brilliant  role  played  by  Switzerland  in  the 
history  of  science  is  chiefly  due  to  the  rich  recruits- which  that 
country  received  from  the  persecutions  carried  on  in  other  coun- 
tries, as  de  Candolle  has  so  fully  shown.  There  is  a  still  broader 
aspect  to  the  subject.  National  degeneracy,  while  it  might  be  pro- 
duced by  the  actual  sacrifice  of  the  entire  dite  of  any  country,  is 
usually  due  much  more  to  the  more  or  less  voluntary  abandonment 
of  such  countries  by  their  great  men,  or  by  men  who  subsequently 
become  great  in  the  land  of  their  adoption.  This  need  not  necessarily 
be  due  to  oppression.  It  may  be  due  to  other  causes.  But  whatever 
the  cause  may  be,  the  country  which  cannot  retain  its  progressive 


134  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Pari  II 

spirits  is  doomed  to  decay.  All  of  which  shows  in  the  most  con- 
vincing manner  that  the  agents  of  civilization  are  the  great  men  and 
the  strong  and  brilliant  minds  in  the  world,  and  not  any  vague, 
impersonal  environmental  conditions. 

The  hero-worshipers  have  greatly  weakened  their  case  by  taking 
for  their  heroes  for  the  most  part  men  of  action,  as  they  are  called, 
—  military  chieftains,  diplomatists,  statesmen,  etc.  These  are  not 
the  true  agents  of  civilization.  The  most  they  have  done  is  to  pro- 
duce certain  alterations  in  the  political  map  of  the  world,  changes 
in  the  position  of  certain  imaginary  lines.  Such  men  do  not  achieve 
in  the  proper  sense  of  the  word,  and  it  is  a  question  whether  civili- 
zation is  any  more  advanced  than  it  would  have  been  if  they  had 
not  existed.  Moreover,  of  them  it  is  largely  true,  as  it  is  not  of  really 
great  men,  that  they  are  the  products  of  their  time  and  the  mere 
instruments  of  society  in  the  accomplishment  of  its  ends.  Their 
success  is  due  to  the  fact  that  society  wishes  to  have  done  the  things 
that  they  do.  If  society  does  not  wish  this  their  efforts  are  futile, 
they  are  failures  and  not  heroes.  And  it  can  never  be  known  how 
many  men  there  may  be  at  any  given  time  who  could  have  done  as 
well  as  the  particular  ones  whom  society  happens  to  commission,  as 
it  were,  to  do  its  work. 

The  above  is  true  of  all  public  functionaries.  Their  high  position 
is  mistaken  for  superior  ability.  Like  coins,  they  are  taken  at  their 
stamped  and  not  at  their  intrinsic  value. ^  I  have  already  commented 
on  the  impropriety  on  this  account  of  studying  the  judges  of  England 
as  Galton  has  done  in  his  Hereditary  Genius.  Their  "  greatness  "  is 
due  almost  wholly  to  their  position.  There  were  doubtless  barristers 
who  pleaded  before  them  that  would  have  as  signally  graced  the 
bench  if  they  had  been  placed  there.  It  often  happens  that  a  states- 
man is  regarded  as  absolutely  indispensable  and  as  the  savior  of  his 
country,  when  in  fact  he  has  only  ordinary  abilities,  but  happens  to 
hold  a  high  place  at  a  critical  period.  Sometimes  there  is  afforded 
proof  that  he  was  not  really  needed,  as  in  the  case  of  Bismarck. 
After  he  steps  down  the  country  goes  on  as  before.^  The  superiority 

1  Les  rois  font  des  hommes  comme  des  pieces  de  monnaie ;  ils  les  font  valoir  ce 
qu'ils  veulent,  et  Ton  est  force  de  les  recevoir  selon  leur  cours,  at  non  pas  selon  leur 
veritable  prix. — La  Rochefoucauld,  Maxim  No.  165  of  ed.  1665. 

2  Cf.  A.  Odin,  Genese  des  grands  hommes,  Paris,  1895,  Vol.  I,  pp.   130-131. 


Ch.  IX]  THE  LITERATURE  OF  OPPORTUNITY  135 

even  of  military  officers  is  usually  exaggerated.  In  my  own  com- 
pany in  the  Civil  War  the  captain,  who  was  regarded  as  indispen- 
sable, was  wounded  and  the  first  lieutenant  was  called  elsewhere, 
but  the  remaining  officers  led  us  to  victory  just  the  same.  In  many 
cases  non-commissioned  officers  had  to  command  the  companies, 
even  corporals.  Many  a  private,  no  doubt,  would  have  acquitted 
himself  with  honor  if  chance  had  laid  upon  him  the  responsibility 
of  command.  Unless  a  public  officer  does  something  besides  per- 
forming the  duties  of  his  office  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  is  supe- 
rior to  other  men.  It  is  the  peculiarity  of  official  service  in  all 
departments  that  it  does  not  require  extraordinary  abilities.  It  is 
also  a  blessing  that  this  is  so,  for  it  is  necessary  that  the  offices 
be  filled,  and  if  the  state  were  compelled  to  find  men  of  talent  or 
genius  to  fill  vacant  places,  it  would  usually  be  impossible  to  fill  them 
at  all.  The  keeping  of  all  responsible  places  filled  by  competent 
men  is  essential  to  the  social  order,  and  it  is  social  order  and  not 
the  feats  of  public  officers  which  is  the  essential  thing. 

Incidentally,  however,  as  we  shall  see,  public  service  becomes  an 
element  in  civilization.  Some  public  officers  are  men  of  genius,  and 
although  they  perform  their  official  duties,  their  assured  positions 
and  surplus  energy  constitute  their  opportunity  to  achieve  in  fields 
quite  independent  of  their  routine  and  usually  simple  duties.  Aside, 
therefore,  from  sinecurism,  which  is  not  always  an  unmixed  evil,  and 
from  the  influence  of  Maecenases,  the  governmental  environment  is 
a  factor  in  the  production  of  the  agents  of  civilization. 

The  Literature  of  Opportunity 

As  in  the  discussion  of  the  general  problem  it  will  be  necessary 
to  refer  to  the  literature,  it  may  be  well  to  preface  the  discussion 
by  a  brief  survey  of  it.  And  as  all  the  authors  compare  or  contrast 
the  influence  of  nature  or  heredity  with  that  of  nurture  or  oppor- 
tunity it  will  be  impossible  to  separate  these  two  subjects.  Indeed, 
the  movement  began  as  a  discussion  of  heredity  and  gradually  shaded 
off  into  a  discussion  of  the  environment. 

The  Method  of  Discussion.  — Three  different  methods  have  been 
employed  in  this  discussion,  all  of  which  are  scientific  if  logically 


J 


6  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 


applied.  To  vary  slightly  the  Hegelian  formula,  they  may  be  called 
respectively  the  methods  of  discussion  by  theses,  by  hypotheses,  and 
by  syntheses.  The  old  method  of  formal  logic  taught  to  academic 
students,  and  employed  by  them  in  their  debates  and  dissertations, 
is  first  to  state  the  thesis  and  then  to  defend  and  prove  it.  In  scien- 
tific reasoning,  the  thesis  is  more  modestly  called  a  hypothesis,  and 
the  object  is  to  examine  all  the  facts  to  see  whether  they  do  or  do 
not  sustain  the  hypothesis.  The  third  method,  also  regarded  as 
highly  scientific,  is  to  set  out  without  any  definite  proposition  to  be 
proved  or  disproved,  with  a  more  or  less  skeptical  attitude  toward 
all  theories,  and  simply  to  study  the  facts  and  let  them  lead  where 
they  will.  The  first  may  be  called  the  theoretical  or  deductive 
method,  or  method  of  demonstration  ;  the  second  is  more  of  an 
inductive  method,  or  method  of  exclusion;  the  third  is  a  strictly 
heuristic  method,  or  method  of  investigation.  Perhaps  all  the 
authors  have  employed  all  these  methods  more  or  less,  but  the  first 
of  them  is  specially  characteristic  of  some  and  the  third  of  others, 
while  in  this  particular  field  at  least  the  second  has  been  little  used. 
In  passing  in  review  the  different  authors  and  their  contributions, 
these  peculiarities  of  method  will  be  noted  as  bearing  on  the  relative 
force  of  the  respective  arguments. 

It  is  important  to  note  that,  subordinate  to  this  general  method, 
most  of  the  authors  have  used  the  statistical  method.  This  is 
peculiarly  well  adapted  to  the  investigation  of  questions  of  this 
class.  There  is  almost  no  other  way  by  which  such  questions  can 
be  scientifically  discussed.  General  observation  and  experience  are 
wholly  unreliable,  and  in  dealing  with  human  beings  nearly  all  the 
facilities  for  experimentation  and  laboratory  research  that  are 
supplied  to  the  student  of  organic  and  physical  nature  are  wanting. 
The  investigation  of  man  in  all  these  hidden  aspects  becomes  a  sort 
of  social  physics  in  the  sense  to  which  Ouetelet  applied  that  phrase, 
and  its  study  is  satisfactory  or  successful  only  through  the  use  of 
his  method,  viz.,  the  method  of  statistics.  It  is  unnecessary  to  com- 
ment at  this  point  upon  the  great  caution  with  which  this  method 
must  be  employed.  The  frequent  neglect  of  such  caution  will  be 
noted  as  v^e  proceed.  Indeed,  we  shall  find  that  there  is  a  fallacy 
specially  characteristic  of  statistics. 


Ch.  IX]  THE  LITERATURE  OF  OPPORTUNITY  137 

The  Discussion.  —  This  dates  back  to  the  year  1865,  when  Mr. 
Francis  Galton  published  his  first  essay  on  hereditary  talent.^  This 
was  doubtless  largely  inspired  by  the  researches  of  his  great  kins- 
man, Charles  Darwin,  and  proceeds  from  the  distinctly  expressed 
"  thesis  "  that  "  talent  is  transmitted  by  inheritance  in  a  very  remark- 
able degree"  (p.  157).  He  had  already  adopted  the  statistical 
method,  and  he  gives  a  list  of  forty-one  notabilities  who  had  eminent 
relatives  as  near  as  father,  son,  or  brother.  As,  however,  he  does 
not  in  this  essay  distinctly  say  that  the  distinguished  men  of  any  age 
or  country  are  the  only  ones  who  could  have  distinguished  them- 
selves under  any  circumstances,  it  has  no  special  bearing  on  our 
present  subject. 

This  essay  was  the  preliminary  outcome  of  extensive  researches 
which  Mr.  Galton  had  undertaken,  and  which  took  their  final  form 
in  his  now  celebrated  work.  Hereditary  Genius.^  This  work  has 
already  been  so  frequently  referred  to,  and  will  be  dealt  with  so 
much  more  at  length  hereafter,  that  it  need  not  be  specially  analyzed 
here.  It  is  interesting,  however,  to  note  how  completely  he  follows 
the  first  of  the  three  methods  described  above.  He  states  his  thesis 
in  the  first  sentence  of  the  book,  as  follows:  "  I  propose  to  show  in 
this  book  that  a  man's  natural  abilities  are  derived  by  inheritance, 
under  exactly  the  same  limitations  as  are  the  form  and  physical 
features  of  the  whole  organic  world."  But  in  it  he  also  states  his 
other  subsidiary  thesis,  which  has  already  been  quoted  (supra,  p.  1 1 7), 
and  which  brings  the  work  fairly  within  the  purview  of  the  present 
discussion.  Indeed,  it  is  this  subsidiary  thesis,  and  not  the  primary 
one,  that  has  given  rise  to  the  whole  movement.  Nearly  all  admit 
that  mental  qualities  are  hereditary,  but  that  they  are  all-power- 
ful and  will  prevail  over  all  obstacles  was  a  claim  that  was  soon 
challenged. 

The  first  to  do  this  was  M.  Alphonse  de  Candolle,  the  eminent 
Swiss  botanist,  son  of  an  equally  eminent  father,  and  therefore  him- 
self an  example  of  hereditary  genius,  which  he  does  not  deny  in 

1  "Hereditary  Talent  and  Character,"  Macmillan's  Magazine,  Part  I,  June,  1865; 
Second  Paper,  August,  1865  (Vol.  XII,  pp.  157-166;  318-327). 

2  Hereditary  Genius.  An  Inquirj'  into  its  Laws  and  Consequences,  London,  1869  ; 
new  and  revised  edition  with  an  American  preface,  New  York,  1870;  second  edition, 
London  and  New  York,  1892. 


138  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

principle.  In  1873  appeared  his  great  work  on  the  history  of  the 
sciences  and  scientific  men,^  in  which  he  discusses  these  and  so 
many  other  vital  questions.  De  Candolle's  method  is  rather  to  be 
classed  in  the  third  group  above  described  than  in  either  the  first  or 
second.  His  position  is  one  of  doubt  on  all  points  not  adequately 
established,  and  especially  on  Galton's  subsidiary  thesis.  He  also 
employs  the  statistical  method  and  keeps  it  well  under  control,  but 
the  numerical  basis  of  his  inductions,  viz.,  the  membership  of  the 
three  great  academies  of  science  (Paris,  Berlin,  London)  was  much 
too  narrow  to  secure  reliable  results.  As  in  the  case  of  Galton's 
leading  work,  this  one  will  come  in  for  so  much  more  special  treat- 
ment that  any  analysis  of  it  here  would  involve  repetition. 

In  the  same  year  (1873)  appeared  the  work  of  M.  Th.  Ribot  on 
psychological  heredity,^  which  is  to  be  classed  with  Galton's  Heredi- 
tary Genius,  out  of  which  it  doubtless  grew,  and  which,  instead  of 
being  a  criticism  and  a  challenge,  like  that  of  de  Candolle,  is  rather 
a  continuation  and  extension  of  Galton's  views  from  the  standpoint 
of  an  eminent  physiological  psychologist.  In  many  respects  Ribot 
goes  even  farther  than  Galton,  and  he  seems  to  share  with  him 
that  unlimited  faith  in  the  omnipotence  of  heredity.  His  method 
is  distinctively  theoretical  and  to  some  extent  statistical. 

Galton  replied  almost  immediately  in  a  magazine  article  ^  to 
de  Candolle's  criticisms  of  his  own  work,  accusing  him  of  using 
his  name  "as  a  foil  to  set  off  his  own  conclusions,"  and  of  mixing 
hereditary  influences  with  others,  so  as  really  to  become  his  "ally 
against  his  will."  But  he  admits  that  "the  most  valuable  part 
of  the  investigation  is  this:  What  are  the  social  conditions  most 
likely  to  produce  scientific  investigators,  irrespective  of  their  natural 
ability  ?  " 

1  Histoire  des  sciences  et  des  savants  depuis  deux  siecles,  precedee  et  suivie  d'autres 
etudes  sur  des  sujets  scientifiques,  en  particulier  sur  I'heredite  et  la  selection  dans 
I'espece  humaine,  par  Alphonse  de  Candolle,  Geneve,  Bale,  Lyon,  1873.  Deuxieme 
edition  considerablement  augmentee,  Geneve,  Bale,  1885. 

2  L'Heredite  psychologique,  Paris,  1873;  2e  ed.,  1882;  36  ed.,  1887.  Heredity:  A 
Psychological  Study  of  its  Phenomena,  Laws,  Causes,  and  Consequences.  From 
the  French  of  Th.  Ribot,  London,  1875  (this  edition  is  considerably  abridged  and 
generally  inferior). 

3  "  On  the  Causes  which  operate  to  create  Scientific  Men,"  Fortnightly  Review, 
Vol.  XIX  (N.S.,  Vol.  XIII),  March,  1873,  PP-  345-351- 


Ch.  IX]  THE  LITERATURE  OF  OPPORTUNITY  1 39 

But  Galton  evidently  felt  too  hard  hit  to  be  content  with  an 
answer  seven  pages  long.  He  instituted  an  entirely  new  statistical 
inquiry  which  resulted  in  another  book,^  which  is  almost  as  well 
known  as  his  Hereditary  Genius.  He  drew  up  and  sent  out  an  elab- 
orate qiiestion7iaire  to  over  one  hundred  eminent  men  of  science  in 
England  and  compiled  their  answers  in  this  book.  He  admits 
(pp.  35-36)  that  the  greater  frequency  with  which  elder  sons 
attain  eminence  may  be  due  to  their  better  nurture  under  the  pre- 
vailing laws  of  primogeniture.  The  enumeration  of  great  families 
in  the  first  chapter  follows  the  lines  of  his  earlier  work  and  has  the 
same  defects.  Chapter  H  deals  with  the  answers  to  his  questions, 
largely  in  the  language  of  the  writers.  There  is  nothing  in  them 
that  can  be  called  striking.  Chapter  HI  is  a  continuation  of  this, 
and  while  professing  to  deal  with  "  pre-efiicients,"  in  fact  deals 
mostly  with  post-efficients.  Chapter  IV  relates  to  education.  There 
is  considerable  difference  of  opinion  expressed,  and  the  result 
seems  to  indicate  that  few  persons  are  good  judges  as  to  the  influ- 
ence of  their  own  education. 

A  number  of  essays  and  magazine  articles  ^  appeared  in  1880  and 
1 88 1,  bearing  more  or  less  directly  upon  our  subject,  that  of  Pro- 
fessor James  being  quite  an  onslaught  upon  the  general  theory  that 
great  men  are  produced  by  their  environment  and  must  have  been. 
He  also  deals  somewhat  with  Galton's  views,  at  least  in  a  footnote 
(p.  453).  The  replies  of  Fiske  and  Allen,  both  avowed  disciples  of 
Herbert  Spencer,  emphasize  the  influence  of  "general  conditions" 
and  of  heredity. 

In  1 88 1  also  appeared  an  important  work  by  Jacoby^to  which 
frequent  reference  will  be  made.    The  Royal  Academy  of  Medicine 

1  English  Men  of  Science:  their  Nature  and  Nurture,  by  Francis  Galton,  London, 
1874. 

2  "  Great  Men,  Great  Thoughts,  and  the  Environment,"  by  William  James,  Atlantic 
Monthly,  Vol.  XLVI,  October,  1880,  pp.  441-459;  "Great  Men  and  their  Environment," 
in:  The  Will  to  believe  and  other  Essays  in  Popular  Philosophy,  London,  1897, 
pp.  216-254. 

"  Sociology  and  Hero-Worship.  An  Evolutionist's  Reply  to  Dr.  James,"  by  John 
Fiske,  Atlantic  Monthly,  Vol.  XLVII,  January,  1881,  pp.  75-84. 

"The   Genesis   of  Genius,"  by  Grant  Allen,  op.  cit.,  Vol.  XLVII,  March,  1881, 

PP-  371-381- 

^  fitudes  sur  la  selection  dans  ses  rapports  avec  I'heredite  chez  I'homme,  par  Paul 
Jacoby,  Paris,  1881  ;  2e  ed.,  Paris,  1904. 


I40  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

of  Madrid  discussed  in  1874  the  question  of  selection  in  man  in  its 
relations  to  heredity,  and  M.  Jacoby  worked  out  the  subject  in  great 
detail  and  was  rewarded  by  being  elected  a  corresponding  member 
of  that  body.  This  book  was  the  result.  It  is  divided  into  two  very 
unequal  parts,  the  first  treating  at  great  length  of  "power,"  and  the 
second  in  a  much  less  extended  manner  of  "talent."  It  is  only  this 
second  part  that  concerns  the  present  discussion.  It  will  come  in 
for  full  treatment  at  the  proper  time.  The  fourth  chapter  con- 
sists entirely  of  an  extended  list  of  remarkable  personages  arranged 
according  to  their  places  of  birth,  as  a  basis  for  his  thesis  that 
density  of  population  is  the  leading  factor  in  the  production  of 
talent.  In  the  second  edition  of  this  work,  after  so  long  an  interval, 
we  are  surprised  to  find  that  scarcely  any  changes  have  been  made. 
Although  this  edition  claims  to  be  revised  and  enlarged,  it  contains 
only  ten  more  pages  than  the  first  and  is  uniform  with  it  until  we 
reach  the  last  chapter,  where  some  additional  statistics  of  insanity 
are  inserted.  It  has  a  special  preface,  in  which  we  learn  that  the 
work  has  received  favorable  attention  and  some  criticism  from 
various  sources,  but  the  author  who  has  most  fully  studied  it,  or,  at 
least,  the  second  part,  and  who  has  pointed  out  the  fundamental 
defects  in  M.  Jacoby's  method,  viz.,  M.  A.  Odin,  is  not  mentioned. 
If  he  had  acquainted  himself  with  M.  Odin's  work  and  followed  his 
method  he  might  have  rendered  the  excellent  data  which  he  has  so 
laboriously  collected  of  much  greater  value  to  all  concerned.  In 
view  of  these  defects,  which  will  be  pointed  out  later  on,  it  is  almost 
a  surprise  to  find  the  work  commended  by  such  a  man  as  Gabriel 
Tarde,  who  contributed  the  avant-propos. 

In  1883  appeared  a  little  book  by  M.  Henri  Joly  on  the  psychol- 
ogy of  great  men,i  in  which  from  its  title  we  should  expect  to  find 
much  that  bears  upon  the  subject  in  hand.  Especially  in  the  chapter 
(V)  on  "the  great  man  and  the  contemporary  environment,"  we 
should  look  for  a  plunge  into  the  very  center  of  the  controversy. 
In  this  we  are  somewhat  disappointed,  as  attention  is  chiefly  directed 
to  the  cognate  question  discussed  by  Professor  James  and  his  critics 
as  to  whether  the  great  man  is  simply  a  spontaneous  and  necessary 
product  of  his  environment  or  a  special  product  reacting  upon  it, 

1  Psychologie  des  grands  hommes,  par  Henri  Joly,  Paris,  1883;  2e  ed.,  1891. 


Ch.  IX]  THE  LITERATURE  OF  OPPORTUNITY  141 

and  which  we  can  conceive  not  to  exist  though  all  things  else  remain 
precisely  as  they  are.  Of  the  effect  of  the  environment  in  creating 
him  little  is  said. 

I  am  constrained  to  put  my  own  humble  contributions  into  this 
series  in  their  chronological  place,  which  is  here,  because,  although 
I  was  wholly  unacquainted  with  the  foregoing  literature  when  I 
wrote  Dynamic  Sociology  (1883),  still,  as  I  have  intimated  before, 
the  subject  was  one  that  had  engaged  my  attention  from  my  earliest 
recollection,  and  in  that  work  I  went  deeply  into  it,  the  whole  of 
the  second  volume  being  practically  devoted  to  it.  That  work  was 
written  for  a  definite  purpose.  It  was  clear  to  me  from  the  first 
that  the  great  desideratum  was  to  increase  the  efficiency  of  mankind. 
I  saw  that  the  number  that  contributed  to  civilization  was  very 
limited  (sec  p.  175  of  that  volume).  The  problem  was  how  this 
number  could  be  increased.  In  maintaining  that  "  there  is  such 
a  thing  as  latent  intellect''  (p.  6ri),  I  may  be  said  to  have  had  a 
thesis,  and  I  do  not  deny  that  this  was  the  case.  At  the  same  time 
the  whole  argument  of  "  dynamic  sociology,"  by  which,  as  the  subtitle 
of  the  work  shows,  I  meant  "applied  social  science,"  which  is  the 
same  as  applied  sociology,  was  highly  synthetic  and  rigidly  logical 
(see  pp.  106-1 10).  In  this  idea  of  increasing  the  efficiency  of  the 
human  race  I  was  at  one  with  Galton.  In  the  initial  paper  of  his 
cited  above  he  argues  that  the  human  race  can  be  improved  by  the 
same  general  method  by  which  the  best  breeds  of  animals  have  been 
secured,  and  all  his  works,  including  his  latest  studies  in  "  eugenics," 
have  constituted  one  prolonged  argument  and  appeal  for  the  arti- 
ficial improvement  of  the  human  race.  But  he  set  out  with  the 
assumption  that  the  few  de  facto  agents  of  civilization  represent 
its  entire  present  working  force.  He  did  not  recognize,  and,  indeed, 
denied  the  existence  of  a  latent  or  potential  element.  Therefore 
his  method  of  increasing  either  the  number  or  the  eflficiency  of  the 
agents  of  civilization  must  be  purely  physiological.  I,  on  the  con- 
trary, convinced  of  the  existence  of  a  large  latent  contingent,  pro- 
ceeded by  a  method  which  was  strictly  sociological.  I  did  not 
overlook  his  method  (see  p.  463),  but  I  had  and  still  have  little 
faith  in  it,  while  that  of  bringing  out  the  latent  power  of  society 
seemed  and  still  seems  to  be  a  thoroughly  practical  and  feasible 


142  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

one.  The  great  difficulty  was  then  and  still  is  to  bring  about  a  gen- 
eral recognition  on  the  part  of  society  of  the  existence  of  such  a 
latent  power.  When  such  men  as  Galton  deny  its  existence,  surely 
the  first  and  all-important  step  is  to  demonstrate  it.  This  therefore 
becomes  the  primary  problem  of  applied  sociology.  Conditions  are 
much  more  favorable  for  its  solution  now  than  they  were  in  1883, 
and  justify  a  renewed  effort. 

In  the  interest  of  completeness  it  may  be  mentioned  that  not- 
\vithstanding  my  efforts  to  keep  the  lecture  on  Heredity  and 
Opportunity,  or  Nature  and  Nurture,  to  which  allusion  was  made 
(supra,  p.  126),  out  of  print,  I  was  indiscreet  enough  in  1886  to 
publish  an  abridgment  of  it  under  a  title  given  to  it  by  the  editor, 
in  The  Forum  for  December  of  that  year,^  and  this  completes  my  own 
contributions  to  the  literature  of  opportunity. 

No  man  has  written  more  about  genius  than  Lombroso,  and  his 
great  work  on  the  man  of  genius  ^  should  certainly  be  introduced 
here,  although,  still  less  than  Galton,  does  he  recognize  the  role  of 
the  environment  in  producing  men  of  genius.  Indeed,  he  is  a  con- 
firmed pessimist  on  the  whole  subject,  and  looks  upon  genius  as  a 
pathological  phenomenon  and  only  an  aspect  of  mental  degeneracy 
and  insanity.  He  began  by  publishing  six  years  earlier  his  work  on 
genius  and  insanity,^  of  which  he  regarded  his  Man  of  Genius  as  the 
fifth  revised  edition,  "  completamente  mutata."  His  works  have 
aroused  an  immense  interest  and  he  has  many  followers,  but  it  is 
novelty  and  audacity  rather  than  logic  that  furnish  the  charm.  For 
from  the  standpoint  of  logicality  and  of  fidelity  to  fact  his  doctrine 
and  its  exposition  seem  to  me  to  be  faulty  in  the  extreme.  He  is 
dogmatic,  and  many  of  his  unsupported  statements  are  in  flagrant 
opposition  to  well-established  facts.  Some  of  these  defects  will  be 
noted. 

1  "Broadening  the  Way  to  Success,"  The  Forum,  New  York,  Vol.  II,  December, 
1886,  pp.  340-350. 

2  L'Uomo  di  genio  in  rapporto  alia  psichiatria,  alia  storia  ed  all' estetica,  Torino, 
1888. 

L'Homme  de  genie.  Trad,  par  F.  C.  Istria  et  precede  d'une  preface  de  C.  Richet, 
Paris,  1889. 

The  Man  of  Genius,  London  and  New  York,  1891. 

3  Genio  e  foUia  in  rapporto  alia  medicina  legale,  alia  critica  ed  alia  storia,  Roma 
e  Torino,  1882. 


Ch.  IX]  THE  LITERATURE  OF  OPPORTUNITY  1 43 

This  work  of  Lombroso  was  followed  two  years  later  by  another  ^ 
in  which  another  person  was  associated  with  him.  It  breathes  the 
same  spirit  as  the  rest,  but  touches  more  closely  the  topic  in  hand. 
It  is  interesting  reading,  and  the  doctrine  of  misoneism  and  philo- 
neism  is  a  novel  way  of  presenting  an  old  question,  viz.,  the  question 
of  order  and  progress  in  society.  But  the  whole  work  is  dominated 
by  the  one  fundamental  idea  that  underlies  all  of  Lombroso's  writ- 
ings, the  idea  of  physical  and  mental  degeneracy  as  the  necessary 
concomitant  of  civilization. 

We  now  come  to  a  work  about  which  little  need  be  said  here  be- 
cause so  much  must  be  said  hereafter,  but  which  is  the  most  central 
to  our  theme  of  all  that  have  been  considered  or  will  be  considered. 
It  is  a  work  on  the  genesis  of  great  men  by  Alfred  Odin,^  professor 
in  the  University  of  Sofia.  This  work  is  a  perfect  example  of  the 
heuristic  method.  No  bias  ox  parti  pris  can  be  detected  in  the  author. 
Nevertheless  he  is  perfectly  familiar  with  the  entire  movement  and 
its  literature.  With  all  the  theories  and  facts  put  forward  by  all 
other  authors  at  his  command,  and  apparently  willing  to  accept  any- 
thing that  can  be  proved,  he  seems  to  have  found  himself  in  a  state 
of  doubt  and  bewilderment,  and  to  have  seriously  asked  himself: 
What  is  the  truth  .''  But  he  was  not  satisfied  with  merely  asking  this 
question.  Profoundly  dissatisfied  with  the  evidence  and  with  most  of 
the  methods  adopted,  he  set  himself  the  task  of  devising  a  new  and 
adequate  method  and  of  applying  it  rigorously  in  the  single  search 
for  truth.  How  well  he  succeeded  we  shall  try  to  show,  and  need 
only  say  here  that  in  this  work  we  seem  to  have  a  model  which  if  fol- 
lowed in  other  departments,  even  as  fully  as  the  author  has  followed 
it  in  the  one  chosen  by  him,  can  scarcely  fail  to  lead  to  the  whole 
truth.  That  it  should  be  extended  to  other  departments  and  to  all 
civilized  countries  there  can  be  no  doubt. 

1  II  delitto  politico  e  le  rivoluzioni  in  rapporto  al  diritto,  all'  antropologia  criminale 
ed  alia  scienza  di  govemo,  da  Cesare  Lombroso  e  R.  Laschi,  Torino,  1890. 

Le  rdme  politique  et  les  revolutions  par  rapport  au  droit,  a  I'anthropologie  cri- 
minelle  et  a  la  science  du  gouvernement.  Traduit  de  I'italien  par  A.  Bouchard,  2  vols., 
Paris,  1S92. 

-  Genese  des  grands  hommes,  gens  de  lettres  fran9aismodemes,  par  .\.  Odin,  Tome 
premier,  Paris,  1895  !  Tome  second,  tableau  chronologique  de  la  litterature  fran9aise, 
liste  de  6382  gens  de  lettres  fran9ais,  accompagnee  de  33  tableaux  et  de  24  planches 
hors  texte,  Lausanne,  1895. 


144  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

It  only  remains  to  mention  two  articles  published  in  America, 
both  of  which  deal  with  the  subject  in  an  enlightened  spirit  and  con- 
stitute real  contributions  to  it.  The  first  of  these  is  by  Professor 
Charles  H.  Cooley.^  It  is  in  the  nature  of  a  reply  to  Galton's 
Hereditary  Genius,  and  especially  to  his  doctrine  of  the  irrepressi- 
bility  of  genius.  But  it  deals  with  facts  and  to  a  considerable  extent 
with  statistics,  and  is  the  most  consistent  and  satisfactory  answer 
to  that  doctrine  that  I  have  met  with.  As  no  more  appropriate 
occasion  may  present  itself  for  introducing  one  of  Professor  Cooky's 
characteristic  illustrations,  I  venture  to  give  it  here.    He  says  : 

Suppose  one  were  following  a  river  through  a  valley,  and  from  time  to  time 
measuring  its  breadth,  depth,  and  current  with  a  view  to  finding  out  how  much 
water  passed  through  its  channel.  Suppose  he  found  that  while  in  some  places 
the  river  flowed  with  a  swift  and  ample  current,  in  others  it  dwindled  to  a  mere 
brook  and  even  disappeared  altogether,  only  to  break  out  in  full  volume  lower 
down.  Would  he  not  be  led  to  conclude  that  where  little  or  no  water  appeared 
upon  the  surface  the  bulk  of  it  must  find  its  way  through  underground  channels, 
or  percolate  invisibly  through  the  sand?  Would  not  this  supposition  amount 
almost  to  certainty  if  it  could  be  shown  that  the  nature  of  the  rock  was  such  as 
to  make  the  existence  of  underground  channels  extremely  probable,  and  if  in 
some  cases  they  were  positively  known  to  exist .''  I  do  not  see  that  the  infer- 
ence is  any  less  inevitable  in  the  case  before  us.  We  know  that  a  race  has  once 
produced  a  large  amount  of  natural  genius  in  a  short  time,  just  as  we  know 
that  the  river  has  a  large  volume  in  some  places.  We  see,  also,  that  the  number 
of  eminent  men  seems  to  dwindle  and  disappear;  but  we  have  good  reason  to 
think  that  social  conditions  can  cause  genius  to  remain  hidden,  just  as  we  have 
good  reason  to  think  that  a  river  may  find  its  way  through  an  underground  chan- 
nel. Must  we  not  conclude,  in  the  one  case  as  in  the  other,  that  what  is  not 
seen  does  not  cease  to  be,  that  genius  is  present  though  fame  is  not  ?  ^ 

The  other  article  is  by  Mr.  John  M.  Robertson,^  written  while 
he  was  in  this  country  after  reading  Professor  Cooley's  article  to 
which  I  had  directed  his  attention.  Professor  Cooley,  as  he  informed 
me  in  a  letter,  was  not  acquainted  with  the  work  of  de  Candolle, 
but  Mr.  Robertson  wrote  in  full  cognizance  of  this  work,  as  also  of 
the  views  of  Professor  James.  As  a  sample  of  Mr.  Robertson's 
general  method  of  dealing  with  the  problem  the  following  charac- 
teristic passage  may  be  cited : 

1  "  Genius,  Fame,  and  the  Comparison  of  Races,"  by  Charles  H.  Cooley,  Annals  of 
the  Am.  Acad.  Pol.  and  Soc.  Sci.,  Philadelphia,  Vol.  IX,  May,  1897.  pp.  3 r 7-358. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  349. 

3  "  The  Economics  of  Genius,"  by  John  Mackinnon  Robertson,  The  Forum,  New 
York,  Vol.  XXV,  April,  1898,  pp.  178-190. 


Ch.  IX]  ENVIRONMENTAL  FACTORS  1 45 

When  all  is  said,  the  researches  of  M.  de  Candolle  yield  the  outstanding 
result  that,  of  all  social  grades,  the  numerically  small  upper  class  has  in  the 
past  yielded  the  largest  proportion  of  eminent  men  of  science,  from  the  days 
when,  in  Britain,  Napier  and  Bacon,  Newton  and  Boyle  were  contemporaries 
till  at  least  the  last  generation  ;  the  middle  class  yielding  proportionally  fewer, 
and  the  poor  class  by  far  the  least  of  all.  And  as  the  principle  of  heredity 
entirely  fails  to  explain  the  facts,  we  are  driven  back  once  more  to  the  conclu- 
sion that  potential  genius  is  probably  about  as  frequent  in  one  class  as  in  the 
other,  and  that  it  emerges  in  the  ratio  of  its  total  opportunities.^ 

In  the  above  sketch  of  the  hterature  of  opportunity  I  do  not 
pretend  to  have  inckided  all  the  works  bearing  upon  the  subject. 
I  have  recorded  in  the  course  of  my  reading  scores  of  passages  in 
other  works  (devoted  mainly  to  other  matters)  that  bear  directly 
upon  the  essential  points,  and  these  I  shall  freely  use  as  occasion 
may  require,  but  the  body  of  literature  here  passed  in  review  con- 
stitutes the  chief  source  from  which  I  shall  draw.  It  shows  that 
the  attention  of  mankind  has  in  recent  times  been  powerfully  turned 
in  this  direction. 

Environmental  Factors 

What  are,  then,  the  real  environmental  factors  that  have  con- 
tributed to  the  production  of  the  agents  of  civilization  ?  This  is  the 
essential  problem,  and  we  may  as  well  attack  it  at  once.  The  first 
step  is  to  classify  these  factors,  and  after  that  each  factor  or  alleged 
factor  must  be  searchingly  investigated.  Most  authors  have  selected 
some  one  factor  and  largely  neglected  all  others.  De  Candolle, 
however,  recognized  a  large  number  of  such  factors.  It  was  my 
great  pleasure  to  have  been  in  correspondence  with  him  during  the 
last  few  years  of  his  life,  and  I  possess  a  number  of  letters  from 
him,  relating  chiefly  to  botanical  subjects,  but  in  some  of  them  the 
problems  of  heredity  and  environmental  influences  are  discussed. 
In  one  of  them,  dated  July  7,  1891,  he  says  :  "  My  researches  show 
that  nurture  is  more  important  than  nature.  There  are  nineteen 
causL-s  that  favor  the  production  of  men  of  science  in  any  country, 
and  heredity  is  only  one  of  these  causes." 

Of  course  he  referred  to  his  well-known  enumeration  in  his  work 
(second  edition,  pp.  410-41 1).  Although  this  enumeration  has  been 
copied  into  several  of  the  other  works  that  have  been  mentioned 

1  Ibid.,  p.  185. 


146  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

above,  its  importance  to  our  purpose  justifies  its  introduction  here 
also.     Tlie  list  really  includes  twenty  "causes,"  as  follows: 

1.  A  considerable  proportion  of  persons  belonging  to  the  rich  or  well-to-do 
(aisees)  classes  of  the  population,  relatively  to  those  who  are  obliged  to  work 
constantly  for  a  living,  and  especially  to  work  with  their  hands. 

2.  An  important  proportion,  in  the  wealthy  or  well-to-do  classes,  who  know 
how  to  be  satisfied  with  their  incomes,  with  fortunes  easy  to  administer,  and 
consequently  disposed  to  occupy  themselves  with  intellectual  matters  that  are 
only  slightly  or  not  at  all  lucrative. 

3.  Old-time  habits  of  thought  and  feeling,  directed  for  many  generations  to 
real  things  and  true  ideas  (the  effect  of  heredity). 

4.  The  introduction  of  cultured  and  virtuous  foreign  families  having  a  taste 
for  non-lucrative  intellectual  pursuits. 

5.  The  existence  of  numerous  families  having  traditions  favorable  to  the 
sciences  and  to  intellectual  occupations  of  all  kinds. 

6.  Primary,  and  especially  secondary  and  higher  education,  well  organized 
and  independent  of  political  parties  and  religious  sects,  tending  to  stimulate 
research  and  to  encourage  young  persons  and  professors  to  devote  themselves 
to  science. 

7.  Abundant  and  well-organized  material  facilities  for  scientific  research 
(libraries,  observatories,  laboratories,  collections). 

8.  A  public  interested  in  the  truth  and  in  real  things  rather  than  in  things 
imaginary  or  fictitious. 

9.  Freedom  to  express  and  to  publish  any  opinion,  at  least  on  scientific  sub- 
jects, without  its  being  attended  with  any  serious  inconvenience. 

10.  Public  opinion  favorable  to  science  and  to  those  who  pursue  it. 

1 1 .  Freedom  to  follow  any  profession,  to  follow  none  at  all,  to  travel,  to 
avoid  all  personal  service  other  than  that  upon  which  one  voluntarily  enters. 

12.  A  religious  belief  which  makes  little  use  of  the  principle  of  authority. 

13.  A  clergy  friendly  to  education  both  within  its  own  body  and  for  the 
public  at  large. 

14.  A  clergy  not  restricted  to  celibacy. 

15.  The  habitual  use  of  the  three  principal  languages,  English,  German,  and 
French.  Knowledge  of  these  languages  generally  diffused  throughout  the 
educated  classes. 

16.  A  small  independent  countrj^  or  a  confederation  of  small  independent 
countries. 

17.  A  geographical  position  under  a  temperate  or  northern  climate. 

18.  Proximity  to  civilized  countries. 

19.  A  large  number  of  scientific  societies  or  academies. 

20.  The  habit  of  traveling  and  especially  of  sojourning  abroad. 

In  this  list  of  favorable  conditions  de  Candolle  is  obviously 
describing  his  own  surroundings  to  a  considerable  extent,  and  they 
would  probably  have  been  somewhat  different  if  he  had  lived  in 
England,  Germany,  or  France.    The  fact  that  quite  as  great  men 


Ch.  IX]  ENVIRONMENTAL  FACTORS  147 

are  developed  in  other  countries  as  in  Switzerland  shows  that  many 
of  the  conditions  are  unnecessary.  It  may,  indeed,  be  questioned 
whether  the  classification  upon  the  whole  is  a  logical  one.  Still,  it 
is  difficult  to  suppose  that  the  same  person  would  develop  equally 
well  in  the  absence  of  most  or  all  of  them.  A  much  more  general 
classification  is  necessary  to  form  a  basis  for  the  analysis  of  environ- 
mental conditions,  and  it  will  be  necessary  to  take  up  the  principal 
factors,  some  of  which  are  regarded  by  many  as  the  only  factors 
worth  considering,  and  subject  each  to  special  treatment.  These 
principal  conditions  constitute  so  many  classes  or  kinds  of  environ- 
ment, and  they  may  be  reduced  to  the  following  groups  or  heads : 
(i)  the  physical  environment;  (2)  the  ethnological  environment; 
(3)  the  religious  environment  ;  (4)  the  local  environment  ;  (5)  the 
economic  environment ;  (6)  the  social  environment  ;  (7)  the  edu- 
cational environment. 

These  will  be  treated  in  this  order,  which  is  slightly  different 
from  that  of  M.  Odin,  whom  I  am  obliged  to  follow  in  most  respects, 
because  he  is  the  only  one  among  the  numerous  authors  who  has 
adopted  a  rigidly  logical  system  and  supported  it  by  an  adequate 
number  of  facts.  All  other  systems  or  modes  of  treating  this 
question  are  fragmentary,  incoherent,  and  generally  unsatisfactory. 
They  usually  prove  nothing.  They  abound  in  unsupported  asser- 
tions, most  of  which  are  false,  and  when  statistics  are  used  they  are 
either  too  limited  to  have  any  force  of  conviction,  or  they  deal  with 
absolute  numbers,  which  mean  nothing  until  they  can  be  confronted 
with  those  on  the  opposite  side  or  compared  with  those  from  other 
like  sources.  The  usual  fallacy  consists  in  enumerating  a  more  or 
less  respectable  array  of  facts  in  support  of  a  theory  and  ignoring 
all  the  facts  that  would  stand  opposed  to  it.  I  have  already  referred 
to  this  fallacy  (supra,  p.  117),  and  shown  that  it  is  the  fallacy  of 
all  superstition,  but  it  might  with  equal  propriety  be  called  the  fal- 
lacy of  stati.stics.  By  its  so  frequent  use  statistics  become  not 
merely  valueless  but  highly  misleading.  They  either  intentionally 
or  unintentionally  deceive  the  reader,  and  constitute  a  form  of 
sophistry.  M.  Odin  is  never  open  to  this  charge.  He  has  accu- 
mulated an  ample  number  of  facts  and  he  controls  them  with  the 
most  rigid  scrutiny,  always  bringing  forward  all  the  facts  regardless 


148  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

of  their  import,  and  setting  opposing  facts  over  against  each  other 
to  bring  out  the  whole  truth. 

It  is  perhaps  to  be  regretted  that  M.  Odin  did  not  deal  with  men 
of  science  as  well  as  with  men  of  letters,  but  he  gives  his  reasons 
for  not  doing  so.  In  dealing  with  periods  so  remote  as  the  fourteenth 
century,  it  is  evident  that  men  of  science  in  the  modern  sense  would 
have  played  no  part.  In  order  to  obtain  a  large  homogeneous  mass 
of  facts  to  which  statistics  would  properly  apply,  it  was  necessary 
to  select  a  single  class  that  had  played  an  important  role  during  a 
period  of  five  centuries.  There  was  no  class  to  which  this  would 
apply  except  men  of  letters.  But  he  gives  a  wide  meaning  to  this 
phrase  and  includes  all  who  have  written  extensively  on  any  subject 
whatever.  Many  scientific  men  have  done  this  and  their  names  are 
to  be  found  in  his  list.  We  find  there  accordingly  the  names  of 
Ampere,  Arago,  Lagrange,  Laplace,  Lamarck,  Cuvier,  etc.,  so  that 
although  he  calls  them  men  of  letters,  they  are  also  men  of  science, 
and  the  list  embraces  practically  all  the  great  men  of  France.  His 
reasons  for  confining  himself  to  France  are  also  excellent,  and  his 
work,  as  he  confesses,  is  only  a  model  for  others  to  follow  in  treat- 
ing the  same  subject  for  other  countries  and  for  other  classes.  As 
the  subtitle  of  his  second  volume  shows,  he  was  able  by  this  method 
to  collect  together  one  vast  homogeneous  group  of  no  less  than 
6382  great  men  and  to  subject  them  to  a  searching  analysis  from  a 
great  many  different  points  of  view.  This  number  was  obtained  by 
successive  eliminations  from  a  list  of  between  12,000 and  13,000  and 
the  retention  of  none  but  such  as  were  more  or  less  distinguished, 
or,  as  he  expresses  it,  persons  of  recognized  merit.  He  makes  a 
further  classification  of  these  and  finds  1 1 36  whom  he  designates 
as  persons  of  talent.  Even  this  last  number  he  examines  and  finds 
144  whom  he  entitles  persons  of  genius.  In  the  second  volume  he 
gives  the  complete  list  in  the  chronological  order  of  their  birth,  and 
it  is  upon  such  a  basis  that  he  proceeds  with  his  detailed  analyses. 
Any  one  discussing  the  subject  is  therefore  obliged  to  make  this 
work  his  pike  de  resistance.  I  shall  make  free  use  of  it  without 
neglecting  any  other  data  that  I  find  available. 

TJie  Physical  Environment.  —  No  doctrine  has  played  a  more 
important  role  in  the  philosophy  of  history  than  that  of  the  influence 


Ch.  IX]  THE  PHYSICAL  ENVIRONMENT  149 

of  the  physical  environment  on  human  civilization.  It  is  much  older 
than  Montesquieu,  but  he  was  one  of  its  ablest  exponents.  Buckle 
has  been  charged  with  making  it  the  basis  of  his  entire  system,  but 
only  by  those  who  have  only  read  the  introductory  part  of  his  History 
of  Civilization.  Those  who  are  acquainted  with  the  whole  of  that 
work  (or  rather  with  the  small  part  of  it  that  he  was  permitted  to 
give  us)  know  that  he  was  the  apostle  of  intellectual  development. 
But  he  laid  great  stress  on  the  influence  of  the  physical  environment, 
which  Montesquieu  expressed  by  the  word  "climate."  This  has  been 
regarded  as  the  scientific  attitude,  and  it  has  usually  been  maintained, 
and  justly,  against  "the  great  man  theory,"  as  Mr.  Spencer  called 
it,  or  the  crass  hero-worship  of  the  traditional  historians  and  the 
philosophers  of  the  school  of  Carlyle.  But  it  is  remarkable  to  how 
large  an  extent  all  this  has  consisted  in  mere  assertion,  or  in  proof 
of  the  most  vague  and  general  character.  For  the  events  of  history 
in  general  there  has  as  yet  been  discovered  no  definite  form  of  evi- 
dence that  can  be  so  presented  as  to  amount  to  demonstration. 
We  are  therefore  still  obliged  to  accept  it  in  large  measure  on  faith, 
faith  in  the  uniform  workings  of  the  laws  of  nature  in  human  affairs 
and  in  the  environment  of  man. 

But,  as  we  have  seen,  civilization  is  the  work  of  men.  They  are 
its  agents,  and  the  problem  before  us  is  that  of  determining  how 
these  agents  of  civilization  have  been  produced.  Galton  and  his 
school  claim  that  it  is  due  to  heredity,  and  that  if  we  want  more 
civilization  we  must  proceed  to  breed  a  higher  race  of  men  on  the 
same  principles  that  we  breed  superior  races  of  animals.  But  there 
must  be  an  answer  made  to  the  mesologists  who  ascribe  everything 
to  the  physical  environment.  And  here  M.  Odin  is  the  only  author 
known  to  me  who  has  attempted  to  furnish  such  an  answer  by  the 
statistical  or  any  exact  method. 

The  birthplaces  of  nearly  all  French  men  of  letters  are  known. 
France  is  a  country  of  considerable  diversity  of  climate  and  geograph- 
ical conditions.  It  has  a  great  extent  of  sea-coast  and  a  large  inland 
territory.  It  has  mountainous  districts  and  level  areas,  and  there 
are  great  differences  in  the  fertility  of  the  soil  in  different  parts.  If 
these  conditions  are  really  potent  factors  in  the  production  of  men 
of  genius,  accurate  statistics  of  the  talented  persons  coming  from  all 


150  APPLIED    SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

these  various  regions  during  five  centuries  of  their  history  would 
surely  show  the  influence  of  these  physical  factors.  With  his  cus- 
tomary caution,  M.  Odin  felt  obliged  in  this  analysis  to  eliminate 
from  his  entire  list  certain  elements  that  might  somewhat  unduly 
modify  the  results,  and  to  deal  with  a  slightly  smaller  number,  viz., 
5620  authors.  The  area,  as  in  all  his  calculations,  includes  the 
strictly  French  portions  of  Switzerland,  Belgium,  and  Alsace- 
Lorraine.  He  first  divides  this  area  up  into  "departments,"  such 
as  those  into  which  France  is  now  divided.  He  then  gives  a  table 
of  the  number  born  in  each  department.  This  table  has  four 
columns,  the  first  showing  the  absolute  number,  the  second  the 
number  for  each  100,000  population.  The  other  two  columns 
show  the  same  for  those  classed  as  persons  of  talent.  As  the 
essential  point  is  the  ratio  to  population,  he  arranges  the  depart- 
ments in  the  order  of  the  number  so  produced  from  the  highest  to 
the  lowest,  or  from  196  per  100,000  to  i  per  100,000.  The  mean 
was  found  to  be  18  to  100,000,  and  of  the  57  departments  that  pro- 
duced a  considerable  number  only  13  varied  in  any  marked  degree 
from  that  mean.  The  highest  ratio  was  reached  by  Geneva,  which 
has  always  been  an  asylum  for  the  victims  of  religious  persecution, 
with  196  per  100,000,  and  next  to  that  came  the  department  of  the 
Seine,  or  practically  Paris,  with  123  per  100,000.  If  the  mesologists 
should  prefer  to  attribute  the  enormous  ratio  of  Geneva  to  its 
mountainous  position,  how  would  they  explain  the  scarcely  less 
phenomenal  ratio  of  Paris  in  the  tame  valley  of  the  Seine.''  The 
department  third  in  rank  is  that  of  Bouches-du-Rhone,  with  Mar- 
seilles for  its  chef-lieit.  But  the  drop  is  immense,  viz.,  to  42  per 
100,000.  Between  the  mean  (18)  and  this  last  ratio  we  have 
eighteen  departments.  They  are  scattered  throughout  the  coun- 
try, some  maritime,  but  mostly  inland.  As  the  chief  cities  are 
better  known  than  the  names  of  the  departments,  we  may  say 
that  the  cities  of  Dijon,  Avignon,  Lyon,  Orleans,  Metz,  Besangon, 
Versailles,  Montpellier,  Caen,  Tours,  Lausanne,  Chartres,  Troyes, 
Toulouse,  Chaumont,  Rouen,  Nimes,  and  Beauvais  form  the  nuclei 
of  these  departments. 

In  order  to  bring  out  the  facts  in  the  clearest  possible  manner, 
M.  Odin  presents  a  colored  map  of  France,  the  Belgian  provinces, 


Plate  I.    Map  showing  ti.e  iccundity  of  ite  Bepartments  of  France  in  Men  of  Lettei 


Ch.  IX]  THE   PHYSICAL  ENVIRONMENT  151 

and  the  Swiss  cantons,  i.e.,  of  the  entire  area  that  has  contributed 
to  French  hterature,  showing  the  relative  fecundity  of  each  depart- 
ment. This  map  shows  six  grades  of  fecundity  in  men  of  letters  by 
as  many  progressively  deepening  colors,  viz.,  those  yielding  for 
every  100,000  inhabitant's  :  4  or  less,  5  to  8,  9  to  12,  12.5  to  19, 
20  to  42,  and  43  and  upwards.  Unfortunately,  M.  Odin  does  not 
give  the  names  of  the  departments  on  the  map,  but  only  the  principal 
city  in  each,  which  makes  it  difificult  to  correlate  it  with  the  table 
which  it  is  intended  to  illustrate.  In  reproducing  this  map,  there- 
fore, as  Plate  I,  I  have  supplied  the  deficiency  and  caused  the  name 
of  each  department,  as  well  as  its  chief  city,  to  be  plainly  printed. 

To  bring  the  map  and  the  table  into  exact  harmony,  I  have,  in 
reproducing  the  latter,  preserved  the  column  of  relative  fecundity 
only.    Thus  simplified  it  is  shown  on  the  following  page. 

A  casual  examination  of  the  map  and  the  table  is  sufficient  to 
show  that  the  results  cannot  be  explained  by  the  physical  con- 
ditions. We  have  already  considered  the  most  important  depart- 
ments that  rise  considerably  above  the  mean  in  their  fecundity  in 
men  of  letters.  If  we  pass  to  the  other  end  of  the  scale,  or  the 
departments  of  least  fecundity,  this  truth  will  be  still  more  clear. 
The  mountainous  Swiss  canton  of  Valois  has  never  produced  a  man 
of  letters  of  merit,  while  the  equally  rugged  cantons  of  Vaud  and 
Neuchatel  have  yielded  the  first  22  and  the  second  18  to  each 
100,000  of  population,  and  the  F"rench  portion  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
29.  Among  the  very  poor  departments  are  to  be  found  Ariege 
and  Hautes-Pyrenees  at  the  foot  of  the  Pyrenees,  Landes  on  the 
Bay  of  Biscay,  C6tes-du-Nord  on  the  English  Channel,  and  Creuse 
near  the  center  of  France.  None  of  these  has  produced  over  3 
per  100,000.  Others  falling  far  below  the  mean  are  located  in  all 
parts,  some  on  the  west  coast,  some  along  the  eastern  border,  and 
some  in  the  interior.  One  of  these  latter  is  Nievre,  which  joins  the 
high-grade  department  of  Orleans  on  the  southeast.  Corsica  also 
falls  into  this  category,  having  produced  only  5  men  of  letters,  or  3 
per  1 00,000.  Several  other  grades  are  distinguished  on  the  map,  but 
each  grade  is  widely  scattered,  and  it  is  doubtful  whether  the  most 
exhaustive  .study  of  them  in  their  relations  to  topography,  climate, 
soil,  etc.,  would  reveal  any  real  connection.    For  the  smaller  class  of 


152 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


[Part  II 


Departments 


Geneva .     .     .     .     . 

Seine 

Bouches-du-Rhone  . 
Cote-d'Or  .  .  .  . 
Vaucluse    .     .     .     . 

Rhone   

Loiret 

Als.-Lorr.  fran9. 

Doubs 

Seine-et-Oise  .  .  . 
Herault  .  .  .  . 
Calvados  .  .  .  . 
Indre-et-Loire     .     . 

Vaud 

Eure-et-Loir    .     .     . 

Aube 

Haute-Garonne  .  . 
Haute-Marne  .  . 
Seine-Inferieure .     . 

Gard 

Oise 

Neuchatel .     .     .     . 

Marne 

Meurthe-et-Moselle 
Loir-et-Cher  .  .  . 
Ardennes  .     .     .     . 

Yonne 

Somme 

Jura 

Basses-Alpes  .     .     . 

Vienne 

Gironde  .  .  .  . 
Ille-et-Vilaine      .     . 


Per 
100,000 


196 
123 

42 

32 
32 
31 
30 
29 

27 
24 
24 
23 
23 


21 
21 
20 
20 

19 

18 


17 
17 
17 
15 
15 

14 
14 
13 


Departments 


Maine-et-Loire   .     . 

Meuse 

Aisne 

Haute-Vienne     . 

Ain 

Fribourg   .... 

Tarn 

Saone-et-Loire    .     . 

Cher 

Pas-de-Calais      .     . 

Var 

Seine-et-Marne  .     . 

Isere 

Charente-Inferieure 

Indre    

Nord 

Sarthe 

Lot-et-Garonne  .     . 
Puy-de-D6me     .     . 

Drome 

Manche     .... 

Aude 

Correze     .... 

Allier 

Eure 

Ome 

Mayenne   .... 
Tarn-et-Garonne     . 

Lozere 

Hautes-Alpes 

Nievre 

Lot ■ 

Basses-Pyrenees 


Per 

100,000 


13 
13 
12.5 


12 


ID 

10 

9 

9 

9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
8 


Departments 


Loire-Inferieure 
Charente  .     .     . 
Aveyron    . 
Nice      .... 
Finistere  .     .     . 
Haute-Saone 
Vosges      .     .     . 
Liege    .... 
Savoie  .... 
Dordogne      .     . 
Loire     .... 
Ardeche    .     .     . 
Py  re  n  ees-Oriental  es 
Cantal  .... 
Deux-Sevres. 
Hainaut     .     .     . 
Namur      .     .     . 
Gers      .... 
Morbihan .     .     . 
Vendee      .     .     . 
Ariege  .... 
Luxembourg  beige 
C6tes-du-Nord  . 
Corsica 
Creuse .     . 
Haute-Loire 
Landes 
Belfort .     . 
Hautes- Pyrenees 
Jura  Bernois 
Brabant  wallon 
Valois  .... 


Per 
100,000 


specially  talented  persons  almost  exactly  the  same  holds  true.  The 
mean  is  5.3  per  100,000,  and  arranged  in  the  descending  order  from 
highest  to  lowest  the  departments  receive  nearly  the  same  numbers 
as  for  the  whole.  Still  there  are  some  differences,  due  perhaps  in 
part  to  the  diminished  reliability  of  statistics  based  on  small  numbers. 
M.  Odin  next  treats  the  same  area  by  provinces  instead  of  by 
departments.  The  98  departments  are  combined  in  24  provinces  of 
correspondingly  increased  dimensions.    The  data  are  arranged  in 


Number  of  Men  of  Letters 
per  100,000  inhabitants 

from  4.6  to  8.5 

"       8.6    "    12.5 

•■     12.5    "    19.5 

"     19.6    "  42 

43  and  upwards 

After  Odin 


Plate  II.    Map  showing  the  Fecundity  of  the  Provinces  of  France  in  Men  of  Letters 


Ch.  IX] 


THE  PHYSICAL  ENVIRONMENT 


153 


the  same  way  as  before  except  that  the  ratios  are  given  per 
1,000,000  instead  of  100,000.  This  table  has  six  columns,  the  first 
four  being  the  same  as  in  the  pre\ious  one,  and  the  fifth  and  sixth 
showing  the  same  facts  for  the  highest  grade,  or  men  of  genius,  the 
much  greater  number  of  facts  justifying  their  treatment  by  this 
method.  In  the  last  column,  however,  the  ratios  are  small  and 
mostly  expressed  in  fractions.  This  need  not  be  given,  as  the  two 
other  columns  of  ratios  are  sufficient  for  our  purpose. 


Provinces 


ile-de-France  .     . 
French  Switzerland 
Provence     . 
Orleanais    .     .     . 
Burgundy    .     .     . 
Lyonnais     . 
Champagne 
South  Languedoc 
Lorraine      .     . 
Normandy  .     .     . 
Franche-Comte    . 
Touraine     .     . 


Merit 


699 

344 
254 

233 
207 
194 
186 
166 
161 
150 

143 
130 


Talent 


144 
80 

44 
49 
36 
34 
32 
28 
20 
28 
25 


Provinces 


Picardy 

East  Guyenne 

Berry,  Nivemais,  Bourbonnais. 

West  Guyenne 

Saintonge,  Poitou     .     .     .     . 
Auvergne,  Limousin,  Marche 

Savo^-Dauphine 

Brittany 

French  Belgium 

North  Languedoc     .     .     .     . 

Gascony 

Corsica 


Merit 


122 
120 
96 
93 
87 
86 

85 
72 
56 
53 
47 
26 


Talent 


22 
20 
19 
17 
14 
17 
21 

15 
2 


M.  Odin,  for  some  unexplained  reason,  did  not  arrange  these 
jirovinces  in  any  systematic  order,  which  renders  it  difficult  to  grasp 
the  significance  of  his  table.  In  reproducing  it  with  the  above- 
mentioned  modifications  I  have  further  modified  it  by  rearranging 
the  provinces  in  their  order  from  highest  to  lowest  fecundity  in 
men  of  letters. 

M.  Odin  has  also  furnished  a  corresponding  map  of  the  provinces. 
This  shows  five  grades  of  fecundity,  those  namely  from  4.6  to  8.5, 
from  8.6  to  12.5,  from  12.6  to  19.5,  from  19.6  to  42,  and  from  43 
upwards,  for  each  100,000  inhabitants.  This  map  I  have  reproduced 
substantially  unchanged  in  Plate  II. 

Here  we  find  a  much  greater  uniformity  than  that  shown  by  the 
departments.  The  Isle  of  France  continues  to  be  dominated  by  the 
brilliant  French  capital,  but  the  low  condition  of  the  cantons  sur- 
rounding Geneva  brings  French  Switzerland  down  toward  the  level 
of  the  other  high-grade  provinces.    There  are  only  three  of  these 


154 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


[Part  II 


latter,  viz.,  Orleanais,  Burgundy,  and  Provence.  No  two  of  these 
are  contiguous,  although  the  first  is  adjacent  to  the  Isle  of  France. 
Provence  alone  is  maritime,  and  neither  of  the  other  two  is  mountain- 
ous. Provinces  of  the  third  grade,  yielding  from  126  to  195  to  the 
million,  show  a  somewhat  greater  compactness.  They  stretch  across 
the  center  of  France  from  east  to  west,  somewhat  north  of  the 
middle,  from  the  Swiss  and  German  border  to  the  English  Channel, 
with  the  exception  of  South  Languedoc,  which  hes  on  the  Gulf  of 
Lyons  and  the  Mediterranean,  but  Champagne  is  separated  from 
Touraine  and  Normandy  by  the  two  great  central  provinces  of 
higher  grade.  Of  the  provinces  of  the  fourth  grade,  yielding  from 
86  to  125  to  the  million,  the  greater  number  lie  to  the  southwest, 
occupying  also  most  of  the  center  of  France.  This  great  area  is 
wholly  separated  from  the  only  northern  province  of  this  grade, 
Picardy-Artois.  The  provinces  of  the  fifth  grade,  yielding  the 
smallest  number  of  men  of  letters,  viz.,  46  to  85  per  million  inhabi- 
tants, are,  like  those  of  the  second,  widely  scattered;  Gascony  in 
the  extreme  southwest,  Brittany  at  the  west  with  the  largest  amount 
of  sea-coast,  North  Languedoc  in  the  interior,  Savoy-Dauphine  on 
the  Swiss  border,  and  French  Belgium  at  the  extreme  north.  Could 
any  ingenuity  work  out  a  theory  that  would  explain  the  distribution 
of  any  of  these  classes  according  to  their  physical  conditions  ? 

M.  Odin  has  presented  the  subject  in  still  a  third  form,  viz.,  by 
what  he  calls  regions.  These  are  the  North,  Northeast,  Southeast, 
Southwest,  Northwest,  North  Center,  and  South  Center.  In  his 
map  he  uses  only  three  colors  representing  three  grades,  or  those 
regions  whose  fecundity  is  8.6  to  12.5,  12.6  to  19.5,  and  43  or 
upwards  to  each  100,000  inhabitants.  Arranged  in  the  order  of 
their  fecundity  in  men  of  letters  these  regions  are  as  follows  : 


Regions 


North  Center 
Northeast  . 
Southeast  . 
North  .  . 
South  Center 
Northwest  . 
Southwest  . 


Merit 


483 
185 

143 
120 

"5 
92 


Talent 


99 
3- 
26 
20 
22 
16 
16 


Genius 


12.9 
4-3 
3-5 
2.8 
I.I 
2.5 
2.2 


Aftur  Odin 


Number  of  Men  of  Letters 
per  100,000  inhabitants 
from  8.6  to  12.5 
"      12.6   "  19.5 
43  and  upwards 


Plate  III.    Map  showing  the  Fecundity  of  the  .seven  recognized  Regions  of  France  in 

IMen  of  Letters 


Ch.  IX]  THE   PHYSICAL  ENVIRONMENT  1 55 

The  corresponding  map  is  reproduced  in  Plate  III. 

It  will  be  seen  that  the  order  for  men  of  talent  is  the  same  as  for 
all  men  of  letters  of  merit,  and  that  for  men  of  genius  it  is  the  same 
with  one  exception,  viz.,  that  of  the  South  Center.  The  North 
Center  is  still  dominated  by  Paris.  Otherwise  there  is  somewhat 
more  method  in  the  distribution  by  regions,  especially  with  so  few 
grades,  than  in  that  by  either  provinces  or  departments.  The  regions 
of  the  second  grade  he  wholly  on  the  east  and  Mediterranean  border, 
while  those  of  the  third  grade  lie  on  the  west  and  north  and  also 
occupy  the  center  of  France.  One  might  maintain  that  the  Alps  and 
the  Mediterranean  were  favorable,  and  the  Atlantic  and  the  English 
Channel  were  unfavorable  to  the  production  of  men  of  letters,  and 
that  while  the  valley  of  the  Seine  (or  part  of  it)  is  highly  favorable, 
the  valleys  of  the  Loire  and  Garonne  are  unfavorable !  It  is  only 
by  that  kind  of  reasoning  that  a  case  can  be  made  out  for  the  influ- 
ence of  physical  conditions  in  determining  the  fecundity  of  the  differ- 
ent regions  in  men  of  letters.  No  entirely  sane  person  will  of  course 
resort  to  such  arguments,  and  it  may  as  well  be  admitted  that  what- 
ever the  influence  of  the  physical  environment  may  be  (and  its  influ- 
ence is  not  denied)  it  is  so  slight  and  so  subtle  in  the  case  before 
us  that  it  cannot  be  determined  by  the  statistical  method. 

The  general  result  of  this  investigation  cannot  be  better  stated 
than  in  the  words  of  M.  Odin  himself.    He  says: 

On  the  one  hand  the  resemblances  present  a  very  different  character  accord- 
ing to  the  cliaracter  of  the  circumscriptions  compared.  The  colors  group  them- 
selves very  differently  for  departments  than  for  provinces  or  regions.  Each 
map  thus  appears  to  indicate  a  different  kind  of  action  of  the  geographical 
environment  from  the  other  two,  which  leads  to  the  suspicion  that  beneath  the 
apparent  geographical  influence  there  lies  hidden  some  other  more  powerful 
kind  of  influence. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  probability  of  an  influence  on  the  part  of  the  geo- 
graphical environment  diminishes  precisely  in  proportion  as  the  number  of 
circumscriptions  increases.  In  the  map  by  regions  France  is  found  to  be 
divided  in  an  extremely  simple  way  apparently  conforming  to  geographical 
conditions.  In  that  of  the  provinces  we  find  a  grouping  already  much  more 
complex,  and  in  that  of  the  departments  there  remains  almost  nothing  of  the 
primitive  simplicity.  Now  this  increasing  differentiation,  far  from  bringing  out 
clearly  the  influence  of  the  geographical  medium,  tends  on  the  contrary  to 
obscure  it  more  and  more.  If  in  the  map  of  the  regions  it  seems  somewhat 
probable,  if  in  that  of  tlie  provinces  it  can  still  be  found  if  one  wants  to  find  it, 


156  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

when  it  comes  to  that  of  the  departments  it  is  impossible  to  discover  it  without 
doing  violence  to  the  facts.  We  there  find,  in  fact,  a  mass  of  departments 
which,  while  presenting  analogous  geographical  conditions,  differ  entirely  from 
one  another  in  their  respective  fecundity  in  men  of  letters.  Let  any  one  com- 
pare the  departments  of  Var,  of  Haute-Garonne,  of  Gironde,  of  Creuse,  of  the 
Rhone,  of  Seine-et-Marne  with  their  neighboring  departments  !  On  the  other 
hand,  many  departments  very  unlike  from  the  geographical  point  of  view  are 
exactly  similar  in  their  fecundity  in  men  of  letters.  It  is  sufficient  to  point  to 
the  following  series:  French  Alsace-Lorraine,  Haute-Garonne,  and  Seine-Infe- 
rieure;  —  Var,  Lot-et-Garonne,  and  Nord;  —  Landes,  Haute-Loire,  and  Belgian 
Luxemburg. 

From  all  this  it  would  be  an  exaggeration  to  conclude  that  the  action  of  the 
geographical  environment  has  been  7iil  or  only  insignificant.  It  may  in  reality 
have  been  considerable.  But  what  we  are  in  condition  to  state  is  that  this 
action,  whatever  may  have  been  its  role  in  each  particular  case,  has  never  been 
preponderant.  There  is  evidently  no  geographical  reason,  entitled  to  be  called 
such,  why  the  department  of  Doubs  should  have  produced  a  large  number  of 
men  of  letters,  while  the  Bernese  Jura  has  produced  only  a  single  one.  It 
remains  to  inquire  what  has  been  the  real  cause  of  all  the  differences  of  this 
kind.i 

The  Ethnological  Environment.  —  It  is  generally  believed  that 
the  races  of  men  differ  even  more  in  their  psychic  than  in  their 
physical  qualities.  They  are  known  to  differ  greatly  in  intelligence, 
but  this  is  attributed  largely  to  inherent  mental  differences.  Not 
only  are  some  races  regarded  as  much  inferior  to  others  in  their 
intellectual  powers,  but  they  are  believed  to  lack  those  moral  attri- 
butes which  must  accompany  those  powers  in  order  to  render  true 
genius  possible.  There  is  scarcely  any  difference  of  opinion  on  this 
point  so  far  as  concerns  races  so  unlike  as  to  be  of  a  different  color, 
but  most  ethnologists  and  the  public  generally  make  it  apply  to 
those  varieties  of  the  white  race  that  have  been  long  enough  segre- 
gated and  locally  cantoned  to  have  acquired  the  designation  of  races. 
This  factor  should  therefore  strongly  affect  the  production  of  men 
of  genius  in  the  areas  occupied  by  such  races.  M.  Odin's  statistics, 
for  example,  ought  to  show  the  influence  of  race,  and  he  suspected 
that  this  might  be  one  of  the  prime  influences  in  raising  or  lower- 
ing the  fecundity  of  the  different  parts  of  France  in  men  of  letters. 
It  is  true  that  France  is  no  longer  divided  into  localized  races.  All 
the  former  race  elements  have  become  inextricably  mixed.    Still  it 

1  Odin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  448-449. 


Ch.  lAj  ihLE  ETHNOLOGICAL  ENVIRONMENT  157 

is  to  be  supposed  that  the  regions  once  occupied  by  distinct  peoples 
will  retain  such  a  groundwork  of  their  primitive  ethnic  character 
as  to  make  itself  felt  in  large  masses  of  statistics.  It  is  generally 
believed  that  France  is  inhabited  by  five  principal  races,  each 
occupying  a  somewhat  distinct  region.  The  Gaulois,  or  true  Gauls, 
occupy  the  central  portion,  covering  an  area  of  triangular  shape, 
with  its  apex  a  little  north  of  Paris  and  its  base  forming  a  nearly 
east  and  west  line  most  of  the  way  across  the  country  near  the 
latitude  of  Valence  and  Montauban.  The  northwest  of  France  is 
the  land  of  the  Cimbrians,  the  southwest  that  of  the  Iberians,  the 
southeast  that  of  the  Ligurians,  and  the  northeast  that  of  the 
Belgians.^  The  maps  used  in  the  preceding  investigation  will  serve 
sufficiently  well  in  the  present  one.  On  comparing  them  M.  Odin 
was  disappointed  in  not  finding  that  they  indicate  any  marked  differ- 
ence ascribable  to  these  race  influences.    He  says: 

If  we  compare  this  ethnographic  division  with  the  geographical  distribution 
of  French  men  of  letters,  we  will  seek  in  vain  to  discover  the  least  connection 
between  race  and  the  fecundity  in  men  of  letters.  Let  any  one  take  the  map 
of  the  regions,  that  of  the  provinces,  or  that  of  the  departments,  and  he  will 
find  everywhere  that  the  distribution  of  men  of  letters  differs  entirely  from  that 
of  the  races.  He  will  see  that  the  Ligurian,  Iberian,  Gallic,  Cimbrian,  and 
Belgian  areas  prove  indifferently  a  high,  mean,  or  low  fecundity.  There  is  no 
single  race  in  which  we  do  not  meet  all  grades  of  fecundity,  while  on  the  other 
hand  a  great  many  districts  inhabited  by  different  races  show  the  same  degree 
of  fecundity.  This  absence  of  any  complete  correlation  between  the  ethnologic 
distribution  and  literary  "geniality"  is  so  evident  that  even  the  most  biased 
mind  would  not  deny  it.  Nevertheless  it  does  not  necessarily  disprove  the 
action  of  the  ethnological  environment,  since  it  may  simply  be  due  to  our 
ignorance  of  the  true  distribution  of  races. '-^ 

But  M.  Odin  was  not  satisfied  to  rest  the  case  here.  There  are  in 
France  at  least  five  localities  where  a  language  other  than  French 
is  spoken,  viz.,  (i)  Corsica  ;  (2)  the  eastern  Pyrenees,  where  a  Cata- 
lan dialect  prevails  ;  (3)  a  portion  of  the  department  of  Basses- 
Pyrenees,  which  is  Basque  ;  (4)  a  considerable  part  of  Brittany  ; 
(5)  the  Flemish  part  of  the  department  of  Nord,  e.g.,  at  Dunkerque. 
Moreover,  the  area  from  which  French  men  of  letters  have  come, 
according  to  M.  Odin's  definitions,  embraces  part  of  Belgium,  some 

^  These  regions  are  roughly  shown  by  the  broken  lines  on  the  first  map,  Plate  I. 
2  Op.  cit.,  pp.  465-466. 


1^8  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

of  Luxemburg,  and  most  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  Although  French  is 
the  prevailing  language  in  all  these  places,  still  the  inhabitants 
belong  rather  to  other  races.  If  race  was  an  important  factor 
in  the  development  of  genius,  all  these  localities  should  show  this 
in  the  statistics. 

With  regard  to  the  first  of  these  classes,  viz.,  localities  in  France, 
politically  speaking,  but  inhabited  by  races  not  properly  French  and 
speaking  other  languages,  it  is  to  be  noticed  that  with  the  exception 
of  the  department  of  Nord,  in  which,  as  may  be  seen  from  its  shape, 
only  a  portion  belongs  to  this  class,  they  are  all  considerably  below 
the  mean  in  their  fecundity  in  men  of  letters.  At  first  sight  it 
might  seem  that  this  was  a  proof  of  the  superiority  of  the  French 
in  this  respect.  But  this  would  involve  the  fallacy  of  statistics, 
because  these  are  by  no  means  the  only  departments  of  which  the 
same  is  true.  There  are  more  than  twenty  strictly  French  depart- 
ments whose  ratio  is  8  or  less  to  the  100,000,  including  that  of 
Nievre  which  is  contiguous  to  the  rich  departments  of  Loiret  and 
Cote-d'Or.  Renouncing  this  criterion,  therefore,  the  only  one 
remaining  is  that  of  comparing  the  foreign  departments  with  the 
ones  that  he  next  to  them.  For  Corsica,  which  occupies  a  very  low 
position,  this  of  course  is  not  possible,  but  there  are  three  strictly 
French  departments,  Creuse,  Haute-Loire,  and  Landes,  which  have 
the  same  ratio  as  Corsica,  viz.,  3  to  the  100,000.  The  East  Pyre- 
nees, with  a  ratio  of  6,  may  be  compared  with  Aude  (9)  and  Ariege 
(4),  leaving  a  negative  result.  The  Basses-Pyrenees  contain  two  of 
the  foreign  races,  the  Catalans  and  the  Basques.  It  also  has  a 
French  portion,  and  M.  Odin's  data  enable  him  to  inform  us  that  the 
Basque  portion,  furnishing  a  little  more  than  a  third  of  the  popula- 
tion, has  produced  16  men  of  letters,  while  the  much  more  popu- 
lous French  portion  has  produced  only  14.  As  his  total  for  that 
department  is  only  30,  it  follows  that  the  Catalan  portion  has  not 
produced  any.    Commenting  on  these  facts  he  says  : 

We  here  find,  therefore,  that  the  fact  of  belonging  to  a  more  civilized 
nationality  and  to  a  literature  infinitely  richer  has  exerted  no  favorable  influence 
on  the  fecundity  of  the  population  in  men  of  letters,  but  that,  on  the  contrary, 
it  is  the  inferior  nationality  that  has  been  the  more  fruitful  in  this  respect.^ 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  468. 


Ch.  IX]  THE   ETHNOLOGICAL  ENVIRONMENT  159 

Three  departments  lie  against  the  Basses-Pyrenees  on  the  east 
and  north,  viz.,  Hautes-Pyrenees,  Gers,  and  Landes.  All  these  have 
a  lower  productivity  in  men  of  letters.  If  all  this  proves  the  supe- 
riority of  the  Basques  over  the  French  of  the  southwest  corner  of 
France,  this  weighs  little  against  the  fact  that,  relatively  to  the 
whole  of  France,  the  Basses-Pyrenees  are  far  below  the  mean  in  the 
production  of  men  of  letters.  The  only  reasonable  conclusion,  as 
M.  Odin  remarks,  must  be  that  the  ethnological  element  has  had 
little  or  nothing  to  do  with  the  result,  and  that  we  must  look  else- 
where than  to  considerations  of  race  for  the  true  explanation  of 
facts  of  this  kind. 

In  treating  of  Brittany,  more  perhaps  than  elsewhere,  it  must  be 
borne  in  mind  that  IVI.  Odin's  statistics  cover  a  period  of  five  cen- 
turies, and  the  results  must  not  be  judged  by  present  conditions. 
Of  the  five  departments  that  make  up  Brittany,  only  one,  Finistere, 
is  now  exclusively  Breton,  but  nearly  all  of  them  were  so  during  the 
earlier  part  of  the  period  to  which  the  facts  relate.  In  the  production 
of  men  of  letters,  all  the  departments  are  below  the  mean  (18),  but 
one,  Ille-et-Vilaine,  has  a  ratio  of  13.  C6tes-du-Nord,  which  is  more 
French  than  Finistere,  has  a  lower  ratio,  viz.,  3.  Morbihan  comes 
next  with  5,  though  lying  between  Loire-Inferieure  and  Finistere, 
in  both  of  which  the  ratio  is  7.  These  facts  certainly  say  little  for 
or  against  the  influence  of  race.  But  the  strictly  political  boundaries 
more  or  less  obscure  the  true  condition  of  things.  The  fact  is  that 
the  Breton  population  extends  much  farther  east  than  the  boundary 
of  Finistere,  making  C6tes-du-Nord  and  Morbihan  half  Breton  and 
half  French.  This  race  boundary  is  sufficiently  definite  to  enable 
M.  Odin  to  give  us  the  facts  for  the  two  races  separately.  These 
show  that  whereas  in  C6tes-du-Nord  the  French  portion  has  pro- 
duced 14  and  the  Breton  portion  only  4  men  of  letters,  in  Morbihan 
the  French  part  has  produced  only  i  and  the  foreign  part  19. 
Again,  therefore,  as  before,  the  result  is  wholly  negative  so  far  as 
the  ethnological  factor  is  concerned. 

It  remains  to  consider  the  Flemish  race.  So  far  as  France  is  con- 
cerned these  are  found  only  in  the  department  of  Nord  and  only  in 
a  limited  portion  of  that  department  lying  on  the  Manche.  M.  Odin 
states  that  the  Flemish  population  is  only  one  ninth  of  that  of  the 


l6o  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

department.  But  it  happens  that  these  have  produced  1 1  of  the  97 
men  of  letters,  or,  we  may  say,  exactly  their  quota.  If  the  productiv- 
ity of  the  whole  department  in  men  of  letters  is  compared  with  that 
of  the  ones  adjacent  to  it,  we  have  the  following  result  :  Nord,  10  ; 
Pas-de-Calais  on  the  west,  i  i  ;  Aisne  on  the  south,  12.5  ;  Somme 
on  the  southwest,  i  5  ;  Hainaut  on  the  east  and  northeast,  6. 
Commenting  upon  all  the  facts  of  this  class,  M.  Odin  remarks  : 

The  study  of  the  various  cases  in  which  wholly  different  nationalities  in 
France  can  be  directly  compared  leads  with  a  rare  uniformity  in  the  evidence 
to  the  surprising  result  that  the  ethnological  element  exerts  no  appreciable 
influence  upon  literary  productivity.  .  .  .  The  simple  fact  of  being  born  and 
living  in  a  French  medium  evidently  offers  so  many  advantages  that  we  should 
expect  in  all  necessity  to  see  the  regions  that  are  not  French  furnish  many  less 
men  of  letters  than  the  strictly  French  regions.  If  this  is  not  the  case,  if  we 
see  on  the  contrary  that  the  fact  of  belonging  or  not  to  the  French  nationality 
nowhere  implies  in  itself  a  greater  or  less  fecundity  in  men  of  letters,  we  must 
necessarily  admit  that  some  other  circumstance  than  nationality,  and  one  supe- 
rior in  its  effects,  has  determined  the  degree  of  literary  productivity.^ 

M.  Odin's  treatment  of  the  regions  wholly  outside  of  France  is 
somewhat  less  satisfactory,  as  he  is  obliged  to  deal  with  facts  col- 
lected by  him  but  not  included  in  his  tables  and  with  areas  not  shown 
on  his  maps,  but  the  results  are  practically  the  same  as  those  for 
the  regions  already  considered.  He  compares  French  Belgium 
(Belgique  wallone)  with  Flemish  Belgium  (Belgique  flammande), 
the  former  of  which,  as  shown  in  his  table  and  map  of  the  provinces, 
has  produced  84  men  of  letters,  or  at  the  rate  of  56  to  a  million 
inhabitants.  The  latter,  he  says,  has  produced  73,  but  the  ratio  is 
not  stated.  He  thinks  it  would  be  much  more  just  to  let  the  com- 
parison begin  with  the  eighteenth  century,  or  rather  with  the  year 
1725,  because  prior  to  that  date  there  was  scarcely  any  literary 
activity  in  Flemish  Belgium.  Since  that  time  it  has  produced  57 
men  of  letters,  while  French  Belgium  has  produced  only  40,  and 
whereas  the  former  has  produced  8  men  of  talent,  the  latter  has  pro- 
duced only  3.  What  he  calls  German  Belgium,  i.e.,  the  German 
section  of  Belgian  Luxemburg,  has  furnished  no  less  than  8  men 
of  letters  who  belong  properly  to  French  literature,  and  all  within 
the  period  from  1801  to  1830.    This  it  has  done  in  the  face  of  the 

1  Op.  cit.,  p.  470. 


Ch.  IX]  THE   RELIGIOUS  ENVIROxNMENT  l6i 

dominant  German  language  of  that  region,  a  strong  confirmation  of 
de  Candolle's  statement  that  in  any  fair  competition  French  will 
triumph  over  German. ^  The  same  fact  is  also  exemplified  in  Alsace- 
Lorraine.  Notwithstanding  the  strong  influence  of  the  German  city 
of  Strasburg  with  its  great  university,  it  has  furnished  a  large  con- 
tingent to  French  literature.  This  entire  contribution  was  made  in 
the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries.  Between  1801  and  1830 
it  produced  no  less  than  26  men  of  letters  of  this  class,  5  of  whom 
were  men  of  talent.  The  fact  was  due  to  the  superiority  of  the 
French  language  coupled  with  the  influence  of  French  administra- 
tion during  that  period. 

As  a  final  conclusion  from  this  study  of  the  ethnological  factor 
M.  Odin  remarks  (p.  475): 

Thus  then,  outside  of  France  as  well  as  within  it,  we  see  everywhere  that 
a  common  language  does  not  at  all  imply  a  common  literature,  and  any  people 
may  distinguish  itself  in  an  entirely  foreign  literature,  provided  the  circumstances 
are  favorable. 

This  analysis  of  the  ethnological  environment  seems  to  prove  that 
so  far  as  the  different  so-called  races  of  Europe  are  concerned  they 
are  all  about  equally  capable  of  literary  work.  It  is  probable  that 
they  would  show  no  very  marked  differences  in  their  capacity  for 
scientific  work  under  the  same  circumstances.  A  mass  of  evidence 
seems  to  be  accumulating  everywhere  to  show  that  social  efficiency 
does  not  depend  to  any  considerable  degree  upon  race  differences, 
certainly  not  when  only  civilized  races  are  compared,  and  that  it 
does  depend  almost  entirely  on  differences  in  their  equipment. 

The  Religions  Environment.  —  We  have  next  to  consider  the 
effect  of  religion  upon  the  production  of  great  men.  This  is  a 
legitimate  inquiry  because,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  nearly  all  men 
except  within  a  very  short  period  have  been  adherents  of  one  or 
other  religious  sect.  For  a  century  past  there  have  been  a  few 
truly  eminent  men  who  have  had  no  special  attachment  to  any 
religion,  and  the  time  has  already  come  when  it  is  a  sort  of  pious 
fraud  to  classify  the  whole  population  of  an  enlightened  country 
by  religions.  There  are  many  thousands  now  who  do  not  belong 
to  any  religion,  and  these  always  embrace  the  best  minds.    Most  of 

^  De  Candolle,  Histoire  des  sciences  et  des  savants,  2e  t'd.,  1S85,  p.  543. 


l62  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

them  have  great  respect  for  all  religions,  but  regard  them  as  social 
phenomena  to  be  studied  and  compared.  Kidd's  pretense  that  such 
persons  are  unconsciously  influenced  by  the  religions  of  the  world ^ 
is  a  mere  begging  of  the  question.  But  in  considering  the  history 
of  civihzation  this  element  is  so  small  that  it  may  be  neglected, 
and  it  is  convenient  to  assume  that  all  men  belong  to  some  of  the 
great  religions.  The  effect  of  religious  ideas  upon  human  progress 
has  already  been  treated  in  the  earlier  part  of  this  work  (see 
Chapter  VI),  but  this  is  not  the  question  before  us.  It  is  rather 
the  relative  influence  of  different  religions  upon  the  production  of 
great  men,  and  in  the  literature  and  discussion  of  the  present  sub- 
ject it  has  been  practically  narrowed  down  first  to  the  relative  influ- 
ence of  Christianity  and  Judaism  and  then  more  especially  to  the 
relative  influence  of  Catholicism  and  Protestantism.  This  is  because 
nearly  all  the  great  men  considered  have  been  either  Christians  or 
Jews,  and  the  great  majority  of  them,  as  well  as  of  the  peoples  from 
which  they  have  issued,  have  been  either  Catholics  or  Protestants. 
Three  of  de  Candolle's  "favorable  causes"  relate  to  religion,  viz.  : 

12.  A  religion  making  little  use  of  the  principle  of  authority-. 

13.  A  clergy  friendly  to  education  among  its  own  members  and  for  the 
public  at  large. 

14.  A  clergy  not  restricted  to  celibacy. 

The  effect  of  persecution  by  the  church  has  no  doubt  been  very 
injurious  in  this  direction.    This  is  mentioned  by  Galton,  who  says: 

The  extent  to  which  persecution  must  have  affected  European  races  is 
easily  measured  by  a  few  well-known  statistical  facts.  Thus,  as  regards  martyr- 
dom and  imprisonment,  the  Spanish  nation  was  drained  of  free-thinkers  at  the 
rate  of  1000  persons  annually,  for  the  three  centuries  between  1471  and  1781  ; 
an  average  of  100  persons  having  been  executed  and  900  imprisoned  every 
year  during  that  period.  The  actual  data  during  those  three  hundred  years 
are  32,000  burnt,  17,000  burnt  in  efifigy  (I  presume  they  mostly  died  in  prison 
or  escaped  from  Spain),  and  291,000  condemned  to  various  terms  of  imprison- 
ment and  other  penalties.  It  is  impossible  that  any  nation  could  stand  a  policy 
like  this,  without  paying  a  heavy  penalty  in  the  deterioration  of  its  breed,  as 
has  notably  been  the  result  in  the  formation  of  the  superstitious,  unintelligent 
Spanish  race  of  the  present  day.  Italy  was  also  frightfully  persecuted  at  an 
earlier  date.  In  the  diocese  of  Como  alone  more  than  1000  were  tried  annually 
by  the  inquisitors  for  many  years,  and  300  were  burnt  in  the  single  year  1416. 
The   French   persecutions,  by  which    the   English   have   been  large  gainers, 

1  Social  Evolution,  p.  189. 


Ch.  IX]  THE   RELIGIOUS  ENVIRONMENT  163 

through  receiving  their  industrial  refugees,  were  on  a  nearly  similar  scale.  In 
the  seventeenth  century  three  or  four  hundred  thousand  Protestants  perished 
in  prison,  at  the  galleys,  in  their  attempts  to  escape,  or  on  the  scaffold,  and  an 
equal  number  emigrated.  Mr.  Smiles,  in  his  admirable  book  on  the  Huguenots 
has  traced  the  intiuence  of  these  and  of  the  Flemish  emigrants  on  En<^land 
and  shows  clearly  that  she  owes  to  them  almost  all  her  industrial  arts  and  very 
much  of  the  most  valuable  life-blood  of  her  modern  race.^ 

All  this  has  been  so  frequently  written  up  that  it  need  not  be 
further  dwelt  upon,  and  it  is  evident  that  a  religion  that  is  intolerant 
must  be  highly  unfavorable  to  the  production  of  genius.  Although 
the  Protestants  have  done  some  persecuting,  still  they  have  never 
done  it  on  any  such  scale,  and  therefore  from  this  point  of  view 
Protestantism  must  be  regarded  as  more  favorable  to  genius  than 
Catholicism. 

But  in  the  comparison  of  these  two  religious  sects  the  point  upon 
which  the  greatest  stress  has  been  laid  in  the  discussion  of  the 
conditions  favorable  to  genius  has  been  the  effect  of  a  celibate 
clergy.  On  this  there  is  room  for  a  difference  of  opinion.  That 
institution  has  been  strongly  defended  by  others  than  Catholics, 
especially  by  Auguste  Comte.^  But  most  of  the  authors  named  in 
the  literature  of  the  present  discussion  have  regarded  it  as  very 
unfavorable  to  the  production  of  men  of  genius.    Thus  Galton  says: 

The  long  period  of  the  dark  ages  under  which  Europe  has  lain  is  due,  I 
believe,  in  a  very  considerable  degree,  to  the  celibacy  enjoined  by  religious 
orders  on  their  votaries.  Whenever  a  man  or  woman  was  possessed  of  a  gentle 
nature  that  fitted  him  or  her  to  deeds  of  charity,  to  me'litation,  to  literature,  or 
to  art,  the  social  condition  of  the  time  was  such  that  tliey  had  no  refuge  else- 
where than  in  the  bosom  of  the  Church.  But  the  Church  chose  to  preach  and 
exact  celibacy.  The  consequence  was  that  these  gentle  natures  had  no  con- 
tinuance, and  thus,  by  a  policy  so  .singularly  unwise  and  suicidal  that  I  am 
hardly  able  to  speak  of  it  without  impatience,  the  Church  brutalized  the  breed 
of  our  forefathers.  She  acted  precisely  as  if  she  had  aimed  at  selecting  the 
rudest  portion  of  the  community  to  be,  alone,  the  parents  of  future  generations. 
She  practised  the  arts  which  breeders  would  use,  who  aimed  at  creating  fero- 
cious, currish,  and  stupid  natures.  No  wonder  that  club  law  prevailed  for  centu- 
ries over  Europe;  the  wonder  rather  is  that  enough  good  remained  in  the  veins 
of  Europeans  to  enable  their  race  to  rise  to  its  present  very  moderate  level  of 
natural  morality.'' 

'  Hereditary  Genius,  second  edition,  London,  1892,  pp.  345-346. 
2  Philosophie  positive,  3^  ed.,  1869,  Vol.  V,  p.  253. 
*  Hereditary-  Genius,  pp.  343-344. 


1 64  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

The  moral  effects  of  celibacy  have  been  frequently  dwelt  upon. 

As   they  concern   us   here   only  indirectly,  I  will   content   myself 

with  quoting  a  passage  from  Draper: 

The  population  of  England  at  the  Norman  conquest  was  about  two  million. 
In  five  hundred  years  it  had  scarcely  doubled.  It  may  be  supposed  that  this 
stationary  condition  was  to  some  extent  induced  by  the  papal  policy  of  the  en- 
forcement of  celibacy  in  the  clergy.  The  "  legal  generative  force  "  was  doubtless 
affected  by  that  policy,  the  "  actual  generative  force  "  was  not.  For  those  who 
have  made  this  subject  their  study  have  long  ago  been  satisfied  that  public  celibacy 
is  private  wickedness.  This  mainly  determined  the  laity,  as  well  as  the  government 
in  England,  to  suppress  the  monasteries.  It  was  openly  asserted  that  there  were 
one  hundred  thousand  women  in  England  made  dissolute  by  the  clergy.^ 

De  Candolle  was  the  first  to  bring  any  considerable  number  of 

facts  to  bear  on  the  question  of  the  influence  of  celibacy  on  the 

production  of  men  of  genius.    He  says: 

It  is  not  a  matter  of  indifference  that  certain  categories  of  the  educated, 
intelligent,  and  virtuous  public  should  or  should  not  be  restricted  to  celibacy. 
Aside  from  all  dogma  and  from  the  discipline  of  the  clergy,  the  result  is  not 
the  same  for  a  country,  from  the  standpoint  of  education,  when  there  are,  for 
example,  forty  or  fifty  thousand  celibate  ecclesiastics  or  an  equal  number  of 
ecclesiastics  who  are  fathers  of  families.  Even  in  reducing  the  inheritance  of 
things  intellectual  to  the  minimum,  the  simple  existence  in  Protestant  countries 
of  married  pastors  assures  the  development  from  year  to  year  of  a  certain 
number  of  educated  or  upright  persons  who  exert  a  favorable  influence  on 
society.  ...  I  will  mention  in  support  of  my  opinion  a  few  men  of  unques- 
tioned merit  who  would  not  have  been  born  if  Protestant  ecclesiastics  had  been 
restricted  to  celibacy,  or  who  would  have  taken  a  different  course  if  their  educa- 
tion had  been  bad.    They  are  all  sons  of  Protestant  ministers,  deans,  or  pastors  : 

Mathematical,  physical,  or  natural  sciences 

Agassiz,  naturalist  Jenner,  physician 

Berzelius,  chemist  Linnteus,  naturalist 

Boerhaave,  physician,  naturalist  Mitscherlich,  mineralogist 

Brown  (Robert),  botanist  Olbers,  astronomer 

Camper,  anatomist  Rudbeck  (Olaus),  botanist 

Clausius  (Rud.  M.),  physicist  Schimper  (W.  Phil.),  botanist 

Encke,  astronomer  Schweizer,  physicist 

Euler,  mathematician  Studer  (Bernard),  geologist 

Fabricius,  astronomer  Wallis  (John),  mathematician 

Grew,  anatomist,  botanist  Wargentin,  astronomer 

Hanstein  (L.  J.),  botanist  Wollaston,  chemist 

Hartsoeker,  physicist  Wurtz,  chemist 

Heer  (Oswald),  naturalist  Young  (Arthur),  agriculturist 

1  History  of  the  Conflict  between  Religion  and  Science,  by  John  William  Draper, 
fifth  edition.  New  York,  1875,  PP-  262-263. 


Ch.  IX]  THE   RELIGIOUS  ENVIRONMENT  1 65 

Moral,  historical,  political,  or  philo-  Poets  and  literary  tnett 

logical  sciences  .  ,  ,. 

^  Addison 

Abbot,  1st  lord  Colchester,  statesman  Gessner  (Jean) 

Ancillon  (Ch.),  historian  Jonson  (Ben) 

Ancillon  (Fred.),  historian  Lessing 

Bochart,  orientalist  Richter  (Jean  Paul) 

Emerson  (Ralph  Waldo)  Swift 

Hallam  (H.),  historian  Thomson 

Hase  (Ch.  Benoit),  Hellenist  Wieland 

Hobbes  (Thomas),  philosopher  Young 

Miiller  (Jean  de).  liistorian 

Puffendorff  (Sam.),  jurisconsult  Artists 

Schweighaeuser,  Hellenist  Wren  (Christopher) 

Sismondi,  historian  Wilkie  (David) 

I  could  have  tripled  or  quintupled  these  lists  indicating  men  of  recognized 
distinction  but  less  known  to  the  general  public.  This  would  be  useless  as  a 
demonstration,  for  the  names  enumerated  are  sufficient  to  show  to  what  extent 
science,  medicine,  letters  would  have  been  impeded  during  two  centuries  if 
celibacy  had  been  imposed  upon  the  ecclesiastics  of  all  cults,  or  if,  being  married, 
their  habits  of  domestic  education  had  been  bad.^ 

This  is  certainly  a  remarkable  showing,  and  very  little  attempt 
has  been  made  to  answer  the  argument.  We  can  barely  imagine 
what  science  would  have  been  without  Agassiz,  Berzelius,  Euler, 
Jenner,  Linnaeus,  Wollaston.  We  can  think  of  history  without  a 
Hallam,  philosophy  without  a  Hobbes  or  an  Emerson.  We  can 
conceive  of  poetry  without  Addison,  Thomson,  and  Young,  and  of 
literature  without  Ben  Jonson,  Lessing,  and  Dean  Swift,  or  art  with- 
out Sir  Christopher  Wren.  But  all,  I  think,  must  admit  that  the 
absence  of  these  names  would  enormously  dwarf  all  these  branches 
of  human  achievement.  The  world  could  do  without  all  its  great 
men,  but  what  kind  of  a  world  would  it  be .''  To  say  that  the 
environment  would  have  evolved  their  practical  substitutes  would 
be  an  assertion  for  which  there  does  not  seem  to  be  an  atom  of  proof. 
One  answer  is  that  all  these  men  would  have  been  born  just  the 
same,  only  they  would  have  been  illegitimate,  and  according  to 
Galton's  subsidiary  thesis  of  the  irrepressibility  of  genius,  this 
would  have  constituted  no  barrier  to  their  success.  They  would 
have  accomplished  exactly  the  same.     I  know  of  no  better  example 

1  De  CandoUe,  op.  cit.,  pp.  149-152. 


1 66  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

of  the  reductio  ad  absiirdiim.  Illegitimacy,  except  under  the  most 
unusual  circumstances,  is  a  bar  to  all  aspirations.  Perhaps  it  should 
not  be,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact  it  is. 

M.  Odin,  however,  has  a  somewhat  different  answer,  upon  which, 
it  is  true,  he  does  not  stoutly  insist,  but  which  is  at  least  worth  our 
attention.  Admitting  that  the  Catholic  clergy  can  leave  no  posterity 
that  has  any  chance  to  distinguish  itself,  he  nevertheless  points  out 
that  the  rearing  of  a  family,  as  by  the  Protestant  clergy,  involves  a 
large  sacrifice  of  time  and  energy  which  a  celibate  clergy  can  devote 
to  genial  pursuits,  and  therefore,  while  Protestant  clergymen  can 
transmit  their  predisposition  to  culture,  they  cannot,  as  a  rule,  apply 
themselves  to  literary,  scientific,  or  artistic  studies.  On  the  other 
hand,  many  Catholic  priests,  and  especially  the  higher  orders  with 
ample  emoluments  and  much  leisure,  can  and  do  achieve  in  various 
lines.     He  says  further  on  this  general  head  : 

As  a  matter  of  fact  Catholic  ecclesiastics  have  more  formalities  connected 
with  the  cult  to  go  through  than  their  Protestant  confreres.  But,  on  the  other 
hand,  they  are  relatively  more  numerous,  which  facilitates  many  duties  that 
cost  much  time  and  fatigue  to  Protestant  pastors,  such  as  preaching,  teaching 
novitiates,  visiting  the  poor  and  the  sick,  etc.  I  do  not  speak  of  the  numerous 
Catholic  ecclesiastics  who  for  one  reason  or  another  have  di.spensed  with  the 
greater  part  of  these  duties.  It  may  be  said  in  general  that,  all  things  con- 
sidered, the  time  devoted  to  the  special  requirements  of  the  calling  is  practically 
the  same,  and  that  the  Catholic  ecclesiastics  have  as  much  more  time  than  the 
pastors  as  the  latter  devote  to  their  families.  We  should  therefore  expect  to 
see  the  Catholic  clergy  furnish  a  larger  proportion  of  men  of  letters  than  the 
Protestant  clergy.^ 

M.  Odin  neglects  one  factor  which  I  have  reason  to  believe  has 
considerable  importance.  This  is  the  quieting  effect  of  family  life. 
There  are  many  persons  who  cannot  work  under  the  goad  of  unsat- 
isfied affection,  and  find  themselves  in  such  an  uneasy  and  unsettled 
frame  of  mind  that  prolonged  application,  such  as  is  always  necessary 
to  the  production  of  any  great  work,  is  impossible.  And  there  is 
even  a  worse  aspect  of  the  case.  If  their  chastity  is  complete,  as 
there  is  reason  to  believe  it  rarely  is,  they  are  in  danger  of  falling 
under  the  spell  of  mysticism,  which,  while  it  may  be  accompanied 
by  genius,  is  certain  to  deprive  their  labors  of  the  sane  stability  and 

1  Odin,  op.  cit.,  p.  487. 


Ch.  IX]  THE  RELIGIOUS  ENVIRONMENT  167 

fidelity  to  truth  that  are  essential  to  the  highest  productions  of  the 
human  mind.^ 

M.  Odin  has  made  an  effort  to  apply  statistics  to  this  question, 
but  the  results  are  not  very  satisfactory  on  account  of  the  limited 
information  supplied  by  the  biographical  dictionaries.  As  France 
has  been  mainly  Catholic  throughout  modern  times,  it  seems  to  have 
been  assumed  that  the  subject  of  a  sketch  must  be  a  Catholic  unless 
the  contrary  is  specially  stated.  As  the  attempt  to  handle  the  entire 
number  of  literary  men  seemed  hopeless,  M.  Odin  has  confined 
himself  to  the  smaller  class  that  he  designates  as  men  of  letters  of 
talent,  of  whom,  as  already  stated,  he  found  1 136.  Of  these  105  are 
known  to  have  been  Protestants.  Twenty-five  others  became  Prot- 
estants some  time  in  the  course  of  their  lives,  making  a  total  of 
130.  Of  the  105  who  were  born  Protestants  he  gives  a  table  by 
twenty-five-year  periods,  which  shows  the  absolute  number  for  each 
period  and  the  per  cent  that  this  number  is  of  the  whole  number  of 
men  of  talent  for  the  same  period.  This  is  chiefly  interesting  as 
showing  that  while  the  absolute  number  increased  during  modern 
times  the  relative  number  diminished.  The  average  for  the  whole 
period  is  only  10  per  cent,  but  during  the  earlier  parts  of  it  it  amounted 
to  25  per  cent,  and  at  the  very  outset  (i 539-1 550)  to  33  per  cent. 
Upon  the  whole  this  table  cannot  be  said  to  possess  very  great  value 
for  the  problem  at  large. 

His  other  table  is  much  more  to  the  point.  Of  the  Protestants 
he  found  that  47  were  clergymen,  which  is  36  per  cent  of  the  whole. 
Assuming  that  all  the  rest  were  Catholics,  a  basis  of  comparison 
was  found.  At  any  rate  he  made  this  his  basis.  Scrutinizing  his 
list  he  discovered  that  282  modern  French  men  of  letters  of  talent 
were  Catholic  ecclesiastics.  This  is  26  per  cent  of  the  Catholics  of 
this  grade  on  that  basis.  It  should  be  said  that  there  were  five 
Israelites  whom  he  neglects  except  to  deduct  them  from  the  non- 
Protestant  total.  He  divides  the  Catholics  into  high  clergy,  low 
clergy,  and  Jesuits.  His  table  shows  the  result  by  fifty-year  periods 
from  1300  to  1825,  except  that  the  first  line  gives  them  for  the 
first  two  centuries  from  1300  to  1500,  and  the  last  line  for  twenty- 
five  years,  1801-1825.    Besides  the  numerical  table  he  gives,  as  is 

1  This  subject  was  more  fully  discussed  in  Pure  Sociology.    See  pp.  388,  389. 


1 68 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


[Part  II 


his  custom  throughout,  a  graphic  representation,  the  curves  showing 
the  several  classes  and  the  percentages  of  both  Catholics  and  Prot- 
estants.   The  following  is  the  table  : 


Chronological  Table  of  Men  of  Letters  of  Talent  who  were 
Ecclesiastics  (Catholics  and  Protestants) 


Catholics 

Total 

Eccle- 

Hir.H 

TAiNTS 

Jesuits 

Total 

siastics 

Clergy 

Clergy 

Periods 

fc.  ^ 

B,      U 

ft.     u 

ft,     u 

X 

0  J 

0      J 

0     J 

H 

n 

S 
a 

a   J 
0.^ 

a 
a 
S 

D 

a  -J 

H 

a 
S 
a 

^4 

n 
a 

ftl  .J 

OS 

H 

a 
a 

< 

fti 
a 

a 

z, 

0   <; 
H  H 
Z     ft. 

'I 

1300-1500 

6 

II 

18 

32 

— 

— 

24 

43 

3 

50 

27 

44 

1 501-1550 

3 

5 

4 

7 

I 

2 

8 

14 

7 

29 

15 

18 

1551-1600 

7 

12.5 

10 

18 

8 

14 

25 

45 

8 

44 

33 

45 

1601-1650 

7 

5 

38 

28 

15 

II 

60 

44 

9 

56 

69 

46 

1651-1700 

3 

2 

30 

25 

13 

II 

46 

38 

II 

58 

57 

41 

1701-1750 

6 

3 

36 

20 

12 

7 

54 

30 

2 

12.5 

56 

29 

1751-1800 

3 

I 

9 

4 

I 

0.4 

13 

6 

3 

18 

16 

7 

1801-1825 

I 

I 

3 

2 

I 

I 

5 

4 

4 

29 

9 

6 

Total 

36 

4 

148 

15 

51 

5 

235 

24 

47 

36 

282 

26 

No  better  commentary  on  these  results  could  be  offered  than  in 
the  words  of  M.  Odin  himself.    He  says  : 

As  will  be  seen,  the  Catholic  ecclesiastics,  far  from  furnishing  a  particularly 
remarkable  contingent  of  men  of  letters  of  talent,  remain  on  the  contrary  for 
almost  all  the  periods  behind  the  Protestant  clergy.  Their  inferiority  is  espe- 
cially evident  in  the  two  last  periods,  during  which  the  pastors  furnished  rela- 
tively three  and  seven  times  more  men  of  letters  of  talent  than  the  Catholic 
priests.  This  confirms  what  I  have  just  said  relative  to  the  different  composi- 
tion of  the  two  clergies.  It  seems  certain  that  the  Catholics  who  had  literary 
tastes  embrace  the  ecclesiastical  career  less  willingly  than  the  Protestants.  The 
celibacy  of  the  priests  cannot  have  had  as  bad  effects  on  literature  as  the  large 
number  of  men  of  letters  who  had  had  clergymen  for  fathers  seemed  to  indicate. 

A  second  remark  that  our  table  calls  forth  is  that  the  Jesuits  and  the  high 
clergy  have  furnished  an  exceptionally  large  number  of  men  of  letters  of  talent. 
We  shall  see  later  on  that  the  literary  fecundity  of  these  two  classes  of  eccle- 
siastics is  easily  explained. 


Ch.  IX]  THE  LOCAL  ENVIRONMENT  1 69 

If  finally  we  consider  the  table  from  the  chronological  point  of  view  we  shall 
be  struck  first  of  all  by  the  fact  that  the  absolute  and  relative  number  of  eccle- 
siastics who  have  been  men  of  letters  drops  suddenly  in  the  last  century,  in  the 
first  half  of  the  century  for  the  Protestants,  in  the  second  half  for  the  Catholics. 
In  the  following  periods  the  number  of  Protestants  shows  a  tendency  to  rise 
again,  but  that  of  the  Catholics  continues  to  fall.  This  fact  may  furnish  material 
for  interesting  special  researches.  We  need  only  remark  here  that  it  weakens 
the  supposition  of  M.  de  Candolle,  according  to  which  "  the  abandonment  of 
science  by  the  greater  part  of  the  Catholic  ecclesiastics  "  is  explained  by  "  the 
increasing  specialization  of  scientific  men."  The  example  of  men  of  letters 
shows  that  this  abandonment  must  be  due  to  more  general  causes. 

To  sum  up,  we  have  seen  that  four  circumstances  independent  of  one  another 
tend  to  make  us  consider  Protestantism  more  favorable  than  Catholicism  to  the 
culture  of  letters,  at  least  for  the  period  that  we  are  studying.  Each  of  these 
circumstances,  we  repeat,  is  less  conclusive  than  is  generally  supposed.  But 
taken  together  they  constitute  a  combination  of  evidence  to  which  it  is  impossible 
to  deny  all  value.  We  will  admit  then  that  religion  has  exerted  a  perceptible 
action  upon  the  quality  (richesse')  of  literature,  without  being  able,  however,  to 
determine  exactly  what  this  action  has  been.^ 

Perhaps  we  should  not  leave  this  subject  without  remarking  that 
it  is  the  one  in  which  the  greatest  differences  between  literature 
and  science  would  occur,  and  therefore  the  points  of  view  of  M.  Odin 
and  M.  de  Candolle  are  not  the  same.  What  would  be  true  of  the 
one  would  not  always  be  true  of  the  other. 

The  Local  Ejiviromnent.  —  In  his  tentative  groping  after  truth 
for  its  own  sake,  trawling  with  his  great  statistical  net  over  the 
whole  sea  bottom  of  modern  history,  M.  Odin  had  frequently  had 
his  suspicions  aroused  that  there  was  some  great  neglected  factor 
which  must  be  discovered  before  the  real  meaning  of  his  facts  could 
be  grasped.  He  faithfully  tested  all  three  of  the  prevailing  hypoth- 
eses, viz.,  those  of  the  efficacy  of  the  physical,  the  ethnological,  and 
the  religious  environment,  and  found  comparatively  little  to  reward 
the  search.  But  his  charts  and  his  maps  and  his  graphic  represen- 
tations gave  out  constant  hints  of  this  undiscovered  factor.  Jacoby's 
theory  that  the  density  of  population  is  the  chief  influence  attracted 
his  attention.  Jacoby  is  not  the  only  writer  who  has  laid  stress  on 
this  aspect  of  the  question.  In  fact  it  is  a  kind  of  popular  belief 
that  the  friction  of  mind  upon  mind  produced  by  the  close  contact 
of  men   in  populous   centers   constitutes  a   powerful   stimulus   to 

1  Odin,  op.  cit ,  pp.  4S7-489. 


I70  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

intellectual  activity.  Nor  is  this  idea  so  very  new,  for  do  we  not  read 
in  Proverbs  (xxvii.  17) :  "Iron  sharpeneth  iron  ;  so  a  man  sharpeneth 
the  countenance  of  his  friend"  ?  which  Professor  Giddings  says  "was 
the  earliest  and  the  greatest  discovery  ever  made  in  sociology."^ 
Similar  expressions  are  to  be  found  throughout  antiquity,  medieval 
and  early  modern  times,  but  these  are  only  the  adumbrations  that 
go  before  every  important  idea.  Sociologists,  however,  have  gener- 
ally recognized  this  principle  as  a  part  of  their  science,  and  some 
recent  ones  have  laid  great  stress  upon  it.  As  usual  we  find  that 
Comte  had  anticipated  them  and  not  left  them  very  much  that  was 
new  to  add.    We  should  therefore  first  hear  him  : 

I  will  merely  point  at  present  to  the  progressive  condensation  of  our  species 
as  a  last  general  element  serving  to  regulate  the  actual  rapidity  of  the  social 
movement.  It  may  be  easily  perceived  at  a  glance  that  this  influence  contrib- 
utes much,  especially  at  the  outset,  to  bring  about  a  more  and  more  special 
division  in  the  totality-  of  human  labor,  necessarily  incompatible  with  a  too 
small  number  of  cooperators.  Moreover,  by  reason  of  a  more  inherent  and  less 
known  quality,  although  even  more  important,  this  condensation  stimulates 
directly  and  in  a  very  powerful  way  the  more  rapid  progress  of  social  evolution, 
either  by  spurring  individuals  on  to  make  fresh  efforts  to  secure  for  themselves 
through  more  refined  means  an  existence  which  would  otherwise  thus  become 
more  difficult,  or  else  by  compelling  society  to  react  with  more  stubborn  and 
better  concerted  energy  in  order  adequately  to  resist  the  more  powerful  tend- 
encies toward  special  deviations.  In  either  case  we  see  that  it  is  not  a  question 
here  of  the  absolute  increase  in  the  number  of  individuals,  but  rather  of  their 
more  intense  competition  {concotirs)  on  a  given  space,  conformably  to  the 
special  expression  of  which  I  have  made  use,  and  which  is  peculiarly  applicable 
to  the  great  centers  of  population,  where,  at  all  times,  the  chief  progress  of  man- 
kind has  in  fact  first  taken  shape.  In  creating  new  wants  and  new  difficulties, 
this  gradual  agglomeration  also  spontaneously  develops  new  means,  not  only  to 
the  attainment  of  progress,  but  also  of  order  itself,  by  neutralizing  more  and 
more  the  various  physical  inequalities,  and  also  by  giving  an  increasing  ascend- 
ancy to  the  intellectual  and  moral  forces,  which  are  necessarily  held  in  their 
low  primitive  condition  in  every  too  limited  population.  Such  is,  in  brief,  the 
real  influence  of  such  a  continuous  condensation,  irrespective  of  the  actual  dura- 
tion of  the  process  of  its  formation.  If  now  we  consider  it  also  in  relation  to 
this  greater  or  less  rapidity  it  will  be  easy  to  discover  a  new  cause  of  the  general 
acceleration  of  the  social  movement  through  the  direct  disturbance  which  tlie 
fundamental  antagonism  between  the  instinct  of  preservation  and  the  instinct 
of  innovation  must  thus  undergo,  the  latter  being  evidently  destined  henceforth 
to  acquire  a  notable  increase  of  energy.^ 

1  The  Principles  of  Sociology,  by  Franklin  Henry  Giddings,  New  York,  1896,  p.  39. 

2  Auguste  Comte,  Philosophie  positive,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  455-456. 


Ch.  IX]  THE  LOCAL  ENVIRONMENT  171 

Mr.  Spencer  also  laid  great  stress  on  the  pressure  of  population, 
regarding  it  as  the  main  incentive  to  progress  in  past  times  as  well 
as  in  the  present,  and  as  likely  to  remain  such  far  into  the  future. 
But  he  has  not,  to  my  knowledge,  discussed  the  special  question  of 
the  effect  of  density  in  developing  the  intellectual  faculties.  He 
considered  rather  its  effect  upon  fertility,  maintaining  that  this  is 
to  diminish  fertility,  thus  automatically  regulating  population.  These 
questions  do  not  concern  us  here. 

M.  Durkheim  first  approached  this  question  from  the  standpoint 

of  the  division  of  labor,  from  which  Comte  also  considered  it,  and 

he  laid  down  the  following  proposition  : 

The  division  of  labor  varies  in  direct  ratio  to  the  volume  and  the  density  of 
societies,  and,  if  it  progresses  continuously  in  the  course  of  social  development, 
it  is  because  the  societies  are  becoming  constantly  more  dense  and  usually  more 
voluminous.^ 

In  a  later  work  he  discusses  the  subject  more  fully  and  makes 

an  important    distinction    between  what    he    calls    the   "dynamic 

density"  and  the  "material  density."    He  says: 

The  primary  origin  of  anj-  social  process  of  importance  must  be  sought  in 
the  constitution  of  the  internal  social  medium.  .  .  .  Thus  far  we  have  found 
two  series  of  characters  which  answer  in  a  special  way  to  this  condition  ;  these 
are  the  number  of  social  units,  or,  as  we  have  also  said,  the  volume  of  society, 
and  the  degree  of  concentration  of  the  mass,  or,  what  we  have  called  the 
dynamic  density.  By  this  latter  phrase  must  be  understood  not  the  purely  mate- 
rial compression  (resserrernent)  of  the  aggregate,  which  can  have  no  effect  if  the 
individuals,  or  rather  the  groups  of  individuals,  remain  separated  by  moral 
voids,  but  the  moral  contact,  of  which  the  preceding  is  only  the  auxiliary,  and, 
commonly  enough,  the  consequence.  The  dynamic  density  may  be  defined  as, 
for  an  equal  volume,  a  function  of  the  number  of  the  individuals  who  are  in 
relations  not  merely  commercial  but  moral;  that  is,  who  not  only  exchange 
services  or  compete,  but  who  live  a  common  life.  For  as  purely  economic 
relations  leave  men  detached  from  one  another  they  may  be  in  very  close  con- 
tact without  on  this  account  sharing  the  same  collective  existence.  .  .  .  Life  in 
common  can  only  be  affected  by  the  number  of  those  who  effectively  work 
together  in  it.  This  is  why  that  which  best  expresses  the  dynamic  density  of  a 
people  is  the  degree  of  coalescence  of  the  social  segments.  For  if  each  partial 
aggregate  forms  a  whole,  a  distinct  individual,  separated  from  the  rest  by  a 
barrier,  it  is  because  the  action  of  its  members  in  general  remains  localized ; 
if,  on  the  contrary,  these  partial  societies  are  all  blended  in  the  mass  of  the 
whole  society,  it  is  because,  to  the  same  extent,  the  circle  of  social  life  is 
extended. 

'  De  la  division  du  travail  social,  par  fimile  Durkheim,  Paris,  1893,  P-  ~^9- 


172  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  n 

As  regards  the  material  density  —  if,  at  least,  we  understand  by  this  not 
only  the  number  of  inhabitants  per  unit  of  surface,  but  the  development  of  the 
means  of  communication  and  of  transmission  —  it  Jisitaliy  advances  at  the 
same  rate  as  the  dynamic  density,  and,  in  general,  may  serve  as  a  measure  of 
it.  For  if  the  different  parts  of  the  population  tend  to  approach  each  other  it 
is  inevitable  that  they  should  break  the  way  that  allows  such  an  approach,  and, 
on  the  other  hand,  relations  can  only  be  established  between  distant  points  of 
the  social  mass  if  this  distance  is  not  an  obstacle,  i.e.,  if  it  is,  in  fact,  suppressed. 
Nevertheless  there  are  exceptions,  and  we  should  expose  ourselves  to  serious 
errors  if  we  were  always  to  judge  of  the  moral  concentration  of  a  society  by  the 
degree  of  material  concentration  which  it  presents.^ 

I  might  go  on  and  expand  this  discussion  by  citing  other  authors, 
and  especially  M.  Adolphe  Coste,^  but  perhaps  enough  has  been  said 
relative  to  this  particular  aspect  of  our  subject.  There  can  be  no 
doubt  that  it  represents  one  of  the  approaches  toward  the  solution 
of  the  vexed  problem  as  to  what  is  the  true  cause  of  the  develop- 
ment of  talented  individuals.  But,  as  we  shall  see,  it  is  far  from 
being  the  solution  of  that  problem. 

M.  Jacoby  set  out,  in  the  work  mentioned  in  the  section  on  the 
literature  (supra,  p.  1 39),  to  ascertain  the  effect  of  the  accumulation 
of  inhabitants  upon  a  more  or  less  restricted  territory.  He  drew 
up  a  list  of  331 1  names  of  eminent  Frenchmen  of  the  eighteenth 
century  with  the  places  of  their  birth,  and  based  his  calculations  on 
the  census  of  France  of  the  year  1836.  As  was  remarked,  Chapter 
IV  of  Part  II  of  his  book  consists  entirely  of  an  enumeration  by 
name  of  all  these  persons  arranged  in  the  alphabetical  order  of  the 
departments  in  which  they  were  born,  and  also  giving  the  cities, 
arrondissements,  or  more  exact  places  of  their  birth.  This  is  an 
exceedingly  interesting  list,  and  the  number  of  names  is  large 
enough  to  eliminate  statistical  defects  in  most  cases.  The  next 
chapter  considers  the  relative  fecundity  of  the  departments  in 
remarkable  personages,  which  he  discusses  statistically,  but  he 
prefaces  his  long  table  by  the  following  remarks: 

We  have  arrived  ...  at  the  conclusion  that  civilization,  taken  in  its  broad 
and  general  sense,  i.e.,  as  a  multiform  complex  of  intellectual  and  moral  qualities 

1  Les  Regies  de  la  methode  sociologique,  par  fimile  Durkheim,  2^  ed.,  revue  at  aug- 
mentee,  Paris,  1901,  pp.  138-141. 

2  Nouvel  Expose  d'economie  politique  et  de  physiologie  sociale,  Paris,  18S9;  "  Le 
facteur  Population  dans  revolution  sociale,"  Revue  internationale  de  sociologie,  9^ 
annee,  1901,  aout-septembre,  pp.  569-612. 


Ch.  IX]  THE  LOCAL  ENVIRONMENT  173 

of  the  population,  of  certain  conditions  of  life,  social,  political,  scientific, 
etc.,  is  the  result  of  the  accumulation  of  inhabitants  upon  a  more  or  less  re- 
stricted territory.  It  appears  as  a  natural  consequence  of  the  constantly  more 
and  more  increasing  complication  of  the  conditions  of  social  life,  of  the  neces- 
sity of  a  more  and  more  intense  intellectual  activity,  and  finally  of  the  attractive 
force  which  the  centers  already  formed  exert  upon  mobile,  active,  and  intelli- 
gent natures,  which  causes  them  to  abandon  the  rural  districts  and  go  and 
settle  in  the  cities.  These  influences  grow  with  the  increase  in  the  number  of 
the  centers  of  population,  and  with  this  civilization  also  advances.  We  shall 
therefore  perceive  a  direct  causal  connection  between  civilization  on  the  one 
hand  and  the  density  of  population  and  number  of  populous  centers  on  the 
other;  these  two  conditions  must  therefore  furnish  the  positive  indications  of 
the  degree  of  civilization,  and  they  may  thus  serve  as  a  criterion  for  determin- 
ing the  relative  civilization  of  the  various  localities  of  a  country. 

But  if  between  the  number  and  the  population  of  the  cities  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  density  of  population  of  the  country  on  the  other,  there  exists,  as  a 
general  fact,  a  more  or  less  constant  direct  relation,  this  relation  is  far  from 
holding  true  in  each  particular  case.  The  same  density  of  population,  i.e.,  the 
same  number  of  inhabitants  per  kilometer,  for  the  whole  country  taken  together, 
does  not  at  all  imply  an  identical  distribution  of  the  population.  Certain  prov- 
inces have  a  very  dense  population,  but  uniformly  distributed  over  the  whole 
territory,  and  not  only  not  presenting  any  great  centers,  but  not  even  having 
any  cities  of  considerable  magnitude,  as  we  see  in  the  department  of  Cote-d'Or. 
Other  regions  present  the  converse  relations;  large  commercial  or  industrial 
cities  are  here  separated  by  large  tliinly  peopled  and  almost  uncultivated 
spaces,  as  occurs  in  the  department  of  Bouches-du-Rhone.  Which  of  the  two 
factors  has  a  bearing  on  the  question  under  discussion  ?  We  have  no  data  for 
deciding  between  the  two.  There  are  very  grave  reasons  for  thinking  that 
these  conditions  —  density  of  population  and  number  and  population  of  cities, 
in  other  words,  the  percentage  of  the  urban  population  to  the  total  population 
of  the  countr}'  —  both  have  a  positive  influence,  although  it  is  impossible  to 
determine  their  relative  action.  We  therefore  place  the  figures  for  these  two 
factors  in  parallel  columns  with  the  figures  for  the  relative  fecundity  of 
the  present  departments  in  remarkable  personages  during  the  eighteenth 
century.^ 

His  table  consists  of  four  columns.  The  first  contains  the  names 
of  all  the  departments  of  France  arranged  in  alphabetical  order. 
The  second  gives  the  relative  number  of  remarkable  personages 
born  during  the  eighteenth  century  in  each  of  the  departments. 
This  number  is  obtained  by  dividing  the  absolute  number  by  the 
population,  and  is  always  expressed  in  decimal  fractions  carried  out 
to  the  eighth  place.  As  the  fractions  are  always  less  than  a  thou- 
sandth, and  generally  less  than  a  ten  thousandth,  it  results  that 
1  Jacoby,  op.  cit..  pp.  535-536. 


174  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

there  are  always  three  and  usually  four  zeros  before  any  digits  are 
reached,  which  makes  a  very  awkward  showing  and  difficult  to 
grasp.  The  third  column  gives  the  density  of  population,  i.e.,  the 
number  of  inhabitants  per  square  kilometer,  carried  to  two  decimal 
places.  The  fourth  column  shows  the  percentage  that  the  urban 
population  is  to  the  total  population  of  each  depar':ment. 

Thus  arranged  the  table  conveys  no  instructive  lesson,  and  he 
was  obliged  to  supplement  it  with  a  graphic  representation.  The 
table  can,  however,  be  made  clear  by  arranging  the  departments  in 
the  descending  order  of  their  fecundity  and  stating  this  in  the 
number  per  100,000  of  inhabitants.  It  will  then  take  the  form 
shown  on  the  opposite  page. 

It  will  be  observed  that  this  table  has  the  same  form  as  the  one 
by  departments  taken  from  M.  Odin's  work  (supra,  p.  152),  and 
therefore  the  figures  of  the  first  column  admit  of  direct  comparison 
with  those  of  that  table.  It  needs  only  to  be  borne  in  mind  that 
M.  Jacoby  includes  so  much  as  belonged  to  France  in  the  eighteenth 
century,  and  no  more.  This  includes  more  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  but 
excludes  Savoy  and  the  Maritime  Alps,  as  well  as  Corsica,  and  no 
part  of  Switzerland  or  Belgium  was  taken.  It  must  also  be  remem- 
bered that  while  M.  Odin  confined  himself  to  men  of  letters,  M. 
Jacoby  includes  all  persons  of  distinction.  But  as  he  confined  him- 
self to  the  eighteenth  century  w^hile  M.  Odin's  table  covers  five 
centuries,  the  whole  number  included  in  the  latter  is  nearly  twice 
as  large  as  that  in  the  former.  Wherever,  therefore,  the  figure  in 
the  first  column  is  approximately  half  as  large  in  M.  Jacoby's  table 
as  in  M.  Odin's  there  is  substantial  harmony  between  them.  The 
order  should  also  be  nearly  the  same,  but  exact  correspondence  in 
this  respect  could  not  of  course  be  expected.  Wide  deviations  only 
require  explanation.  Seine  and  Bouches-du-Rhone  have  the  same 
position,  and  the  former  shows  the  proper  numerical  relations. 
Doubs  has  about  twice  as  many  remarkable  personages  as  it  would 
be  expected  to  have  from  M.  Odin's  table.  The  same  is  true  of 
Jura,  Var,  and  Aisne,  while  the  high  position  of  Meurthe  is  prob- 
ably to  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  M.  Odin  combines  Meurthe- 
et-Moselle  according  to  the  present  usage.  On  the  other  hand, 
Calvados,  Indre-et-Loire,  Aube,  Oise,  Loir-et-Cher,  and  some  other 


THE  LOCAL  ENVIRONMENT 


175 


Departments 


o  a- 


h  z  ii 
2.  <i- 

cd  a  < 

«=^£ 

a  [1.  o 
Oh  cOh 


Departments 


B   g 


5  "  a: 

o  K  S 

H  ^  f- 

<  g,H 

3^0 

0.  J-    J 

C  M     - 

Oh  o:t<: 


f-  2  s 

2  <  H 

u  a  << 

;^  3 


Seine 

Bouches-du-Rhone    . 

Doubs 

Cote-d'Or    .     .     .     . 

Rhone     

Seine-et-Oise    .     .     . 

Meurthe 

Vaucluse      .     .     .     . 

Herault 

Jura 

Loiret 

Gard 

Marne 

Var 

Haute-Marne  .  .  . 
Seine-Inferieure  .  . 
Calvados  .  .  .  . 
Haute-Garonne     .     . 

Aisne 

Moselle 

Eure-et-Loir  .  .  . 
Basses-Alpes    .     .     . 

Somme 

Ille-et-Vilaine  .  .  . 
Bas-Rhin  .  .  .  . 
Ardennes     .     .     .     . 

Yonne 

Indre-et-Loire  .     .     . 

Ain 

Gironde 

Aube 

Isere  

Seine-et-Marne      .     . 

Meuse 

Oise 

Aude 

Tarn-et-Garonne  .  . 
Pas-de-Calais  .  .  . 
Ilaut-Rhin  .  .  .  . 
Uaute-Saone  .  .  . 
Finist^re       .     .     .     . 

Manche 

Charente-Inferieure  . 


69 

31 
26 

25 
24 
19 

17 
17I 

15 
15 
14 
13 
13 
II 


2327 
71 
54 
44 
173 
80 
70 
69 
58 
63 
47 

63 
42 

44 

41 

119 

91 

72 
72 
80 

49 
21 
90 
81 
123 
59 
48 
50 
60 

57 
42 
69 
57 

51 
68 

45 
65 

lOI 

109 
64 
81 

100 
66 


23 

63 
31 

25 
50 
57 
19 

27 
45 


17 
43 

25 
35 
21 

25 
16 
16 

25 
20 
40 
20 

17 
21 

13 
39 
24 
19 
20 

17 
19 

25 
26 

30 
41 
'3 
24 
21 
24 


Orne 

Aveyron     .     .     .     . 

Vosges 

Drome 

Lot-et-Garonne  . 
Haute-Vienne  .  . 
Maine-et-Loire  .  . 
Hautes-Alpes  .  . 
Correze  .  .  .  . 
Puy-de-D6me  .  . 
Saone-et-Loire     .     . 

Eure 

Cantal 

Loir-et-Cher  .  .  . 
Pyrenees-Orientales 
Ardeche     .     .     .     . 

Nievre 

Vienne 

Basses-Pyrenees .  . 
Deux-Sevres  .     .     . 

Indre 

Lot 

Nord 

Tarn 

Loire 

Gers 

Loire-Inferieure .  . 
Haute-Loire  .  .  . 
Dordogne  .  .  .  . 
Hautes-Pyrenees 

Sarthe 

Allier 

Vendee 

Mayenne    .     .     .     . 

Lozere 

Landes  

Morbihan  .     .     .     . 

Ariege 

C6tes-du-Nord    .     . 

Cher 

Creuse 

Charente    .     .     .     . 


72 
42 
68 
47 
65 
53 
67 
23 
52 
74 
63 
71 
46 

38 
40 
64 
44 
41 
59 
51 
38 
55 
181 
60 
87 

50 
68 
60 
53 
54 
75 
42 
5' 
70 
27 
31 
66 

53 
88 

38 

50 
61 


17 
17 
16 
26 
21 
26 
22 
10 

13 
21 

19 
17 
II 
21 
37 

15 
20 
18 

19 
12 

25 
13 

54 

25 
40 
18 
29 

17 
II 
16 

20 

23 
II 
i8 
12 

9 
17 
15 

9 
27 

8 

'5 


1  ^Vhere  several  departments  have  the  same  number  they  are  arranged  in  the  descending  order 
of  the  decimals  of  M.  Jacoby's  table. 


176  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

departments  fall  below  their  quota.  But  most  of  the  other  high- 
grade  departments  correspond  as  nearly  in  the  two  tables  as  could 
reasonably  be  expected.  At  the  other  end  of  the  scale,  Charente, 
Cher,  Lozere,  Mayenne,  Allier,  and  a  few  others  fall  far  below  in 
M.  Jacoby's  table,  while  the  Hautes-Pyrenees  and  Haute-Loire  are 
in  excess.  Some  of  these  differences  may  be  explainable,  but  this 
would  require  special  researches. 

These  comparisons,  though  interesting  in  themselves,  do  not  di- 
rectly bear  upon  M.  Jacoby's  contention.  This  can  be  tested  only 
by  a  comparison  of  the  figures  in  the  three  columns  of  his  table  with 
one  another.  He  does  not  specially  claim  that  density  of  population 
alone  determines  the  degree  of  fecundity,  but  only  that  it  does  so 
when  taken  in  connection  with  the  proportion  of  urban  population. 
If  we  consider  the  first  of  these  factors  by  itself  we  shall  see  how 
far  it  falls  short  of  doing  so.  If  we  take  the  case  of  the  department 
of  the  Seine,  98  per  cent  of  which  is  concentrated  in  the  city  of 
Paris,  we  see  how  enormously  greater  this  density  is  than  the 
relative  fecundity,  great  as  that  also  is.  If  the  mean  per  100,000 
is  about  9  eminent  personages,  its  fecundity  is  between  eight  and 
nine  times  that  of  the  mean.  Its  density  is  2327  and  that  of  Rhone 
is  173.  The  former  is  therefore  nearly  thirteen  times  greater  than 
that.  But  the  average  density  is  less  than  100,  and  exclusive  of 
Paris  it  is  much  less  ;  therefore  the  density  of  this  one  department 
is  anywhere  from  three  to  five  times  as  great  as  the  theory  would 
require,  and  it  ought  to  have  produced  200  or  300  distinguished 
personages  instead  of  69  per  100,000  inhabitants.  But  perhaps  this 
is  not  a  fair  illustration.  The  failure  of  the  theory,  however,  is 
equally  clear  if  we  consider  departments  of  low  fecundity.  As  we 
go  down  the  scale  we  see  the  fecundity  gradually  diminishing  until 
it  almost  disappears.  If  we  scan  the  second  column  we  do  not  find 
this  to  be  the  case.  Yet  the  theory  would  require  it  to  be  the  case. 
But  we  find  Nord,  with  a  fecundity  of  only  4,  occupying  the  second 
place  in  point  of  density.  This  is  the  most  extreme  case,  but  those 
of  Pas-de-Calais,  Manche,  Orne,  and  especially  C6tes-du-Nord,  Loire, 
and  Sarthe,  are  almost  as  striking.  Instances  of  the  opposite  class, 
viz.,  where  high  fecundity  goes  along  with  low  density,  are  also  abun- 
dant, as  in  Cote-d'Or,  Doubs,  Loiret,  Marne,  and  Basses- Alpes.  In 
fact,  the  figures  for  the  density  scarcely  diminish  at  all  in  passing 


Ch.  IX]  THE  LOCAL  ENVIRONMENT  177 

from  higher  to  lower  fecundity.  They  even  seem  to  increase 
toward  the  bottom  of  the  scale. 

Let  us  next  examine  the  percentage  of  urban  population.  Here 
we  do  see  some  diminution  parallel  with  that  of  the  fecundity.  Paris 
is  98  per  cent  of  the  Seine  and  has  much  the  largest  fecundity. 
Bouches-du-Rhone  with  Marseilles  and  other  cities  making  up  8  1 
per  cent  comes  second  in  point  of  productivity  in  great  men.  But 
here  we  meet  a  counter-fact  in  Doubs  and  Cote-d'Or  with  23  and 
22  per  cent  of  urban  population  holding  the  third  and  fourth  places 
in  point  of  fertility  of  talent.  Rhone,  again,  with  Lyons  to  swell  the 
percentage  of  urban  population  in  a  comparatively  small  department, 
restores  the  balance  for  a  moment,  but  it  is  soon  lost  again,  and  the 
whole  series  becomes  so  irregular  and  fitful  that  all  that  can  be  said 
is  that  many  of  the  departments  of  a  low  fecundity  also  have  a  small 
urban  population.  Still,  Haut-Rhin,  with  a  fecundity  of  7,  has  a 
percentage  of  urban  population  of  41  ;  Loire,  with  4,  a  percentage  of 
40;  and  Cher,  with  only  2,  a  percentage  of  27.  But  more  remark- 
able still,  and  as  puzzling  in  this  case  as  in  the  preceding,  is  Nord, 
which,  notwithstanding  its  great  density  of  population,  amounting 
to  181  inhabitants  to  the  square  kilometer,  and  notwithstanding  its 
54  per  cent  of  urban  population,  produced  only  4  men  of  talent  for 
each  100,000  inhabitants  during  the  entire  eighteenth  century  ! 

M.  Jacoby  did  not  shut  his  eyes  to  these  facts.  His  graphic  dia- 
gram brought  them  out  too  plainly,  but  not  more  forcibly  than  does 
the  table  as  I  have  rearranged  it.  His  general  comment  upon  the 
whole  result  is  as  follows  : 

The  reader  perceives  that  the  graphic  view  already  proves,  up  to  a  certain 
point,  the  correctness  of  our  idea  and  of  the  conclusions  at  which  we  arrived 
a  priori.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  we  must  not  allow  ourselves  to  be  deceived 
nor  shut  our  eyes  to  the  evidence.  The  agreement  in  the  lines  which  express 
the  conditions  which  we  are  analyzing  zrtfelt,  it  is  true,  more  or  less  in  their 
general  direction,  but  these  lines  present  at  the  same  time  a  long  series  of  devia- 
tions not  in  the  least  doubtful  in  particular  cases.  Evidently  it  could  not  be 
expected  that  questions  as  complex  as  that  of  the  intensity  of  the  energy  of 
intellectual  activity  in  its  relation  to  conditions  as  multiplied  as  those  that  con- 
stitute civilization,  could  be  e.xpressed  by  a  graphic  figure  so  simple  and  exact 
that  it  would  admit  of  neither  deviation  nor  exception.  But  it  must  be  admitted 
nevertliele.ss  that  the  graphic  representation  scarcely  enables  us  to  feel,  to  guess 
the  relation  between  the  conditions  which  form  the  object  of  our  search,  with- 
out giving  out  any  positive  indication  with  regard  to  it  ;  at  least  the  exceptions 


178  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

are  so  numerous,  the  deviations  so  great,  that  they  render  the  general  harmony 
of  the  lines  completely  illusory.  Moreover  these  exceptions,  these  deviations 
also  have  their  raison  cfeire,  and  therefore  must  have  their  meaning  and  their 
explanation.  To  say  that  they  mask  the  general  direction  of  the  lines  and  hence 
the  law  that  governs  them,  w^ould  be  an  error.  These  deviations  break  in  the  most 
positive  and  indubitable  manner  the  parallelism  of  the  lines,  and  thus  constitute 
in  the  particular  cases  a  direct  refutation  of  the  law  that  we  have  laid  down.^ 

One  might  have  supposed  that  M.  Jacoby  would  have  been  con- 
tent to  rest  his  case  here,  having  shown  by  statistics  that  density 
of  population  coupled  with  the  proportion  of  persons  living  in  cities 
has  some  unknown  relation  to  the  amount  of  talent  in  a  country,  al- 
though he  had  scarcely  advanced  the  subject  beyond  the  popular 
intuitions  with  regard  to  it.  But  his  faith  in  his  theory,  which  he 
now  admits  to  have  been  only  a  hypothesis,  was  too  strong  to  permit 
him  to  abandon  it,  and  he  proceeds  to  discuss  a  great  variety  of  as- 
pects of  the  question,  especially  the  ethnological  and  the  physical  or 
climatological  and  even  geological  causes  of  the  various  deviations 
that  his  table  and  graphic  scheme  present.  He  proceeds  to  make 
what  he  calls  an  ethnological  grouping  of  the  departments,  which,  he 
claims,  satisfies  the  hypothesis.  But  it  is  not  an  ethnological  group- 
ing at  all.  It  seems  to  be  nothing  else  than  a  wholly  arbitrary 
grouping  made  with  the  express  intention  of  satisfying  it.  By  suc- 
cessive trials  he  was  able  to  put  together  certain  departments  in 
such  a  way  that  the  five  groups  thus  formed  would  show  a  nearly 
parallel  diminution  in  all  three  of  the  columns.  The  first  group,  for 
example,  consists  of  the  following  departments:  Seine,  Bouches-du- 
Rhone,  Doubs,  Rhone,  Cote-d'Or,  Seine-et-Oise,  Meurthe,  Vaucluse, 
Herault.  Will  any  one  claim  that  the  inhabitants  of  Paris,  Mar- 
seilles, Besan^on,  Lyons,  Dijon,  Versailles,  Nancy,  Avignon,  and 
Montpellier  belong  in  any  proper  sense  to  any  particular  race  ? 
But  the  departments  in  the  other  four  groups,  though  more  numer- 
ous, are  even  more  widely  scattered.  The  third  group,  for  example, 
contains  departments  as  different  ethnologically  as  Finistere  and 
Haut-Rhin,  while  the  fourth  group  contains  the  Pyrenees-Orientales 
and  Basses-Pyrenees  in  the  extreme  south  and  southwest,  with  a 
considerable  Basque  population,  and  Nord,  with  its  Flemish  admix- 
ture.   This,  surely,  is  forcing  statistics  with  a  vengeance. 

1  Jacoby,  op.  cit.,  p.  539. 


Cii.  IX]  THE  LOCAL  ENVIRONMENT  I  79 

In  Chapter  IX  of  his  book,  while  still  insisting  that  the  frequency 
of  remarkable  personages  is  in  direct  ratio  to  the  density  of  popula- 
tion and  to  the  proportion  of  urban  population,  he  says  that  these 
two  conditions  are  in  direct  relation  with  each  other,  and  asks  the 
question  whether  we  may  not  conclude  that  they  should  be  regarded 
the  one  as  a  function  of  the  other,  which  would  then  be  the  inde- 
pendent variable,  and  he  adds  : 

Since  the  frequency  of  remarkable  persons  is  in  direct  relation  with  both  the 
conditions  of  population,  it  should  be  in  direct  relation  with  their  product,  and, 
designating  the  density  of  population  by  x,  the  percentage  of  urban  population 
by/,  and  the  frequency  of  remarkable  personages  by  «,  we  shall  have  for  the 
expression  of  our  law,  no  longer  u  =/{x,y),  but  u  =/(xy). 

He  then  proceeds  to  apply  this  formula  to  certain  selected  prov- 
inces, not  wholly  the  recognized  provinces  of  France,  but  corre- 
sponding in  part  to  these,  and  finds  that  they  conform  to  his  alleged 
law.  That  this  would  not  be  true  of  all  the  provinces  is  evident, 
and  it  is  difficult  to  see  what  real  value  all  this  has  for  those  who 
simply  want  to  know  the  truth.  M.  Odin,  in  discussing  this  singular 
proceeding,  remarks  : 

I  will  confine  myself  to  pointing  out  the  strange  blunder  {bevue')  that  tlie 
author  commits  when  he  multiplies  the  density  of  the  population  by  the  per- 
centage of  urban  population.  It  is  not  enough  to  discover  an  operation  which 
permits  us  to  attain  a  given  result.  It  is  also  essential  that  its  application  be 
legitimate.  But  it  evidently  is  not  so  in  the  present  case.  If  we  take  a  depart- 
ment with  a  total  dense  population  but  with  a  small  urban  population,  by  what 
right  can  we  make  the  first  compensate  the  second?  What  meaning  has  the 
.density  by  itself  in  the  theory  of  our  author?  None  at  all.  It  has  no  influence 
except  as  it  comes  from  urban  agglomerations.  A  very  dense  population  living 
only  in  hamlets  could  not  equal  a  less  dense  one  grouped  around  an  important 
center,  although  the  product  of  the  density  by  the  percentage  of  population 
might  be  practically  the  same  in  the  two  cases.  But  if  the  density  means  noth- 
ing by  itself  how  could  it  serve  to  correct  the  proportion  of  urban  population? 
One  fact  makes  it  unnecessary  to  insist  on  the  strangeness  of  supposing  that 
when  neither  the  density  of  population  nor  the  amount  of  urban  population 
furnishes  the  desired  result,  the  combination  of  these  two  elements  will  do  so. 
This  is  that,  even  admitting  this  arbitrary  multiplication,  it  is  impossible  to  dis- 
cover a  general  agreement  between  the  definite  figures  obtained  by  the  author 
and  the  number  of  remarkable  men.  It  is,  on  the  contrary,  easy  to  show  by 
numerous  and  striking  examples  taken  at  random  that  the  law  laid  down  by 
him  is  purely  imaginary.  In  the  first  place,  here  is  a  series  of  departments 
which,  although  their  population  is  distributed  in  a  wholly  different  way,  never- 
theless present  almost  the  same  fecundity  in  remarkable  personages : 


i8o 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


[Part  II 


Departments 


Density 


Population 


Percentage 


Urban 
Population 


Definite 
Index 


Civilization 


Relative 

Nu.MBER   OF 

Remarkable 
Personages 


Hautes-Alpes 
Deux-Sevres 
Tarn     .     .     . 

Loire    .     .     . 
Nord     .     .     . 


23-47 
50.70 
60.36 
86.67 
180.68 


lO.I 

12. 1 

24-7 
39-5 

53-7 


2.4 

6.1 

14.9 

34-2 

97.0 


5-337 
4275 
4-039 
3-875 
4.092 


Now,  on  the  contrary  here  are  other  departments  which,  wnth  an  almost  iden- 
tical distribution  of  population,  differ  entirely  in  their  fecundity  in  men  of  mark  : 


Departments 

Density 

of 

Population 

Percentage 

OP 

Urban 
Population 

Definite 
Index 

OF 

Civilization 

Relative 

Nu.MBER    OP 

Remarkable 
Personages 

Charente        .     . 
Basses-Pyrenees 
Eure-et-Loir  . 
Loiret  .... 

61.44 

58.56 

48.53 

46.696 

44.02 

14-15 

18.8 
16.2 
27.0 
22.3 

8.7 
I  1.2 

7-9 

12.6 

9.8 

1.369 

4.480 

9-472 

13.916 

24.636 

Cote-d'Or      .     . 

It  would  be  easy  to  multiply  examples.  Those  that  I  have  given  will  suffice 
to  astonish  the  reader  as  it  does  me  that  any  one  should  have  been  able  to 
maintain  a  theory  so  in  contradiction  to  the  facts.  Even  if  these  examples  were 
the  only  ones  that  could  be  cited,  they  would  be  sufficient  to  refute  the  theory. 
A  law  that  admits  of  such  monstrous  exceptions  evidently  cannot  be  true.^ 

It  follows  from  all  this  that  density  of  population,  while  doubtless 
a  potent  influence  in  civilization,  is  not  in  and  of  itself  the  real 
factor  of  the  local  environment  that  we  are  seeking  —  the  true 
generator  of  men  of  genius.  That  factor  is  still  to  be  found,  but 
M.  Odin  has  actually  found  it,  and  we  have  only  to  follow  him  to 
learn  what  it  is.  The  true  local  environment  is  something  much 
closer  and  more  directly  associated  with  the  man  of  genius.  It  is 
also  a  much  simpler  phenomenon  than  any  of  those  that  have  been 
so  long  and  patiently  sought  for.  This  is  another  among  numerous 
examples  in  which  the  truth  is  missed  for  no  other  reason  than  that 
it  is  so  plain  and  patent  that  it  is  overlooked,  despised,  as  it  were. 
The  human  mind  wants  obscure,  remote,  recondite  solutions.  Simple, 

^  Odin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  246-248. 


Ch.  IX]  THE  LOCAL  ENVIRONMENT  l8i 

commonplace  explanations  do  not  satisfy  it.    As  M.  Odin  says  in 

the  paragraph  that  immediately  follows  the  one  last  quoted : 

In  fact,  M.  Jacoby  had  a  much  more  simple  and  effective  means  of  determin- 
ing the  relation  that  may  exist  between  the  distribution  of  the  population  and 
the  fecundity  in  great  men,  a  means  so  simple  in  reality  that  we  can  scarcely 
conceive  of  his  not  thinking  of  it.  Instead  of  resorting  to  such  subtle  oper- 
ations, he  would  have  needed  only  to  inquire  how  many  remarkable  personages 
were  born  in  the  large  cities,  how  many  in  the  small  cities,  and  how  many  in 
the  country.  The  enigma  would  have  been  solved  at  one  stroke,  and  without 
any  possible  dispute. 

There  is  a  wide-spread  belief  that  great  men  are  nearly  all  born 
in  the  country.  Bagehot  is  claimed  to  have  said :  "  Very  few  great 
men  have  issued  from  the  exhausted  soil  of  a  metropolis,"^  and 
Richter  declared  that  "no  poet  is  ever  born  in  a  capital."  ^  Qid- 
dings  says:  "  Genius  is  rarely  born  in  the  town."^  I  have  myself 
shared  this  view,  based  on  a  considerable  number  of  examples  that 
have  come  under  my  personal  observation.  Lombroso  and  Laschi 
claim  to  have  "  demonstrated  that  the  greater  number  of  geniuses, 
though  they  die  in  the  cities,  are  born  in  the  country."  "^  One  might 
cite  a  large  number  of  statements  to  the  same  or  similar  effect,^  and 
M.  Jacoby  seems  to  be  thoroughly  imbued  with  it,  notwithstanding 
the  facts  of  his  own  compilation  to  the  contrary.  It  would  be 
easy,  though  somewhat  laborious,  to  compile  from  his  fourth  chapter 
a  series  of  tables  that  would  bring  out  the  true  facts  on  this  point. 
On  account  of  the  differences  above  pointed  out  between  his  facts 
and  those  compiled  by  M.  Odin,  they  might  reward  this  labor,  but 
such  comparisons  as  have  already  been  made  between  them  show 
such  a  general  agreement  that  we  naturally  expect  it  to  hold  also 
in  the  present  case. 

As  a  preparation  for  this  most  important  part  of  his  entire  work, 
M.  Odin  drew  up  an  elaborate  table  showing  chiefly  by  half-century 

^  Cf.  Lombroso  and  Laschi,  Le  Crime  politique,  p.  158.  See  also  Lombroso, 
L'Homme  de  genie,  pp.  199  ff. 

■^  So  says  Lombroso,  but  I  find  only  this  to  justify  it :  "  Let  no  poet  suffer  him- 
self to  be  born  or  educated  in  a  metropolis,  but  if  possible,  in  a  hamlet,  at  the  highest 
in  a  village"  (Life  of  Jean  Paul  F.  Richter  together  with  his  Autobiography.  Trans- 
lated from  the  German,  London,  1845,  ^o'-  I'  P-  --1  '•^•'  i"  'be  Autobiography). 

3  Principles  of  Sociology,  p.  347.  *  Le  Crime  politique,  etc.,  p.  157. 

^  Cf.  de  CandoUe,  op.  cit.,  p.  380;  Coste,  La  Sociologie  objective,  Paris,  1899, 
p.  13;  Dallemagne,  Degenerescence  individuelle  et  Degenerescence  collective,  Bru- 
xelles,   1897,  p.  7. 


l82 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


[Part  II 


periods  the  exact  places  of  birth  of  all  the  modern  French  men  of 
letters.  The  periods  are  shown  in  columns  and  the  departments 
are  arranged  in  alphabetical  order,  the  cities  in  each  department 
standing  over  them.  The  lists  of  cities  are  always  terminated  by  the 
chateaux,  where  any  are  born  in  the  chateaux  of  any  department, 
as  is  very  frequently  the  case.  The  entry  "other  localities  "  which 
concludes  the  enumeration  of  the  cities  usually  includes  all  born  in 
the  rural  districts  or  in  very  small  villages.  Wherever  any  of  the 
men  of  letters  are  men  of  talent  the  figure  for  these  is  put  in  paren- 
theses by  the  side  of  the  figure  for  the  whole  number.  The  last 
column  gives  the  total  for  the  entire  period  (1300-182 5).  This 
table  enables  any  skeptical  person  to  verify  the  general  results  of 
future  tables.  The  next  table  shows  the  results  by  periods  and 
provinces,  distinguishing  those  born  in  cities  from  those  born  in 
other  localities.    Omitting  the  periods  this  table  is  as  follows: 


Cities 


Merit  Talent 


Country 


Merit  Talent 


Normandy 

Picardy,  Artois 

Provence       

Lyonnais 

Lorraine 

South  Languedoc       

Orleanais 

Brittany 

West  Guyenne 

Touraine,  Anjou,  Maine     .     .     . 

Burgundy 

French  Switzerland 

East  Guyenne 

Champagne 

Isle  of  France,  exclusive  of  Paris 
Auvergne,  Limousin,  Marche 

Saintonge,  Poitou 

Franche-Comte 

Berry,  Nivernais,  Bourbonnais    . 

Savoy,  Dauphine        

French  Belgium 

Gascony 

North  Languedoc 


259 
238 
203 
148 

145 
140 

137 
134 
121 
120 
120 
119 
117 
116 
112 


94 
71 
68 

56 
32 


46 

32 
28 
26 
19 
19 
28 

30 
18 
22 
20 

27 

15 
17 
23 
19 
16 
21 
17 
19 
2 

7 
I 


125 

125 

85 

23 

89 

44 
47 
40 

41 
69 

59 
35 

45 

52 

106 

32 
38 
87 
28 

5' 

24 

23 
26 


24 
33 

22 

4 
10 
II 
12 

5 

7 

10 

9 

9 

II 

12 


4 
12 

3 
12 
I 
7 
4 


Ch.  IX] 


THE  LOCAL  ENVIRONMENT 


i8- 


This  table  shows  how  much  truth  there  is  in  the  popular  belief 
that  great  men  are  usually  born  in  the  country.  With  a  single 
exception,  and  that  the  one  that  yielded  the  smallest  number,  the 
cities  of  every  province  yielded  a  larger  number  of  men  of  letters 
than  the  country.  In  most  cases  it  is  more  than  double.  In  two 
provinces,  Franche-Comte  and  Isle  of  France,  the  difference  is  not 
very  great.  For  the  first  of  these  the  reason  is  not  clear,  but  for 
the  second  it  is  obviously  due  to  the  influence  of  the  metropolis, 
the  principal  city  being  Versailles,  and  a  great  part  of  the  region 
consisting  of  suburbs,  which  were  counted  as  country,  although  to 
all  intents  and  purposes  they  are  parts  of  Paris.  It  is  clear  then 
that  it  is  not  so  much  the  general  density  of  the  population  of  a 
province  as  some  peculiar  influence  which  a  city  exerts  that  raises 
the  productivity  in  great  men,  while  life  in  rural  districts  and  in 
small  villages  tends  strongly  to  diminish  this  productivity.  ' 

The  same  truth  is  brought  out  with  equal  force  when  the  facts 
are  shown  by  regions  instead  of  provinces,  as  in  the  following 
table : 


Regions 

Cities 

Country 

Merit 

Talent 

Merit 

Talent 

North 

Northeast 

553 
478 
422 
365 
352 
3^7 
270 

80 
87 
67 

68 
68 
62 
40 

274 
270 
206 
205 
147 

83 
109 

58 
40 

49 
35 
19 
15 

25 

Southeast 

North  Center,  exclusive  of  Paris      .     . 

South  Center 

Southwest 

Here  there  is  no  region  in  which  the  country -born  at  all  approach 
the  city-born.  In  four  of  them  the  latter  are  more  than  double  the 
number  of  the  former,  and  in  one,  the  South  Center,  they  are 
nearly  four  times  as  many.  In  the  other  three  they  are  somewhat 
less  than  double.  As  in  all  previous  cases  the  results  for  the 
larger  areas  are  more  uniform,  and  the  larger  irregularities  are 
smoothed  off. 

M.  Odin  next  gives  a  curious  table  of  the  men  of  letters  born  in 
chateaux.    The  importance  of  this  to  our  subject  will  become  more 


1 84 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


[Part  II 


apparent  as  we  proceed,  and  I  will  reproduce  the  table  here.  As 
the  periods  form  an  essential  feature  in  this  case,  they  will  be  shown 
as  he  has  drawn  them  up. 


Merit 

Talent 

Periods 

Number 

Annual       Per  Cent 
Average      of  Total 

Number 

Annual 

A\'ERAGE 

Per  Cent 
OF  Total 

I 300-1 500 
1501-1550 
1551-1600 
1601-1650 
1651-1700 
1701-1725 
1 726-1 7 50 
1751-1776 
1777-1800 
1801-1825 

15 
17 
18 

15 
14 
7 
4 
14 
9 
4 

0.075            5-1 
0.34                4-1 
0.36                3.6 
0-3°       :        2.3 
0.28        !         2.2 
0.28                 1.7 
0.16                0.7 

0.56                     2.1 
0.36          ,            1.4 
0.16                     0.4 

3 
6 
8 
5 
7 
3 
2 

3 

2 

I 

0.015 

0.12 

0.16 

O.IO 

0.14 

0.12 

0.08 

0.12 

0.08 

0.04 

5-2 
7-4 

II.O 

3-3 
51 
3-8 
2.0 

2-3 

2.0 
0.7 

Total 

117 

2.0 

40 

3-8 

It  is  certainly  surprising  that  117  persons  of  distinction  from  a 
literary  point  of  view,  or  two  per  cent  of  all  the  men  of  letters  of 
France,  should  have  been  born  in  chateaux.  Forty  of  these  were 
men  of  talent,  forming  nearly  four  per  cent  of  all  of  that  grade. 
Both  these  facts  will  find  their  explanation  at  a  later  stage  in  the 
discussion. 

In  the  tables  by  provinces  and  by  regions  only  the  actual  number 
born  in  cities  and  in  the  country  are  shown.  The  results  are  suffi- 
ciently remarkable,  but  they  do  not  by  any  means  afford  a  fair  test 
of  the  real  effect  of  city  life  in  the  development  of  genius.  This  is 
because  for  any  considerable  area  the  city  population  falls  much 
below  that  of  the  country.  This  is  true  even  for  departments,  and 
M.  Odin  has  prepared  a  table  of  these,  showing  in  addition  to  the 
facts  shown  in  the  other  tables  the  number  per  100,000  inhabitants. 
This  brings  out  the  real  difference  between  urban  and  rural  fecun- 
dity in  men  of  letters.    The  following  is  the  table : 


Ch.  IX] 


THE  LOCAL  ENVIRONMENT 


185 


Comparative  Table  by  Departments  of  France  of  City  and 
Country  in  Men  of  Letters 


Departments 


Cities 

Country 

Nvmber 

Number 

Number 

PER  100,000 

Number 

PER  100,000 

Inhabitants 

Inhabitants 

1344 

243 

12 

15 

90 

243 

33 

II 

28 

187 

24 

II 

39 

156 

34 

10 

55 

145 

18 

10 

71 

142 

20 

8 

51 

134 

26 

17 

78 

132 

13 

5 

27 

123 

4 

2 

38 

119 

19 

8 

135 

118 

13 

7 

66 

118 

5 

I 

36 

112/2 

23 

10 

42 

III 

13 

3 

65 

108 

17 

8 

28 

108 

8 

4 

80 

107 

45 

12 

34 

106 

30 

8 

50 

104 

45 

12 

49 

102 

15 

7 

47 

102 

12 

5 

35 

100 

17 

9 

30 

97 

14 

4 

2  "^ 

96 

28 

12 

125 

93 

26 

6 

28 

93 

4 

2 

34 

92 

23 

8 

32 

89 

8 

4 

40 

87 

18 

5 

30 

86 

26 

6 

59 

85 

23 

6 

48 

84 

20 

8 

'5 

83 

23 

8 

51 

82 

21 

5 

122 

80 

26 

20 

18 

78 

27 

10 

14 

78 

II 

5 

18 

75 

6 

3 

17 

74 

5 

2 

18 

72 

22 

9 

Seine 

Cote-d'Or.  .  .  . 
Ilaute-Mame      .     . 

Oise 

Doubs 

Loiret 

Vaucluse  .  .  .  . 
Haute-Garonne .     . 

Cher 

Eure-et-Loir  .     .     . 

Rhone  

Ille-et-Vilaine  .  . 
Indre-et-Loire     .     . 

Isere     

Herault  .  .  .  . 
Loir-et-Cher  .  .  . 
Calvados  .     .     .     . 

Aisne 

Seine-et-Oise  .  . 
Meurthe-et-Moselle 

Marne 

Aube 

Sarthe 

Ardennes  .     .     .     . 
Seine-Inferieure 
Ilaute-Vienne    .     . 

\'onne 

Vienne 

Maine-et-Loire  .  . 
Saone-et-Loire  .  . 
Somme      .     .     .     . 

Card 

Ain 

Pas-de-Calais  .  . 
Bouches-du-Rhone 

Jura 

Correze     .     .     .     . 

Allier 

Charente  .  .  .  . 
Meuse 


1 86 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


[Part  II 


Departments 


Cities 


Country 


Number 

PER    100,000 

Inhabitants 


Number 


Seine-et-Marne  .  . 
Puy-de-D6me     .     . 

Indre    

Tarn 

Ardeche  .... 
Manche  .... 
Lot-et-Garonne 
Charente-Inferieure 
Gironde  .... 
Basses-Pyrenees 

Lot 

Orne 

Mayenne  .... 

Creuse 

Drome 

Nord 

Eure 

Aude 

Finistere  .... 
Deux-Sevres .     .     . 

Cantal 

Basses-Alpes  .  . 
Pyrenees-Orientales 

Loire 

Var 

Aveyron  .... 
Haute-Saone  .  . 
Vosges  .... 
Tarn-et-Garonne  . 
Morbihan  .... 

Nievre 

Hautes-Pyrenees  . 
Loire-Inferieure 

Ariege 

Savoie 

C6tes-du-Nord  .  . 
Hautes-Alpes     .     . 

Lozere  

Corsica      .     .     .     . 

Nice 

Haute- Loire  .  .  . 
Gers 


20 
41 
17 
24 

5 
25 
16 

32 

63 
20 
12 
14 
14 
5 

XI 

72 

15 
20 

25 

10 

10 

8 

7 

13 
19 
12 

5 

10 
16 
13 

9 

4 
23 

3 
12 

7 
3 
2 

4 
3 
4 
3 


71 
69 
68 

65 

62)4 

61 

59 

58 

57 

57 

57 

56 

5^ 

55;^ 

55 

54 

50 

54 

51 

50 

50 

47 

47 

46 

43 
43 
42 
42 
41 
36 
32 
31 
27 
27 
26 
26 
21 
20 
20 
16 
15 
13 


15 
9 
6 

13 
16 


10 
II 

7 
6 
20 
14 
3 
15 
23 
21 

4 
10 

7 

5 

12 

3 

ID 

19 
13 
19 
18 

4 

6 

12 

I 

9 

6 

16 

10 

5 
6 


4 
12 


Ch.  IX]  THE  LOCAL  ENVIRONMENT  187 

M.  Odin  in  his  table  arranged  the  departments  simply  in  geo- 
graphical order.  This  makes  it  difficult  to  study.  I  have  rearranged 
them  in  the  descending  order  of  the  number  per  100,000  inhabitants 
born  in  cities,  and  where  this  number  is  the  same  for  two  or  more 
departments,  then  in  the  same  order  for  those  born  in  the  country. 
By  letting  the  eye  run  down  the  second  column  and  comparing  it 
with  the  fourth  a  clear  idea  is  gained  of  the  relations  between  the 
two.  The  result  of  comparing  the  first  and  third  columns  giving 
the  absolute  number  of  each  class  born  in  each  department  is  less 
significant,  but  important  lessons  can  be  drawn  from  its  irregu- 
larity. But  the  great  lesson  is  derived  from  a  comparison  of  the 
second  and  fourth  columns.  The  two  tables  (pp.  182  and  183) 
giving  the  absolute  number  by  provinces  and  by  regions  showed 
that  the  fecundity  of  cities  was  about  twice  as  great  as  that  of  the 
country.  We  now  see  how  misleading  this  is,  and  what  a  mis- 
take it  would  be  to  infer  from  it  that  the  influence  of  the  city  is 
only  about  twice  as  favorable  as  that  of  the  country  in  the  pro- 
duction of  men  of  eminence.  The  merest  inspection  shows  that 
it  is  generally  many  times  as  great.  To  arrive  at  the  average  we 
have  only  to  foot  the  two  columns  and  divide  the  sum  of  the  second 
column  by  that  of  the  fourth.  Or  we  may  divide  these  sums  by  82, 
the  number  of  departments,  which  gives  the  average  in  each  case 
per  100,000  of  population,  and  then  divide  the  average  for  the  cities 
by  that  for  the  country.  The  result  is  of  course  the  same,  i.e., 
nearly  13  (exactly  12.77).  This  means  that  on  an  average  the  cities 
of  France  have  produced  nearly  thirteen  times  as  many  eminent 
authors  for  the  same  number  of  inhabitants  as  the  rural  districts. 
The  average  of  the  former  is  j"]  and  of  the  latter  6  for  all  depart- 
ments per  100,000  population.  This  result  is  contrary  to  all  theories 
and  to  the  popular  view,  and  it  could  only  have  been  reached  by 
such  a  prolonged  and  exhaustive  investigation  as  that  which  M.  Odin 
has  conducted. 

It  now  begins  to  be  apparent  what  the  local  environment  is  and 
how  it  operates  in  the  production  of  great  men.  This  is  still  more 
clearly  brought  out  by  a  special  study  of  Paris  in  comparison  with 
other  cities  and  with  the  country.  M.  Odin  has  drawn  up  a  table  by 
twenty-five-year  periods  to  show  this.    The  whole  number  of  men 


l88  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  ll 

of  letters,  as  shown  in  his  extended  list,  that  were  born  in  Paris  is 
1 341.  The  number  born  in  other  chief  cities  is  2757.  The  number 
born  in  all  other  localities  exclusiv^e  of  chateaux  is  1 294,  or  less 
than  the  number  for  Paris  alone.  He  gives  a  column  for  the  num- 
ber relative  to  the  population  for  each  of  these  classes,  i.e.,  what 
the  whole  number  in  France  would  have  been  if  the  whole  country 
had  produced  the  same  number  for  the  same  population  as  each 
class  actually  produced.  The  result  is  that  if  all  France  had  the 
same  relative  fecundity  in  men  of  letters  as  Paris,  it  would  have  pro- 
duced 53,640  instead  of  6382  ;  if  it  had  the  same  fecundity  as  the 
other  chief  cities,  it  would  have  produced  22,060  ;  but  if  it  had  only 
the  same  fecundity  as  the  rural  districts,  the  total  output  would 
have  been   1522. 

Fecundity  in  eminent  persons  seems  then  to  be  intimately  con- 
nected with  cities,  and  we  have  made  one  step  toward  its  full 
explanation.  It  will  be  remembered  that  in  all  cases  it  is  the  place 
of  birth  that  is  considered,  irrespective  of  all  movements  from  place 
to  place  during  life.  At  first  sight  this  may  seem  to  be  an  inadequate 
criterion.  The  case  would  obviously  be  greatly  strengthened  if  the 
place  where  men  did  their  chief  work  were  taken  instead  of  merely 
the  place  of  their  birth.  Lombroso  is  undoubtedly  right  when  he 
says  that  great  numbers  born  in  the  country  repair  to  the  city,  do 
their  life-work  there,  and  die  there.^  But  Lombroso,  like  so  many 
others,  was  led  by  this  into  the  error  that  most  great  geniuses  are 
born  in  the  country.  He  says  that  their  appearance  in  so  great 
numbers  in  the  cities  leads  to  the  belief  that  they  are  all  born  there. 
This  is  exactly  the  opposite  of  the  truth.  There  is  no  popular  belief 
that  great  men  are  mostly  born  in  cities,  but  there  is,  as  he  himself 
shows,  a  wide-spread  belief  that  they  are  mostly  born  in  the  coun- 
try and  find  their  way  to  the  cities.  The  comparatively  small  num- 
ber who  really  do  this  produces  a  strong  impression  on  the  minds  of 
persons  acquainted  with  such  facts.  A  few  examples,  as  I  know 
from  my  own  experience,  suffice  to  create  this  impression.  We 
have  no  way  of  controlling  our  judgments  in  such  matters.  The 
much  larger  number  born  in  cities  are  not  brought  to  our  attention. 
When  this  is  the  case  the  biographies  are  silent  with  regard  to  it. 

1  Lombroso  and  Laschi,  Le  Crime  politique,  etc.,  pp.  157-158. 


Ch.  IX] 


THE  LOCAL  ExNVIRONMENT 


189 


It  is  the  old  fallacy  that  we  are  constantly  meeting  with.    It  is  the 
exceptions  that  strike  us  and  we  ignore  the  rule. 

The  question  narrows  down  then,  at  least  for  the  present,  to  a 
study  of  cities.  Departments,  provinces,  regions,  are  vague  desig- 
nations, and  their  study  fails  to  afford  a  clear  grasp  of  the  condi- 
tions. The  following  table  of  the  chief  cities  of  France  and  their 
fecundity  in  men  of  letters  will  instruct  us  in  this  respect : 

Cities  of  France  that  have  produced  Three  or  More  Men  of 
Letters  of  Merit  or  of  Talent 


CrTiES 


Paris  .     . 

Lyon  .     . 

Rouen 

Geneva    . 

Toulouse 

Dijon 

Marseille 

Bordeaux 

Orleans 

Montpellier 

Caen  . 

Aix 

Rennes 

Besan9on 

Metz   . 

Nancy 

Nimes 

Versailles 

Avignon 

Reims 

Amiens 

Angers 

Tours 

Chartres 

Grenoble 

Troyes 

Lille    . 

Limoges 

Bourges 

Le  Mans 


Merit 


I341 
129 

99 
91 
76 

73 
67 
63 
62 

51 
50 
45 
41 
40 
40 
35 
35 
35 
33 
33 
31 
30 
30 
29 
28 
28 

27 
26 

25 
24 


Talent 


285 
22 
18 


15 
12 

4 


9 
6 
10 
12 
8 
6 
5 
7 
6 
8 
6 
6 
5 
9 
8 

3 
4 
5 
6 


Cities 


Langres  .  .  . 
Arras  .... 
Beauvais  .  .  . 
Liege  .... 
Nantes  .  .  . 
Blois  .... 
Poitiers  .  .  . 
Saint-Malo  .  . 
Auxerre  .  .  . 
La  Rochelle .  . 
Lausanne  .  . 
Mens  .... 
Riom  .... 
Clermont-Ferrand 
Douai  ... 
Moulins  .  .  . 
Saint-Quentin  . 
Valenciennes  . 
Le  Havre  .  . 
Angouleme  .  . 
Beziers  ... 
Laval  .... 
Sedan  .... 
Vienne  ... 
Boulogne-sur-Mer 
Castres  .  .  . 
Issoudun 
Abbeville  .  . 
Bayeux  .     . 

Quimper  .     .     . 


Merit 


23 
21 
21 
21 
21 
20 
20 
20 

19 
18 


18 

17 

15 

15 

15 

15 

14 

I3I 

13 

13 

13 

13 


Talent 


1  Including  one  born  in  the  chiteau. 


I90 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


[Part  II 


Cities 


Toulon  . 

Agen 

Alenfon 

Aries 

Bayonne 

Bourg-en-Bresse  . 

Brive-la-Gaillarde 

Cambrai     .     .     . 

Chalon-sur-Saone 

Dieppe  .... 

Lorient .... 

Loudun      .     .     . 

Saumur      .     .     . 

Sens 

Vire  . 


Albi  . 
Brest 
Cahors 
Carpentras  .  . 
Compiegne  .  . 
Laon  .... 
Macon  .... 
Namur  .... 
Uzes  .... 
Verdun-sur-Meuse 
Autun  .... 
Carcassonne  .  . 
Castelnaudary  . 
Chalons-sur-Marne 
Chambery  . 
Niort  .  . 
Pontoise  . 
Saint-Omer 
Soissons 
Bar-le-duc  . 
Coutances  . 
Montbrison 
Montdidier 
Perpignan  . 
Saintes  . 
Toul  .  . 
Apt  .  .  . 
Baume-les-Dames 


Merit 


lO 

4 

lO 

— 

10 

— 

10 

3 

lO 

3 

10 

— 

lO 

— 

lO 

— 

10 

2 

10 

3 

lO 

2 

10 

I 

lO 

— 

lO 

3 

9 

I 

9 

— 

9 

3 

9 

I 

9 

I 

9 

I 

9 

2 

9 



9 

2 

9 

I 

Cities 


Beaune  

Chatillon-sur-Seine .  . 
Fontainebleau  .  .  . 
Fontenay-le-Comte .     . 

Luneville 

Montbeliard    .     .     .     . 

Neuchatel 

Nevers 

Pau 

Perigueux 

Peronne     

Rodez 

Vendome 

Villefranche-sur-Saone 

Aurillac 

B^thune 

Chaumont  .... 
Clermont-en-Beauvoisis 

Cognac 

Dole 

fitampes 

fivreux  

Lisieux 

Mezieres 

Millau 

Montargis 

Pont-Audemer  .  .  . 
Saint-Claude  .... 
Saint-fitienne      .     .     . 

Semur 

Tournay 

Valence 

Alais 

Aubusson 

Bar-sur-Aube  .... 

Bergerac     

Chateauroux  .... 
Cherbourg      .... 

Digne    

Doullens 

Dreux 

Dunkerque  .... 
Fribourg 


6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

61 

6 

6 

6 

6 

6 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5^ 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

5 

4 

4 

4 

4 

4 

4 

4 

4 

4 

4 

4 


1  Including  one  born  in  the  chateau. 


Ch.  IX] 


THE  LOCAL  ENVIRONMENT 


191 


Cities 

Merit 

Talent 

Cities 

Merit 

Talent 

Le  Puy 

4 

Dax 

3 



Loches  

4 
4 

4 

Dinan 

3 
3 

3 

J 

Lons-le-Saunier  . 

Dinant 

Meaux 

Draguinan  .     . 



Melun 

4 

Falaise    .     .     . 

3 

I 

Montelimar    . 

4 
4 
4 
4 

2 

Figeac 

3 
3 
3 
3 

I 

Poligny 

Provins       .... 

Grasse 

— 

Gray  .... 

Saint-Brieuc    .     .     . 

/    .... 
La  Fleche    .     . 



Saint-Flour     .     .     . 

4 

I 

Mauleon       .     . 

3 

— 

Saint-L6     .... 

4 

— 

Mirecourt     .     . 

3 

— 

Sarlat 

4 

2 

Montreuil-sur-Mer 

3 

I 

Senlis 

4 

I 

Narbonne    .     . 

3 

— 

Tulle 

4 

2 

Neufchateau     . 

3 

— 

Valognes   .... 
Villeneuve-sur-Lot  . 

4 
4 



Orange    . 

3 
3 

I 

— 

Pithiviers     .     . 

Vitre 

4 

I 

Pontarlier    .     . 

3 

I 

Ajaccio       .... 
Avallon      .... 

3 
3 

I 

Rethel     .     .     . 

3 
3 

Rochefort    .     . 



Avranches      .     . 

3 

— 

Saint-Denis 

3 

2 

Berney  

3 

— 

St.-Jean-d'Angely 

3 

— 

Chateaudun    .     .     . 

3 

— 

Tournon       .     . 

3 



Condom     .... 

3 

I 

Vitry-le-Franfois 

3 

I 

This  list  does  not  of  course  include  all  the  larger  cities  of  France. 
Quite  as  large  a  number,  some  of  them  larger  places  than  certain 
of  these,  have  produced  less  than  three  men  of  letters.  On  the  other 
hand,  no  less  than  thirty-seven  places  so  small  that  they  have  not 
been  included  among  the  cities,  but  figure  in  the  preceding  tables 
as  "  country,"  a  term  used  merely  for  brevity  and  convenience, 
have  produced  three  or  more  men  of  letters.  These  small  towns 
and  villages  all  of  course  have  names,  and  some  of  them,  as  Saint- 
Germain-en-Laye,  Saint-Cloud,  Tarascon,  etc.,  are  more  or  less 
celebrated.  On  the  next  page  is  the  table  of  these  in  the  same 
form  as  the  last  : 

Four  of  those  bom  at  Saint-Germain-en-Laye  were  born  in  the 
chateau,  two  of  whom  were  men  of  talent,  and  one  of  those  born 
at  Saint-Cloud  was  born  in  the  chateau. 

In  order  to  bring  out  the  general  result  in  the  clearest  possible 
manner  M.  Odin  has  introduced  a  map  of  France  by  departments, 


192 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


[Part  II 


Smaller  Towns  of  France  that  have  produced  Three  or  More 
Men  of  Letters  of  Merit  or  of  Talent 


Towns 


Salins 

Noyon 

Amboise 

Saint-Germain-en-Laye 

Granville 

Guise 

Saint-Remy  .  .  .  . 
Villeneuve-de-Berg  . 
Cavaillon  .  .  .  . 
Landerneau  .     .     .     . 

Meulan 

Romans 

Saulieu 

Arnay-le-Duc     .     .     . 

Bagnols 

Calais 

Charleville    .     .     .     . 

Frejus      

Grenade 


Merit 

Talent 

Towns 

Merit 

Talent 

II 

4 

Ham 

3 

2 

8 

2 

Hennebont  . 

3 

— 

7 

2 

Hesdin    . 

3 

I 

7 

3 

Le  Bignon    . 

3 

I 

5 

2 

Montbard     . 

3 

I 

5 

I 

Pesmes    .     . 

3 

— 

5 

I 

Pezenas  .     . 

3 

I 

5 

3 

Riez    .     .     . 

3 

I 

4 

— 

Saint-Cloud 

3 

— 

4 

— 

Saint-Fargeau 

3 

— 

4 

— 

Saint-Geniez 

3 

— 

4 

I 

Saint-Mihiel 

3 

I 

4 

— 

Saint-Nicolas 

3 

— 

3 

I 

Tarascon 

3 

I 

3 

I 

Torigni    .     . 

3 

I 

3 

I 

Tournus  . 

3 

— 

3 

I 

Triancourt   . 

3 

— 

3 

2 

Varennes     . 

3 

— 

3 

I 

using  as  before  different  colors  to  indicate  degrees  of  fecundity  per 
100,000  inhabitants,  but  distinguishing  the  fecundity  of  the  cities 
from  that  of  the  rest  of  the  area  of  the  departments.  This  he  has 
accomplished  by  placing  a  circular  spot  in  the  center  of  each  depart- 
ment having  the  color  required  for  the  fecundity  of  the  cities.  As 
this  always  stands  upon  the  general  color  for  the  rest  of  the  depart- 
ment it  contrasts  sharply  with  the  latter  and  affords  a  clear  graphic 
view  of  the  difference.  Nothing  could  be  simpler  or  more  effective. 
A  comparison  of  this  map  with  the  other  one  by  departments,  but 
in  which  the  fecundity  is  shown  for  the  whole  population,  irrespec- 
tive of  the  cities  and  their  superiority  to  the  country,  is  in  the  high- 
est degree  instructive. 

Curiously  enough,  in  this  map,  the  sole  purpose  of  which  is  to 
show  the  influence  of  cities  in  the  production  of  men  of  letters, 
M.  Odin  has  omitted  to  give  the  chief  city  of  each  department.  In 
reproducing  it,  therefore,  as  Plate  IV,  I  have  introduced  this  feature, 
which  I  think  all  will  admit  to  be  a  great  improvement.    This  map, 


^ 


l.,.ATE  IV.    Map  sho«in.  .l.e  l^eUtivel   lily  o(  ,h,  f,.b,„  ,„d  Rural  Populati, 


Ch.  IX]  THE  LOCAL  ENVIRONMENT  193 

therefore,  and  the  first  one,  Plate  I,  now  agree  except  in  the  one 
leading  respect  for  which  this  one  is  introduced,  and  they  may  be 
profitably  compared.  In  fact,  such  a  comparison  is  needed  to  bring 
out  in  the  fullest  light  the  true  influence  of  centers  of  population  in 
the  production  of  talented  writers. 

I  also  reproduce  as  Plate  V  the  graphic  representation  of  the 
results  of  this  table  as  furnished  by  M.  Odin,  which  may  be  studied 
to  advantage  in  connection  with  the  map. 

Any  one  at  all  acquainted  with  the  cities  of  France,  or  who  will 
take  the  trouble  to  look  up  their  population,  will  perceive  that  their 
fecundity  does  not  by  any  means  depend  upon  their  size.  The  first 
two,  Paris  and  Lyons,  do,  indeed,  lead  in  both  population  and 
fecundity,  but  Rouen  with  112,000  inhabitants  greatly  exceeds 
Marseilles  with  404,000,  and  Toulouse  with  150,000  and  even 
Dijon  with  only  65,000  outrank  the  metropolis  of  the  Midi  in 
literary  productivity.  And  what  shall  we  say  of  Saint-Etienne 
with  133,000  population  which  has  produced  only  five  men  of 
letters  per  100,000.-*  Then  there  are  large  cities  like  Roubaix 
with  115,000  and  Nice  with  88,000,  which,  from  their  absence  in 
the  table,  appear  to  have  produced  less  than  three  to  the  100,000. 
Look  again  at  the  position  in  the  table  of  such  cities  as  Reims, 
Lille,  Liege,  Nantes,  Toulon,  and  Havre,  all  with  over  100,000 
inhabitants.  Compare  these  with  that  of  Dijon,  Orleans,  Mont- 
pellier,  Caen,  Aix,  the  last  with  only  28,000  population.  It  is  evi- 
dent that  the  dynamic  density  is  something  very  different  from  the 
material  density,  something  more  than  M.  Durkheim  contemplated 
in  defining  these  terms.  The  dynamic  influence  is  not  density  at 
all.  It  is  not  the  friction  of  mind  upon  mind.  It  is  rather  the  con-v 
tact  of  mind  with  things,  with  the  kind  of  things  that  tend  to| 
sharpen  it,  such  as  some  cities  afford  and  others  do  not. 

M.  Odin  in  discussing  this  table  says  : 

If  now  we  examine  more  closely  the  cities  that  figure  in  our  table,  especially 
those  that  are  distinguished  by  an  especially  high  fecundity,  we  recognize  that 
they  are  for  the  most  part  localities  which  differ  from  the  others  less  by  their 
size  than  by  a  group  of  properties  of  which  the  following  appear  to  be  the  chief  : 

I.  Usually  the.se  cities  have  been  centers  of  political,  ecclesiastical,  or  judi- 
ciary administration,  whicli  confirms  what  we  have  previously  stated  relative  to 
the  influence  exerted  by  the  political  and  administrative  environment. 


194  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  ii 

2.  These  cities  have  furnished  particularly  numerous  opportunities  for  culti- 
vating the  acquaintance  of  intelligent  and  scholarly  men,  owing  to  the  presence 
of  writers,  savants,  distinguished  artists,  a  numerous  educated  clergy,  a  wealthy 
nobility  devoted  to  letters,  etc. 

3.  They  have  afforded  important  public  intellectual  resources,  such  as  higher 
institutions  of  learning,  libraries,  museums,  book-stores,  publishing  houses,  etc. 

4.  Finally  they  have  presented,  relatively  to  the  other  cities,  a  larger  amount 
of  wealth,  or  at  least  a  greater  proportion  of  wealthy  or  well-to-do  families.^ 

These  conditions  remind  us  of  a  number  of  de  Candolle's  "  favor- 
able causes,"  and  although  M.  Odin  accuses  de  Candolle  of  "glori- 
fying privilege,"  they  really  amount,  taken  together,  to  a  series  of 
special  privileges.  What  they  are  at  bottom  is  simply  so  many 
special  opportunities.  We  can  now  better  interpret  the  facts  that 
have  been  brought  out  relative  to  the  fecundity  of  chateaux.  We 
may  look  upon  a  chateau  as  a  diminutive  city  containing  most  of 
the  dynamic  qualities  of  those  cities  most  favorable  to  the  production 
of  literary  men.  The  "  density  "  is  very  small.  The  whole  number 
of  persons,  including  the  retinue  of  servants,  the  mechanics,  and 
the  laborers,  to  be  found  in  a  chateau  and  the  buildings  attached  to 
it,  although  it  might  amount  in  some  cases  to  several  hundred  or 
even  a  thousand,  would  certainly  make  a  small  city.  But  the  num- 
ber of  persons  of  culture,  including  instructors,  living  in  any  chateau 
is  very  much  less.  The  one  at  Saint-Germain-en-Laye  has  pro- 
duced three  men  of  merit  and  two  of  talent.  This  would  probably 
be  at  the  rate  of  200  or  300,  perhaps  1000  per  100,000.  This 
astonishing  result  is  due  to  the  fact  that  a  chateau,  especially  one 
in  the  suburbs  of  Paris,  affords  nearly  every  conceivable  opportunity 
for  its  inmates  to  distinguish  themselves.  Its  productivity  is  limited 
only  by  the  conditions  of  heredity,  i.e.,  by  the  actual  amount  of 
genius  possessed  by  its  occupants.  This  would  realize  Galton's 
idea  that  the  only  geniuses  in  the  world  are  those  who  have  actually 
attained  eminence,  i.e.,  of  the  identity  of  fame  and  genius.  Where 
all  possible  opportunity  accompanies  genius  this  theory  is  true,  and 
the  number  of  eminent  persons  is  a  just  measure  of  the  amount  of 
genius  actually  existing.  But  the  present  case  clearly  shows  how 
enormously  this  would  exceed  the  actual  condition  of  things.  It 
simply  indicates  what  the  factor  opportunity  is. 

1  Odin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  51 1-5 12. 


245 


X   Cr  <   <? 


o     o     3    »     ,-•    c      a     «•     »     =     S.    «•     2.    2.     2.     2     2 


'1 ^       .              _^               41-  1 

4^                        ±2 

T                                                i                                        t     " 

2 

Men  of  letters  tjorn  irt  chief  cities                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       2 

■>     ■•       '■           "      "  other  locahtles                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                2 

Average  of  the  men  of  letters  born  in  the  departments                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          -                -    2 

' 

^^       ' 

5                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         ' 

-^                                                  -■       ^ 

-  V                       -■ 

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T                           iq     .-I               _   -      - 

±  ±                                                              -•     -4                ^    -       ■ 

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r                                                                                                                                           ..L  ,.                  1 

4    -                 T     ^    - 

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H                                                          -       -      r                                        A 

H                                                          -V     ^^ 

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IX     ~                 -1^        X      4A     -y^^^ 

rt   , Ay     ^     ^  ?                h  1 

-4            t                 tnhlr                 t                 -^^    '^                 -^  - 

4^        I          5   4 'tt t            V                ^-44a^            444  ^ 

4h     ^  J-.        t   Illtl  i     y^/                        '^                  A  - 

it      14.      "47     "      JtltiJ     ^                 it                               1 

7          11        ^    fi-H           "^lL^44i  - 

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^^    I  -    "          -^  t     '^^^    \     it              At                                j- 

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Ltii^  7    r           IT       i  7       \ .       it                                                                                  ^-'' 

sS^flt^^'lL^L W J  ^ y      mill __,_,,__z 

HHlffir".,  .;|rr  .'rr:;..-f.r  |.:-"i  :■"-"  =r-  |f--r-[-^r^  r}-'      :  .;  ■ 

Pi.ATK  V.    Chart  showing  the  Relative  Fecundity  of  the  Urban  and  Rural  Population 
of  France  in  Men  of  Letters 


Ch.  IX] 


THE  LOCAL  ENVIRONMENT 


195 


Another  illustration  of  the  same  class  is  furnished  by  the  statis- 
tics of  women  of  letters.  M.  Odin's  tables  always  include  women, 
but  of  course  the  number  is  small.  With  his  accustomed  thorousrh- 
ness,  he  has  drawn  up  a  comparative  table  of  men  and  women, 
showing  the  number  of  each  born  in  Paris,  in  other  chief  cities,  in 
all  other  localities  except  chateaux,  and  in  chateaux,  with  the  per- 
centage that  each  of  these  items  is  of  the  total  of  each  sex.  This 
table  is  as  follows : 


Men 

Women 

Place  of  Birth 

Number 

Per  Cent 
OF  Men 

Number 

Per  Cent 

OF  Women 

Paris 

Other  large  cities 

Rural  districts,  etc 

Chateaux 

1229 

2646 

1265 

93 

23-5 
50.6 
24.2 

1.8 

112 

III 

29 

14 

42.1 
41.7 
10.9 

S-3 

Total  1 

5233 

266 

We  perceive  first  of  all  that  nearly  twice  as  large  a  proportion  of 
women  as  of  men  are  born  in  Paris.  This  is  because  in  Paris  as 
nowhere  else  there  are  opportunities  for  women  to  distinguish  them- 
selves. In  the  rural  districts  and  small  towns  the  proportion  of 
women  is  much  less  than  half  that  of  men,  and  for  the  converse 
reason  that  there  are  almost  no  opportunities  in  these  for  women 
to  display  their  talents.  For  the  chateaux,  on  the  contrary,  the 
number  of  women  of  letters  born  there  relatively  to  the  whole 
number  is  just  three  times  as  great  as  the  number  of  men  of  letters 
relatively  to  the  whole  number.  The  explanation  is  the  same  in  all 
three  cases,  viz.,  presence  or  absence  of  opportunities,  or  as  M.  Odin 
expresses  it : 

The  proportion  of  women  of  letters  coming  from  each  class  of  localities 
corresponds  exactly  to  the  chances  that  the  women  had  to  acquire  a  higher 
education.  It  is  evident  that  the  chances  were  relatively  great  in  the  chateaux, 
and  to  a  less  degree  in  Paris,  while  they  vary  greatly  in  other  cities,  and  are 
practically  nil  at  other  localities.'^ 

1  This  is  the  whole  number  born  in  French  territory  to  the  year  1825  whose 
exact  places  of  birth  are  known. 

2  Odin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  519-520. 


196 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


[Part  II 


While  on  the  subject  of  women  of  letters  perhaps  it  is  as  well  to 
give  M.  Odin's  table  of  them  by  periods  throughout  modern  times, 
as  follows: 


Periods 


Merit 


Annual 
Average 


Per  Cent 
OF  Total 


1 300- 1  500 
1501-1550 
1551-1600 
1601-1650 
1651-1700 
1701-1725 
1726-1750 

1751-1775 
1 7 76-1 800 
1801-1830 


9 

9 

16 

47 
33 
28 

36 
45 
47 
64 


2 

I 

3 

13 

12 

7 

5 

12 

9 

7 


0.045 

0.18 

0.32 

0.94 

0.66 

1. 12 

1.44 

1.80 

1.88 

2.13 


2.9 
2.1 

31 
7.0 

51 
6.5 
5-7 

6.3 
6.8 
4.8 


Total 


334 


71 


5- 


oi 


Although,  on  account  of  the  number  whose  exact  place  of  birth 
was  not  known,  the  total  in  this  table  is  considerably  larger  than 
in  the  preceding  one,  still  M.Odin  characterizes  it  as  "  derisoire," 
being  only  about  one  twentieth  that  of  the  men.  Nevertheless,  he 
does  not  agree  with  de  Candolle  ^  that  this  inferiority  is  due  to  any 
essential  deficiency  in  the  female  mind.  Another  table  which  he 
gives,  but  which  we  need  not  reproduce,  shows  the  different  fields 
of  literary  activity  in  which  women  have  engaged.  As  already  re- 
marked, he  includes  the  histrionic  art  among  the  different  branches, 
and  here  he  finds  that  they  have  furnished  29  per  cent  of  the  per- 
sons eminent  in  that  branch.  About  one  fourth  of  these  were  of 
the  second  grade,  or  women  of  talent.  He  might  have  added  that 
in  this  one  art  at  least  women  have  actually  excelled  men.  Women 
have  also  furnished  20  per  cent  of  the  prose  writers  of  distinction. 
In  other  lines  they  fall  much  below.  But  M.  Odin  attributes  this 
entirely  to  circumstances  independent  of  their  natural  abilities,  and  he 
says  that  "other  things  equal  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  a  priori 
that  woman  is  naturally  inferior  to  man  in  any  branch  of  literature."^ 

^  For  women  of  talent  the  percentage  of  all  persons  of  talent  was  6.25. 

2  De  Candolle,  op.  cit.,  pp.  270-272.  3  Odin,  op.  cit.,  p.  432. 


Ch.  IX]  THE  LOCAL  ENVIRONMENT  197 

It  may  be  said  that  much  that  is  true  for  French  men  of  letters 
would  not  be  true  for  other  countries,  and  would  be  still  less  true 
for  other  kinds  of  genius,  as,  for  example,  art  and  science.  It  must 
be  admitted  that  such  statements  cannot  be  disproved  in  the  present 
state  of  the  investigation  of  these  questions,  but  neither  can  they 
be  proved.  This  is  because  there  has  been  no  study  of  the  facts  at 
all  comparable  to  that  of  M.  Odin  for  French  men  of  letters.  Galton 
and  de  Candolle  confined  themselves  to  men  of  science.  Although 
they  both  estimate  the  whole  number  of  scientific  men  to  have  been 
from  5000  to  16,000,  they  each  deal  with  a  comparatively  small 
number,  less  than  200.  In  his  Hereditary  Genius  the  former  pays 
very  little  attention  to  the  birthplace  of  such  men,  often  not  giving 
it  in  his  accounts  of  the  different  men  of  science.  De  Candolle 
introduces  a  column  for  it  in  his  table  of  the  foreign  members  of 
the  Paris  Academy,  but  not  for  those  of  the  Royal  Society  of 
London  nor  for  those  of  the  Berlin  Academy.  In  running  down 
the  list  it  is  easy  to  see  that  most  of  them  were  born  in  cities. 
Galton  in  his  English  Men  of  Science  gives  the  birthplaces  of  the 
100  savants  that  he  deals  with  in  that  work.  Of  these  21  were 
born  in  London  or  its  suburbs,  18  in  other  large  cities,  21  in  smaller 
towns,  and  40  "elsewhere."  He  seems  to  think  their  geographical 
distribution  important,  and  makes  a  kind  of  map  plotting  it  over 
the  country  (pp.  19,  20).  M.  Jacoby's  enumeration  might  be  tabu- 
lated from  this  point  of  view,  and  this  is  what  he  ought  to  have 
done  in  the  rexised  edition.  A  glance  through  it  shows  that  great 
numbers  were  born  in  cities,  but  it  would  be  unsafe  to  draw  con- 
clusions from  mere  inspection.  It  seems  probable  that  his  "  remark- 
able personages"  do  not  widely  differ  in  this  respect  from  men  of 
letters. 

We  are  obliged  therefore  to  fall  back  again  upon  M.  Odin's 
investigations.  Although  he  was  compelled  to  limit  his  chief  re- 
searches to  France  and  to  literary  men,  still  he  made  wide  excur- 
sions into  other  fields  and  countries,  and  in  an  appendix  he  has  told 
us  what  he  had  been  able  to  learn  about  men  of  letters  of  Italy, 
Spain,  England,  and  Germany.  In  this  he  confines  himself  wholly 
to  the  highest  class,  viz.,  cases  of  acknowledged  genius.  Studying 
the  birthplaces  of  this  class,  he  finds  a  total  for  Italy  of  55,  23  of 


198  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

whom  were  born  in  seven  cities,  all  of  which  are  intellectual  centers, 
as  follows :  Florence,  7 ;  Venice,  4 ;  Ferrara,  3  ;  Naples,  3 ;  Arezzo,  2 ; 
Pistoia,  2;  Verona,  2.  Many  of  the  others  were  born  at  Bergamo, 
Mantua,  Milan,  Modena,  Padua,  Pavia,  Reggio,  etc.  "  We  find 
here,"  he  says,  "that  the  theory  according  to  which  the  rural 
districts  are  particularly  adapted  to  the  production  of  great  men 
is  a  pure  hypothesis  devoid  of  any  serious  foundation." 

Of  the  60  men  of  letters  of  genius  in  Spanish  literature,  29  were 
born  in  the  six  cities  of  Madrid  (16),  Seville  (5),  Alcala  de  Henares 
(2),  Cordova  (2),  Grenada  (2),  Toledo  (2),  all  of  which  except  Cor- 
dova possess  a  university.  The  rest  were  in  part  born  in  the  uni- 
versity towns  of  Barcelona,  Lisbon,  Salamanca,  Saragossa,  Valencia, 
and  Valladolid. 

Of  the  70  English  literary  geniuses  of  the  highest  order,  1 5  were 
born  in  London,  4  in  Dublin,  and  2  in  Edinburgh.  Others  were 
born  in  Bristol,  Cambridge,  Glasgow,  Liverpool,  etc. 

In  Germany  the  71  highest  had  a  somewhat  different  origin. 
Three  were  not  born  in  Germany.  One  was  born  in  a  chateau.  Of 
one  the  place  of  birth  could  not  be  determined.  Most  of  the  lead- 
ing cities  have  produced  one  or  more,  but  none  more  than  three. 
Berlin,  Breslau,  and  Hannover  count  three  each,  Hanau  and  Konigs- 
berg  two  each.  Seventeen  others  produced  one  each.  There  would 
still  remain  to  be  accounted  for  a  large  number  of  whom  M.  Odin 
gives  no  details.  Doubtless  some  of  them  were  born  in  the  country 
or  in  very  obscure  villages.  At  least  the  sources  of  the  great 
authors  of  Germany  are  much  more  scattered  than  is  the  case  for 
any  other  country,  but  the  general  law  of  the  fecundity  of  great 
cities  is  not  thereby  invalidated. 

TJie  Economic  Environment.  —  It  is  very  difficult  to  ascertain 
the  economic  standing  of  eminent  men.  The  idea  that  those  who 
have  achieved  great  things  have  done  so  by  virtue  of  inherent  quali- 
ties that  defy  all  external  conditions  is  so  ingrained  in  the  human 
mind  that  biographers  neglect  to  record  certain  of  the  most  im- 
portant facts  connected  with  their  lives.  If  a  great  discoverer  or 
inventor  works  ten  years  uninterruptedly  and  at  last  succeeds  and 
astonishes  the  world,  all  this  will  be  told  in  minutest  detail  without 
a  word  as  to  how  he  was  fed,  housed,  and  clothed  during  all  this 


Ch.  IX]  THE  ECONOMIC  ENVIRONMENT  199 

time  that  he  was  earning  nothing.  If  a  great  author  writes  a  book 
that  costs  him  many  years  of  patient  unremunerative  research,  noth- 
ing will  be  said  about  how  he  was  enabled  to  devote  all  these  years 
to  such  a  subject.  The  fact  is  that  in  every  such  case  there  must 
have  been  some  kind  of  a  fortune  behind  it  all,  or  something  equiva- 
lent to  a  fortune,  such  as  a  state  annuity,  emoluments  granted  to 
the  nobility  or  the  clergy,  or  some  sinecure  official  position,  or  at 
least  a  well-paid  position  that  did  not  exhaust  all  of  the  man's 
energies. 

When  we  read  of  the  great  characters  of  antiquity  we  are  apt  to 
imagine  that  they  were  ordinary  citizens  of  Greece  or  Rome,  and 
that  any  such  who  possessed  the  talent  might  be  poets,  sculptors, 
orators,  philosophers,  and  writers.  Nothing  could  be  more  false. 
The  heroes  of  Homer  were  all  men  of  immense  wealth.  They 
owned  whole  states  and  oxen  (the  circulating  medium)  and  slaves 
unnumbered.  A  study  of  the  economic  condition  of  the  philoso- 
phers, from  Thales  to  Aristotle,  would  probably  show  that  they 
were  all  men  of  wealth  or  else  were  in  some  way  attached  to  kings 
and  courts  so  as  to  be  wholly  above  want.  It  was  the  same  with 
the  poets  and  artists.  The  sculptors  were  hired  by  the  state  to 
decorate  the  temples,  and  all  were  put  in  one  way  or  another 
beyond  the  reach  of  want  or  of  the  necessity  of  earning  a  livelihood 
otherwise  than  by  their  art.  ^schylus  and  Sophocles  were  gen- 
erals in  the  Athenian  army  and  alternated  between  fighting  and 
writing  plays.  Aristotle  was  the  adviser  of  Philip  and  teacher  of 
Alexander.  It  is  scarcely  told  how  Socrates  and  Plato  could  devote 
their  lives  to  philosophy,  but  it  is  certain  that  they  did  not  teach 
for  a  living.  And  so  it  was  with  all  the  sophists  and  stoics,  one  of 
the  latter  of  whom  was  an  emperor.  Of  the  two  great  Sicilians, 
Archimedes  and  Empedocles,  the  former  was  attached  to  the  court, 
and  the  latter  was  immensely  rich. 

In  medieval  and  more  modern  times  it  was  not  otherwise,  but 
we  are  generally  left  in  ignorance  as  to  economic  conditions.  The 
older  ones  were  all  in  the  church,  even  Roger  Bacon  and  Coper- 
nicus, and  thus  freed  from  material  concerns.  After  universities 
were  established  most  great  discoverers  were  professors  and  carried 
on  their  investigations  in  connection  with  their  professional  duties. 


200  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

Many,  like  Bacon,  were  of  the  nobility,  others  were  high  public 
officers,  and  still  others  belonged  to  the  wealthy  bourgeoisie. 

But  if  any  one  happened  to  be  in  limited  circumstances,  and  still, 
owing  to  great  talents  and  the  favor  of  wealthy  friends,  happened 
to  attain  eminence,  the  biographical  dictionaries  record  the  fact  of 
their  indigence  with  great  emphasis,  but  omit  the  series  of  happy 
accidents  that  really  enabled  them  to  succeed.  It  has  therefore  been 
found  almost  impossible  to  arrive  at  the  facts  of  an  economic  char- 
acter in  a  sufficient  number  of  cases  to  form  a  safe  basis  for  statis- 
tical inquiry.    M.  Odin  says  : 

Whoever  has  had  occasion  to  read  a  large  number  of  biographies  of  men  of 
letters,  and  of  celebrated  persons  in  general,  has  been  able  to  convince  himself 
that  .  .  .  every  time  that  a  remarkable  man  has  sprung  from  a  humble  family 
—  from  what  are  called  the  working  classes  —  the  biographers  take  extra  pains 
to  acquaint  us  with  the  fact.^ 

It  is,  therefore,  only  in  the  case  of  men  of  the  highest  order,  men 
of  genius  and  fame,  about  whom  a  great  deal  has  to  be  said,  that 
details  of  this  class  can  be  found,  and  these  are  thrown  in  inci- 
dentally, being  regarded  as  of  no  particular  importance. 

De  Candolle  was  able  to  gather  some  information  on  this  head 
with  regard  to  the  members  of  the  great  academies.  Thus,  of  the 
lOO  foreign  associates  of  the  Paris  Academy  he  could  make  the 
following  classification  : 

Belonging  to  the  nobility,  English  gentlemen,  or  of  aristo- 
cratic families  of  old  free  cities  or  rich  families  ...       41 

Of  the  middle  class 52 

Of  the  working  class 7 

Total 100 

For  a  much  smaller  number  of  French  savants  he  found  the 
following  proportions  : 

Of  noble  or  wealthy  families 10,  or  28  per  cent 

Of  the  middle  class 17,  "    47    "      " 

Of  the  working  class 9,  "    25     "     " 

Total 36,  or  1 00  per  cent 

He  enumerates  all  these  by  name,  and  among  them  are  Buffon, 
Antoine  and  Laurent  Jussieu,  Ampere,  and  Cuvier. 

1  Odin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  536-537. 


Ch.  IX]  THE  ECONOMIC  ENVIRONMENT  20 1 

In  another  list  exclusively  of  the  eighteenth  century,  containing 
24  names,  the  following  are  the  proportions  : 

Of  the  wealthy  or  noble  class 11,  or  46  per  cent 

Of  the  middle  class 8,  "    33     "     «' 

Of  the  working  class 5,  "    21     "     «« 

Total 24,  or  100  per  cent 

Combining  the  last  two  lists  we  have  : 

Of  the  wealthy  or  noble  class 21,  or  35  per  cent 

Of  the  middle  class 25,  "    42    "     " 

Of  the  working  class 14,  "    23     "      " 

Total 60,  or  100  per  cent  ^ 

Galton  in  his  English  Men  of  Science  (p.  22)  gives  some  similar 
statistics,  but  they  will  be  more  in  place  in  the  next  subsection. 
What  he  says  of  primogeniture  (p.  33),  however,  properly  belongs 
here.  This  is,  that  out  of  99  eminent  men  of  science,  22  were  only 
sons  and  26  were  eldest  sons,  making  48,  or  practically  half,  who 
would  inherit  the  fortunes  of  their  parents.  He  says  *'  that  the  elder 
sons  have,  on  the  whole,  decided  advantages  of  nurture  over  the 
younger  sons.  They  are  more  likely  to  become  possessed  of  inde- 
pendent means,  and  therefore  able  to  follow  the  pursuits  that  have 
most  attracted  their  tastes." 

In  de  Candolle's  statistics  it  may  be  assumed  that  the  savants 
belonging  to  the  middle  class  or  bourgeoisie  were  at  least  well  to  do 
and  exempt  from  the  necessity  of  gaining  a  livelihood  either  by  their 
science  or  by  any  other  kind  of  occupation.  From  our  present  point 
of  view,  therefore,  it  becomes  a  comparison  of  the  first  two  categories 
with  the  third.  Or  rather,  we  have  only  to  consider  the  third  cate- 
gory in  its  relation  to  the  whole.  In  the  first  list  it  is  7  per  cent, 
in  the  second  25,  in  the  third  21,  and  in  the  last  two  combmed  23. 
If  we  take  into  consideration  the  proportion  which  each  of  these 
categories  forms  of  the  total  population  of  the  world,  we  can  readily 
see  that  the  first  yields  by  far  the  greatest  proportion,  being  a  com- 
paratively small  class.  The  second  is  a  much  larger  class,  and 
therefore,  while  it  has  yielded  a  larger  number  of  savants,  its 
fecundity  is  much  less  than  that  of  the  first.  As  to  the  third,  it 
represents  the  great  bulk  of  the  population,  and  as  it  has  always 

1  De  Candolle,  op.  cit.,  pp.  272-279. 


202  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

yielded  a  much  smaller  absolute  number  of  men  of  science,  its 
relative  fecundity  is  almost  a  negligible  quantity.  For  those  who 
hold  that  native  genius  is  as  frequent  in  one  class  as  in  another, 
these  differences  become  a  simple  measure  of  the  influence  of  the 
economic  factor. 

For  the  reasons  already  given,  M.  Odin  was  compelled,  in  study- 
ing the  economic  environment  from  his  extensive  tables,  to  confine 
himself  to  men  of  letters  of  talent.  If  the  economic  condition  of 
all  the  literary  men  of  France  throughout  modern  times  could  have 
been  learned,  their  statistical  presentation  would  have  been  a  most 
interesting  chapter.  As  it  is,  he  has  giv-en  us  much  food  for  reflec- 
tion. It  will  be  remembered  that  one  of  the  four  principal  elements 
enumerated  by  him  in  the  fecundity  of  cities  was  the  greater  wealth 
of  some  cities,  or  at  least  a  higher  proportion  of  wealthy  or  well-to- 
do  families.  This  has  a  direct  bearing  on  the  present  aspect  of  the 
question,  and  is  no  doubt  a  potent  factor,  but  he  does  not  follow  it 
up  and  show  to  which  of  the  cities  it  most  especially  applies.  In 
making  a  special  examination  of  the  economic  environment  he  con- 
fines himself  to  bringing  out  such  facts  as  his  data  afford  relative 
to  the  economic  condition  of  the  men  of  letters  themselves.  The 
difficulties  that  he  encountered  in  this  investigation  he  sets  forth 
as  follows  : 

I  have  had  great  difificulty  in  determining  in  what  economic  conditions  the 
youth  of  our  men  of  letters  was  spent.  The  biographers,  historians,  and  literary 
critics  manifest  in  general  only  a  very  slight  interest  in  questions  of  this  class, 
and  they  usually  do  not  even  suspect  that  they  can  have  any  real  importance. 
Just  as  people  love  to  believe  that  genius  has  no  need  of  instruction,  so  they 
devoutly  imagine  that  it  can  develop,  with  more  or  less  difificulty  perhaps,  under 
no  matter  what  material  conditions.  How  often,  alas,  the  sad  reality  belies  these 
naive  theories  !  ^ 

He  was,  however,  able  to  ascertain  with  exactness  the  economic 
environment  of  619  men  of  letters  of  talent.  He  divides  them  into 
two  classes :  (i)  Those  whose  youth  was  spent  in  the  absence  of  all 
material  concern.  This  class  may  be  designated  by  the  term  "rich," 
without  thereby  implying  that  there  were  not  great  differences  in 
the  degree  of  wealth  and  in  social  conditions  generally.  (2)  Those 
whose  youth  was  spent  in  poverty  or  economic  insecurity.    This 

1  Odin,  op.  cit.,  p.  528. 


Ch.  IX] 


THE  ECONOMIC  ENVIRONMENT 


203 


Periods 

Rich 

Poor 

1 300-1 500 

1501-1550       

1551-1600       

1601-1650       

1651-1700       

1701-1725       

I726-1750       

1751-I775       

1 776-1800 

1801-1825       

24 
39 
42 
84 
73 
36 

S3 
86 

52 

73 

I 

4 

5 
4 
3 
9 
8 
12 
II 

Total 

562 

57 

class  may  be  designated  by  the  term  "poor,"  although,  as  in  the  other 
class,  there  were  many  degrees  and  kinds  of  poverty.  The  table  by 
periods  is  then  as  follows  : 

This  table  shows  that 
what  was  true  for  men  of 
science,  as  seen  in  de  Can- 
dolle's  tables,  holds  true 
for  men  of  letters  and 
for  the  entire  history  of 
literature.  The  column 
designated  "  poor  ' '  fairly 
represents  the  working 
class,  and  it  will  be  ob- 
served that  the  fecundity 
of  that  class  has  been 
gradually  increasing.  In  de  Candolle's  tables  it  amounted  in  most 
cases  to  over  20  per  cent.  For  men  of  letters  it  is  generally  less, 
much  so  in  the  earlier  periods,  but  in  the  last  quarter  of  the  eight- 
eenth century  it  was  nearly  19  per  cent,  but  this  seems  to  have  been 
an  exceptional  period.  The  average  for  the  entire  time  is  slightly 
more  than  9  per  cent,  or  about  one  eleventh  of  the  whole  number 
of  men  of  letters. 

It  is,  of  course,  very  difficult  to  determine  the  proportion  of  the 
population  in  any  country  who  would  answer  to  the  above  designa- 
tion of  "poor,"  and  this  has  certainly  diminished  during  modern 
times.  De  Candolle  estimates  that  when  France  had  a  population 
of  36  million,  which  was  in  1856,  the  working  classes  numbered  18 
or  20  million.  This  estimate  is  probably  much  too  low.  The  middle 
class,  he  says,  is  much  less  numerous,  but  he  does  not  estimate  it. 
As  regards  the  wealthy  class,  he  says  that  at  the  time  of  the  French 
Revolution  the  nobility  was  estimated  at  100,000.  He  thinks  that 
the  number  of  wealthy  bourgeoisie  would  not  exceed  that.  But 
these  estimates  do  not  include  the  families  of  such  persons,  and  he 
counts  about  four  dependent  persons  (women  and  children)  to  each 
noble  or  wealthy  business  man.  This  would  make  500,000  of  each 
class,  or  one  million,  as  belonging  to  the  wealthy  or  well-to-do  popu- 
lation. This  would  be  less  than  3  per  cent  of  the  total  population. 
Commenting  upon  this  he  remarks  : 


204  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

If  natural  talent,  if  a  pronounced  taste  for  scientific  research,  were  the  sole 
causes  that  determine  the  career  and  success  of  men  of  science,  there  would 
have  been  infinitely  more  scientific  men  issuing  from  poor  families  than  from 
other  sources  —  certainly  the  number  of  savants  from  rich  families  would  have 
been  very  small  relative  to  the  others  —  which  has  not  been  the  case.^ 

M.  Odin  makes  the  following  commentary  upon  his  table : 

As  we  see,  only  the  eleventh  part  of  the  men  of  letters  of  talent  passed  their 
youth  under  difficult  economic  conditions.  This  proportion,  small  as  it  is  in 
itself,  appears  much  more  striking  still  when  we  try  to  represent  to  ourselves 
the  numerical  relation  that  must  have  existed  for  the  entire  population  between 
well-to-do  families  and  those  who  were  not  so.  It  is  impossible  of  course  to  say 
exactly  what  the  average  proportion  was  for  the  whole  modern  epoch.  But  it 
is  clear  that  we  shall  still  remain  far  below  the  reality  if  we  assume  that  the 
families  of  the  second  class  were  three  or  four  times  more  numerous  than  those 
of  the  first.  This  means  that  by  the  sole  fact  of  the  economic  conditions  in  the 
midst  of  which  they  grew  up  the  children  of  families  in  easy  circumstances  had 
at  least  forty  to  fifty  more  chances  of  making  themselves  a  name  in  letters  than 
those  who  belonged  to  poor  families  or  to  families  of  insecure  economic  position !  ^ 

He  has  more  to  say  under  this  head,  but  much  of  it  applies  so 
well  to  one  or  other  of  the  environments  that  remain  to  be  con- 
sidered that  its  introduction  here  would  be  an  anticipation.  One 
remark  I  cannot  pass  over.  Cold  and  objective  as  is  at  all  times 
his  style  and  his  treatise  as  a  whole,  he  seems  for  once  to  have  felt 
a  touch  of  the  fire  that  kindles  in  most  minds  when  they  find  them- 
selves in  the  presence  of  a  great  hitherto  undiscovered  truth,  and 
he  half  exclaims,  "Genius  is  in  things,  not  in  man."^ 

Here  surely  is  historical  materialism.  Will  those  who  defend 
that  particular  ism  listen  to  it  .-*  By  the  side  of  it  all  the  other 
claims  that  have  been  made  for  that  doctrine  sink  into  insignificance. 

The  Social  E?tvironment.  —  It  was  almost  impossible  to  treat  of 
the  economic  environment  without  working  in  facts  that  properly 
belong  to  the  social  environment.  This  is  not  because  the  two  are 
not  generically  distinct,  but  because  they  so  largely  run  parallel. 
It  was,  for  example,  more  convenient  for  de  Candolle  to  use  the 
nobility,  a  social  class,  for  his  first  category  than  to  call  it  persons 
receiving  large  life  emoluments  from  the  state,  which  was  what  he 
meant.    But  there  are,  especially  in  France  during  recent  times, 

1  De  Candolle,  op.  cit.,  pp.  280-281.  2  Odin,  op.  cit.,  p.  529. 

3  Odin,  op.  cit.,  p.  560. 


Ch.  IX]  THE  SOCIAL  ENVIRONMENT  205 

many  persons  belonging  to  the  nobility  who  receive  scarcely  any 
or  no  emoluments.  It  is  so  to  a  slight  extent  in  other  countries 
and  has  always  been  so  in  all  countries.  Still,  for  the  earlier  periods, 
this  is  a  negligible  quantity,  and  it  is  safe  to  assume  that  the  no- 
bility is  entirely  exempt  from  material  concerns.  For  other  classes 
the  social  environment  practically  amounts  to  a  classification  of 
occupations. 

In  Galton's  list  of  96  persons  to  whom  he  addressed  his  questions 
in  1873  and  discussed  the  answers  in  his  English  Men  of  Science, 
the  social  positions,  professions,  occupations,  etc.,  are  classified  by 
him  (p.  22)  as  follows: 

Noblemen  and  private  gentlemen 9 

Army  and  navy 6 

Civil  service        9 

Subordinate  officers 3 

Total  government  officials 18 

Law II 

Medical 9 

Clergy  and  ministers 6 

Teachers 6 

Architect i 

Secretary  to  an  insurance  office i 

Total  professional  men 34 

Bankers 7 

Merchants 21 

Manufacturers 15 

Total  business  men 43 

Farmers 2 

Others i 

This  makes  a  total  showing  of  107,  but,  as  he  explains,  the  same 
name  recurs  in  1 1  cases. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  he  addressed  his  inquiries  only  to 
persons  whom  he  knew  to  have  attained  distinction  in  some  branch 
of  scientific  research,  so  that  all  these  men  had  pursued  such  scien- 
tific investigations  in  connection  with  and  more  or  less  independ- 
ently of  their  business,  whatever  that  was.  If  he  had  not  allowed 
the  duplications  of  which  he  speaks,  but  had  assigned  each  man  to 
the  position  which  seemed  the  characteristic  one,  we  should  be  able 
to  arrive  at  the  percentages  for  the  different  occupations.  As  it  is 
we  can  now  only  base  it  upon  the  whole  number,  107,  and  this  will 


206  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

probably  be  sufficiently  correct.  The  nobility  would  then  appear  to 
furnish  8.4  per  cent,  tne  public  officers  16.8,  the  learned  professions 
3.2,  the  bourgeoisie  40,  the  farmers  1.9.  Unless  the  person  classed 
as  "  others  "  was  a  laboring  man  that  class  furnished  none  of  these 
96  men  of  science.  The  discussion  that  follows  shows  that  Galton 
did  not  see  the  question  at  all  as  it  presents  itself  in  the  light  of 
the  facts  now  under  consideration. 

We  must  therefore  again  have  recourse  to  M.  Odin's  investiga- 
tions, because  he  alone  has  grasped  the  full  import  of  the  problem 
and  striven  methodically  to  discover  its  solution.  The  first  of  the 
influences  enumerated  by  him  that  affect  the  fecundity  of  cities  in 
men  of  letters  was,  as  will  be  remembered,  that  certain  of  them  have 
long  been  centers  of  political,  ecclesiastical,  or  judiciary  administra- 
tion. This  gives  a  certain  social  standing  to  a  large  number  of 
persons,  enabling  them  to  achieve  in  lines  distinct  from  their  admin- 
istrative duties.  In  his  special  study  of  the  social  environment 
(Chapter  VIII)  he  confined  himself,  as  in  that  of  the  economic 
environment,  and  probably  for  similar  reasons,  to  men  of  letters  of 
talent.  Of  these  he  was  able  to  determine  in  636  cases  the  social 
position  and  occupation  of  their  parents.  He  gives  a  list  of  328 
different  occupations  arranged  in  the  descending  order  of  the  num- 
ber in  each.  Where  the  same  person  had  two  occupations  he  counts 
each  as  i.  More  than  half  the  occupations  show  only  one  person 
as  following  it.  Many  show  only  two,  three,  or  four.  Only  fifteen 
occupations  were  followed  by  ten  or  more  persons,  and  only  seven 
by  more  than  twenty.  These  last  being  the  most  important  may  be 
profitably  reproduced  here: 

Lawyers 25^ 

Administrators  ...     25 
Physicians     ....     23 

Some  of  the  lower  ones  are  rather  amusing.  For  example,  there 
are  four  kings,  i.e.,  the  sons  or  daughters  of  these  kings  were 
talented  writers.  By  the  side  of  these  stand  equally  four  coopers  and 
four  jewelers,  also  four  engineers.  One  was  a  valet  de  chambre  of 
a  prince,  another  of  a  dauphin,  and  a  third  of  a  king.  The  reader 
is  at  a  loss  to  understand  why  the  kings  and  dukes  and  viscounts 


Magistrates  .     . 

.     .     go4 

Noblemen     .     . 

•     •     69I 

Merchants     .     . 

•     •     40^ 

Gentlemen     . 

.     .     32 

\ 


Ch.  IX] 


THE  SOCIAL  ENVIRONMENT 


207 


and  barons  scattered  through  the  list  were  not  put  with  the  nobles. 
Much  of  the  classification  seems  arbitrary  and  duplicated.  M.  Odin 
says  of  this  list : 

As  will  be  seen,  men  of  letters  have  issued  from  local  environments  that  are 
ver)^  unlike,  but  in  very  different  proportions.  In  order  to  be  able  to  appreci- 
ate exactly  the  action  which  these  environments  have  exerted,  it  is  indispensable 
first  of  all  to  bring  the  multitude  of  occupations  enumerated  within  certain 
natural  categories.  This  will  be  almost  always  very  easy ;  the  few  cases  in 
which  one  might  hesitate  are  not  of  a  kind  sensibly  to  modify  the  general  rela- 
tion among  the  categories. 

He  proceeds  to  describe  the  five  groups  to  which  he  reduces 
them,  as  follows  : 

1.  Nobles  and  officers:  Nobility. 

2.  Magistrates  and  public  functionaries,  "nobles  de  robe"  and  "  notaires  " 
who  lived  in  a  very  similar  social  medium  :   Officials  (^inagisirahire). 

3.  Artists,  lawyers,  litterateurs,  engineers,  physicians,  clergymen,  etc.:  Lib- 
eral professions. 

4.  Merchants,  bankers,  citizens  {bourgeois),  proprietors,  subordinate  func- 
tionaries. For  want  of  a  more  precise  term  he  designates  all  these  occupations 
by  the  general  term  Bourgeoisie. 

5.  Industrials,  artisans,  tillers  of  the  soil  {cultivateurs,  laboureurs),  concierges, 
servants,  etc. :  Manual  laborers  {>/iain-d'a'uvre). 

He  was  able  to  obtain  all  requisite  data  for  623  cases  coming 
under  these  five  heads,  and  he  gives  an  interesting  table  by  periods, 
showing  the  number  of  each  class  and  the  per  cent  that  each  class 
forms  of  the  whole  number.  As  the  historical  aspect  is  not  as  vital 
as  the  other  aspects,  we  may  omit  it  and  give  only  the  general 
results.    These  will  take  the  following  form : 

These  figures  speak  for 
themselves.  They  show 
that  considerably  more 
than  three  quarters  of  the 
talented  men  of  France 
have  sprung  from  the  no- 
bility, the  government 
officials,  and  the  liberal 
professions.  The  business  class  furnished  less  than  12  per  cent  and 
the  laboring  class  less  than  10.  The  differences  in  these  and  other 
respects  between  these  results  and  those  of  Galton's  table  may  be 


Social  Classes 

Number 

Per  Cent 

Nobility 

Government  officials      .     . 
Liberal  professions    .     .     . 

Bourgeoisie 

Manual  laborers    .... 

159.0 
187.0 

1 43- 5 
72-5 
61.0 

=5-5 
30.0 
23.0 
11.6 
9.8 

Total 

623.0 

208 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


[Part  II 


explained  by  the  fact  that  the  latter  deals  with  the  eminent  men 
themselves  and  not  with  their  parents  or  famihes.  Galton's  men 
were  all  living  in  1873,  while  Odin's  table  only  comes  down  to  1825, 
and  there  was  great  progress  during  that  half  century  in  the  con- 
dition and  character  of  the  bourgeoisie.  But  the  number  dealt  with 
by  Galton  is  too  small  to  form  a  reliable  basis  for  a  statistical 
investigation. 

But  M.  Odin  was  not  content  to  stop  here.  In  the  social  as 
in  the  economic  environment  the  actual  number  that  each  class 
furnishes,  or  even  the  per  cent  that  this  number  is  of  the  whole 
number,  gives  a  very  misleading  idea  of  the  true  relative  fecundity 
of  each  class.  This  can  be  arrived  at  only  when  the  proportion  that 
each  class  forms  of  the  population  is  taken  into  the  account.  This 
proportion  for  the  five  classes  of  the  table  is  in  the  exact  reverse 
order  of  their  absolute  fecundity.  What  then  is  their  fecundity 
relative  to  population .''  This  he  shows  in  the  last  column  of  the 
next  table,  in  which  he  also  gives  the  number  of  men  of  letters  of 
genius  distinct  from  those  of  talent  only. 


Talent  only 

Genius 

Number 

Social  Classes 

Relative 

TO 

Number 

Per  Cent 

Number 

Per  Cent 

Population 

Nobility 

125.0 

24-5 

34-0 

30-4 

159.0 

Government  officials       .     . 

157-5 

30.8 

29.5 

26.3 

62.0 

Liberal  professions    .     . 

116. 5 

22.8 

27.0 

24.1 

24.0 

Bourgeoisie 

62.0 

12. 1 

10.5 

9.4 

7.0 

Manual  laborers    .... 

50.0 

9.8 

II.O 

9.8 

0.8 

Total 

51 1. 0 

1 1 2.0 

We  perceive  that  the  nobility,  which  furnished  only  24.5  per  cent 
of  the  men  of  talent,  furnished  30.4  of  the  men  of  genius,  while  the 
public  officers,  who  furnished  30.8  per  cent  of  the  men  of  talent, 
furnished  only  26.3  per  cent  of  the  men  of  genius.  The  liberal  pro- 
fessions yielded  slightly  more  of  the  higher  grade,  the  bourgeoisie 
somewhat  less,  and  the  working-class  exactly  the  same.  These  facts 
may  not  have  great  significance,  though  the  superiority  of  the 
nobility  was  doubtless  due  to  their  more  complete  leisure.  The  last 
column  is  the  one  that  should  chiefly  arrest  our  attention.  The  first 


Ch.  IX]  THE  SOCIAL  ENVIRONMENT  209 

question  is  how  M.  Odin  arrived  at  the  figures  contained  in  it.  Like 
de  Candolle,  he  tries  to  estimate  the  relative  number  of  each  class. 
He  says  the  estimates  of  the  number  of  nobles  have  varied  from 
one  half  of  one  per  cent  to  two  per  cent.  He  considers  the  first 
too  low  and  the  last  too  high,  and  adopts  as  a  basis  of  his  calcu- 
lations the  mean  of  these,  or  one  per  cent  of  the  population.  By 
the  census  of  180 1  the  population  of  France  was  over  twenty-seven 
million,  which  would  give  the  nobility  two  hundred  and  seventy 
thousand. 

Without  professing  to  be  exact,  M.  Odin  estimates  the  number 
belonging  to  the  working-classes  at  80  per  cent,  the  bourgeoisie  at 
10  per  cent,  the  liberal  professions  at  6  per  cent,  and  the  public 
officials  at  3  per  cent.  If  then  we  divide  the  number  furnished  by 
each  class  by  its  percentage  of  the  population,  we  have  the  relative 
fecundity  of  each  class  as  expressed  in  the  last  column.  The  dis- 
proportions are  so  enormous  that  it  makes  very  little  difference 
whether  the  respective  ratios  to  population  are  correct  or  not.  They 
are  approximately  correct,  and  even  if  the  percentage  of  the  nobility 
were  much  greater  or  that  of  the  laboring  class  much  less,  the 
results  would  be  sufficiently  striking.  Assuming  them  to  be  correct, 
these  figures  show  the  relative  chances  that  genius  has  in  the 
several  classes  of  making  itself  known.  For  example,  a  person  born 
of  the  nobility  has  nearly  two  hundred  times  the  chance  to  become 
eminent  that  one  born  in  the  working-class  has,  assuming  that  the 
native  genius  is  the  same.  For  the  bourgeoisie  the  chances  are 
only  one  to  twenty-three.  The  son  of  a  noble  has  six  and  one  half 
times  the  chance  of  the  son  of  a  physician  or  lawyer  and  two  and  one 
half  times  that  of  the  son  of  a  judge  or  prociiretir.  Again  we  are 
brought  back  to  the  fundamental  truth  that  is  taught  by  all  the 
facts,  that  the  manifestation  of  genius  is  wholly  a  question  of 
opportunity.     Or  as  M.  Odin  himself  expresses  it  : 

As  regards  the  social  environment,  we  have  seen  that  certain  strata  of  the 
population  have  been  much  more  fruitful  than  others  in  remarkable  literary 
men.  Confininp;  ourselves  to  the  five  social  strata  —  nobility,  administration, 
liberal  professions,  bourgeoisie,  working-men  —  we  have  ascertained  that  the 
literary  fecundity  of  each  of  them  was  in  inverse  ratio  to  its  numerical  impor- 
tance. What  is  specially  striking  is  the  prodigious  superiority  of  the  first  three 
classes  over  the  last  two,  and  especially  of  the  nobility  over  the  hand  workmen, 


2  lO 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


[Part  II 


the  first  having  had  at  least  two  hundred  times  as  many  chances  as  the  second 
to  give  Vjirth  to  men  of  letters  of  talent.^ 

In  order  to  satisfy  himself  that  France  was  not  exceptional  in  this 
respect,  M.  Odin  made  extensive  investigations  into  the  conditions 
existing  in  other  countries.  Confining  himself  to  men  of  genius,  he 
obtained  data  for  39  cases  in  Italy,  28  in  Spain,  6 1  in  England,  and 
52  in  Germany,  and  presented  the  results  in  the  following  table  : 


Countries 

Nobility 

Public 
Officials 

Liberal 
Profes- 
sions 

Bourgeoi- 
sie 

Laboring 
Class 

Total 

Italy      .... 

22 

^y^ 

6 

6 

2;^ 

39 

Spain    .... 

M>^ 

4 

VA 

Z% 

2>^ 

28 

England     .     .     . 

16 

9 

17 

\o]i 

8>^ 

61 

Germany    .     .     . 

7 

9 

22% 

7 

6K 

52 

Total .     .     . 

59>^ 

^^y^ 

49 

27 

20 

180 

Per  cent  of  total 

33 

14 

27 

15 

II 

100 

In  some  respects  these  figures  differ  from  those  for  France, 
especially  in  the  case  of  England,  where  the  liberal  professions  and 
the  business  men  produced  a  much  larger  proportion,  also  to  some 
extent  in  the  case  of  Germany,  the  tendency  being  in  the  same 
direction.  Taking  all  these  countries  together,  however,  and  com- 
paring the  percentages  with  those  for  men  of  genius  in  France,  as 
shown  in  the  fourth  column  of  the  last  table,  we  find  that  the  dif- 
ferences are  not  very  great.  For  the  nobility  it  is  about  the  same : 
France,  30.4;  other  countries,  33.  For  public  officers  the  differ- 
ence is  large:  France,  26.3  ;  other  countries,  14.  For  the  liberal 
professions  the  deviation  is  the  other  way  but  much  less  :  France, 
24.1  ;  other  countries,  27.  For  the  bourgeoisie  the  difference  is 
considerable:  France,  9.4;  other  countries,  15.  For  the  working- 
class  it  is  less  :  France,  9.8  ;  other  countries,  1 1.  Allowance  must 
also  be  made  for  the  paucity  of  the  data  for  other  countries.  But 
taking  the  first  three  classes  together  as  constituting  the  leisure 
class  or  the  class  with  the  greatest  intellectual  stimulus  and  oppor- 
tunity, and  the  last  two  together  as  constituting  the  busy  or  toil- 
ing class  with  little  time  or  opportunity,  and  comparing  these  two 

1  Odin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  546-547- 


Ch.  IX]  THE  EDUCATIONAL  ENVIRONMENT  2  1 1 

classes  in  connection  with  their  numerical  relations,  we  have  the 
same  general  result  —  the  enormous  influence  of  the  factor  oppor- 
tunity. The  local  environment  and  the  economic  environment 
combine  with  the  social  environment  in  the  production  of  this 
result. 

The  Educational  Environment.  —  The  prevailing  idea  is  that  for 
the  di-splay  of  genius  where  it  exists  education  is  entirely  unnecessary. 
Or  rather  it  is  maintained  that  a  true  genius  will  always  educate 
himself  as  much  as  he  needs,  which  is  not  thought  to  be  very  much, 
because  genius  is  a  substitute  for  education.  Most  geniuses  seem 
to  have  little  idea  of  the  effect  that  their  education  has  exerted  on 
them.  This  is  true  of  great  discoverers  and  scientific  men,  as  any 
one  can  see  by  reading  the  answers  made  by  such  men  as  recorded 
in  Galton's  English  Men  of  Science.  De  Candolle,  however,  realized 
the  value  of  education,  and  among  the  conditions  to  success  that 
he  enumerated  is  the  following : 

6.  Primary  and  especially  secondary  and  higher  education  well  organized, 
independent  of  political  parties  or  religious  sects,  tending  to  encourage  research 
and  to  aid  young  men  and  professors  in  the  pursuit  of  science. 

In  considering  the  qualities  possessed  by  certain  cities  of  France 
tending  to  stimulate  genius  and  in  part  explaining  their  literary 
fecundity,  M.  Odin  says  that  "they  have  afforded  important  public 
intellectual  resources,  such  as  higher  institutions  of  learning,  libra- 
ries, museums,  book-stores,  and  publishing  houses."  And  compar- 
ing this  with  the  other  three  conditions  enumerated,  he  considers 
these  as  the  ones  that  have  exerted  by  far  the  most  powerful 
immediate  effect,  and  adds  : 

We  see  that  all  the  cities  that  have  presented  in  a  special  degree  influences 
of  this  class  have  also  distinguished  themselves  by  a  remarkable  fecundity  in 
men  of  letters,  while  cities  that  have  presented  the  other  conditions  and  not 
these  .  .  .  have  been  relatively  less  fruitful  in  men  of  letters.  But  this  is  not 
all.  We  may  go  further  and  affirm  that  it  is  especially  the  cities  possessing 
higher  schools,  and  in  particular  universities  or  equivalent  institutions,  that  have 
produced  the  most  men  of  letters  in  proportion  to  their  population.  ...  It  is 
impossible  not  to  be  struck  by  the  rank  occupied  in  this  respect  by  such  cities 
as  Geneva.  Orleans,  Montpellier,  Caen,  Aix,  to  cite  only  a  few  of  the  most  salient 
examples.^ 

^  Odin.  op.  cit.,  p.  513. 


2  12  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

He  should  certainly  have  added  Dijon  and  Besan^on.  The  fifteen 
university  cities  of  France  all  show  a  high  rate  of  literary  produc- 
tivity, and  stand  near  the  head  of  the  table  on  pages  1 89- 191.  They 
are:  Paris,  Lyons,  Toulouse,  Dijon,  Marseilles- Aix,  Bordeaux,  Mont- 
pellier,  Caen,  Rennes,  Besan^on,  Nancy,  Grenoble,  Lille,  Poitiers, 
Clermont-Ferrand.  But  these  do  not  by  any  means  represent  the 
whole  of  the  educational  activity  of  France.  There  are  all  kinds  of 
minor  institutions,  many  of  them  highly  active  and  efficient,  and 
a  thorough  investigation  of  the  French  educational  system  would 
probably  fully  bear  out   M.  Odin's  statement.    He  further  says  : 

If  we  take  all  this  into  consideration,  far  from  insisting  upon  unavoidable 
exceptions,  we  shall  be  astonished  at  the  extraordinary  fecundity  which  those 
cities  show  that  have  been  during  the  last  centuries  the  seat  of  higher  educa- 
tional institutions.^ 

Such  are  some  of  the  reflections  which  M.  Odin  could  not  sup- 
press in  discussing  the  influence  of  the  local  environment.  So 
obvious  is  it  that  this  is  the  chief  factor,  and  that  the  influence  of 
centers  of  population,  of  cities,  etc.,  in  stimulating  genius  is  great 
precisely  in  proportion  as  it  is  educational,  using  that  term  in  its 
broadest  sense.  Indeed,  we  must  go  further  and  say  the  same  for 
all  the  different  environments  that  we  have  considered.  Even  the 
physical,  ethnological,  and  religious  environments  come  under  this 
law  in  so  far  as  they  are  factors  at  all.  We  considered  them  at 
some  length  because  it  is  upon  them  that  so  great  stress  has  been 
laid  as  alleged  factors  of  civilization.  The  result  in  each  case  was 
chiefly  negative,  at  least  as  regards  any  supposed  influence  that 
they  exert  upon  the  production  of  men  of  genius  and  agents  in 
human  achievement.  It  was  about  the  same  for  the  chief  claim 
made  for  the  local  environment,  viz.,  density  of  population.  It  was 
therefore  necessary  to  narrow  that  term  down  to  something  much 
simpler  and  wholly  different  in  character  from  any  of  the  influences 
that  had  been  so  confidently  assigned. 

The  local  environment  does,  indeed,  narrow  itself  down  chiefly 
to  the  influence  of  large  cities,  but  only  because  it  is  these  that 
furnish  opportunity  to  genius  to  unfold.  It  need  not  necessarily 
be  cities,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  case  of  chateaux,  and  the  cities  need 

1  Odin,  op.  cit.,  p.  516. 


Ch.  IX]  THE  EDUCATIONAL  ENVIRONMENT  213 

not  necessarily  be  great,  provided  they  furnish  these  opportunities. 
The  quantity  of  population  has  nothing  to  do  with  it,  but  the  qual- 
ity of  the  population  is  a  factor.  The  great  factor,  however,  is  the 
material,  social,  and  educational  conditions  that  make  it  possible 
for  the  man  of  genius  surrounded  by  them  to  realize  his  ideals.  As 
M.  Odin  sa)"s  : 

We  have  thus  arrived,  by  a  series  of  careful  approaches  and  eliminations,  at 
the  conclusion  that  the  fecundity  of  the  respective  localities  in  remarkable  men 
of  letters  rests  essentially  upon  the  educational  resources  that  they  place  within 
the  reach  of  their  occupants.  The  conclusion  is  unexpected,  for  if  many  thinkers 
have  been  able  heretofore  to  proclaim  a  priori  and  without  giving  good  reasons 
the  absolute  influence  of  education,  positive  science,  by  a  very  natural  reaction 
has  rather  tended  to  support  the  contrary  thesis,  so  much  so  that  in  our  day 
scientific  men  are  almost  unanimous  in  rejecting  all  influence  of  this  character. 
Thus  it  is  not  surprising  that  none  of  the  authors  who  have  thus  far  undertaken 
seriously  to  study  the  genesis  of  great  men  have  recognized  the  immense  role 
that  education  plays.  The  most  of  them  have  not  even  suspected  that  it  could 
exert  any  appreciable  effect.  Lombroso,  who  discusses  at  length  the  most 
improbable  eventualities,  devotes  just  one  half  page  to  the  influence  of  educa- 
tion.^ Galton  and  Jacoby  speak  of  it  only  to  combat  it  a  priori  by  entirely 
general  arguments,  contradicted  in  part  by  their  own  data.  De  Candolle  alone 
sought  to  establish  positively  the  influence  that  higher  institutions  of  learning 
might  have  exerted,  but  he  almost  always  contents  himself  with  his  personal 
experiences,  and  when  he  has  recourse  to  statistics  his  data  are  found  to  be 
much  too  slender  to  permit  any  serious  calculation. 

Nevertheless,  as  we  have  just  seen,  the  facts  show  in  the  most  obvious  way 
that  higher  education  has  exerted  a  decisive  influence  on  the  development  of 
men  of  letters.  ...  A  still  more  striking  proof  of  the  influence  that  higher  edu- 
cation has  exerted  is  furnished  by  women  of  letters.  We  have  seen  how  very 
small  the  number  of  women  was  relative  to  the  total  of  literary  persons.  But 
nothing  is  more  completely  established  than  the  extreme  inferiority  of  the  instruc- 
tion that  women  in  general  receive.  It  is  difficult  to  comprehend  the  full  extent 
of  this  inferiority.  The  similarity  in  the  names  that  the  schools  for  persons  of 
the  two  sexes  bear  often  gives  rise  to  illusion  in  this  respect.  In  reality,  the 
secondary  and  higher  instruction  reserved  for  women  is,  in  almost  all  cases, 
extremely  inferior  to  that  which  men  receive,  and  it  is  very  rare  that  a  woman 
has  really  made  any  solid  studies,  in  spite  of  all  the  diplomas  that  have  been 
conferred  upon  her.  But  if  this  is  true  even  in  our  day,  when  we  imagine  that 
so  much  is  being  done  for  the  emancipation  of  woman,  how  much  greater  must 
have  been  the  difference  between  the  two  sexes  in  the  past  !  Nothing  could 
more  clearly  confirm  the  singular  influence  that  higher  education  has  had  upon 
the  development  of  French  men  of  letters. 

This  influence  is  especially  seen  in  the  manner  in  which  the  women  are  dis- 
tributed among  the  different  classes  of  localities.    We  learn  that,  preserving  all 

1  Lombroso,  L'Homme  de  genie,  p.  200. 


2  14  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

the  proportions,  women  have  come  much  more  frequently  than  men  from  Paris, 
and  especially  from  the  chateaux,  while  they  come  much  less  frequently  from 
other  large  cities,  and  still  less  from  other  localities.^ 

The  study  we  have  made  of  the  economic  environment  was  also 
found  to  lead  directly  to  the  same  general  conclusion.  We  found 
that  it  was  the  classes  that  were  economically  independent  that 
yielded  the  greater  part  of  the  men  of  eminence.  Surely  it  was  not 
simply  wealth,  money,  goods,  that  caused  this.  What  then  was  the 
real  influence  .-*  It  may  be  said  that  it  was  leisure.  Very  true.  But 
leisure  might  be  and  often  is  spent  in  idleness.  Leisure  is  only 
a  means,  but  it  is  an  effective  means.  It  enables  its  possessor  to 
apply  himself  undisturbed  for  prolonged  periods  to  preparation  for 
usefulness.  But  this  preparation  is  education.  Aside  entirely,  then, 
from  the  greatly  superior  facilities  that  the  children  of  wealthy 
parents  almost  always  have  for  receiving  the  preliminary  instruction 
necessary  to  a  literary  career,  ample  means  serve  to  enable  them 
to  carry  on  that  preliminary  and  preparatory  work  and  fit  them- 
selves in  a  thorough  manner  for  that  higher  work  which  will  yield 
them  fame  and  make  their  names  immortal.  The  economic  environ- 
ment is,  then,  for  the  true  genius,  highly  educational,  in  the  sense 
that  it  affords  him  an  opportunity  to  labor  for  all  time  and  not  from 
hand  to  mouth,  and  to  achieve  to  the  limit  of  his  native  powers. 

When  we  come  to  the  social  environment  we  find  this  even  more 
manifestly  true.  We  have  already  noted  the  intimate  connection 
between  the  economic  and  the  social  environment.  It  is  the  higher 
social  classes,  as  it  is  the  higher  economic  classes,  that  have  pro- 
duced most  of  the  great  men  of  the  world,  and  to  a  large  extent 
they  are  the  same  classes  and  the  same  persons.  In  both  classes 
it  is  chiefly  leisure  that  develops  genius,  but  in  both,  too,  the  youth 
of  the  higher  classes  are  liberally  instructed  so  that  they  can  profit 
by  their  leisure  in  later  life.  The  nobility  is  economically  an  inde- 
pendent class  and  socially  a  leisure  class.  High  public  oflicials,  usu- 
ally holding  their  places  by  a  life  tenure  with  ample  salaries,  become 
a  leisure  class  to  the  extent  that  they  possess  energies  in  excess 
of  those  demanded  by  their  official  duties.  In  the  great  majority 
of  cases  this  excess  is  large,  few  of  them  being  hard-worked,  and 

^  Odin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  516-519. 


Ch.  IX]  THE  EDUCATIONAL  ENVIRONMENT  215 

most  of  them  being  able  to  delegate  all  heavy  duties  to  subordinates. 
If  genius  happens  to  coincide  with  these  conditions,  something  is 
likely  to  be  produced.  At  least  this  class  can  and  usually  do  give 
their  children  all  the  education  that  the  country  and  the  times  will 
permit.  Professional  men  often  have  both  leisure  and  literary  tastes, 
sometimes  great  talent  in  various  directions,  and  find  time  to  pre- 
pare themselves  for  a  life  of  achievement.  In  fact,  the  educational 
preparation  necessary  to  their  profession  constitutes  a  basis  for 
such  work,  and  it  requires  only  leisure  in  a  man  of  genius  thus  pre- 
pared and  circumstanced  to  put  him  on  the  high  road  to  fame. 

It  is  for  these  reasons  that  I  have  treated  the  educational  environ- 
ment last  in  the  series,  or  in  an  order  different  from  that  adopted 
by  M.  Odin.  It  is  the  end  toward  which  the  others  all  lead.  In 
one  sense,  the  local,  economic,  and  social  environments  are  all 
educational  environments,  and  their  influence  on  the  production 
of  men  of  letters,  of  science,  of  art,  and  of  distinction  generally 
depends  entirely  on  the  extent  to  which  they  are  educational.  They 
all  combine  and  converge  to  this  end,  and  practically  constitute  the 
educational  environment. 

There  is,  however,  a  sense  in  which  the  educational  environment 
may  be  regarded  as  distinct  from  all  the  others,  and  in  this  sense 
it  is  susceptible  to  a  limited  extent  of  being  treated  by  the  statisti- 
cal method.  The  question  may  always  be  asked  whether  a  person 
of  distinction  received  an  education  in  his  youth  or  whether  his 
education  was  neglected.  Unfortunately  the  biographies  of  great 
men  are  very  deficient  in  this  kind  of  information.  Probably  it  is 
difficult  to  procure,  but  another  reason  for  its  omission  is  that,  as 
already  remarked,  there  is  an  almost  universal  belief  that  education 
has  no  influence  in  the  production  of  genius  or  even  of  success. 
Galton  seems  to  share  this  view,  and  Herbert  Spencer,  though,  as  his 
autobiography  shows,  almost  overeducated,  repeatedly  echoes  it  and 
never  tires  of  belittling  the  value  of  educational  institutions.  Ribot 
belongs  to  the  same  school,  but  qualifies  the  doctrine  as  follows: 

We  think  it  is  restricting  the  influence  of  education  to  its  just  limits  to  say: 
//  is  HC7'er  absolute  and  has  a  decided  injiuence  only  on  averai^e  natures.  Sup- 
pose the  various  degrees  of  human  intelligence  to  be  arranged  in  such  a  way 
that  they  should  form  one  immense  linear  series  extending  from  idiocy  at  one 


2l6 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


[Part  II 


extreme  to  genius  at  the  other.  In  our  opinion,  the  influence  of  education  at 
the  two  ends  of  the  series  is  at  its  jninivium.  Upon  the  idiot  it  has  almost  no 
effect :  extraordinary  efforts,  marvels  of  patience  and  skill,  often  end  in  insig- 
nificant and  ephemeral  results.  But  as  we  rise  toward  the  medium  grades  this 
influence  increases.  It  attains  its  viaxiintii?i  in  those  average  natures  who, 
being  neither  good  nor  bad,  are  about  what  chance  makes  them.  Then,  if  we 
rise  toward  the  higher  forms  of  intelligence  we  see  it  again  diminish,  and  as 
the  highest  genius  is  approached,  it  tends  toward  its  minimum.' 

It  is  evident  that  all  the  men  of  letters  of  merit  constituting 
M.  Odin's  entire  list  of  6382  persons  would  stand  so  high  in  Ribot's 
series  that  according  to  his  theory  education  would  have  no  effect 
upon  them.  During  the  most  fruitful  period,  viz.,  from  1801  to 
1830,  the  list  contains  1344  names.  This  would  be  one  to  each 
25,000  or  30,000.  For  men  of  talent  as  he  rates  them  the  proportion 
would  be  one  to  200,000,  and  for  men  of  genius  one  to  1,500,000. 
All  these  would  of  course  be  far  out  of  the  reach  of  all  educational 
influences,  according  to  Ribot's  scheme. 

He  found  it  necessary,  for  want  of  data,  to  confine  himself  to 
men  of  talent.  Of  these,  in  827  cases  he  was  able  to  find  sufficient 
information  relative  to  their  early  education.  He  divided  these  into 
two  groups,  in  one  of  which  he  could  safely  say:  "education  good," 

i.e.,  their  education  was 
shown  to  be  at  least  equal 
to  that  afforded  by  the 
French  lycee  or  the  German 
gymnasium.  This  would 
correspond  to  an  average 
college  education  in  the 
United  States.  Of  course 
in  many  cases  it  was  much 
better.  The  persons  of  the 
other  group  were  shown  to 
have  received  an  education 
less  than  this,  and  in  many 
cases  very  little  or  practically  none  at  all.  These  two  groups  he 
classifies  by  periods  in  his  usual  way  and  presents  the  results  in 
the  accompanying  table. 


Periods 

Education 
Good 

Education 
Poor  or  None 

1301-1500 
1 501-1550 
1551-1600 
1601-1650 
1651-1700 
I70I-1725 
I726-1750 

I751-1775 
1776-1800 
180I-1825 

33 

58 

lOI 

91 

56 

89 

116 

83 
132 

2 
7 

I 

2 
2 
2(1?) 

Total 

811 

16(15?) 

1  Ribot,  L'Heredite  psychologique,  2^  ed.,  Paris,  1882,  p.  329. 


Ch.  IX] 


THE  EDUCATIONAL  ENVIRONMENT 


217 


It  thus  appears  that  98  per  cent  of  the  talented  authors  of  France 
received  a  good  education  in  their  youth,  while  only  2  per  cent 
received  an  inadequate  education  or  none  at  all.  The  table  includes 
J I  per  cent  of  the  writers  of  that  grade  (i  136),  and  were  the  facts 
known  for  the  remainder  they  would  scarcely  alter  the  result. 
What  are  we  to  conclude  from  this  }  Can  it  be  reconciled  with  the 
theory  that  education  has  no  influence  on  men  of  genius }  Can  we 
logically  argue  that  because  16  out  of  827  were  able  to  attain  emi- 
nence with  very  little  or  no  education,  the  other  811  would  have 
done  so  had  they  received  no  better  education  than  the  \6}  In 
order  to  make  it  possible  to  give  approximate  answers  to  such  ques- 
tions M.  Odin  has  given  us  further  detailed  information  relative  to 
these  16  persons.  This  consists  of  their  names,  the  year  and  place 
of  their  birth,  and  the  kind  of  literary  work  in  which  they  distin- 
guished themselves.  The  date  is  of  some  interest,  and  he  arranges 
the  names  in  chronological  order.  The  kind  of  literary  work  is  not 
so  important,  because  for  most  of  them  their  work  is  known  to  most 
readers.  The  important  fact  is  the  locality,  because  this  shows  the 
influence  of  the  local  environment,  which,  as  we  have  seen,  may  be 
highly  educational.  The  following  is  the  list  with  the  other  data, 
excepting  the  kind  of  literary  work : 


Name 


Place  of  Birth 


Corrozet    .... 
Du  Bellay      .     .     . 

Billaut 

Conrart  .... 
Dassoucy  .... 
La  Rochefoucauld 
Colbert  .... 
Boursault .... 
Champmesle  (Mme.) 
Genlis  (Mme.)  .  . 
Fabre  d'figlantine  . 
Cazal^s  .... 
Beranger  .... 

Bouffe 

Dumas .'.... 
Anicet-Bourgeois   . 


Paris 

Chateau  de  Lire 

Nevers 

Paris 

Paris 

Paris 

Reims 

Mussy  I'Evique 

Rouen 

Chateau  de  Champcery 

Carcassonne 

Grenade 

Paris 

Paris 

Villers-Cotterets 

Paris 


2l8  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

Of  this  table  M.  Odin  remarks: 

If  we  consider  the  place  of  birth  of  the  men  of  letters  whose  education  was 
neglected,  we  perceive  that  seven  of  them  were  born  in  Paris,  two  in  a  chateau, 
four  in  large  cities  other  than  Paris,  and  only  three  in  other  localities.  They 
have  therefore  nearly  all  issued  from  localities  that  we  have  seen  to  be  specially 
adapted  to  the  production  of  remarkable  men  of  letters,  from  localities,  there- 
fore, where  it  was  comparatively  easy  to  compensate  in  one  way  or  another  for 
the  lack  of  regular  instruction.  As  regards  the  three  who  do  not  belong  to  this 
class,  two  of  them,  Cazal^s  and  Dumas,  grew  up  under  circumstances  which 
took  the  place  in  large  measure  of  education  properly  so  called.  Cazales,  who 
distinguished  himself  solely  as  an  orator,  had  found  in  the  very  bosom  of  his 
family  all  the  elements  of  a  higher  culture.  His  father  was  councilor  to  the 
parliament  of  Toulouse,  his  mother  a  distinguished  woman  of  good  family,  and 
although  his  parents  had  not  allowed  him  to  pursue  ^'fortes  etudes,''''  he  evi- 
dently must  have  sufficiently  profited  by  his  intercourse  with  them  to  be  able 
to  acquire  in  the  end  by  himself  all  the  positive  knowledge  that  he  required. 
For  he  did  not  fail  early  to  remodel  his  whole  intellectual  education.  .  .  .  As 
much  may  be  said,  in  an  entirely  different  field  of  activity,  of  Alexandre  Dumas. 
As  to  Boursault,  it  would  be  necessary,  in  order  to  venture  an  explanation,  to 
know  his  biography  more  exactly  than  we  do.  We  know  at  least  that  he  came 
at  the  age  of  thirteen  years  to  Paris,  and  that  he  very  soon  had  an  opportunity 
to  learn  to  write  French  with  purity.  Now  we  have  seen  that  Paris  offered  con- 
ditions much  more  favorable  than  any  other  place  for  the  class  of  literature 
(dramatic  poetry)  for  which  Boursault  was  distinguished. 

Finally  it  is  to  be  noted  that  of  these  sixteen  men  of  letters  of  talent,  three 
only,  La  Rochefoucauld,  Beranger,  and  Dumas,  belong  to  the  class  of  men  of 
genius.  We  have,  then,  here  also,  the  extremely  small  proportion  of  2  per  cent. 
Thus,  even  for  genius,  circumstances  can  take  the  place  of  higher  education 
only  in  very  rare  cases.  Again,  it  is  sufficient  to  remember  what  the  life  and 
class  of  literary  activity  of  La  Rochefoucauld  and  Beranger  were  in  order  to 
recognize  that  these  two  personages  found  themselves  in  fact  in  very  favorable 
conditions  for  the  development  of  their  talent. 

Everj'thing  therefore  forces  us  to  admit  that  education  plays  a  role  not  only 
important  but  vital  and  decisive  in  the  development  of  men  of  letters.  It  acts 
not  only  upon  average  natures,  but  also,  and  with  quite  as  great  intensit}',  on 
talent  and  on  genius.^ 

As  a  further  test  of  the  universality  of  this  law,  M.  Odin  col- 
lected considerable  information  relative  to  the  amount  of  education 
received  by  eminent  literary  men  of  other  countries,  especially  Italy, 
Spain,  England,  and  Germany.  It  related  chiefly  to  men  of  the 
highest  grade,  or  men  of  genius.  He  gives  it  in  the  following  table 
for  264  persons,  apportioned  as  follows:  Italy,  55;  Spain,  63; 
England,  75  ;  Germany,  71. 

1  Odin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  526-527. 


Ch.  IX] 


THE  EDUCATIONAL  ENVIRONMENT 


219 


Countries 


Education 
Good 


Education 
Poor  or  None 


Education 

Doubtful  or 

Unknown 


Total 


Italy  . 
Spain  . 
England 
Germany 

Total 


51 
44 
71 
64 


55 
63 
75 
71 


230 


28 


264 


On  this  table  he  remarks  as  follows : 

These  figures  are  almost  identical  with  those  that  we  had  obtained  for 
French  literature.  Out  of  a  total  of  236  men  of  genius  for  whom  we  know 
more  or  less  exactly  the  educational  environment  in  which  they  grew  up,  not 
less  than  230,  or  97^  per  cent,  had  an  opportunity  to  move  during  their  youth 
in  a  favorable  intellectual  environment.  Even  if  we  were  to  range  all  the  cases 
in  which  the  educational  environment  is  unknown  or  doubtful  under  the  head 
of  education  poor,  —  which  surely  would  not  correspond  to  the  reality,  —  there 
would  still  remain  more  than  87  per  cent  of  cases  in  which  the  educational 
environment  would  have  been  favorable.^ 

It  would  probably  have  been  better  to  omit  all  mention  of  the 
28  cases  in  which  scarcely  anything  was  known  of  their  education, 
and  base  the  calculations  on  the  236  cases  in  which  it  was  fully 
known.  This  shows  98^  percent  who  received  a  higher  education. 
The  large  number  (18)  from  Spain  about  whose  education  nothing 
is  known  simply  shows  the  difficulty  of  obtaining  information  for 
that  country,  and  probably  most  of  them  were  well  educated  ;  but 
even  if  we  gi\e  half  (14)  to  one  column  and  half  to  the  other,  the 
number  of  well  educated  will  be  92.42  per  cent  of  the  whole.  Turn 
it  as  we  may,  the  truth  remains  that  nearly  all  who  make  a  name 
for  themselves  have  had  a  preparation  at  some  seat  of  learning. 

No  one  has  ever  understood  by  education  the  mere  conning  of 
lessons,  much  less  simple  attendance  at  school.  Education  includes 
any  and  all  influences  that  react  upon  the  mind,  supply  it  with 
knowledge  and  provide  it  with  the  means  of  giving  expression  to 
genius,  talent,  and  all  the  native  powers  of  the  individual  under  its 
influence.  As  already  remarked,  all  four  of  the  kinds  of  environment 
last  considered  are  essentially  educational.  The  local  educational 
environment  is  the  easiest  to  realize.    The  young  man  of  genius 

'  Odin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  604-605. 


220  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

born  in  the  rural  districts  will  if  possible  gravitate  to  the  city.  If 
he  does  not,  it  may  be  safely  predicted  that  his  talents  will  never 
be  known.  If  statistics  of  the  class  we  have  been  considering  had 
been  based  on  the  place  where  men  have  done  their  work  instead  of 
simply  on  their  place  of  birth,  all  would  have  been  shown  to  belong  to 
the  cities.  It  is  impossible  for  a  man  of  genius  to  attain  eminence 
and  remain  all  his  life  in  the  country.  The  facilities  that  the  city 
affords  are  not  only  aids  to  his  development,  but  they  are  the  indis- 
pensable conditions  to  any  and  all  progress  beyond  mediocrity.  For 
a  person  of  genius,  too,  the  local  environment  often  becomes  a  con- 
dition to  his  economic  independence.  Men  without  talents  may  fail 
in  the  city,  but  talented  persons  are  almost  certain  soon  to  find  some 
avenue  to  material  success.  The  same  is  true  of  the  social  environ- 
ment. The  man  of  talent  transplanted  to  the  intellectual  atmosphere 
of  a  great  metropolis,  whatever  may  have  primarily  been  his  social 
position,  usually  soon  finds  himself  in  one  of  a  higher  grade.  He 
may  engage  in  successful  business,  acquire  a  small  fortune,  and 
devote  his  leisure  to  his  favorite  pursuit.  Or  he  may  enter  the  class 
of  liberal  professions  and  gain  his  end  through  that  means.  Or, 
again,  he  may  find  his  way  into  the  public  service  and  through  his 
talents  secure  preferment,  until  he  finds  himself  in  a  position  to 
devote  a  large  share  of  his  surplus  energy  to  literary,  artistic,  or 
scientific  pursuits  and  thus  mount  to  fame.  Cases  are  not  wholly 
wanting  in  which,  in  the  older  days,  such  men  have  even  risen  to 
a  place  in  the  nobility,  as  must  have  been  the  history  of  the  duke 
de  La  Rochefoucauld.  Galton  shows  that  many  of  the  judges  of 
England  rose  thus  from  the  lower  ranks  of  life. 

The  trend  of  the  whole  investigation  has  been  in  the  general  direc- 
tion of  showing  that  great  men  have  been  produced  by  the  coopera- 
tion of  two  causes,  genius  and  opportunity,  and  that  neither  alone 
can  accomplish  it.  But  genius  is  a  constant  factor,  very  abundant 
in  every  rank  of  life,  while  opportunity  is  a  variable  factor  and  chiefly 
artificial.  As  such  it  is  something  that  can  be  supplied  practically 
at  will.  The  actual  manufacture,  therefore,  of  great  men,  of  the 
agents  of  civilization,  of  the  instruments  of  achievement,  is  not  a 
Utopian  conception  but  a  practical  undertaking.  It  is  also  com- 
paratively simple,  and  consists  in  nothing  but  the  extension  to  all 


Ch.  IX]  PROSPECTIVE  INVESTIGATIONS  22  1 

the  members  of  society  of  an  equal  opportunity  for  the  exercise  of 
whatever  mental  powers  each  may  possess.  There  are  many  artifi- 
cial substitutes  for  the  various  kinds  of  favorable  environment,  but 
since,  as  we  have  seen,  these  are  effective  only  to  the  extent  that 
they  constitute  an  educational  environment  and  are,  in  fact,  only  so 
many  aspects  of  the  educational  environment,  it  is  obvious  that  this 
is  the  real  factor  in  the  development  of  genius  and  the  progress  of 
civiUzation.  If  therefore  the  educational  environment  can  be  sup- 
plied, the  rest  may  be  dispensed  with,  and  the  real  end  to  be  attained 
is  simply  and  solely  the  establishment  on  a  gigantic  and  universal 
scale  of  an  educational  environment. 

Prospective  Investigations.  —  The  thoroughly  objective,  scientific, 
and  heuristic  investigations  of  M.  Odin,  limited  as  they  are  in  their 
scope,  clearly  point  to  the  nature  of  the  work  that  remains  to  be 
done.  He  has  stated  the  problem,  which  is  to  discover  what  the 
real  influences  are  that  ha\-e  produced  the  true  agents  of  history. 
He  was  compelled,  working  single-handed  and  alone,  to  confine 
himself  to  one  group  of  these  agents,  and  practically  to  one  coun- 
try. What  is  needed  is  to  extend  these  researches  to  all  kinds  of 
agents  and  to  all  countries.  Although  there  are  many  groups,  still 
the  two  principal  ones  that  are  largely  omitted  in  his  statistics  are 
men  of  art  and  men  of  science.  Or  perhaps  we  should  reverse  this 
order  and  say  men  of  science  and  men  of  art,  but  use  the  latter 
term  in  its  broad  but  still  legitimate  sense,  which  would  then  in- 
clude not  merely  the  so-called  fine  arts  but  also  the  practical  arts. 
No  one  will  deny  that  painters  and  sculptors,  carvers,  engravers, 
stucco- workers,  ceramic  decorators,  and  beautifiers  of  every  kind 
are  agents  of  civilization,  and  none  of  these  should  be  neglected. 
But,  as  we  saw  in  the  nineteenth  chapter  of  Pure  Sociology,  the 
great  achievements  of  the  world  have  been  chiefly  in  two  fields, 
viz.,  scientific  discovery  and  mechanical  invention.  It  is  through 
these  far  more  than  through  literature  or  any  of  the  other  arts  that 
the  conquest  of  nature  has  been  brought  about.  Galton  and  de 
Candolle  clearly  saw  this  and  confined  themselves  accordingly  to 
men  of  science.  But,  as  we  have  seen,  their  methods  were  defec- 
tive and  their  data  so  meager  that  no  conclusive  results  have 
emerged  from  their  researches. 


222  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

Our  studies  have  also  taught  us,  as  nothing  else  could,  what  is 
the  true  task  and  mission  of  the  biographer.  The  prevalence  of  a 
mass  of  almost  universally  accepted  popular  error  has  prevented 
biographers  from  recording  the  most  important  facts  connected  with 
the  life  and  career  of  great  men,  and  for  those  that  have  lived  and 
labored  in  former  ages  these  are  probably  now  for  the  most  part  lost 
forever.  The  work  of  the  future  must  therefore  begin  with  the 
present,  which  is  rapidly  becoming  the  past.  There  needs  to  be 
a  serious  and  widely  extended  effort  to  collect  the  material  that  is 
absolutely  indispensable  to  the  determination  of  these  vast  social 
influences.  At  the  present  time  there  is  a  most  pernicious  practice 
in  vogue  which  cannot  be  too  severely  condemned.  It  cannot  prob- 
ably be  stopped,  but  something  so  much  better  should  be  set  on 
foot  that  it  will  lose  its  economic  stimulus  and  be  completely  sup- 
planted. I  refer  to  the  deluge  of  alleged  biographical  dictionaries 
which,  under  various  names,  are  flooding  civilized  countries.  They 
are  all  mercenary  schemes,  set  on  foot  by  shrewd  financiers  who 
know  much  of  the  weak  side  of  human  nature  and  know  how  to 
glut  their  greed  by  appealing  to  the  vanity  of  ambitious  men.  They 
need  no  description,  as  every  one  who  has  in  the  least  attracted  the 
attention  of  the  world  has  become  the  victim  of  them.  Those  who 
have  no  other  way  to  get  their  names  before  the  public  readily  fall 
into  the  net.  They  are  asked  to  write  their  own  biographies,  and 
these  volumes  are  filled  with  the  self-praises  of  charlatans.  Truly 
great  men  are  loath  to  contribute,  and  when  they  do  so,  either  from 
goodness  of  heart  or  to  put  an  end  to  importunity,  it  is  always  some 
modest  note  that  gives  no  adequate  idea  of  their  true  merit  or  their 
work.  The  perspective  is  thus  totally  lost,  the  vain  and  worthless 
are  made  to  appear  to  be  the  chief  figures,  and  all  forms  of  mediocrity, 
charlatanry,  and  quackery  are  brought  into  the  foreground. 

Society  itself  should  undertake  this  most  important  of  all  opera- 
tions. It  should  conduct  a  most  searching  and  continuous  statistical 
investigation  of  the  agents  of  civilization.  It  should  prepare  in  the 
most  careful  manner  a  series  of  questions  calculated  to  bring  out 
every  important  fact  and  send  them  out  judiciously  to  all  that  it 
would  be  of  use  to  interrogate.  Great  men,  or  men  who  possess  the 
elements  of  true  greatness,  would  gladly  respond  to  such  inquiries. 


Ch.  IX]  PROSPECTIVE  INVESTIGATIONS  223 

If  Galton  could  obtain  answers  from  the  greater  part  of  those  to 
whom  he  sent  his  questions,  certainly  ar  properly  organized  bureau 
would  be  treated  respectfully  by  all  who  were  really  worthy  of  being 
included  in  such  an  investigation.  But  this  is  by  no  means  the  only 
method  to  adopt.  There  are  hundreds  of  ways  by  which  the  desired 
information  could  be  obtained.  M.  Odin's  researches  furnish  a  per- 
fect model  from  which  to  proceed.  It  could  and  would  no  doubt  be 
improved  upon  and  great  fields  covered  which  he  was  obliged  to 
leave  fallow.  No  aspect  of  such  a  momentous  question  should  be 
overlooked  or  neglected,  and  with  time,  patience,  and  ample  resources 
it  would  be  possible  ultimately  to  present  to  the  world  such  a  mass 
of  well-digested  statistics  as  would  enable  legislators  and  statesmen 
to  frame  measures  certain  to  multiply  the  workers  in  every  great 
field  of  social  achievement. 

In  default  of  such  true  social  action,  and  in  view  of  the  well- 
known  inertia  of  great  states,  there  are  certain  institutions  which 
in  their  extent,  resources,  and  importance  constitute  true  social 
agents.  Such  a  one  is  the  Carnegie  Institution,  devoted  to  the  pro- 
motion of  disinterested  researches  in  the  interest  of  human  prog- 
ress. With  its  vast  resources  it  is  able  to  undertake  great  works 
that  are  wholly  beyond  the  reach  of  individual  enterprise.  It  claims 
to  prefer  such  as  could  not  bring  pecuniary  returns,  provided  they 
be  really  important.  The  investigations  here  outlined  answer  this 
description.  Surely  no  man  who  devotes  time,  energy,  and  means 
to  them  could  ever  hope  for  any  material  returns  whatever.  Yet 
what  could  be  more  important  from  the  broadest  cosmopolitan  and 
humanitarian  point  of  view  than  to  investigate  the  conditions  that 
underlie  the  progress  of  the  world.''  Could  those  who  control  such 
institutions  share  in  any  modest  degree  the  views  and  vistas  of  the 
very  few  who  have  long  and  deeply  studied  these  vast  problems, 
there  would  be  no  hesitation  in  organizing  such  researches  on  a 
grand  scale  and  backing  them  up  with  all  the  resources  at  their 
command. 


CHAPTER    X 
THE  LOGIC  OF  OPPORTUNITY 

The  history  of  the  world  is  the  biography  of  great  men.  —  Carlyle. 

AcT  S"  ouTw?  wa-rrtp  iv  ypa^/xaTetw  (S  fxrjOev  {iTrapp^ei  lvT(.X(.-)(€La  yeypafifxevov 
OTTcp  avfi^aivu  iiri  tov  vov.  — ARISTOTLE. 

II  n'est  de  vrais  plaisirs  qu'avec  de  vrais  besoins. —  Voltaire. 

II  n'y  a  pas  d'existence  sans  activity.  —  Auguste  Comte. 

Our  Httle  hves  are  driven  eddies  of  the  dust  of  chance  in  the  gust  of  circum- 
stance.—  George  M.  Gould. 

The  facts  that  we  have  passed  in  review  in  the  last  chapter,  and 
especially  under  the  last  five  heads,  have  shown  in  a  wholly  unex- 
pected way  what  the  real  environmental  factors  of  civilization  are, 
factors  for  the  most  part  wholly  neglected  by  all  the  investigators 
in  this  field.  These  factors  are  (i)  centers  of  population  containing 
special  intellectual  stimuli  and  facilities ;  (2)  ample  material  means 
insuring  freedom  from  care,  economic  security,  leisure,  and  the 
wherewithal  to  supply  the  apparatus  of  research;  (3)  a  social  posi- 
tion such  as  is  capable  of  producing  a  sense  of  self-respect,  dignity, 
and  reserve  power  which  alone  can  inspire  confidence  in  one's  worth 
and  in  one's  right  to  enter  the  lists  for  the  great  prizes  of  life; 
(4)  careful  and  prolonged  intellectual  training  during  youth,  whereby 
all  the  fields  of  achievement  become  familiar  and  a  choice  of  them 
possible  in  harmony  with  intellectual  proclivities  and  tastes. 

The  Resources  of  Society 

The  same  facts  also  place  us  in  a  position  to  form  some  sort  of 
estimate  of  the  true  resources  of  society  in  the  agents  of  civiliza- 
tion. These  resources  are  made  up  of  two  elements :  the  quantity 
and  the  quality  of  talent  that  exist  in  the  world.  But  as  the  ele- 
ment quality  appears  to  be  distributed  in  about  the  same  proportions 
everywhere,  so  that  a  given  number  of  persons  of  genius  taken  at 

224 


Ch.  X]  THE  RESOURCES  OF  SOCIETY  225 

random  from  the  population  of  any  country  at  any  period  would 
probably  present  the  same  qualitative  gradations,  we  may,  at  least 
for  the  present,  leave  this  element  out  of  the  account  and  concen- 
trate our  attention  on  the  element  quantity.  This  of  course  means 
the  actual  number  of  talented  persons  in  society.  We  have  already 
had  abundant  reasons  for  concluding  that  this  cannot  be  measured 
by  the  number  who  have  succeeded  for  one  cause  or  another  in 
giving  expression  to  their  inherent  powers,  because  in  order  to  do 
this  one  or  more  of  the  four  environmental  factors  must  have  coin- 
cided with  the  possession  of  these  powers,  otherwise  they  never 
could  find  expression. 

Galton,  who  proceeded  on  this  erroneous  assumption,  estimated, 
probably  with  approximate  accuracy,  that  there  are  at  all  times  in 
England  about  850  men  of  special  ability  of  fifty  years  of  age  or 
upward,  and  as,  according  to  the  latest  census  at  the  time  he  wrote, 
there  were  about  two  million  male  persons  of  those  ages,  this  would 
make  425  to  the  million.  But  he  does  not  regard  all  these  as  men 
of  genius,  and  proposes  to  reduce  the  number  to  500,  or  250  to  the 
million.  This  would  be  one  to  every  four  thousand  of  that  age  and 
sex.  This  does  not  give  a  very  clear  idea  of  the  fecundity  of  a 
country,  because  few  know  offhand  what  proportion  the  men  of  fifty 
and  upward  bear  to  the  total  population.  The  figures  for  England 
.are  not  now  readily  at  my  hand,  but  the  proportion  would  not  prob- 
ably vary  greatly  in  different  countries.  Taking  down  the  Compen- 
dium of  the  Twelfth  Census  of  the  United  States  (1900),  I  find  that 
the  total  number  of  male  persons  of  fifty  years  of  age  and  upward 
was  5,182,464.  As  the  population  of  the  United  States  was  75,793,- 
991,  this  was  6.8  per  cent  of  it,  or  about  one  fifteenth.  Assuming 
that  this  would  be  approximately  true  for  England,  we  find  that, 
according  to  Galton's  estimate,  there  would  be  one  man  of  genius 
to  every  60,000  of  the  population.  We  have  been  accustomed  in 
dealing  with  M.  Odin's  tables  and  maps  to  think  of  the  fecundity 
in  men  of  genius  as  so  many  per  100,000  of  population,  and 
reducing  this  to  that  basis  we  have  for  England  i|  per  100,000 
inhabitants. 

Odin's  tables  cover  a  period  of  five  centuries,  and  therefore  the 
number  per  100,000  shown  by  him  cannot  be  directly  compared  with 


2  26  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

Galton's  figures.  M.  Jacoby's  table  covers  only  one  century,  which 
is  about  three  generations  of  men.  A  glance  at  it  shows  that  the 
great  majority  of  the  departments  yielded  four  or  more  "  remark- 
able personages  "  per  100,000  inhabitants,  only  two  less  than  one, 
sixteen  more  than  ten,  five  more  than  twenty,  while  Seine  went  up 
to  sixty-nine.  The  average  of  the  eighty-five  departments  is  8.5.  If 
we  leave  out  Seine  with  its  exaggerated  fecundity,  the  mean  for  all 
the  remaining  departments  is  about  7.8.  The  number  of  men  of 
genius  existing  at  any  given  time  is  practically  the  same  as  the 
number  born  during  one  generation.  For  the  two  estimates  to  agree, 
therefore,  the  mean  for  a  century  should  be  substantially  three  times 
the  estimate  for  a  given  time.  Or  conversely,  the  number  existing 
at  a  given  time  multiplied  by  three  should  be  practically  the  mean 
for  a  century.  We  see  that  this  number  (5)  falls  considerably  short 
of  even  the  less  of  the  two  calculations  (7.8),  but  there  are  so  many 
elements  of  uncertainty  in  both  estimates,  and  even  in  the  method 
of  calculation,  that  perhaps  the  discrepancy  should  not  be  regarded 
as  serious.  But  Galton's  estimate  is  also  too  low  as  compared  with 
M.  Odin's  tables.  It  appears  from  them  that  there  were  born  in 
France  1686  men  of  letters  during  the  period  from  1801  to  1825, 
or  considerably  less  than  a  generation.  The  number  of  persons  of 
distinction  in  all  branches  must  have  been  nearly  twice  as  great, 
say  3000.  The  population  of  France  during  the  same  period  was 
about  thirty  million,  or  practically  the  same  as  that  of  England, 
where  Galton  found  only  850  at  the  most,  which  he  reduced  to  500. 
The  ratio  for  France  would  therefore  be  10  per  100,000  inhabitants. 
If  we  confined  it  to  men  of  letters  alone,  it  would  still  be  between 
5  and  6,  or  more  than  six  times  Galton's  estimate. 

These  figures  give  us  some  idea  of  what  the  actual  working  force 
of  society  is  either  at  the  present  time  or  at  any  given  date  in  the 
past.  They  are  useful  in  forming  an  estimate  of  the  resources  of 
society,  but  they  are  in  themselves  no  measure  of  those  resources. 
These  may  be  compared  to  mineral  resources  which  lie  hidden  in 
the  earth.  The  actual  workers  would  then  represent  the  surface 
indications  which  the  mining  prospector  sees  as  he  surveys  a  given 
region.  A  few  glittering  grains  and  an  occasional  nugget  lie  on  the 
surface,  and  he  knows  that  if  a  shaft  is  sunk  at  the  proper  place 


Ch.  X]  THE  RESOURCES  OF  SOCIETY  227 

rich  veins  will  be  revealed.  The  comparison  soon  fails,  however, 
for  the  treasures  of  the  earth  are  segregated  and  exist  only  in  rare 
spots,  while  the  treasures  of  human  genius  are  somewhat  uniformly 
distributed,  and  there  is  no  region  which,  if  properly  w^orked,  will 
not  yield  them. 

If  we  go  back  to  Jacoby's  table  we  find  that  the  productivity 
of  the  different  departments  ranges  from  i  to  69  per  100,000. 
These  differences  are  all  due  to  differences  in  the  environment  at 
different  points,  and  we  have  already  seen  what  these  environmental 
factors  are.  The  differences  are  not  at  all  due  to  the  character  of 
the  people  living  in  these  different  departments.  The  people  of 
Creuse  or  Charente  are  the  same  kind  of  people  as  those  of  Bouches- 
du-Rhone  or  of  Seine.  Or,  if  they  differ  etbnologically,  we  have 
seen  that  this  has  no  influence  on  their  capacity  for  achievement. 
The  Basques  of  the  Basses-Pyrenees,  the  Bretons  of  Finistere,  the 
Germans  of  Haut-Rhin,  have  as  high  a  rate  of  fecundity  as  many 
purely  French  departments.  It  is,  therefore,  the  maximum  fecundity 
attained  that  represents  the  real  resources  of  a  country.  If  the 
mean  is  between  2  and  3  per  100,000,  the  maximum  is  over  20, 
and  the  fact  that  this  is  actually  reached  anywhere  shows  that 
it  is  possible  everywhere. 

A  number  of  Odin's  tables  show  that  even  this  is  much  less  than 
the  maximum  range  in  fecundity.  In  Jacoby's  table  the  maximum 
(69)  is  about  eight  times  the  mean  (8.5).  He  dealt  with  the  fecun- 
dity of  each  department  as  a  whole.  But,  as  we  have  seen,  this  is 
a  wholly  false  basis  for  arriving  at  the  influence  of  the  local  environ- 
ment in  the  production  of  genius.  The  great  factor  is  the  cities  as 
against  the  rural  districts.  We  saw  that  cities  exert  on  an  average 
about  thirteen  times  the  influence  of  the  country  in  this  direction. 
But  in  our  estimate  of  the  resources  of  society  we  are  not  to  go  by 
the  mean  of  all  the  departments.  The  true  resources  represent  the 
absolute  maximum  attained  anywhere.  For  France  we  must  there- 
fore judge  by  Paris,  which  has  by  far  the  greatest  fecundity.  This 
is  over  thirty-five  times  that  of  the  rural  districts  taken  together. 
The  total  range  is  of  course  much  greater.  But  even  Paris  does  not 
furnish  the  absolute  maximum.  To  find  this  we  must  go  to  the 
chateaux,  where,  as  we  saw,  the  rate  per  100,000  occupants  may 


228  APPLIP:D   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

be  as  high  as  200.  If  the  average  rate  is  about  two,  this  shows  that 
the  actual  resources  of  society  in  effective  working  power  are  capable 
of  being  increased  a  hundredfold. 

Thus  far  we  have  considered  the  influence  of  the  local  environ- 
ment only.  The  economic  environment  must  also  be  reckoned  with. 
This  may  be  more  or  less  independent  of  the  local  environment. 
When  this  is  the  case  it  simply  adds  to  the  influence  of  the  latter. 
It  was  shown  that  about  eleven  times  as  many  talented  persons 
belong  to  the  wealthy  or  well-to-do  classes  as  to  the  poor  or  labor- 
ing classes,  although  the  latter  are  about  five  times  as  numerous  as 
the  former.  The  chances  of  success  for  the  same  degree  of  talent 
are  fifty-five  for  the  former  class  to  one  of  the  latter.  The  extremes, 
of  course,  are  very  much  greater,  and  for  absolute  poverty  or  uninter- 
rupted labor  at  long  hours  the  chance  of  success  is  necessarily  zero, 
no  matter  how  great  may  be  the  native  talent  or  even  genius.  Indi- 
gence is  an  effective  bar  to  achievement.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
resources  of  society  may  be  enormously  increased  by  abolishing 
poverty,  by  reducing  the  hours  of  labor,  and  by  making  all  its  mem- 
bers comfortable  and  secure  in  their  economic  relations.  Any  sacri- 
fice that  society  might  make  in  securing  these  ends  would  be  many 
times  repaid  by  the  actual  contributions  that  the  few  really  talented 
among  the  hundreds  of  thousands  thus  benefited  would  make  to  the 
social  welfare.  For  talent  is  distributed  all  through  this  great  mass 
in  the  same  proportions  as  it  exists  in  the  much  smaller  well-to-do 
or  wealthy  class,  and  the  only  reason  why  the  latter  contribute  more 
is  because  their  economic  condition  affords  them  opportunity. 

Exactly  the  same  must  be  said  of  the  social  as  of  the  economic 
environment.  It  simply  adds,  in  so  far  as  it  is  distinct,  to  the  influ- 
ence of  place  and  of  means.  We  saw  that  more  than  three  fourths 
of  the  men  of  eminence  have  belonged  to  the  higher  social  classes, 
notwithstanding  their  relative  paucity  in  numbers.  When  we  looked 
into  the  relative  fecundity  of  these  classes  we  saw  that  the  differ- 
ences were  enormous.  The  nobility,  the  public  officers,  and  the 
liberal  professions  all  together  make  up  only  10  per  cent  of  the 
population,  yet  these  three  classes  furnished  over  78  per  cent  of 
the  men  of  renown.  The  lowest  class,  which  constitutes  80  per 
cent  of  the  population,  furnished  less  than  10  per  cent.    The  range 


Ch.  X]  THE  RESOURCES  OF  SOCIETY  229 

in  fecundity  relative  to  population  was  from  jS_  of  i  to  159,  which 
is  approximately  200  to  i.  This  again  indicates  the  true  resources 
(the  unworked  mines)  that  society  possesses.  Only  10  per  cent  of 
these  resources  have  been  developed.  Another  10  per  cent  are 
somewhat  developed.  There  remain  80  per  cent  as  yet  almost 
wholly  undeveloped.  The  task  of  applied  sociology  is  to  show  how 
this  latent  four  fifths  of  mankind  can  be  turned  to  account  in  the 
work  of  civilization.  For,  as  was  said  of  the  indigent  class  —  and 
they  are  for  the  most  part  the  same  —  they  possess  potential 
abilities  in  the  same  proportion  to  their  numbers  as  the  highest 
social  class. . 

When  at  last  we  come  to  the  educational  environment,  although 
the  data  are  more  defective  than  for  most  of  the  others,  the  indica- 
tions are  all  in  the  same  direction.  We  saw  that  98  per  cent  of 
the  men  of  talent  of  France  and  only  slightly  less  of  those  of  the 
four  other  leading  countries  of  the  world  were  provided  in  their  youth 
with  ample  educational  facilities.  Only  2  or  2^  per  cent  suc- 
ceeded in  struggling  up  to  distinction  after  a  limited  or  wholly 
neglected  early  instruction.  In  all  the  cases  of  this  last  class  about 
whom  any  information  could  be  obtained,  they  were  shown  to 
have  soon  come  under  the  influence  of  a  favorable  local  environ- 
ment, which,  coupled  with  their  talents,  took  the  place  of  an  edu- 
cation, indeed  actually  constituted  one,  albeit  acquired  somewhat 
later  in  life.  It  is  evident,  then,  that  education  is  absolutely  indis- 
pensable at  least  to  a  literary  career,  and  it  is  practically  so  to  any 
career  in  a  civilized  community.  This  means  that  all  who  are  with- 
out it  are  debarred  at  the  outset  from  all  hope  of  ever  joining  the 
forces  of  civilization.  All  the  achievement  of  the  world  has  been 
done  by  educated  persons.  Doubtless  different  kinds  of  achieve- 
ment require  different  kinds  and  amounts  of  education,  and  the  term 
must  be  given  the  broad  meaning  insisted  upon  from  the  first.  It 
may,  and  in  many  cases  does,  consist  almost  wholly  of  experience, 
and  still  the  cases  of  any  great  distinction  having  been  attained 
under  conditions  of  actual  illiteracy  are  so  rare  as  to  be  practically 
legendary. 

But  really,  for  all  except  the  rarest  cases,  something  more  than 
the  mere  "common-school  education"  is  required  to  insure  success. 


230  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

A  much  broader  view  of  the  principal  branches  of  learning  is  neces- 
sary to  enable  a  person  of  talent  or  even  of  genius  to  select  a 
career  and  pursue  it  successfully.  The  great  men  of  all  time  have 
had  this,  however  and  whenever  they  may  have  acquired  it.  But 
when  we  consider  how  small  the  number  is  who  have  this  privilege 
we  see  from  what  a  limited  group  the  efficient  workers  of  the  world' 
have  had  to  be  selected.  All  outside  of  that  group,  whatever  may 
be  their  native  talents,  are  excluded  even  from  candidacy  to  achieve- 
ment. And  yet,  precisely  as  in  the  case  of  the  inhabitants  of  back- 
ward provinces  or  districts,  precisely  as  in  the  case  of  the  poor  and 
disinherited,  precisely  as  in  the  case  of  the  working-classes  and 
proletariat,  talent  and  genius  are  distributed  throughout  the  ranks 
of  the  uneducated  in  the  same  numerical  proportion  as  among 
the  city-born,  the  opulent,  the  nobility,  and  the  academicians.  But 
we  saw  that  centers  of  population,  wealth,  and  social  rank  were 
conducive  to  greatness  and  achievement  only  in  so  far  as  they 
were  substitutes  for  an  educational  environment.  They  make  self- 
education  possible.  They  furnish  the  education  of  experience,  of 
intercourse  with  bright  minds,  of  access  to  the  treasures  of  learn- 
ing stored  up  in  libraries,  of  facilities  for  publication,  of  numerous 
readers  of  books  written.  It  is  all  education,  and  it  is,  it  may  be 
admitted,  education  for  much  of  which  there  is  no  substitute.  Still, 
a  well-organized  system  of  public  instruction  in  all  the  higher  fields 
where  genius  delights  to  revel  may  and  does  constitute  a  basis  for 
a  genial  career,  and  the  recipients  of  such  privileges  are  practically 
certain  to  seek  out  and  find  their  appropriate  local  environment. 
They  are  certainly  to  a  large  extent  a  substitute  for  the  economic 
and  the  social  environment,  and  often  result  in  the  attainment  of 
both. 

At  least,  while  it  would  be  regarded  as  wholly  Utopian  to  propose 
to  provide  all  with  a  high  economic  and  social  environment,  and 
while  it  is  in  many  ways  undesirable  that  all  should  flock  to  the 
great  educational  centers,  it  is  an  entirely  practical  proposition  to 
provide  every  member  of  society  with  such  an  education  as  will 
enable  him  to  select  and  successfully  pursue  a  career.  If  society 
could  see  this  in  its  full  meaning,  it  would  perceive  that  it  would  be 
the  most  economical  of  all  public  measures.    Even  if  there  were  no 


Ch.  X]  THE  RESOURCES  OF  SOCIETY  231 

persons  of  talent  or  of  genius  among  them,  the  superior  public  en- 
lightenment that  could  not  fail  to  result  would  repay  a  thousandfold 
all  the  effort  and  expense.  But  the  certainty  that  potential  genius 
does  exist  everywhere  in  the  same  proportions  as  in  the  most  favored 
classes  insures  the  actual  production  of  a  great  army  of  high-grade 
social  agents,  who  without  instruction  could  never  make  their  talents 
effective  and  would  remain  forever  unknown. 

To  sum  up  the  general  results  of  this  inquiry,  it  may  be  safely 
stated  that  a  well-organized  system  of  universal  education,  using 
that  term  in  the  sense  in  which  it  was  used  in  Dynamic  Sociology, 
as  conferring  "the  maximum  amount  of  the  most  important  extant 
knowledge  upon  all  the  members  of  society,"  would  increase  the 
average  fecundity  in  dynamic  agents  of  society  at  least  one  hun- 
dred-fold. The  fecundity  is  apparently  about  2  to  the  100,000 
population.  It  can  therefore  be  made  at  least  200  to  the  100,000, 
or  I  to  every  500. 

One  great  factor,  however,  has  been  omitted  by  nearly  all  who 
have  discussed  these  questions.  This  factor  is  nothing  less  than 
exactly  one  half  of  the  human  race,  viz.,  womankind.  Galton's  point 
of  view  is  of  course  exclusively  androcentric.  Woman  is  a  wholly 
negligible  factor  in  all  his  calculations.  De  Candolle  devotes  nearly 
two  of  the  five  hundred  and  seventy-six  pages  of  his  book  to 
"Women  and  Scientific  Progress,"  but  no  woman  had  ever  been 
admitted  to  any  of  the  great  academies  of  which  he  treats.  Jacoby's 
list  may  contain  the  names  of  some  women.  It  would  be  profitless 
to  search  for  them.  M.  Odin  is  the  only  one  who  has  seen  that  the 
true  cause  of  the  small  literary  fecundity  of  women  has  been  their 
almost  complete  lack  of  opportunity.  He  shows  that  where  they 
have  really  enjoyed  any  opportunity  they  have  done  their  share. 
Looking  at  the  subject  from  the  standpoint  of  the  local  environment 
alone,  this  is  clearly  brought  out  by  the  facts.  The  great  superi- 
ority of  Paris  over  all  other  cities  in  France  has  been  sufficiently 
emphasized,  even  in  the  case  of  men.  Paris  produced  23.5  of  the 
men  of  letters  of  F'rance,  but  it  produced  42.1  of  the  women  of 
letters  of  France.  This  was  because  only  there  did  woman  find 
anything  like  a  congenial  environment.  Only  one  other  condition 
proved    superior    to    Paris,   and   this   was   life    in    chateaux.    The 


232  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

chateaux  of  France  produced  less  than  2  per  cent  of  the  men  of 
letters,  but  they  produced  over  5  per  cent  of  the  talented  women. 

The  universal  prevalence  of  the  androcentric  world  view,  shared 
by  men  and  women  alike,  acts  as  a  wet  blanket  on  all  the  genial 
fire  of  the  female  sex.  Let  this  be  once  removed  and  woman's  true 
relation  to  society  be  generally  perceived,  and  all  this  will  be  changed. 
We  have  no  conception  of  the  real  amount  of  talent  or  of  genius 
possessed  by  women.  It  is  probably  not  greatly  inferior  to  that  of 
men  even  now,  and  a  few  generations  of  enlightened  opinion  on  the 
subject,  if  shared  by  both  sexes,  would  perhaps  show  that  the  differ- 
ence is  qualitative  only.  If  this  is  so,  the  gain  in  developing  it  would 
be  greater  than  that  of  merely  doubling  the  number  of  social  agents, 
for  women  will  strike  out  according  to  their  natural  inclinations  and 
cultivate  fields  that  men  would  never  have  cultivated.  They  will 
thus  add  to  the  breadth,  even  if  they  do  not  add  to  the  depth,  of 
the  world's  progress.  The  estimates  hitherto  made  of  the  resources 
of  society  have  taken  men  only  into  consideration.  We  concluded 
that  this  amounted  to  i  in  every  500  of  the  population.  How  much 
can  we  add  for  women  when  they  shall  be  fully  recognized  and 
taken  into  the  fold  ?  For  the  transition  period  it  is  not  claimed 
that  they  would  double  the  number  of  contributors  to  civilization, 
but  very  soon  they  would  raise  the  proportion  to  i  in  300,  and 
ultimately  they  would  contribute  their  full  moiety. 

There  is,  however,  a  certain  crudeness,  at  least,  if  not  positive 
error,  in  all  these  calculations  of  the  number  of  geniuses,  actual  or 
potential,  in  the  \vorld.  The  fact  is,  that  genius,  like  almost  every 
other  natural  product,  is  entirely  relative.  There  are  gradations  in 
everything,  and  here  as  everywhere  natura  non  facit  salUis.  There 
are  all  conceivable  degrees  of  genius,  and  the  present  irregularities 
among  men  in  this  respect  are  abnormal.  They  constitute  in  them- 
selves a  proof  that  something  is  preventing  the  full  natural  expression 
of  this  universally  diffused  social  force.  The  different  environments 
that  we  have  been  considering,  local,  economic,  social,  educational, 
as  they  actually  exist  in  society,  may  be  looked  upon  in  two  dia- 
metrically opposite  ways.  We  have  seemed  to  be  considering  them 
as  so  many  sources  of  opportunity,  and  hence  as  generators  of  genius. 
But  it  is  equally  legitimate  to  consider  them  from  their  negative 


Ch.  X]  THE  RESOURCES  OF  SOCIETY  233 

aspect.  In  every  one  of  them  the  repressive  influence  is  far  greater 
than  the  liberative  influence.  Over  against  the  metropolis  stands  the 
country,  and  for  every  Athens  there  is  an  Arcadia.  The  few  rich 
are  the  antithesis  of  the  many  poor.  The  nobiUty  is  opposed  to  the 
proletariat.  The  intelligent  class  is  immersed  in  the  illiterate  mass. 
We  are  looking  only  at  the  exceptions  and  ignoring  the  rule.  In 
each  environment  the  upper  strata  represent  only  what  has  succeeded 
in  bursting  through.  To  use  the  language  of  geology,  they  are  extru- 
sive materials.  In  fact,  they  are  simply  privileged  classes,  and  we  are, 
as  M.  Odin  says,  merely  extolling  privilege.  Let  us  listen  to  the  last 
words  of  that  remarkable  book  to  which  and  to  the  true  genius  of 
its  author  we  owe  so  large  a  part  of  all  that  we  have  been  able  to 
bring  forward  in  the  present  chapter  and  the  one  that  precedes  it : 

Literature  then  is  not  .  .  .  in  its  origin,  and  hence  in  its  essence,  that  vague, 
ethereal,  spontaneous  thing  whose  phantom  so  many  historians  and  literary 
critics  have  been  pleased  to  evoke.  It  is  in  the  full  force  of  the  term  an  artifi- 
cial creation,  since  it  is  derived  essentially  from  causes  due  to  the  intentional 
intervention  of  man,  and  has  not  resulted  from  the  simple  natural  evolution  of 
mankind.  It  is  a  natural  phenomenon  only  as  it  faithfully  reflects  the  inner 
mental  workings  of  certain  social  strata.  It  possesses  nothing  national  or  popu- 
lar. Literature  can  only  be  national  when  it  springs  from  the  very  bosom  of  the 
people,  when  it  serves  to  express  with  equal  ardor  the  interests  and  the  passions 
of  the  whole  world.  French  literature  does  not  do  this.  With  rare  exceptions 
it  is  only  the  mouthpiece  of  a  few  privileged  circles.  And  this  explains  why,  in 
spite  of  so  many  efforts  of  every  kind  to  spread  it  among  the  people,  it  has 
remained  upon  the  whole  so  unattractive  and  so  foreign  to  the  masses.  Born  in 
the  atmosphere  of  the  hotbed  it  cannot  bear  the  open  air.  Not  until,  from  some 
cause  or  other,  the  whole  population  shall  be  brought  to  interest  itself  actively 
in  intellectual  affairs  will  it  be  possible  for  a  truly  national  literature  to  come 
forth  which  shall  become  the  common  property  of  all  classes  of  society.^ 

In  the  past  and  present  state  of  the  world  not  only  literary  but 
all  other  achievement  has  been  irregular,  sporadic,  and  spasmodic. 
The  world  of  thought  may  be  compared  to  a  vast  mountainous  region 
with  great  peaks  and  domes,  chains  and  sierras,  rising  with  the  utmost 
irregularity  as  to  size,  form,  and  height,  in  a  wild  chaos,  but  not  with- 
out a  certain  rude  grandeur.  This  is  all  due  to  these  artificial  causes, 
to  influences  repressing  most  of  the  genius  of  mankind,  coinciding 
with  those  of  the  most  highly  favorable  character,  which  have  caused 

1  Odin,  op.  tit.,  p.  564. 


2  34  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

genius  to  burst  through  in  places  and  throw  up  and  scatter  over  the 
surface  of  society  all  these  towering  and  fantastic  forms.  If  the 
movement  had  been  natural  and  normal,  the  whole  mass  would 
have  risen  together.  It  would  have  been  an  epeirogenic  and  not 
an  orogenic  movement,  and  we  should  have  had  great  continents 
over  whose  merely  undulating  surface  all  the  powers  of  the  human 
mind  would  be  in  harmonious  operation. 

Now  the  purpose  of  applied  sociology  is  to  point  out  a  way  by 
which  these  great  irregularities  may  be  eliminated,  not  by  lowering 
the  higher  but  by  raising  the  lower  elements,  and  by  a  general  level- 
ing of  all  classes  from  this  purely  intellectual  point  of  view.  As  the 
higher  classes  have  attained  their  position  solely  through  superior 
opportunities,  it  is  evident  that  the  powers  of  mind  that  have  not 
found  expression  can  be  enabled  to  find  expression  only  through  the 
extension  of  opportunities  to  them  also.  This  points  the  direction 
that  the  movement  must  take  if  the  object  is  to  be  accompHshed. 
That  object,  as  the  statistics  have  shown,  is  nothing  less  than  the 
centupling  of  the  present  working  forces  of  society. 

The  Fallacy  of  History 

History  may  be  defined  as  a  record  of  exceptional  phenomena. 
Any  fact  or  event  to  be  worthy  of  such  record  must  stand  out  as 
something  extraordinary,  something  quite  out  of  the  regular  course 
of  things.  Such  events  are  supposed  to  be  wholly  uncaused.  Any- 
thing for  which  a  natural  cause  can  be  assigned  immediately  loses 
all  its  historical  interest.  If  the  cause  is  known  in  advance  it  is  not 
recorded.  It  is  too  tame.  It  was  so  at  first  with  natural  history. 
Attention  was  paid  only  to  such  objects  (minerals,  plants,  animals) 
as  were  unusual,  bizarre,  huge,  abnormal,  or  monstrous.  The  idea 
of  a  museum  was  simply  that  of  a  curiosity  shop.  Twenty  years 
ago  I  wrote  : 

Science  often  has  its  origin  in  wonder  at  unexplained  phenomena,  and  there 

is  no  science  of  which  this  is  more  true  than  of  paleontology.    Nearly  all  the 

early  writers  openly  avow  that  they  have  been  chiefly  spurred  on  to  undertake 

and  carry  on  their  investigations  by  an  "  eager  curiosity  "  ^  respecting  the  objects 

'  they  were  treating,  and  the  first  collections  of  such  objects  were  looked  upon 

1  Parkinson's  Organic  Remains  of  a  Former  World,  1804,  p.  v. 


Ch.  X]  THE  FALLACY  OF  HISTORY  235 

simply  as  curiosities,  while  what  have  since  become  the  greatest  scientific  insti- 
tutions in  the  world  sometimes  betray  their  origin  by  perpetuating  the  original 
names  expressive  of  their  sense  of  wonder.^ 

Biography  is  only  a  kind  of  history,  the  part  of  history  which  deals 
exclusively  with  heroes.  A  hero  is  a  wholly  exceptional  being.  He 
is  not  at  all  like  other  men.  He  is  regarded  as  wholly  independent 
of  circumstances,  at  least  as  in  no  sense  a  creature  of  them.  The 
same  is  true  of  all  "  great  men."  No  wonder  then  that  so  little  can 
be  learned  from  biography.  But  if  now  we  look  back  over  the  whole 
movement  that  we  have  been  sketching,  we  see  that  it  partakes  in 
large  measure  of  this  spirit  of  wonder  study.  The  entire  effort  to 
find  out  who  the  great  geniuses  of  the  world  have  been  is  of  this 
nature.  The  works  in  which  this  effort  has  been  specially  made  are 
written  by  men  claiming  to  be  scientific,  and  in  them  we  find  flings 
at  the  historians,  and  yet  they  look  upon  a  genius  as  in  many  respects 
an  exceptional  being,  at  least  as  one  wholly  independent  of  circum- 
stances. They  suppose  that  just  so  many  of  these  human  curiosities 
have  been  brought  into  the  world,  and  that  it  is  with  this  fixed  quan- 
tity that  we  have  to  deal.  Some  do  indeed  imagine  that  the  quantity 
could  be  increased  by  the  adoption  of  certain  rules  in  the  process 
of  breeding  men,  but  they  deny  that  any  geniuses  exist  or  ever 
have  existed  except  the  few  that  have  made  their  way  to  fame. 

Now  there  is  no  essential  difference  between  this  mental  attitude 
and  that  which  I  have  shown  to  be  the  fallacy  of  superstition  (supra, 
p.  I  17),  and  later  to  be  also  the  fallacy  of  statistics  (supra,  p.  147). 
It  is  the  "fallacy  of  history  in  general  and  the  most  serious  vice  in  all 
human  reasoning.  M.  Odin  saw  this  clearly,  and  he  has  adverted  to 
it  on  numerous  occasions.  The  following  passage  is  one  of  several 
that  are  well  worth  listening  to  : 

The  historians  are  constantly  making  the  mistake  of  studying  only  the  facts 
that  present  a  certain  peculiarity  which  has  struck  them  from  the  first  and  of 
setting  aside  and  neglecting  the  others,  perhaps  much  more  important.  They 
proceed  exactly  as  do  those  persons  who  seek  to  justify  their  belief  in  presenti- 
ments. These  know  how  to  cite  a  number  of  cases  in  which  their  presentiments 
have  been  realized,  simply  forgetting  all  those,  much  more  numerous  of  course, 

^  For  example,  the  great  Academia  Leopoldino-Carolina  Naturae  Curiosorum, 
founded  in  1670  at  Frankfort-on-the-Main  (Fifth  Annual  Report  of  the  United  States 
Geological  Survey,  1883- 1884,  Washington,  1885,  p.  385). 


236  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

in  which  their  presentiments  have  played  them  false.  If  any  one  were  to  press 
them  they  would  probably  admit  overlooking  cases  in  which  presentiments  did 
not  come  true.  But  they  look  upon  these  as  e.xceptions  which  they  may  neglect 
as  not  affecting  the  general  rule.^ 

He  proceeds  to  give  a  number  of  striking  examples  of  the  fallacy 
of  history,  some  of  them  committed  by  writers  as  distinguished  as 
M.  Taine. 

Relativity  of  Genius.  —  One  of  the  best  illustrations  of  the  fallacy 
of  history  is  the  neglect  or  refusal  to  recognize  the  relativity  and 
universality  of  genius.  The  doctrine,  usually  ascribed  to  Locke,  that 
the  mind  of  man  at  birth  is  comparable  to  a  sheet  of  paper  on  which 
nothing  has  as  yet  been  written,  and  that  what  it  is  to  become  will 
depend  entirely  on  what  shall  be  written  upon  it,  is  as  old  as  the 
Stoics,^  Plato,^  Aristotle,*  and  Quintilian,  and  if  Helvetius  was  the 
only  one  who  ever  accepted  it  to  the  full  extent  of  asserting  the  com- 
plete equality  of  all  minds  and  the  extraneous  nature  of  all  intelli- 
gence, all  must  admit  the  paramount  influence  of  experience  in  the 
determination  of  the  quantity  and  quality  of  intelligence  in  the  adult 
human  being.  While  few  doubt  that  enormous  differences  exist 
among  men  in  the  substratum  of  the  intellect,  the  true  extent  of 
the  external  factor  has  only  recently  begun  to  be  understood.  The 
evidence  is  rapidly  accumulating  to  show  that  not  only  between 
individuals  of  the  same  race  but  also  between  the  races  of  men  the 
substratum  differs  far  less  than  was  supposed,  and  the  chief  differ- 
ence lies  in  the  equipment. 

The  comparison  of  the  new-born  mind  to  a  blank  sheet  of  paper 
is  not,  therefore,  wholly  exact.  Like  most  comparisons,  it  limps. 
Still  it  has  been  of  great  service,  and  the  truth  it  contains  constitutes 
the  foundation  of  modern  scientific  psychology.  Perhaps  there  is 
a  still  better  comparison.  Suppose  we  liken  the  wholly  inexperi- 
enced brain  to  soil  in  which  no  seeds  or  germs  of  any  kind  as  yet 
exist.  The  quality  of  this  soil  then  represents  heredity  or  the  pre- 
efiflcients  of  mind.  It  may  be  very  poor,  devoid  of  salts  and  nitroge- 
nous constituents,  and  therefore  be  incapable  of  yielding  any  rich 

1  Odin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  loo-ioi. 

2  Plutarch,  De  Placitis  Philosophorum,  Lib.  IV,  C.  XI. 

3  Theastetus.    Opera,  V,  iii,  p.  268  (ed.  Bekker). 

<  De  Anima,  III,  IV,  14, 1.  vii,  p.  71  (Tauchnitz)  ;  T.  4.  430a  (ed.  Biehl,  1896,  p.  85). 


Ch.  X]  RELATIVITY  OF  GENIUS  237 

products,  or  it  may  have  any  degree  of  richness  and  thus  be  capable 
of  raising  all  grades  of  crops.  If  very  rich,  it  contains  the  elements 
of  true  genius.  Then  the  character  of  the  seed  that  is  sown  upon 
it  may  vary  in  all  degrees.  That  germs  or  seeds  will  fall  upon  it  is 
certain,  for  the  atmosphere  is  always  and  everywhere  charged  with 
them.  This  represents  experience,  and  no  being  can  pass  a  moment 
after  birth  without  some  kind  of  experience.  If  left  entirely  to  itself, 
such  a  mind  will  receive  only  the  germs  that  float  about  at  random, 
or  are  borne  by  the  winds  or  waters  or  birds,  and  which  these  acci- 
dentally let  fall  upon  it.  Under  these  conditions  the  mind  will  be 
stocked  with  all  manner  of  germs  comparable  to  molds  and  algae,  and 
different  kinds  of  weeds  that  will  spring  up,  struggle  together  for 
existence,  choke  out  one  another,  and  leave  the  mastery  to  those  that 
possess  the  greatest  vitality,  although  they  may  be  coarse,  noxious, 
and  worthless.  Such  is  the  environment  of  nature.  But  the  seed 
may  be  carefully  selected  and  only  the  most  useful  kinds  allowed 
to  grow.  Careful  tillage  may  destroy  the  low,  useless  growths  and 
leave  the  useful  plants  to  flourish  without  competition  and  bear 
rich  and  abundant  fruit.  This  is  nurture  and  represents  a  favor- 
able educational  environment.  Where  careful  nurture  is  applied  to 
a  rich  soil  we  have  the  condition  of  talent  or  even  of  genius. 

The  human  race  has  represented  every  conceivable  combination 
of  all  these  conditions,  and  the  history  of  mankind  exhibits  as  a 
consequence  all  the  great  irregularities  in  its  intellectual  develop- 
ment that  we  have  been  studying.  Over  the  soil  itself  man  has 
little  control.  He  may  artificially  enrich  it  over  small  areas,  but 
here  perhaps  the  parallel  fails  more  fully  than  elsewhere,  for  nothing 
has  as*yet  been  discovered  for  the  mind  comparable  to  the  fertiliza- 
tion of  soils.  It  is  on  this  problem  that  men  of  Galton's  school  have 
been  working,  but  they  have  not  yet  solved  the  problem.  Everything 
else  is  completely  under  the  control  of  man  as  soon  as  he  learns  what 
to  do.  He  can  control  the  environment  to  any  required  extent.  He 
can  prepare  the  soil,  select  the  seed,  and  carry  the  tillage  to  any 
point  he  pleases.  Over  nature  he  has  little  power,  but  over  nurture 
he  is  complete  master. 

But  nature,  as  we  have  seen,  has  not  been  niggardly  in  providing 
the  soil  or  substratum  of  intelligence.     How  the  human  intellect  has 


238  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

been  able  to  reach  the  state  at  which  we  find  it  in  even  the  most 
backward  races,  and  especially  in  the  most  forward  ones,  I  have  on 
various  occasions  essayed  to  explain.^  The  important  fact  is  that 
the  human  intellect  everywhere  is  more  vigorous  than  the  ordinary 
material  wants  of  life  require,  and  is  constantly  striking  out  into 
new,  biologically  non-advantageous  paths.  Nothing  prevents  it  from 
doing  so  but  the  environmental  restraints  that  keep  it  in  check.  Burst 
these  bonds  at  any  point  and  the  human  mind  will  soar.  The  arti- 
ficial classes  of  society  possess  no  monopoly  of  the  mental  powers  of 
man,  and  they  seem  to  do  so  only  because  their  economic,  social,  and 
educational  environment  enables  them  to  rise  into  a  freer  intellectual 
atmosphere.  No  one  has  seen  or  expressed  this  truth  more  clearly 
than  M.  Odin,  as  in  the  following  paragraphs  : 

Perhaps  it  would  be  better  never  to  speak  of  men  of  genius,  but  only  of  works 
or  achievements  of  genius.  We  should  thus  avoid  gratuitous  assumptions, 
which,  by  force  of  repetition,  ultimately  acquire  the  appearance  of  evidence. 
Is  it  not  generally  believed  that  sooner  or  later  genius  will  burst  out,  whatever 
may  be  the  circumstances  that  oppose  it  ?  And  yet  this  universal  belief  is 
founded  after  all  only  on  simple  assumptions  whose  insufficiency  ought  to  leap 
to  the  eyes.  1 1  requires  only  a  little  reflection  to  recognize  that  by  this  something 
is  affirmed  with  a  perfect  assurance  which  it  is  absolutely  impossible  to  know. 
Of  course  genius  always  bursts  out  —  in  all  the  cases  in  which  we  see  it  burst 
out  !  But  who  shall  ever  tell  us  of  the  others  ?  Yet  we  should  always  consider 
them  as  possible,  according  to  the  traditional  idea  of  genius  as  an  entity.  But 
if  we  see  genius  not  in  the  persons  but  in  the  acts,  a  latent  genius  would  no 
longer  be  anything  more  than  a  contradiction  of  terms,  a  manifest  absurdity. 

It  is  not  otherwise  with  the  opinion  so  often  expressed  by  contemporary 
critics,  that  our  civilization  is  unfavorable  to  the  unfolding  of  genius,  that  men 
of  talent  will  perhaps  go  on  multiplying,  but  that  true  genius  will  become  more 
and  more  rare.  This  would  be  to  fall  into  a  very  strange  optical  illusion,  to 
attribute  to  an  assumed  modification  of  the  environment  the  consequences  of  a 
simple  change  in  our  point  of  view.  In  fact,  in  proportion  as  our  knowledge  of 
great  men  has  increased  the  difference  which  separates  the  man  of  genius  from 
the  man  of  talent,  and  the  latter  from  the  ordinary  man,  must  diminish.  It  is 
clear,  moreover,  that  this  difference  must  appear  less  striking  as  education  is 
diffused  and  strengthened,  that  is,  the  nearer  we  approach  to  our  epoch.  Con- 
temporary geniuses  are  probably  neither  less  numerous  nor  less  exalted  than 
those  of  preceding  epochs,  they  are  simply  less  different  from  the  great  mass.  It 
is  not  genius  itself  that  has  changed,  it  is  rather  the  point  of  view  from  which  we 
consider  it.  The  great  man  appears  less  great  only  because  other  men  appear 
less  small. 

1  Especially  in  Dynamic  Sociology,  Vol.  I,  Chaps.  V  and  VI  ;  Vol.  II,  pp.  477- 
480 ;  The  Psychic  Factors  of  Civilization,  Part  III  ;  Pure  Sociology,  Chap.  XVIII. 


Ch.  X]  GENIUS  PRESENT  IN  ALL  CLASSES  239 

Thus  therefore  everj'thing  leads  us  to  admit  between  the  man  of  genius  and 
the  common  run  of  mortals  a  simple  difference  of  degree  and  not  a  generic 
difference.  Genius  results  from  a  particular  combination  of  qualities  which  are 
found  in  all  men,  only  in  varying  proportions.  All  that  we  know  thus  far  is  that 
it  is  impossible  to  separate  men  into  clearly  distinct  categories  according  to  the 
nature  and  amount  of  their  talents.  So  far  as  experience  and  reason  enable  us 
to  judge,  the  passage  from  the  one  to  the  other  is  imperceptible  ;  they  all  form, 
from  the  most  sublime  to  the  most  limited,  one  same  and  single  series,  inter- 
crossing in  all  directions,  and  from  which  we  cannot  except  arbitrarily  detach 
any  part.  This  impossibility,  which  many  deplore,  of  fixing  absolute  limits,  of 
establishing  a  truly  natural  classification,  is  common  to  all  orders  of  phenomena. 
To  have  recognized  it  is  the  greatest  conquest  of  modern  science.  It  is  only  by 
admitting  it  without  reserve  that  we  can  attain  to  a  rational  conception  of  the 
facts.i 

Those  who  deplore  this  state  of  things  belong  to  the  same  class 
as  do  the  naturalists  who  deplore  the  inevitable  tendency  of  all  the 
natural  sciences  to  fill  in  the  missing  links  and  diminish  the  number 
of  distinct  species.  So  long  as  species  are  distinct  and  clearly  marked 
off  from  one  another  science  is  simple  and  easy,  but  when  interme- 
diate forms  begin  to  be  found  the  work  of  classification  becomes  more 
difficult.  The  class  of  naturalists  referred  to  are  incapable  of  seeing 
that  the  gain  in  the  increased  knowledge  of  nature  greatly  outweighs 
these  merely  systematic  inconveniences. 

Genius  Presejit  in  All  Classes.  —  Attention  has  already  been  called 
to  the  fact  that  the  advocates  of  the  irrepressibility  of  genius  fre- 
quently allude  to  the  rise  of  great  men  from  obscurity  to  positions 
of  eminence  and  renown.  No  one  disputes  the  fact,  but  while,  as 
we  shall  see,  it  does  not  prove  their  theory,  it  does  prove  a  proposi- 
tion which  they  are  loath  to  admit.  It  proves  that  genius  is  present 
in  all  classes.  Among  those  cited  by  Galton  in  this  connection  are 
D'Alembert,  Watt,  Hardwicke  and  other  judges  of  England,  Scaliger, 
Huss,  Luther,  Latimer,  and  many  other  less  known  men.  Weismann 
cites  Schwanthaler,  Defregger,  and  Lenbach  among  sculptors  and 
painters,  and  a  lung  list  of  musical  composers,  including  Bach  and 
Haydn.  But  we  are  perfectly  familiar  with  the  mention  in  this  con- 
nection of  the  names  of  Davy,  Faraday,  Laplace,  Leverrier,  Claude 
Bernard,  Regnault,  etc.,  in  science,  and  of  Robert  Burns,  John  Bun- 
yan,  Alexandre  Dumas,  Bcranger,  Edgar  A.  Poe,  Hawthorne,  and  even 

1  Odin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  148-149. 


240  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

Shakespeare,  in  literature.  Of  statesmen  and  financiers  of  this  class 
of  course  there  is  no  end,  and  America  is  the  great  nursery  of  "  self- 
made  men."  That  most  of  these  men  were  really  of  humble  birth 
and  emerged  from  the  lower  classes  of  society  is  doubtless  true,  and 
it  teaches  a  great  lesson.  Whatever  theories  different  writers  may 
have  on  the  subject  they  all  practically  agree  that  genius  exists  in 
all  the  strata  of  society.  But  this  whole  subject  was  treated  in  Chap- 
ter VII  under  the  title  Intellectual  Egalitarianism,  and  this  simply 
forms  an  additional  illustration  on  that  head. 

The  statistical  summary  that  was  made  in  the  last  chapter  con- 
firms this  general  view.  We  saw  that  57  or  over  9  per  cent  of 
modern  French  men  of  talent  had  passed  their  youth  in  more  or  less 
destitute  circumstances,  presumably  because  they  belonged  to  the 
lower  classes  of  society.  This  was  confirmed  by  the  table  showing 
that  61,  or  9.8  per  cent,  doubtless  mainly  the  same  persons,  actually 
belonged  to  the  laboring  class.  Very  nearly  the  same  result  appears 
for  the  highest  class,  or  men  of  genius,  of  the  other  four  greatest 
nations  of  the  world,  Italy,  Spain,  England,  and  Germany,  all  of 
which  together  produced  20  of  this  class,  or  1 1  per  cent  of  the  whole 
from  the  laboring  class.  Surely  nothing  more  could  be  needed  to 
prove  the  existence  of  talent  and  genius  in  the  lowest  class,  and 
there  is  nothing  to  indicate  that  the  amount  of  these  qualities  is 
fairly  indicated  by  these  figures.  They  only  indicate  the  fact  of 
their  existence,  not  the  extent  of  it.    On  this  point  M.  Odin  remarks  : 

Theoretically  of  course  it  might  be  asked  whether,  along  with  the  personages 
whose  talent  we  have  been  able  to  establish,  there  really  have  been  others 
endowed  with  analogous  natural  qualities,  and  who,  for  want  of  a  favorable 
environment,  have  not  succeeded  in  making  themselves  a  name.  It  would  be 
conceivable  in  itself  that  the  men  of  letters  whom  we  know  have  been  the  only 
individuals  naturally  endowed  with  literary  talent.  In  this  case  our  researches 
would  evidently  not  prove  much  relative  to  the  action  exerted  by  the  environ- 
ment. But  as  absolutely  nothing  supports  this  hypothesis,  while,  on  the  con- 
trary, simple  good  sense  not  less  than  reason  and  all  experience  leads  us  to  regard 
it  as  absurd,  we  may,  until  there  is  proof  to  the  contrary,  boldly  affirm  that, 
besides  the  men  of  letters  whom  we  know,  there  has  been  a  multitude  of  individ- 
uals endowed  by  heredity  with  equal  or  superior  aptitudes,  who,  in  the  absence 
of  an  appropriate  environment,  have  not  been  able,  in  spite  of  all  their  natural 
talent,  to  attain  even  to  the  most  modest  repute.^ 

1  Odin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  556-557. 


Ch.  X]  NOT  GENIUS  BUT  ACHIEVEMENT  241 

Not  Genius  but  Achievement.  —  Under  the  influence  of  the  fallacy 
of  history  the  point  of  view  of  the  whole  discussion  is  false.  The 
sociologist  at  least  cares  nothing  about  genius.  What  concerns  him 
is  achievement.  As  we  have  seen,  there  is  no  line  of  demarcation 
between  genius  and  talent,  between  talent  and  merit,  and  the  minds 
of  most  persons  are  capable,  if  afforded  an  opportunity,  of  accom- 
plishing some  kind  of  useful  work.  If  it  be  said  that  the  great  bulk 
of  the  work  of  the  world  is  of  the  routine  kind  and  that  there  must 
exist  somebody  to  do  this  routine  work,  the  answer  is,  first,  that 
well-stored  minds  can  do  routine  work  at  least  as  well  as  ill-stored 
minds,  and  secondly,  that  intelligent  persons  engaged  in  routine 
work  will  invent  ways  and  means  of  expediting  it  and  of  divesting 
it  of  much  of  its  character  as  drudgery.  But  in  the  last  resort  we 
can  fall  back  upon  the  doctrine  now  current,  and  substantially  true, 
that  all  work  is  at  bottom  mental,  and  that  there  is  scarcely  any 
form  of  human  action,  as  distinguished  from  animal  activity,  that 
does  not  involve  a  greater  or  less  amount  of  thought. ^ 

It  was  shown  in  the  last  section  of  Chapter  VII,  on  man's  Capac- 
ity for  Truth,  that  all  sane  persons  are  intellectually  qualified  to 
move  in  the  highest  class  of  society,  and  that  all  can  acquire  and 
utilize  all  the  truth  needful  for  the  proper  guidance  of  their  conduct 
in  life.  Good  authority  was  also  adduced  for  believing  that  all  who 
can  have  their  interest  aroused  are  capable  of  performing  some 
useful  work.  In  certain  of  the  arts  special  aptitudes  are  of  course 
presupposed,  and  this  is  probably  true  for  that  great  art  called 
literature,  but  in  the  various  sciences,  outside  of  mathematics,  this 
is  not  so  much  the  case,  and  almost  any  one  with  the  proper  train- 
ing and  adequate  facilities  can  prosecute  scientific  researches.  This 
is  the  great  field  of  real  achievement,  because  in  almost  any  depart- 
ment of  science  fresh  discoveries  arc  liable  to  be  made  that  will 
advance  the  material,  mental,  and  moral  progress  of  the  world. 
There  is  no  science  of  which  it  would  be  safe  to  say  that  it  is  necesv* 
sarily  infertile  from  this  point  of  view,  and  such  discoveries  are 
constantly  being  made  in  sciences  from  which  we  should  least 
expect  practical  results.^ 

1  Compare  Pure  Sociology,  pp.  28-29. 

2  For  illustrations  of  this  truth,  see  Dynamic  Sociology,  Vol.  II,  pp.  208,  509. 


242  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

But  all  this  is  now  a  truism,  and  the  question  is  how  to  increase 
the  number  of  these  dynamic  agents  of  society.  Of  course  there 
are  many  such  workers  now.  De  Candolle  estimated  that  there  had 
been  more  than  sixteen  thousand  authors  of  scientific  works  during 
the  past  two  centuries.  There  are  probably  nearly  that  number  now 
at  any  given  date.  But  the  majority  of  investigators,  even  to-day, 
enjoy  very  limited  facilities,  and  what  is  worse,  they  have  a  very 
inadequate  mental  equipment  for  their  work.  In  other  words,  they 
are  deficient  in  training,  and  most  of  them  are  inspired  by  enthusi- 
asm in  some  narrow  line,  and  lacking  in  any  broad  foundation  which 
would  enable  them  to  see  their  subject  in  all  its  relations.  The 
number  who  are  really  prepared  for  their  work  is  not  large.  The 
desideratum  is,  therefore,  to  prepare  a  much  greater  number  for 
scientific  work  rather  than  to  multiply  narrow  specialists.  None  of 
these  require  to  be  geniuses  in  any  special  sense.  They  need  to  be 
clear  and  broad-minded  persons,  but  given  sound  minds  and  average 
talents,  the  proper  training  will  do  the  rest.  Narrow  and  fruitless 
specialism  is  rather  to  be  discouraged,  the  number  of  those  who 
are  chasing  after  worthless  trifles  ^  diminished,  and  that  of  the 
serious  investigators  greatly  increased. 

Leisure  as  Opportunity 

The  two  principal  forms  of  opportunity  are  leisure  and  education. 
Both  are  furnished  by  the  economic  and  social  environments,  but 
more  especially  by  the  first.  As  we  have  seen,  all  environments  are 
favorable  to  the  development  of  genius  only  in  so  far  as  they  secure 
education,  and  therefore  leisure  must  be  regarded  as  a  means  to 
education.  It  may  be  called  negative  education,  and  differs  from 
positive  education  in  being  a  condition  to  self -education.  It  was  the 
great  school  of  mankind  before  there  was  any  such  thing  as  positive 
education.  It  began  with  the  priesthood,  and  to  it  we  owe  all  we 
possess  of  early  Indian,  Chinese,  Chaldean,  and  Egyptian  learning 
and  science.  The  ruling  classes  of  Greece  and  Rome  possessed  it, 
and  but  for  it  they  would  have  accomplished  little  in  art,  literature, 
or  philosophy.    Throughout  the  Middle  Ages  what  little  was  done 

1  Compare  Dynamic  Sociology,  Vol.  II,  p.  504. 


Ch.  X]  THE  INSTINCT  OF  WORKMANSHIP  243 

in  the  intellectual  world  was  chiefly  the  work  of  high  church  officers 
exempt  from  all  material  concerns.  In  more  modern  times  leisure 
was  secured  through  social  position,  the  nobility  and  high  clergy 
being  all  men  of  leisure.  In  the  present  condition  of  the  Old  World 
this  is  somewhat  less  the  case,  but  high  officials  with  a  life  tenure 
of  office  and  high  salaries  constitute  a  sort  of  leisure  class.  More 
and  more,  too,  professional  men,  where  successful  in  their  practice, 
acquire  large  leisure.  It  is  only  quite  recently  that  business  men, 
the  bourgeoisie,  by  the  accumulation  of  great  wealth,  have  acquired 
leisure  and  have  begun  to  devote  a  portion  of  it  to  disinterested 
pursuits.  But  it  must  not  be  supposed  that  all  the  leisure  mankind 
have  enjoyed  has  been  devoted  to  study  and  contemplation.  Only 
a  very  small  part  of  it  has  been  so  employed,  and  the  most  of  it,  as 
in  the  case  of  our  modern  multimillionaires,  has  always  been  either 
wasted  or  worse  than  wasted. 

TJie  Instinct  of  Workmanship.— -T^xx^  phrase,  of  course,  is  bor- 
rowed from  Mr.  Thorstein  Veblen's  remarkable  book.  The  Theory 
of  the  Leisure  Class,  and  I  have  used  it  freely  elsewhere.^  It  is 
due  to  its  author  that  the  leading  passage  in  which  it  occurs  should 
be  quoted  somewhat  fully.  He  was  dealing  with  the  current  apolo- 
gies for  sports,  many  of  which  have  a  "  predatory  "  origin,  and  had 
already  said :  "  In  the  most  general  economic  terms,  these  apologies 
are  an  effort  to  show  that,  in  spite  of  the  logic  of  the  thing,  sports 
do  in  fact  further  what  may  broadly  be  called  workmanship."  ^  And 
after  some  further  discussion  he  adds  : 

Tlie  ulterior  norm  to  which  appeal  is  taken  is  the  instinct  of  workmansliip, 
which  is  an  instinct  more  fundamental,  of  more  ancient  prescription,  than  the 
propensity  to  predatory  emulation.  The  latter  is  but  a  special  development  of 
the  instinct  of  workmanship,  a  variant,  relatively  late  and  ephemeral  in  spite 
of  its  great  absolute  antiquity.  The  emulative  predatory  impulse  —  or  the  in- 
stinct of  sportsmanship,  as  it  might  well  be  called  —  is  essentially  unstable  in 
comparison  with  the  primordial  instinct  of  workmanship  out  of  which  it  has 
been  developed  and  differentiated.'' 

1  Pure  Sociology,  pp.  129,  245,  513. 

2  The  Theory  of  the  Leisure  Class.  An  Economic  Study  in  the  Evolution  of  Insti- 
tutions.   By  Thorstein  Veblen.    New  York,  1899,  p.  269. 

2  Veblen,  op.  cit.,  p.  270.  The  expression  first  occurs  on  page  i  5,  where  he  says 
that  man  "  is  possessed  of  a  taste  for  effective  work  and  a  distaste  for  futile  effort. . .  . 
This  aptitude  or  propensity  may  be  called  the  instinct  of  workmanship." 


244  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

In  my  review  of  this  book  I  made  the  following  remark  : 

As  has  already  been  seen,  the  two  great  social  classes  are  characterized  by 
an  assortment  of  sharply  contrasted  words  and  phrases,  and  not  only  their  occu- 
pations, but  their  underlying  instincts,  are  clearly  marked  off  by  such  expres- 
sions as  the  "  instinct  of  sportsmanship  "  and  the  "  instinct  of  workmanship  "  ; 
"  exploit  and  industry,"  or  "  exploit  and  drudgery  " ;  "  honorific  and  humilific  " 
occupations,  and  "  perfunctory  and  proficuous  "  activities,  all  forming  the  pri- 
mary contrast  between  "  futility  and  utility."  In  each  of  these  pairs  the  first 
belongs  to  the  leisure  class  and  represents  the  superior  fitness  to  survive  in 
human  society.  The  leisure  class  constitutes  the  biologically  fittest,  the  socially 
best,  the  aristocracy.^ 

The  dynamic  quality  of  leisure,  as  I  have  frequently  shown,  lies 
in  the  fact  that  pleasure  consists  exclusively  in  the  normal  exercise 
of  the  faculties.  Leisure,  therefore,  does  not  involve  inactivity,  but 
always  takes  on  some  form  of  activity.  If  this  activity  is  not  work  it 
will  be  sport,  so  that  the  two  "  instincts,"  as  Mr.  Veblen  says,  have 
a  common  basis.  This  basis  is  the  absolute  necessity  of  exercising 
the  faculties.  Prolonged  inactivity  becomes  intensely  painful.  Thus 
imprisonment  becomes  a  terrible  punishment.  The  pain  resulting 
from  inactivity  is  called  ennui.  Many  leisure-class  authors  have 
painted  the  horrors  of  ennui.  Helvetius  indulges  in  an  apotheosis 
of  compulsory  labor  as  a  sure  escape  from  ennui,  and  truly  says 
that  the  pain  of  fatigue  cannot  be  compared  to  that  of  ennui.  It  is 
on  this  ground  more  than  any  other  that  he  and  other  authors  insist 
that  the  poor  are  happier  than  the  rich.  Montesquieu  says  that  they 
ought  to  have  put  continual  idleness  among  the  pains  of  hell,  and 
Schopenhauer  declares  that  while  want  is  the  scourge  of  the  lower 
classes,  ennui  is  the  scourge  of  the  upper,  and  that  all  the  hope  that 
is  held  out  for  the  future  is  a  choice  between  the  torments  of  hell 
and  the  ennui  of  heaven. ^  Condorcet  remarks  that  "the  men  who 
were  not  obliged  to  seek  their  daily  nourishment  necessarily  had 
intervals  of  repose;  and  immediately  the  need  of  experiencing  new 

1  American  Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  V,  May,  1900,  p.  836. 

2  Sein  [des  Menschen]  Leben  schwingt  also,  gleich  einem  Pendel,  bin  und  her, 
zwischen  dem  Schmerz  und  der  Langenweile,  welche  beide  in  der  That  dessen  letzte 
Bestandtheile  sind.  Dieses  hat  sich  sehr  seltsam  auch  dadurch  aussprechen  miissen, 
dass,  nachdem  der  Mensch  alle  Leiden  und  Quaalen  in  die  Holla  versetzt  hatte,  fiir 
den  Himmel  nun  nichts  iibrig  blieb,  als  eben  Langeweile.  —  Die  Welt  als  Wille  und 
Vorstellung,  Vol.  I,  p.  368. 


Ch.  X]  THE  INSTINCT  OF  WORKMANSHIP  245 

sensations  in  the  midst  of  a  long  and  complete  inactivity  was  given 
the  name  of  ennui."  ^    De  Greef  says  : 

Free  or  forced  inaction  is  the  condition  sitie  qua  noti  of  art;  in  contradis- 
tinction to  the  ordinary  producer,  the  artist  works  irregularly,  according  to  his 
moods,  that  is,  when  repose  has  made  him  nervous  and  irritable;  the  genus 
irritabile  vatuin  has  this  physiological  and  economic  explanation  ;  it  is  in  this 
nervous  state  that  the  man  of  unconscious  and  truly  inspired  genius  brings  forth 
those  creations,  in  appearance  sudden  and  spontaneous,  but  in  reality  issuing 
forth  from  a  slowly  accumulated  store  of  energy. - 

De  Candolle  remarks : 

They  say  that  idleness  is  agreeable  to  men.  It  is  believed  that  there  must 
be  a  pressing  necessity  for  any  one  to  work.  This  is  true  for  manual  labor,  not 
for  mental.  Give  a  little  liberty  to  young  persons  of  rich  families  ;  let  them 
receive  an  education  proper  to  direct  their  curiosity  toward  things  true  and 
elevated,  ...  let  them  travel  and  complete  their  studies  for  themselves,  and 
you  will  see  many  of  them  occupying  themselves  with  scientific  researches.^ 

M.  Odin,  in  discussing  the  economic  environment,  asks : 

What  is  the  cause  of  this  extraordinary  superiority  of  well-to-do  families,  a 
superiority  the  more  remarkal^le  because  rich  young  persons,  having  absolutely 
no  need  to  think  of  the  morrow,  are  only  too  miich  inclined  to  idleness  or  to 
kinds  of  activity  directly  opposed  to  labors  of  the  mind.''* 

He  does  not  answer  the  question.  The  facts  answer  it  and  give 
the  lie  to  another  popular  theory.  It  is  not  true  that  easy  circum- 
stances prevent  men  of  talent  from  working.  It  is  not  true  that 
men  of  genius  depend  upon  adversity  and  dire  necessity  as  a  spur 
to  activity.  This  is  all  a  popular  illusion  which  the  entire  history 
of  human  achievement  disproves  and  should  dispel.  The  instinct 
of  workmanship,  if  it  be  in  no  other  form  than  fear  of  the  hell  of 
ennui,  is  the  great  and  unremitting  spur  that  drives  and  goads  all 
men  to  action.  The  action  that  men  of  leisure  engage  in  is  of  every 
conceivable  kind,  whatever  best  accomplishes  the  primary  egoistic 
purpose  of  driving  away  ennui  and  yielding  the  maximum  satisfaction. 
Far  more  of  the  energy  is  devoted  to  sport  than  to  work,  much  of  the 
activity  is  perverse  and  injurious,  but  this  is  due  to  human  nature 
and  an  unorganized  social  state.  The  normal  percentage,  as  in  all 
human  activities,  is  devoted  to  one  form  or  another  of  achievement. 

1  Tableau,  etc.,  p.  244. 

2  Introduction  i  la  sociologie,  par  Guillaume  De  Greef,  Premiere  Partie,  Bruxelles, 
1886,  p.  185.  3  De  Candolle,  op.  cit.,  p.  274.  *  Odin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  529-530. 


246  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

Education  as  Opportunity 

The  other  principal  form  of  opportunity  is  education.  By  this  I 
now  mean  something  a  httle  more  restricted  than  what  has  hereto- 
fore been  imphed  by  the  term,  viz.,  positive  education  or  instruction, 
chiefly  in  youth.  It  has  been  shown  that  nearly  all  the  eminent 
writers  of  all  the  leading  nations  have  received  ample  instruction  in 
their  youth,  and  the  very  few  who  did  not  soon  took  steps  to  com- 
pensate through  self-instruction  for  the  loss.  This  proves,  what 
scarcely  would  have  needed  to  be  proved,  that  an  education  is  a 
sine  qua  non  to  a  literary  career  at  least.  It  may  be  argued  that 
this  is  not  so  much  the  case  in  other  careers,  especially  in  a  scien- 
tific career,  because  in  literature,  which  is  an  art,  it  is  essential  to 
be  grounded  in  the  rules  of  grammar  and  rhetoric,  and  if  one  is  to 
be  a  poet,  those  of  versification,  etc.,  must  be  added.  These  things, 
it  is  said,  are  not  needed  in  a  scientific  career,  and  especially  is  all 
study  of  the  "dead  languages"  regarded  as  wholly  superfluous.  I 
do  not  propose  to  discuss  this  last  question  here  further  than  to 
say  that  a  knowledge  of  the  structure  of  Latin  and  Greek  words  is 
essential  to  the  correct  use  of  the  current  vocabulary  of  nearly  every 
science,  and  especially  of  the  biological  sciences. 

It  may  be  admitted  that  an  education  for  a  scientific  career  should 
be  somewhat  different  from  an  education  for  a  literary  career.  L^p 
to  a  certain  point  they  should  be  the  same,  but  at  a  certain  point 
they  should  very  properly  diverge.  But  there  is  no  less  need  that 
the  person  who  is  to  follow  a  scientific  career  should  be  instructed 
with  a  view  to  that  career  than  in  the  case  of  a  literary  career. 
There  is  no  more  pernicious  notion  afloat  than  that  one  is  prepared 
to  pursue  any  branch  of  science  with  nothing  but  the  rudiments  of 
an  education.  The  great  need  in  this  direction,  as  all  competent 
judges  know,  is  for  a  thorough  scientific  training,  largely  in  the 
laboratory,  and  this  really  involves  more  time  and  study  than  does 
a  preparation  for  a  literary  career,  which  can  be  gained  chiefly 
from  books. 

After  the  statistical  demonstration  of  the  influence  of  education 
made  in  the  last  chapter,  any  collection  of  antecedent  opinions  on 
the  subject  may  seem  useless.    It  will  amount  at  best,  it  must  be 


Ch.  X]  EDUCATIOxN  AS  OPPORTUNITY  247 

admitted,  to  little  more  than  an  anthology  of  the  subject.  But  it 
may  at  least  be  said  that  it  is  interesting  in  any  connection,  and 
it  becomes  doubly  so  at  this  juncture,  in  showing,  if  nothing  else, 
the  far-seeing  penetration  of  certain  superior  minds.  Galton  him- 
self says,  "  I  acknowledge  freely  the  great  power  of  education  and 
social  influences  in  developing  the  active  powers  of  the  mind,  just 
as  I  acknowledge  the  effect  of  use  in  developing  the  muscles  of  a 
blacksmith's  arm,  and  no  further."^  This  certainly  is  all  that  any 
one  asks  or  has  claimed.  It  may,  indeed,  be  questioned  whe-ther 
this  is  not  going  too  far,  for  it  is  doubtful  whether  education  does 
strengthen  the  brain  in  any  such  physiological  way  as  a  blacksmith's 
arm  is  strengthened,  or  at  least  in  any  such  degree.  What  it  does 
is  to  enlighten  the  mind,  and  this  it  can  do  without  in  the  least 
altering  the  texture  of  the  brain. 

.We  need  not  go  to  the  professional  educators  like  Lorenz 
von  Stein,  Herbart,  Lotze,  Horace  Mann,  and  that  class,  but  will 
cite  only  philosophers,  thinkers,  investigators,  and  statesmen.  Thus 
Leibnitz  said,  "Education  conquers  all  things."  ^  The  favorite 
phrase  of  Helvetius  is  so  near  to  this  that  one  might  suppose  he 
had  borrowed  it  from  Leibnitz,  but  he  never  mentions  him.  It  was, 
"  Education  can  do  all  things."  ^  He  bases  it  squarely  on  the  doc- 
trine of  Locke,  and  says : 

The  principles  of  Locke,  far  from  contradicting  this  opinion,  confirm  it  ; 
they  prove  that  education  makes  us  whatever  we  are;  that  men  are  as  much 
ahke  as  their  education  is  alike  ;  .  .  .  that  finally  if  men's  minds  are  very  differ- 
ent it  is  because  education  is  not  the  same  for  any.'' 

Condorcet  clearly  saw  the  value  of  education,  as  may  be  seen 
from  the  following  utterance: 

We  shall  remark  how  a  more  universal  education  (^insinution)  in  each 
country,  by  giving  to  a  larger  number  of  men  that  elementary  knowledge  which 
will  inspire  in  them  both  the  taste  for  learning  and  the  facilities  to  progress, 
must  increase  their  hope ;  how  much  more  it  would  still  increase  if  a  more 
general  condition  of  easy  circumstances  could  permit  more  individuals  to  engage 
in  such  pursuits,  since  in  fact,  in  the  most  enlightened  countries,  scarcely  the 

*  Hereditary  Genius,  p.  12. 

2  "  Die  Erziehung  uber\vindet  alles,"  Werke,  ed.  Klopp,  I.  Keihe,  Bd.  VI,  Han- 
nover, 1872,  p.  209. 

*  "  L'education  peut  tout."    This  is  the  title  of  Sect.  X,  Chap.  I,  Vol.  II,  p.  332. 

*  IbitL,  p.  394. 


248  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

fiftieth  part  of  those  to  whom  nature  has  given  talents  receive  the  instruction 
necessary  to  develop  them  ;  and  how  thus  the  number  of  men  destined  to 
advance  the  boundaries  of  science  by  their  discoveries  would  then  increase  in 
the  same  proportion.^ 

Mazzini  was  another  who  saw  in  education  the  salvation  of  the 
world : 

Education,  I  have  said,  and  my  whole  doctrine  is  included  and  summed  up 
in  the  grand  word.  The  vital  question  in  agitation  at  the  present  day  is  the 
question  of  Education.  .  .  .  Education  is  the  bread  of  the  soul.  .  .  .  Without 
education  you  are  incapable  of  rightly  choosing  between  good  and  evil;  you 
cannot  acquire  a  true  knowledge  of  your  rights  ;  you  cannot  attain  that  partici- 
pation in  political  life  without  which  your  complete  social  emancipation  is  im- 
possible ;  you  cannot  arrive  at  a  correct  definition  and  comprehension  of  your 
own  mission.  .  .  .  Without  it  your  faculties  lie  dormant  and  unfruitful,  even 
as  the  vital  power  lies  sterile  in  the  seed  cast  into  untilled  soil  and  deprived  of 
the  benefits  of  irrigation  and  the  watchful  labor  of  the  agriculturist.'^ 

Kant  wrote: 

In  education  lies  the  great  secret  of  the  perfecting  of  human  nature.  .  .  . 
It  is  delightful  to  reflect  that  human  nature  will  always  be  growing  better 
through  education,  and  that  this  can  be  reduced  to  a  form  that  is  adapted 
to  mankind.  This  opens  up  to  us  the  prospect  of  the  future  happiness  of  the 
human  race.^ 

Comte  proclaimed  universal  education,  and  although  he  admitted 
the  intellectual  mediocrity  of  the  bulk  of  mankind,  still  he  saw  that 
all  were  capable  of  being  instructed  and  greatly  elevated  from  the 
prevailing  state  of  blank  ignorance.    He  says: 

Finally,  according  to  a  last  more  special  consideration,  this  physiology  makes 
it  an  incontestable  principle  that  men  are  in  the  common  run  essentially  medi- 
ocre, for  good  and  for  bad,  in  their  twofold  affective  and  intellectual  nature ; 
that  is,  outside  of  a  very  small  number  of  exceptional  organizations,  each  one 
possesses  to  a  limited  degree  all  the  sentiments  and  all  the  elementary  aptitudes, 
without  any  faculty  being  generally  in  itself  strongly  preponderant.  It  is  there- 
fore clear  that  there  is  thus  directly  opened  a  vast  field  for  education  to  modify 
in  almost  every  direction  such  flexible  organisms;  although,  in  the  matter  of 
degree,  their  development  must  always  remain  of  that  moderate  kind  which 
clearly  comports  with  true  social  harmony.* 

1  Tableau,  etc.,  p.  174. 

-  The  Duties  of  Man.  Addressed  to  Workingmen.  By  Joseph  Mazzini.  Reprinted 
by  permission  of  Mrs.  Emilie  Ashurst  Venturi,  editor  of  The  Life  and  Writings  of 
Joseph  Mazzini.    New  York,  1892,  pp.  13,  74,  93. 

3  liber  Padagogik.     Sammtliche  Werke,  Leipzig,  1838,  Neunter  Theil,  S.  373. 

♦  Philosophic  positive,  Vol.  Ill,  pp.  566-567. 


Ch.  X]  EDUCATION  AS  OPPORTUNITY  249 

Paul  Broca,  the  founder  of  the  science  of  anthropology,  who  was  one 
of  the  few  eminent  men  of  France  who  had  to  struggle  with  poy^rty, 
adversity,  and  limited  early  advantages,  but  who  made  his^vay  to 
the  metropolis  and  soon  found  means  of  completing  his  preparation 
for  a  great  career,  has  this  to  say  about  the  value  of  education : 

Education  in  all  its  forms  is  the  intelligent  force  which  enables  society  to 
improve  the  race  by  struggling  against  the  rude  processes  of  natural  selection. 
Add  to  it  just  institutions  that  permit  each  individual  to  obtain  a  position  com- 
mensurate with  his  worth  and  you  will  have  done  more  for  the  race  than  the 
most  pitiless  natural  selection  could  ever  do.^ 

Then  there  are  the  statesmen  and  men  of  action,  who,  although 
not  philosophers,  and  much  less  men  of  science,  see  the  world  from 
the  most  practical  point  of  view,  and  whose  opinions  are  surely 
worthy  of  respect.  Macaulay  says  :  "  The  gross  ignorance  of  the 
common  people  is  a  principal  cause  of  danger  to  our  persons  and 
property.  Therefore,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  government  to  take  care 
that  the  common  people  shall  not  be  grossly  ignorant.  ...  By  some 
means  government  must  protect  our  persons  and  property.  If  you 
take  away  education,  what  means  do  you  leave.-'  .  .  .  You  leave 
guns  and  bayonets,  stocks  and  whipping  posts,  treadmills,  solitary 
cells,  penal  colonies,  gibbets."  ^  Napoleon,  in  organizing  the  French 
system  of  higher  education,  said  in  council: 

I  feel  called  upon  to  organize  a  system  of  education  for  the  new  generation, 
such  that  both  political  and  moral  opinions  may  be  duly  regulated  thereby.^ 

The  celebrated  words  of  George  Washington  in  his  farewell 
address  are  perhaps  too  familiar,  at  least  to  Americans,  to  be  quoted 
here,  but  perchance  some  reader  may  not  have  read  them  or  may 
have  forgotten  them  : 

Promote,  then,  as  an  object  of  primar\-  importance,  institutions  for  the  gen- 
eral diffusion  of  knowledge.  In  proportion  as  the  structure  of  a  government 
gives  force  to  public  opinion,  it  is  essential  that  public  opinion  should  be 
enlightened. 

•  Quoted  in  Revue  scientifique,  Vol.  XXXVI,  12  decembre,  1885,  p.  760. 

'  The  Works  of  Lord  Macaulay  complete,  edited  by  his  sister.  Lady  Trevelyan, 
in  eight  volumes.  Vol.  VIII,  London,  1866,  p.  389  (speech  delivered  in  the  House 
of  Commons  on  the  19th  of  April,  1847). 

'  Napoleon  in  Council,  or  the  opinions  delivered  by  Bonaparte  in  the  Council  of 
State.  Translated  from  the  French  of  Baron  Pelet  (de  la  Lozere)  by  Captain  Basil 
Hall,  R.  N.      London,  1837,  pp.  199-200. 


250  APPLIKD   SOCIOLOGY  .  [Part  II 

The  briefer  and  more  pithy  remark  of  Jefferson  to  the  same  effect 
is  perhaps  even  more  famiUar  :  "  If  a  nation  expects  to  be  ignorant 
and  free  in  a  state  of  civilization,  it  expects  what  never  was  and  never 
will  be."  ^ 

The  total  inadequacy  of  existing  systems  of  education  to  the 
needs  of  the  age  was  clearly  pointed  out  by  Kidd  : 

How  far  we  are  at  present  from  the  realisation  of  this  ideal  of  equality  of 
opportunity,  we  shall  probably  perceive  more  clearly  as  the  development  con- 
tinues. Future  generations  may  regard  with  some  degree  of  surprise,  and  may 
even  smile  at  our  conceptions  of  present-day  society  as  a  condition  in  which  we 
secure  the  full  benefits  of  free  competition  ;  in  which  we  get  the  right  men  into 
the  right  places  and  give  them  sufficient  inducements  to  exert  themselves  ;  and 
in  which  we  have  obtained  for  all  members  of  the  community  the  necessary 
opportunity  for  the  full  exercise  of  their  faculties.  It  requires  but  little  reflec- 
tion to  see  how  wide  of  the  mark  such  a  conception  really  is.  A  large  propor- 
tion of  the  population  in  the  prevailing  state  of  society*  take  part  in  the  rivalry  of 
life  only  under  conditions  which  absolutely  preclude  them,  whatever  their  natural 
merit  or  ability,  from  any  real  chance  therein.  They  come  into  the  world  to  find 
the  best  positions  not  only  already  filled  but  practically  occupied  in  perpetuity. 
For,  under  the  great  body  of  rights  which  wealth  has  inherited  from  feudalism, 
we  to  all  intents  and  purposes  allow  the  wealthy  classes  to  retain  the  control  of 
these  positions  for  generation  after  generation,  to  the  permanent  exclusion  of 
the  rest  of  the  people.  Even  from  that  large  and  growing  class  of  positions  for 
which  high  acquirements  or  superior  education  is  the  only  qualification,  and  of 
which  we,  consequently  (with  strange  inaccuracy),  speak  as  if  they  were  open 
to  all  comers,  it  may  be  perceived  that  the  larger  proportion  of  the  people  are 
excluded  —  almost  as  rigorously  and  as  absolutely  as  in  any  past  condition  of 
society  —  by  the  simple  fact  that  the  ability  to  acquire  such  education  or  quali- 
fication is  at  present  the  exclusive  privilege  of  wealth.- 

It  is  often  said  that  genius  will  create  its  opportunity.  It  is  far 
more  true  that  education  will  do  this.  Latent  genius  is  absolutely 
impotent,  and  of  all  the  ways  of  making  latent  genius  patent  edu- 
cation is  the  chief.  Indeed,  as  we  have  seen,  all  the  other  ways 
are  successful  only  as  they  lead  to  education.  Genius,  however 
brilliant,  cannot  succeed  without  education.  On  the  other  hand, 
education  without  genius  can  do  much,  for  all  normal  intellects 
are  capable  of  performing  useful  work  if  the  proper  advantages 
are  vouchsafed. 

1  The  Writings  of  Thomas  Jefferson,  etc.,  New  York,  1899,  Vol.  X,  p.  4. 

2  Social  Evolution,  pp.  232-233. 


Ch.  X]  SUCCESS  IMPLIES  OPPORTUNITY  251 

Success  implies  Opportunity 

I  now  propose  to  show  in  a  sufficient  number  of  cases  that  persons 
who  have  attained  eminence  and  distinction  in  the  world  have,  as  a 
matter  of  fact,  had  opportunities.  There  are  of  course  cases  in  which 
this  cannot  be  proved,  but  only  because  no  data  exist  for  proving 
either  this  or  the  contrary,  but  wherever  the  data  can  be  produced 
they  will  always  sustain  this  proposition.  The  subject  falls  naturally 
under  two  heads,  or  embraces  two  classes  of  cases.  One  of  these 
classes  includes  those  persons  who  are  popularly  supposed  to  have 
made  their  way  to  fame  by  dint  of  their  genius  alone  and  in  the 
absence  of  favorable  opportunities,  or  alleged  self-made  men.  The 
other  class  includes  those  cases  in  which  it  is  admitted  that  ample 
opportunities  have  existed.  As  the  first  class  is  the  one  about  which 
so  much  more  has  been  said  and  written  we  will  deal  with  it  first. 

Before  entering  upon  the  subject  proper,  however,  it  may  per- 
haps be  well  to  dispose  of  a  certain  very  plausible  theory  that  is 
widely  prevalent  and  is  constantly  being  presented.  This  is,  that  in 
the  life  of  every  one  opportunity  is  certain  to  present  itself,  but  that 
those  only  who  have  the  wit  to  discern  it  and  the  energy  to  seize  it 
profit  by  it,  while  the  dull  and  the  indolent  allow  it  to  pass  by  and 
thus  miss  their  opportunity.  The  most  classical  expression  of  this 
theory  is  that  of  the  well-known  lines  of  Shakespeare  : 

There  is  a  tide  in  the  affairs  of  men, 
Which,  taken  at  the  flood,  leads  on  to  fortune ; 
Omitted,  all  the  voyage  of  their  life 
Is  bound  in  shallows  and  in  miseries.^ 

Montesquieu  expressed  it  as  follows: 

There  is  no  man  whom  fortune  does  not  visit  once  in  his  life  ;  but  when  it 
does  not  find  him  ready  to  receive  it,  it  comes  in  through  the  door  and  goes 
out  through  the  window.^ 

Galton  says  : 

Even  if  a  man  be  long  unconscious  of  liis  powers,  an  opportunity  is  sure  to 
occur  —  they  occur  over  and  over  again  to  every  man  —  that  will  discover 
tliem.' 

^  Julius  Caesar,  Act  IV,  so.  iii. 

*  Pens^es  diverses  de  Montesquieu,  in:  Maximes  et  Pensees diverses,  Paris,  1864, 
p.  139.  •'  Hereditary'  Genius,  p.  40. 


252  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

This  is  also  practically  the  thought  of  the  little  poem  written  by 
Senator  J.  J.  Ingalls  of  Kansas,  pubUshed  originally  in  the  journal 
Truth  some  time  in  the  nineties,  and  widely  reproduced  by  the 
American  press.    It  is  entitled  "  Opportunity,"  and  is  as  follows  : 

Master  of  human  destinies  am  I  ! 

Fame,  love,  and  fortune  on  my  footsteps  wait. 

Cities  and  fields  I  walk  ;   I  penetrate 

Deserts  and  seas  remote,  and  passing  by 

Hovel  and  mart  and  palace  —  soon  or  late 

I  knock  unbidden  once  at  every  gate  ! 

If  sleeping,  wake  —  if  feasting,  rise  before 

I  turn  away.    It  is  the  hour  of  fate, 

And  they  who  follow  me  reach  everj*  state 

Mortals  desire,  and  conquer  every  foe 

Save  death  ;  but  those  who  doubt  or  hesitate, 

Condemned  to  failure,  penury,  and  woe. 

Seek  me  in  vain  and  uselessly  implore. 

I  answer  not,  and  I  return  no  more  ! 

The  thought  is,  indeed,  somewhat  poetic,  but  alas  !  poetic  only. 
It  contains  no  truth.  It  is  the  old  fallacy  of  dealing  with  the  excep- 
tions only  and  ignoring  the  regular  and  normal  phenomena.  It  is 
true  of  the  few  who  have  seen  and  seized  their  opportunity,  but  what 
of  the  millions  that  she  passes  by  entirely  .''  These  have  no  gate  to 
knock  at,  no  door  to  enter  nor  window  to  escape  from.  They  are 
submerged. 

Alleged  Self-made  Men.  —  From  the  constant  reference  to  great 
men  who  have  risen  from  obscurity  by  dint  of  their  inherent  genius, 
which  is  supposed  to  overcome  all  obstacles,  one  would  suppose  that 
there  would  be  no  difficulty  in  citing  any  number  of  salient  examples. 
Indeed,  the  popular  impression  is  that  nearly  all  the  truly  great  men 
'belong  to  this  class,  and  that  they  have  been  made  by  adversity. 
It  is  often  said  that  if  the  same  men  had  been  surrounded  by  all 
manner  of  material  blessings  they  would  never  have  accomplished 
anything.  Abundant  means,  high  social  position,  superior  early  edu- 
cational facilities,  are  supposed  to  beget  sloth,  dissipation,  and  general 
mental  and  moral  degeneracy.  And  yet,  when  we  come  to  make 
an  effort  to  collect  striking  examples  in  this  class,  we  find  our- 
selves somewhat  embarrassed  to  discover  them.  We  find  that  all  the 
noise  is  made  over  a  comparatively  small  number,  and  consists  in  a 


Ch.  X]  ALLEGED  SELF-MADE  MEN  253 

perpetual  repetition  of  the  same  old  things  about  the  same  men. 
Without  descending  to  persons  of  comparatively  low  grade,  I  shall, 
therefore,  in  this  subsection  scarcely  be  able  to  go  beyond  what 
was  said  above  under  the  head,  Genius  present  in  All  Classes.  I 
shall  be  obliged  for  the  most  part  to  confine  myself  to  the  same 
persons,  and  to  giving  some  further  details  of  their  lives  and 
careers. 

All  this,  of  course,  is  not  strange  when  we  remember  what  we 
learned  in  the  last  chapter,  that  about  80  per  cent  of  all  distinguished 
persons  are  born  in  large  cities  and  that  nearly  all  others  go  early  to 
great  intellectual  centers ;  that  over  90  per  cent  of  them  belong  to 
wealthy  or  well-to-do  families  and  are  exempt  from  all  material  con- 
cerns ;  that  nearly  90  per  cent  of  them  belong  to  the  higher  social 
classes  (nobility,  public  officials,  liberal  professions,  business  men)  ; 
and  that  98  per  cent  of  them  receive  a  liberal  education  in  their 
youth.  How  could  the  little  remnant  of  country-born,  poor,  toiling, 
and  uneducated  geniuses  be  expected  to  constitute  any  considerable 
part  of  the  real  working  force  of  society  ?  But  the  public  knows 
nothing  of  these  great  social  facts.  It  is  habitually  fed  on  the  cur- 
rent error,  due  to  the  fallacy  of  history,  which  consists  in  reiterat- 
ing the  exceptions  and  ignoring  the  regular  phenomena  of  society. 

We  will  begin  with  D'Alembert,  because  he  is  the  one  on  whom 
Galton  lays  the  greatest  stress.    This  is  what  he  says  of  him  : 

He  was  a  foundling  (afterwards  shown  to  be  well  bred  as  respects  ability), 
and  put  out  to  nurse  as  a  pauper  baby,  to  the  wife  of  a  poor  glazier.  The  child's 
indomitable  tendency  to  the  higher  studies,  could  not  be  repressed  by  his  foster 
mother's  ridicule  and  dissuasion,  nor  by  the  taunts  of  his  schoolfellows,  nor  by 
the  discouragements  of  his  schoolmaster,  who  was  incapable  of  appreciating 
him,  nor  even  by  the  reiterated  deep  disappointment  of  finding  that  his  ideas, 
which  he  knew  to  be  original,  were  not  novel,  but  long  previously  discovered 
by  others.  Of  course,  we  should  e.xpect  a  boy  of  this  kind,  to  undergo  ten  or 
more  years  of  apparently  hopeless  strife,  but  we  should  equally  e.xpect  him  to 
succeed  at  last ;  and  D'Alembert  did  succeed  in  attaining  the  first  rank  of 
celebrity,  by  the  time  he  was  twenty-four.  .  ,  .  He  was  illegitimate  ;  his  mother 
abandoned  him,  and  left  him  exposed  in  a  public  market,  near  the  church  of 
Jean  le  Rond,  whence  his  Christian  name  ;  the  origin  of  his  surname  is  unknown. 
He  showed,  as  a  child,  extraordinary  eagerness  to  learn,  but  was  discouraged 
at  every  step.  The  glazier's  wife,  in  whose  charge  he  had  been  placed  by  the 
authorities  as  a  foundling,  ridiculed  his  pursuits  ;  at  school  he  was  dissuaded 
from  his  favorite  mathematics  ;  whenever  he  persuaded  himself  that  he  had 


2  54  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

done  something  original,  he  invariably  found  that  others  had  found  out  the  same 
thing  before  him.  But  his  passion  for  science  urged  him  on.  He  became  a 
member  of  the  Academy  set.  24,  and  thenceforward  his  career  was  one  of 
honor.^ 

It  is  known  that  his  mother  was  "Mile,  de  Tencin,  a  novelist  of 
high  ability,"  and  that  his  father  was  the  chevalier  Destouches,  of 
the  French  army.  Galton's  primary  argument,  that  D'Alembert 
constituted  an  example  of  hereditary  genius,  is  therefore  decidedly 
weak,  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  Destouches  was  specially  noted 
as  a  mathematician ;  or  unless  we  accept  Weismann's  theory  that 
genius  is  not  specialized,  and  that  a  novelist  is  just  as  likely  to  bring 
forth  a  mathematician  as  a  prose  writer.  Few  will  go  that  far.  But 
this  aspect  of  the  subject  does  not  now  specially  concern  us.  As 
to  the  other  claim,  however,  that  D'Alembert  is  an  example  of  the 
irrepressibility  of  genius,  it  is  obvious  either  that  Gallon  did  not 
know  certain  vital  facts,  or  that  he  purposely  suppressed  them.  It 
is  well  known  that  Destouches  not  only  recognized  his  son  but  settled 
on  him  an  annual  rente  of  1 200  pounds.    Of  this  M.  Odin  says : 

On  the  other  hand  it  is  pretended  that  we  see  in  D'Alembert  the  example 
of  a  genius  whose  rise  the  most  adverse  circumstances  could  not  arrest.  This 
again  is  at  least  very  much  exaggerated.  D'Alembert  was  of  course  a  natural 
child,  but  it  is  to  this  in  reality  that  his  whole  misfortune  is  confined.  Far  from 
having  received  an  inadequate  education,  as  they  would  have  us  understand, 
he  received  on  the  contrary  an  excellent  education  for  his  time.  His  father, 
moreover,  insured  for  him  an  income  of  1200  pounds,  which  certainly  was  no 
small  matter.- 

Galton  would  have  us  suppose  (and  those  who  read  only  his  book 
could  have  no  other  impression)  that  D'Alembert  simply  shared  the 
limited  resources  of  the  poor  glazier,  and  struggled  thus  against 
both  poverty  and  lack  of  appreciation,  overcoming  all  by  his  genius 
and  rising  to  fame.    How  utterly  false  this  view  of  the  case  is! 

While,  as  has  already  been  remarked,  illegitimacy  is  usually  a 
complete  bar  to  all  aspirations,  there  may  be  exceptions  to  this,  and 
the  present  case  is  a  notable  one.  Considering  the  prevalence  of 
illegitimacy  in  France  and  the  resulting  toleration  in  public  opinion, 
a  young  man  with  plenty  of  money  and  a  bright  mind  could  prob- 
ably get  on  about  as  well  as  if  he  were  not  illegitimate.    After  all 

1  Hereditary  Genius,  pp.  38-39,  201.  2  odin,  op.  cit.,  p.  583. 


Ch.  X]  ALLEGED  SELF-MADE  MEN  255 

that  has  been  said  about  this  case,  therefore,  it  may  be  dismissed 
as  a  normal  example  of  superior  talents  combined  with  rather  excep- 
tionally favorable  opportunities.  If  what  Galton  has  told  were  the 
whole  truth  the  world  would  never  have  heard  of  Jean  le  Rond 
D'Alembert. 

Another  of  Galton's  favorite  examples  is  Julius  Caesar  Scaliger. 
He  was  erudite  and  somewhat  brilliant,  but  that  he  was  any  such 
great  shining  light  as  Galton  assumes  will  be  doubted  by  many.  I 
will  not  go  into  his  case,  but  will  refer  the  reader  to  Professor 
Cooky's  article  cited  by  me  in  the  literature  of  this  subject  (supra, 
p.  144),  where  (pp.  323-327)  he  will  find  it  ably  discussed.  It  dif- 
fers somewhat  from  the  case  of  D'Alembert,  mainly  in  showing 
that  accounts  do  not  agree  and  that  his  real  history  is  not  known, 
but  the  general  impression  that  results  from  a  full  examination  of 
the  case  is  that  Scaliger  did  have  a  fairly  good  education  and  was 
always  located  in  an  environment  highly  favorable  for  the  develop- 
ment of  the  kind  of  talent  that  he  displayed, 

Robert  Burns  is  constantly  numbered  among  the  "  self-made 
men,"  and  doubtless  he  was  as  much  so  as  any  that  could  be  named. 
But  Galton  himself  says  that  "  Burns  was  a  village  celebrity  at  16, 
and  soon  began  to  write."  ^  We  are  left  in  the  dark  as  to  how  he 
learned  to  write  or  even  to  read.  Does  any  one  suppose  he  could 
learn  to  write  unless  he  was  taught  ?  It  is  clear  that  he  must  have 
received  considerable  instruction  at  a  very  early  age.  But  we  are 
put  at  rest  on  this  point  by  the  biographies,  which  inform  us  that 
his  father  "was  at  great  pains  to  giv-e  his  children  a  good  educa- 
tion." ^  Very  little  more  than  this  would  be  needed  for  a  man  like 
Burns,  with  a  genius  for  the  simple  sweet  poetry  that  he  wrote  and 
the  melodious  songs  of  country  life  for  which  he  is  famous.  Noth- 
ing is  said  about  his  circumstances,  but  that  he  had  considerable 
means  and  leisure  to  devote  to  these  things  and  to  reading  and 
informing  himself  there  can  be  no  doubt. 

John  Bunyan,  who  wrote  just  one  celebrated  book,  is  another 
of  this  class,  but  he  left  an  autobiography  in  which  he  says : 
"  Notwithstanding  the  meanness  and  inconsiderableness  of  my 
parents,  it  pleased  God  to  put  it  into  their  hearts  to  put  me  to 

1  Hereditary  Genius,  p.  218.  ^  Cooley,  article  cited,  p.  328. 


256  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  11 

school,  to  learn  me  both  to  read  and  write."  ^  This  was  his  oppor- 
tunity, and  but  for  it  the  Pilgrim's  Progress  would  never  have  been 
written.  But  to  call  Bunyan  a  man  of  genius  is  an  exaggeration. 
He  was  simply  a  man  of  deep  feelings  and  religious  fervor,  who  had 
learned  how  to  write. 

Among  musicians  Haydn  is  the  one  most  frequently  mentioned, 
but  Weismann,  who  enumerates  a  considerable  number  of  cases,  and 
who  says  that  "  a  great  musician  not  only  needs  the  highest  talent, 
but  also  stimulus  and  all  the  culture  that  his  times  can  bestow," 
adds:  "we  may  safely  conclude  that  Joseph  Haydn  would  never 
have  surpassed  his  father's  national  songs  and  harp  had  he  not 
chanced  to  become  a  chorister  in  the  little  town  of  Hainburg,  and 
had  he  not  afterwards  entered  the  music-school  in  Vienna,  of  which 
Reutter,  the  organist  of  the  cathedral,  was  the  head."  ^ 

Opportunities  are  of  various  kinds.  They  do  not  always  consist 
of  wealth,  social  position,  education,  and  a  favorable  location.  There 
are  certain  forms  of  opportunity  that  are  commonly  mistaken  for 
chance  or  luck.  Hence  the  saying:  "it  is  better  to  be  born  lucky 
than  rich."  Helvetius,  indeed,  ascribes  all  success  to  chance  or 
accident.  He  illustrates  this  idea  in  the  case  of  a  number  of  emi- 
nent men.    Of  Shakespeare  he  says : 

If  Shakespeare  had  always  remained,  like  his  father,  a  woolen  merchant ;  if 
his  bad  conduct  had  not  compelled  him  to  quit  the  business  and  the  country  ; 
if  he  had  not  associated  with  libertines;  if  he  had  not  stolen  hinds  in  the  park 
of  a  lord ;  if  he  had  not  been  pursued  for  this  theft  and  been  obliged  to  fly  to 
London  and  hire  out  to  a  troupe  of  comedians;  and  if  finally,  becoming  tired 
of  being  a  third-rate  actor,  he  had  not  taken  to  authorship,  the  smart  Shake- 
speare would  never  have  been  the  celebrated  Shakespeare,  and  whatever  ability 
he  might  have  had  for  the  wool  business,  his  name  would  never  have  illustrated 
England.^ 

He  gives  a  similar  "chapter  of  accidents,"  but  longer  drawn  out, 
in  the  cases  of  Moliere,  Corneille,  and  Rousseau.  With  a  broader 
sweep  Mr.  Henry  George  says: 

Had  Caesar  come  of  a  proletarian  family;  had  Napoleon  entered  the  world 
a  few  years  earlier ;  had  Columbus  gone  into  the  church  instead  of  going  to 

^  Grace  abounding  to  the  Chief  of  Sinners.    In:   Works,  Philadelphia,  i87i,p.  29. 

2  Essays  upon  Heredity  and  Kindred  Biological  Problems,  by  August  Weismann, 
Oxford,  1892,  Vol.  n,  pp.  45-46. 

3  Helvetius,  De  I'Homme,  etc..  Vol.  I,  pp.  26-27. 


Ch.  X]  ALLEGED  SELF-MADE  MEN  257 

sea;  had  Shakespeare  been  apprenticed  to  a  cobbler  or  chimney-sweep;  had 
Sir  Isaac  Newton  been  assigned  by  fate  the  education  and  the  toil  of  an  ao-ri- 
cultural  laborer;  had  Dr.  Adam  Smith  been  born  in  the  coal  hews,  or  Herbert 
Spencer  forced  to  get  his  living  as  a  factory  operative,  what  would  their  talents 
have  availed  ?  ^ 

Here  would  appropriately  be  treated  the  sixteen  cases  of  eminent 
French  men  of  letters  who  received  a  very  limited  education,  enu- 
merated in  the  last  chapter  under  the  head  of  The  Educational  En- 
vironment (supra,  p.  217),  but  it  was  there  shown  that  in  every  case 
there  was  a  fair  substitute  for  an  early  training  in  the  presence  of 
some  other  favorable  environment,  which  really  in  the  end  secured 
for  them  a  sufficient  education  for  the  class  of  literary  work  in  which 
they  engaged.  We  need  not,  therefore,  repeat  any  part  of  what  was 
there  said. 

In  dealing  with  the  economic  environment,  in  which,  as  will  be 
remembered,  there  were  57  out  of  619  men  of  talent  who  had 
passed  their  youth  in  poverty  or  economic  insecurity,  M.  Odin  shows 
that  seventeen  of  these  were  born  in  Paris,  one  in  a  chateau,  nineteen 
in  other  large  cities,  and  two  abroad.  This  leaves  eighteen  whose 
local  environment  did  not  constitute  a  fair  substitute  for  means 
and  education.  In  a  note  at  the  end  of  the  volume  (pp.  593-598), 
M.  Odin  takes  up  each  of  these  cases  and  gives  such  information 
as  the  biographies  afford.  It  is  not  necessary  to  give  this  informa- 
tion here  in  detail,  but  it  will  suffice  to  quote  in  as  many  cases  as 
deal  with  that  aspect  the  part  that  sets  forth  what  each  one's 
opportunity  was.    Thus : 

Wolfgang  Meusel  (latinized  Musculus),  1497-1563,  Hebrew  scholar  and 
Protestant  theologian.  "  His  fine  voice  having  charmed  the  prior  of  a  mon- 
astery of  Benedictines  established  near  Lixheim,  he  entered  this  convent  as  a 
novice  at  the  age  of  fifteen  years.  After  persevering  study  he  was  ordained  a 
priest,  and  devoted  himself  to  the  work  of  preaching." 

Antoine  Galland,  1646-1715,  orientalist  and  numismatist.  "Certain  chari- 
table persons  placed  him  at  their  own  expense  in  the  college  of  Noyon.  He 
remained  there  ten  years  studying  Latin,  Greek,  and  Hebrew." 

Jacques  Abbadie,  1657-1727,  celebrated  Protestant  theologian.  "  The  indi- 
gence of  his  parents  at  first  caused  his  education  to  be  neglected.  But  the 
assistance  of  his  coreligionaries  soon  put  young  Abbadie  in  condition  to  pros- 
ecute advanced  studies,  and  he  received  at  Sedan  the  degree  of  doctor  of 
theology." 

'  Progress  and  Poverty,  p.  336. 


258  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

Jean  Franqois  Marmontel,  1 723-1 799,  poet,  romance  writer,  and  critic. 
Family  obscure  and  poor.  A  priest  gave  him  primary  instruction,  and  at  the 
age  of  nine  years  he  was  sent  to  the  college  of  Jesuits  at  Mauriac.  At  fifteen, 
having  finished  rhetoric,  he  went  to  Clermont,  where  he  took  a  course  in  philos- 
ophy, supporting  himself  by  giving  lessons  to  college  comrades  less  advanced 
than  himself. 

Charles  Francois  Lhomond,  1 727-1 794,  humanist.  Born  of  poor  parents, 
Lhomond  obtained  a  scholarship  at  the  College  d'Inville  in  Paris,  distinguished 
himself  there  by  his  conduct  and  zeal  in  his  work,  and  not  less  so  at  the  Sorbonne, 
where  he  completed  his  theological  studies. 

Nicolas  Edme  Restif  (or  Rdtif)  de  la  Bretonne,  1 734-1 806,  fertile  writer.  His 
father  intrusted  him  to  his  eldest  son,  a  respectable  ecclesiastic,  who  gave  him 
lessons  in  grammar  and  Latin.    Later  he  was  apprenticed  to  a  printer. 

Jacques  Delille,  abbd,  1738-18 13,  poet.  Natural  child.  His  godfather 
settled  upon  him  a  life  pension  of  100  crowns  (old  French  crown  of  4  shillings 
or  one  dollar).  Sent  to  college  at  Lisieux,  became  professor,  and  later  maitre 
^lementaire  (Privat-Docent?)  at  Beauvais. 

Sdbastien  Roch  Nicolas  Chamfort  or  Champfort,  1 741-1794,  litterateur. 
Natural  child.  Studied  at  the  College  des  Grassins,  where  a  doctor  of  Navarre, 
Morabin,  his  first  teacher,  had  obtained  for  him  a  half-scholarship. 

Pierre  Simon  Laplace,  1 749-1827,  celebrated  astronomer  and  physicist.  Son 
of  a  poor  farmer  in  Beaumont-en-Auge,  a  village  of  lower  Normandy,  in  the 
present  department  of  Calvados.  It  is  not  known  how  he  made  his  first  studies, 
for  later,  having  attained  to  honors,  Laplace  had  the  weakness  to  conceal  his 
humble  origin.  It  is  known,  however,  that  he  early  distinguished  himself,  and 
that  his  prodigious  memorj'  was  a  powerful  aid  to  him.  He  took  courses  at  the 
military  school  of  Beaumont. 

Antoine  Rivarol,  1 753-1801,  celebrated  writer.  Educated  by  his  father,  who 
was  of  noble  birth,  but  at  that  time  without  fortune.  He  owed  to  the  munificence 
of  the  bishop  of  Uzes  the  prosecution  of  his  studies. 

Francois  Joseph  Michel  Noel,  1755-1841,  litterateur.  He  obtained  through 
the  protection  of  a  person  influential  at  the  court  a  free  scholarship  at  the  College 
des  Grassins,  from  which  he  passed  to  that  of  Saint-Louis. 

Jean  Louis  Burnouf,  1 775-1 844,  celebrated  philologist.  Lost  his  parents 
while  young.  Gardin-Dumesnil,  emeritus  professor  of  rhetoric  at  Paris,  received 
the  young  orphan  into  his  house  and  taught  him  Latin,  for  which  he  afterwards 
obtained  a  scholarship  in  the  college  of  Harcourt. 

Of  at  least  12,  then,  of  these  18  persons,  enough  is  said  to 
show  that  there  was  in  each  case  some  favorable  circumstance, 
sometimes  several  such,  sufficient  to  insure  an  adequate  education 
and  means  to  carry  out  their  designs  and  open  their  careers.  In  the 
other  six  cases  it  is  always  obvious  that  this  must  have  also  been 
true,  because  without  these  aids  the  abrupt  transition  from  one 
state  to  the  next,  as  described,  would  have  been  impossible.    But 


Ch.  X]  ALLEGED  SELF-MADE  MEN  259 

the  records  are  simply  missing.  In  every  case,  had  such  aids  been 
wanting  we  should  never  have  heard  of  the  men  in  question.  Think 
of  the  thousands,  equally  endowed  by  nature,  of  whom  the  world 
has  never  heard,  simply  because  no  one  happened  to  give  them  an 
opportunity  to  make  their  talents  known  ! 

It  is  entirely  safe  to  say  that  in  every  case  of  an  alleged  self-made 
man,  could  his  entire  history  be  told,  or  the  particular  part  of  it  that 
explains  how  he  succeeded  in  escaping  the  repressing  influence  of 
adversity,  it  would  be  clear  that  something  besides  his  own  genius 
came  in  to  turn  the  scale  in  his  favor.  As  Odin  says  :  "  We  always 
see  some  fortuitous  circumstance  enabling  them  to  receive  an  edu- 
cation far  superior  to  that  which  they  could  have  obtained  in  view 
of  the  economic  condition  of  their  parents."  ^ 

Other  cases  might  of  course  be  taken  up,  as  there  are  other 
"alleged  "  self-made  men,  but  in  most  of  them  it  becomes  at  once 
so  obvious  that  this  is  only  alleged,  and  that  the  prevailing  idea  is 
entirely  false,  that  it  seems  needless  to  dwell  on  them.  I  will  instance 
one  such,  merely  as  an  example  of  the  rest,  and  that  is  the  case  of 
Herbert  Spencer.  Now  that  his  autobiography  is  published,  in  which 
he  himself  shows  that  there  is  no  ground  for  any  such  claim,  the 
case  can  only  serve  to  show  how  unreliable  the  current  accounts  of 
such  men  are,  and  also  how  eager  biographers  are  to  show  that  their 
heroes  are  exceptions  and  wholly  different  from  ordinary  mortals. 
I  have  already,  in  a  review  of  the  Autobiography,^  attempted  to 
correct  the  popular  impression,  but  there  is  perhaps  something  more 
to  be  said.  I  was  not  the  first  to  run  counter  to  received  opinion  on 
this  point,  for  I  find  that  Eleanor  Rathbone  in  a  review  of  his  book, 
Various  Fragments,  soon  after  it  appeared,  makes  the  remark  that 
"if  Mr.  Spencer  had  not  happened  to  possess  private  means,  the  laws 
of  Survival  of  the  Fittest  and  Free  Trade  would  have  strangled  the 
Synthetic  Philosophy  in  its  cradle."^ 

But  it  is  better  to  hear  Mr.  Spencer  himself.  In  the  second  vol- 
ume of  his  Autobiography,  page  i  58,  he  says  : 

Had  it  not  been  for  a  legacy  from  an  uncle  in  1853,  I  should  not  have  been 
able  to  write  the  Principles  of  Psychology ;  and  I  should  inevitably  have  been 

1  Odin,  op.  cit.,  p.  531.  2  Science,  N.S.,  Vol.  XIX,  June  10,  1904,  pp.  873-879. 

8  International  Journal  of  Ethics,  Vol.  IX,  October,  1898,  p.  116. 


26o  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

brought  to  a  stand  by  pecuniary  difficulties  in  the  middle  of  First  Principles, 
had  it  not  been  that  another  uncle,  who  died  in  i860,  left  me  the  greater  part 
of  his  small  property. 

And  on  page  532  he  adds  : 

Had  it  not  been  for  the  £  80  which,  in  1850,  I  proved  to  the  printer  was  com- 
ing to  me  under  the  Railway  Winding-up  Act,  I  should  have  been  unable  to 
publish  Social  Statics.  Only  because  the  bequest  from  my  uncle  Thomas  made 
it  possible  to  live  for  a  time  without  remunerative  labour,  was  I  enabled  to  write 
and  pul)lish  the  Principles  of  Psychology.  For  two  years  after  the  Synthetic 
Philosophy  had  been  projected,  no  way  of  bringing  it  before  the  world  was  dis- 
coverable. When,  at  length,  mainly  by  the  aid  of  scientific  friends,  without  whose 
endorsement  I  could  have  done  nothing,  it  became  possible  to  get  together  a 
sufficient  number  of  subscribers,  it  was  presently  proved  that,  partly  because 
of  my  inability  to  keep  up  the  intended  rate  of  publication,  and  pardy  because 
of  losses  entailed  by  numerous  defaulters,  I  should  have  been  obliged  to  desist 
before  the  completion  of  First  Principles,  had  it  not  been  that  the  death  of  my 
uncle  William,  and  bequest  of  the  greater  part  of  his  property  to  me,  afforded 
the  means  of  continuing. 

Even  this  was  not  sufficient,  and  he  was  on  the  point  of  discon- 
tinuing, when  two  other  events  occurred,  which  he  describes  as 
follows  (pp.  532-533)  •• 

Only  because  the  necessity  for  discontinuance  was  removed,  partly  by  the 
American  testimonial  and  partly  by  my  father's  death,  which  diminished  the 
responsibilities  coming  upon  me,  was  the  notice  of  cessation  cancelled.  .  .  . 
Evidently  it  was  almost  a  miracle  that  I  did  not  sink  before  success  was  reached. 

His  father  had  considerable  property,  and  it  about  all  fell  to  him, 
and  although  he  was  obliged  to  administer  it  and  remove  certain 
encumbrances,  still  it  enabled  him  to  go  on  with  his  work,  and  his 
circumstances  were  thereafter  comparatively  easy.  At  least  he  was 
able  to  live  for  the  most  part  without  remunerative  labor.  So  much 
for  his  economic  environment.  As  to  his  local  environment,  it  was 
about  as  favorable  as  any  one  could  conceive.  My  review  of  his 
Autobiography  was  written  before  I  had  undertaken  the  present 
study  of  the  influence  of  environments  and  before  I  had  read  M. 
Odin's  book,  but  this  is  what  I  said  on  that  point  (p.  874)  : 

His  very  environment  was  sufficient  to  bring  out  all  that  was  in  him.  On 
intimate  terms  for  the  greater  part  of  his  life  with  such  men  as  Huxley,  Tyndall, 
Hooker,  Lubbock,  Mill,  Lewes,  and  Bain,  belonging  to  the  same  clubs,  taking 
long  walks,  and  having  constant  discussions  with  them,  the  stimulus  must  have 
been  enormous. 


Ch.  X]  PRIVILEGED  MEN  261 

And  with  regard  to  his  educational  environment  I  said  (pp.  874, 

875): 

Herbert  Spencer  is  commonly  represented  as  being  the  type  of  a  self-educated 
man.  Nothing  could  be  farther  from  the  truth.  The  son  of  a  professional 
teacher  belonging  to  a  long  line  of  teachers,  he  was  surrounded  by  educational 
influences  from  his  very  birth.  So  far  from  struggling  to  educate  himself,  his 
main  efforts  as  a  boy  seem  to  have  been  to  escape  from  the  perpetual  drill  of 
the  domestic  school.  .  .  .  Herbert  Spencer  as  a  boy  -was  always  being  taught. 
His  education  was  not  sporadic  and  one-sided,  but  methodical  and  all-sided. 

The  prevailing  opinion  has  been  that  he  was  a  typically  '  self-made  man.' 
He  has  been  represented  as  having  had  to  struggle  with  adversity,  and  has  been 
held  up  as  a  proof  of  the  theory  that  great  abilities  are  certain  to  assert  them- 
selves whatever  the  obstacles  may  be  in  their  path.  His  life  shows  that,  on  the 
contrary,  he  was  highly  favored  by  circumstances.  While  of  course  without  his 
talents  his  achievements  would  have  been  impossible,  still,  given  such  talents, 
there  was  scarcely  any  reason  why  he  should  not  have  accomplished  great 
things.  He  does  not  himself  favor  the  Galtonian  doctrine,  but  fully  recognizes 
his  indebtedness  to  circumstances.  He  admits  that  but  for  the  three  legacies 
that  were  one  after  the  other  left  him  by  his  two  uncles  and  his  father,  he  could 
never  have  completed  his  system.  But  he  was  even  more  indebted  to  the  help 
of  influential  friends,  freely  volunteered,  and  to  a  whole  train  of  favorable  cir- 
cumstances, fully  set  forth  in  his  '  Autobiography.' 

Further  illustrations  of  alleged  self-made  men  seem  to  be 
unnecessary. 

Privileged  Men.  — Although  there  are  really  no  self-made  men, 
and  all  who  have  succeeded  have  done  so  by  virtue  of  some  form 
of  opportunity,  still  there  is  some  difference  between  even  the  most 
favored  of  the  men  whom  we  have  been  considering  and  the  con- 
fessedly privileged  men  of  whom  we  have  now  to  speak.  We  shall 
see  how  much  truth  there  is  in  the  popular  view  that  highly  favor- 
able circumstances  tend  toward  intellectual  degeneracy.  And  here, 
in  marked  contrast  with  the  previous  class,  we  are  not  at  all  em- 
barrassed for  material.  In  fact,  we  are  confronted  on  the  threshold 
with  an  embarras  dc  ricJiesse.  Looking  over  the  long  list  of  the 
great  contributors  to  human  progress,  it  becomes  clear  at  once  that 
with  the  few  exceptions  that  have  been  enumerated,  and  a  few  more 
that  might  be  added,  all  the  truly  great  men  of  history  have  belonged 
to  this  class  and  have  never  had  to  give  a  moment's  thought  to  the 
material  concerns  of  existence.  Who  have  been  the  great  agents 
of  intellectual  progress.?  We  will  make  special  mention  of  a  few  of 
them. 


262  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

Take  Descartes,  as  a  typical  example.  As  Littre  says:  "he  did 
not,  as  he  himself  said,  feel  compelled  to  make  a  business  of  science 
to  mitigate  his  fortune.  He  retired  to  a  corner  of  Holland,  a 
country  which  had  then,  more  than  any  other,  the  merit  of  compara- 
tive tolerance,  and  there  he  fulfilled  without  disturbance  his  philo- 
sophic destiny,"  ^  And  this  is  what  he  said  of  himself:  "  je  ne  me 
sentais  point,  grace  a  Dicu,  de  condition  qui  m'obligeat  a  faire  un 
metier  de  la  science  pour  le  soulagement  de  ma  fortune."^ 

Newton  was  not  rich,  though  he  came  from  a  well-to-do  family, 
but,  as  all  know,  he  held  a  high  public  office,  that  of  Master  of  the 
Mint,  which  probably  gave  him  much  leisure  and  little  fatigue.  He 
was  not  able  to  publish  the  Principia  after  he  had  written  it,  but 
Halley,  who  realized  its  value,  bore  the  entire  expense  of  the  first 
edition.  It  is  safe  to  say  that  Newton  always  possessed  abundant 
leisure  to  follow  his  profound  meditations  without  any  of  the  annoy- 
ing distractions  of  economic  insecurity. 

Darwin,  as  everybody  knows,  was  always  in  perfectly  easy  circum- 
stances, and  had  literally  nothing  else  to  do  all  his  life  but  to  pursue 
his  scientific  investigations  according  to  his  own  sweet  will.  He 
says  in  his  Autobiography:  "I  have  had  ample  leisure  from  not 
having  to  earn  my  own  bread."  ^ 

Adam  Smith  was  thoroughly  educated  as  a  boy  and  young  man. 
He  went  to  the  University  of  Glasgow  at  the  age  of  fourteen,  and 
to  Oxford  at  seventeen,  where  he  remained  six  years.  He  held  the 
chair  of  English  literature  at  Edinburgh  and  that  of  logic  at  Glas- 
gow, and  subsequently  traveled  in  Europe  as  tutor  to  the  Duke 
of  Buccleuch.  Nothing  ever  stood  in  his  way,  and  he  wrote  his 
Wealth  of  Nations  from  the  ripest  scholarship. 

Galileo  was  of  an  ancient  Florentine  family  and  was  highly  edu- 
cated. Soon  after  he  made  his  celebrated  discovery  from  watch- 
ing the  oscillations  of  the  lamp  in  the  cathedral  of  Pisa  he  was 
appointed  professor  of  mathematics  in  the  university  there,  and 
auspiciously  launched  on  his  great  career. 

1  Augiiste  Comte,  Philosophic  positive,  3"=  ed.,  Paris,  1869,  edited  by  £.  Littre. 
Preface  d'lin  disciple,  Vol.  I,  p.  xv. 

2  Discours  de  la  methode,  CEuvres  de  Descartes,  Paris,  1844,  p.  6. 

3  The  Life  and  Letters  of  Charles  Darwin,  including  an  autobiographical  chapter, 
edited  by  his  son,  Francis  Danvin,  New  York,  1S88,  Vol.  I,  p.  85. 


Ch.  X]  PRIVILEGED  MEN  263 

Hobbes  must  have  been  highly  educated  in  his  early  youth,  for 
he  went  to  Oxford  at  the  age  of  fourteen.  He  was  a  protege  of 
Lord  Hardwicke  and  his  son,  Earls  of  Devonshire.  He  commenced 
writing  early  in  life,  and  his  defense  of  monarchy  always  kept  him 
in  high  favor  with  those  in  authority.  He  seems  never  to  have 
lacked  for  means  or  leisure. 

Harvey  came  from  the  business  class,  but  was  well  educated,  and 
entered  Cambridge  at  the  age  of  sixteen.  He  was  able  to  go  to 
Padua  and  take  a  course  in  medicine  at  that  then  celebrated  school. 
He  stayed  there  five  years,  and  then  returned  to  England  and  beg-an 
his  career,  leading  finally  to  his  being  made  physician-extraordinary 
to  James  I,  and  later  to  Charles  I.  It  was  under  such  favorable 
conditions  that  he  was  able  to  discover  the  law  of  the  circulation 
of  the  blood. 

The  father  of  Thomas  Buckle  was  wealthy,  and  dying  when 
Buckle  was  nineteen  left  him  in  easy  circumstances,  with  leisure  to 
pursue  his  studies  in  the  direction  of  his  tastes.  Kant,  Hegel,  Fichte, 
and  all  the  Scottish  school  of  philosophers  were  of  course  professors 
with  all  the  privileges  and  advantages  that  accrue  from  such  posi- 
tions.   Bacon  was  the  lord  of  Verulam,  and  Humboldt  was  a  baron. 

Professor  Cooley  classes  the  following  in  the  upper  or  upper 
middle  class,  "  using  the  latter  term  rather  broadly  to  include  clergy- 
men, advocates,  well-to-do  merchants,  and  the  like": 

Dante,  Petrarch,  Boccaccio,  Chaucer,  Ariosto,  Montaigne,  Spenser,  Tasso, 
Cervantes,  .Shakespeare,  Bacon,  Jonson  (?),  Descartes,  Milton,  Corneille,  Hobbes, 
Pascal,  Dryden,  Leibnitz,  Locke,  Addison,  Montesquieu,  Voltaire,  Fielding, 
Hume,  Johnson,  Lessing,  Gibbon,  Cowper,  Burke,  Goethe,  Coleridge,  Scott, 
Landor,  Byron,  Shelley,  Niebuhr,  Macaulay,  Comte,  Hugo,  Thackeray,  Dis- 
raeli, Tennyson,  Browning,  Ruskin. 

To  the  lower  middle  class,  "shopkeepers,  prosperous  handicrafts- 
men, etc.,"  he  assigns  the  following: 

Luther,  Rabelais,  Camoens,  Erasmus,  Scaliger,  Moli^re,  Spinoza,  Racine, 
De  Foe,  Swift,  Steele,  Pope,  Adam  Smith,  Rousseau,  Kant,  .Schiller,  Words- 
worth, Hegel,  Keats,  Bdranger,  Heine,  Balzac,  Carlyle,  Dickens. 

There  is  room  for  differences  of  opinion  in  a  number  of  the  above 
cases,  and  M.  Odin's  classification  seems  to  me  more  clear  and  satis- 
factory, but  certainly  nearly  all  of  the  first  list  belong  to  the  general 


264  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

class  of  privileged  men,  while  very  few  of  the  second  belong  to  the 
class  even  of  alleged  self-made  men.  A  number  in  both  lists  have 
already  been  more  specially  treated,  and  it  does  not  seem  profitable 
to  go  farther  with  this. 

The  general  outcome  of  the  whole  is  that  by  far  the  greater  part 
of  the  real  work  of  civilization  has  been  done  by  privileged  men, 
many  of  whom  were  privileged  in  a  high  degree.  Only  a  few  men 
of  science  have  been  mentioned,  but  Linnaeus,  the  Jussieus,  Cuvier, 
the  de  Candolles,  the  Herschels,  the  Hookers,  Richard  Owen,  and 
Huxley,  for  that  matter,  should  all  be  classed  as  privileged  men  in 
varying  degrees.  John  Stuart  Mill  and  his  father  James  Mill  should 
both  be  added  to  the  philosophers  and  thinkers. 

For  the  very  highest  types  of  genius,  such,  for  example,  as  are 
represented  by  Newton  and  Darwin,  privilege,  in  the  sense  here 
used,  is  a  sine  qua  non.  One  of  the  commonest  popular  mistakes 
is  to  confound  aggressiveness  and  belligerency  with  genius.  These 
qualities  are  almost  in  inverse  proportion.  There  are  some  aggres- 
sive men  who  combine  great  talent  with  assertiveness.  Such  men 
were  Hobbes,  Carlyle,  Huxley,  and  Herbert  Spencer.  But  usually 
great  energy  and  determination,  and  especially  combative  qualities, 
are  associated  with  rather  meager  abilities,  and  men  of  this  stamp 
depend  upon  their  moral  force  rather  than  upon  their  intellectual 
superiority.  The  former  becomes  a  substitute  for  the  latter.  More- 
over, the  work  of  that  class  of  persons  is  usually  short-lived. 

In  the  lecture  on  Heredity  and  Opportunity,  or  Nature  and  Nur- 
ture, to  which  I  have  previously  referred,  I  discussed  this  aspect  of 
the  question,  and  it  happens  that  a  part  of  that  discussion  was  pub- 
lished in  the  article  in  which  I  summarized  the  lecture.  At  least 
these  words  occur,  to  which  I  still  adhere: 

There  is  no  need  to  search  for  talent.  It  exists  already  and  everywhere. 
The  thing  that  is  rare  is  opportunit}',  not  ability.  The  fact  that  many  do 
struggle  up  out  of  obscurity  does  not  so  much  show  that  they  possess  superi- 
ority as  that  they  happen  to  be  less  inextricably  bound  down  than  others  by  the 
conventional  bonds  of  society.  And  those  who  have  succeeded  in  bursting  these 
bonds  have  usually  done  so  at  such  an  immense  cost  in  energy,  that  their  future 
work  is  rendered  crude  and  well-nigh  valueless.  Such  is  the  character  of  most 
of  the  results  accomplished  by  so-called  self-made  men.  To  attain  to  a  position 
where  they  can  labor  in  any  great  field,  they  must  carry  on  a  life-long  battle 


Ch.  X]  PRIVILEGED  MEN  265 

against  obstacles ;  they  must  display  enormous  individuality,  amounting  to 
conceit ;  they  must  become  heated  contestants  and  bitter  partisans.  All  this 
narrows  the  mental  horizon,  and  renders  the  results  superficial  and  unenduring. 
There  is  no  more  vicious  popular  fallacy  than  that  the  powers  of  the  mind  are 
strengthened  and  improved  by  adversity.  Every  one  who  has  accomplished 
anything  against  adverse  circumstances  would  have  accomplished  proportion- 
ally more  had  such  circumstances  been  removed.  The  talent  that  can  fight 
against  adversity  is  never  of  the  highest  and  best  quality.  Between  honest  work 
and  open  warfare  there  is  a  certain  incompatibility.  True  greatness  is  timid 
and  recoils  before  obstacles.  The  finest  and  most  genuine  of  all  qualities  — 
those  which,  if  allowed  free  scope,  will  produce  the  greatest  and  most  enduring 
results  —  will  not  brook  opposition,  and  shrink  from  the  least  sign  of  hostility. 
Far  from  implying  cowardice,  this  is  simply  the  characteristic  modesty  of  true 
greatness.  It  is  a  paradox  of  daily  observation  that  those  who  are  the  nearest 
right  are  the  least  convinced  of  it:  and  hence  those  who  possess  the  greatest 
truths  are  often  deterred  from  uttering  them  against  opposition,  not  from  any 
fear  of  opposition,  but  from  fear  of  the  possibility  that  after  all  they  may  not 
be  true.  It  is  due  to  this  principle  that  the  greatest  intrinsic  merit  never  comes 
to  the  surface.  True  merit  will  not  create  its  opportunities.  It  requires  that 
opportunities  be  brought  to  it.  If  this  is  not  done  there  is  no  result,  and  society 
is  the  loser.  Nearly  all  the  work  of  permanent  value  that  has  been  done  in  the 
world  has  emanated  from  men  possessing  these  qualities,  and  left  undisturbed 
in  their  continuous  exercise.^ 

All  this    is  well   exemplified  in   Newton's  case.    As  Professor 

Woodward  says  : 

Possessing  to  a  painful  degree  that  modesty  which  is  born  of  knowlege  of 
things,  he  shrunk  from  the  controversy  into  which  his  discoveries  drew  him  ;  and 
it  appears  probable  that  his  Principia  would  never  have  been  written  had  not 
his  friend  Halley  urged  him  on  to  the  marvelous  feat  which  brought  out  that 
masterpiece  in  less  than  two  years'  time.^ 

The  same  was  equally  true  of  Darwin,  and  Professor  Cooley 

justly  says  : 

There  is  a  class  of  men  of  genius  in  whom  extreme  sensitiveness,  combined 
with  lack  of  physical  vigor,  makes  it  essential  that  they  should  be  secluded  from 
the  stress  and  annoyance  of  bread-winning  activities.  The  case  of  Darwin  .  .  . 
may  be  cited  as  one  in  which,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  inherited  wealth  could  not 
well  have  been  dispensed  with.  • 

Dr.  T.  Clifford  Allbutt,  although  strongly  tinctured  with  the  cur- 
rent oligocentric  world  view,  nevertheless  remarks  : 

Some  may  aver,  and  not  without  seeming  of  truth,  that  trial  is  to  genius  as 
the  furnace  to  noble  metal.    But  surely,  this  world  will  always  offer  to  its  children 

^  The  Forum,  New  York,  Vol.  II,  December,  1886,  pp.  345-346. 

*  Science,  N.S.,  Vol.  I,  February  8,  1895,  p.  146.        *  Cooley,  article  cited,  p.  335 


266  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

a  front  stern  enough  for  their  chastisement,  and  a  law  hard  enough  for  their 
contrition —  there  needs  not  the  imposition  of  fetters  of  ours,  nor  the  devices 
of  our  caprice  or  austerity.  One  born  before  his  time,  in  the  inertia  of  his  own 
generation,  will  find  resistance  enough  to  try  his  steel.  Moreover,  as  I  have 
said,  great  quality  of  brain  may  not  be  associated  to  high  tension,  and  a  mod- 
erate resistance  may  be  fatal  to  achievement.' 

Professor  Huxley's  well-known  lecture  on  Technical  Education  is 
too  familiar  to  need  quoting,  but  there  is  one  paragraph  in  it  that 
might  have  been  written  for  this  particular  place  : 

Now  the  most  important  object  of  all  educational  schemes  is  to  catch  these 
exceptional  people  and  turn  them  to  account  for  the  good  of  society.  No  man 
can  say  where  they  will  crop  up  ;  like  their  opposites,  the  fools  and  knaves, 
they  appear  sometimes  in  the  palace  and  sometimes  in  the  hovel  ;  but  the  great 
thing  to  be  aimed  at,  I  was  almost  going  to  say  the  most  important  end  of  all 
social  arrangements,  is  to  keep  these  glorious  sports  of  Nature  from  being  either 
corrupted  by  luxury  or  starved  by  poverty,  and  to  put  them  into  the  position  in 
which  they  can  do  the  work  for  which  they  are  specially  fitted.^ 

The  "glorious  sports  of  Nature"  to  which  Professor  Huxley- 
alludes,  as  his  preceding  paragraph  shows,  are  the  geniuses  of 
Galton,  numbering  only  one  in  a  million,  supposed  to  be  a  fixed 
quantity,  and  to  consist  of  beings  entirely  unlike  other  men.  On 
this  conception  is  based  the  "exceptional  man"  theory,  to  which 
Professor  Huxley  seems  to  lend  considerable  countenance.  It  is  also 
Mr.  Carnegie's  leading  idea  in  founding  the  Carnegie  Institution.* 
But  we  have  seen  that  it  is  a  wholly  false  idea,  and  that  genius  of 
varying  shades  and  grades  permeates  society.  "  The  most  important 
object  of  all  educational  schemes,"  and  "  the  most  important  end  of 
all  social  arrangements,"  is  to  spread  a  net  over  society  so  contrived 
that  it  will  catch  all  the  "  big  fish  "  in  the  social  sea.  There  is  only 
one  kind  of  net  that  can  do  this,  and  that  is  the  kind  that  extends 
absolutely  equal  opportunities  to  all  the  members  of  society.    The 

1  Brain,  A  Journal  of  Neurology,  Vol.  I,  April,  1878,  p.  66. 

2  Fortnightly  Review,  Vol.  XXIX  (New  Series,  Vol.  XXIII),  January  i,  1878,  p.  57. 
8  In  the  trust  deed  prepared  by  Mr.  Andrew  Carnegie  and  delivered  to  the  trustees, 

creating  a  trust  for  the  benefit  of  the  Carnegie  Institution  of  Washington,  D.C.,  the 
aims  of  the  institution  are  set  forth  under  six  heads,  the  second  of  which  is  as  follows : 
"  2.  To  discover  the  exceptional  man  in  every  department  of  study  whenever  and 
wherever  found,  inside  or  outside  of  schools,  and  enable  him  to  make  the  work  for 
which  he  seems  specially  designed  his  life  work."  —  The  Carnegie  Institution  of  Wash- 
ington, D.C.,  founded  by  Andrew  Carnegie,  1902,  Washington,  D.C.,  March,  1902, 
p.  II. 


Ch.  X]  THE  POWER  OF  CIRCUMSTANCES  267 

*'  small  fry  "  would  slip  through  such  a  net,  even  as  they  do  through 
the  bungling  apparatus  that  exists  now,  but  all  that  are  worth  having 
would  be  caught  and  utilized,  and  not  allowed  for  the  most  part  to 
"get  away,"  as  has  thus  far  always  been  the  case. 


The  Power  of  Circumstances 

That  man  is  a  creature  of  circumstance  is  an  oft-repeated  phrase, 
and  while  it  is  usually  uttered  without  much  reflection,  it  neverthe- 
less represents  a  thought  that  has  been  crystallized  from  untold  ages 
of  experience.  That  it  is  true  of  the  mind  as  well  as  of  the  life  and 
fortunes  of  men  is  a  much  more  modern  conception,  and  one  that  is 
b)-  no  means  universally  accepted.  After  biology  began  to  be  scien- 
tifically studied  the  tendency  was  to  class  psychic  along  with  vital 
phenomena,  and  to  assume  that  what  was  true  of  the  body  must  also 
be  true  of  the  mind.  And  as  it  was  obvious  that  the  circumstances 
surrounding  an  animal  or  a  human  being  during  life  have  no  power 
to  modify  the  body,  when  such  influences  are  compared  with  those 
of  heredity  in  shaping  its  form  and  determining  its  character,  it  was 
concluded  that  the  same  must  be  true  of  the  mind.  This  was  and 
still  is  looked  upon  as  the  scientific  view  par  excellence,  and  the  oppo- 
site view,  that  circumstances  determine  the  character  of  the  mind  to 
any  considerable  degree,  is  considered  a  mere  popular  notion,  devoid 
of  scientific  basis.  Galton  clearly  expresses  this  supposed  scientific 
view  when  he  says  : 

I  have  no  patience  with  the  hypothesis  occasionally  expressed,  and  often 
implied,  especially  in  tales  written  to  teach  children  to  be  good,  that  babies  are 
born  pretty  much  alike,  and  that  the  sole  agencies  in  creating  differences  between 
boy  and  boy,  and  man  and  man,  are  steady  application  and  moral  effort.  It  is 
in  the  most  unqualified  manner  that  I  object  to  pretensions  of  natural  equality.^ 

Now  the  fallacy  here  is  in  supposing  that  the  mind  is  nothing 
but  the  brain.  It  would  be  all  true  of  the  brain,  for  the  brain  is 
simply  a  part  of  the  body,  and  whatever  is  true  of  the  whole  body  is 
true  of  its  parts.  But  it  is  not  true  of  the  mind,  because  the  mind 
is  something  besides  the  brain.  It  is  also  something  more  than 
intellect.    I  have  defined  intelligence  as  intellect  plus  knowledge. 

1  Hereditary  Genius,  p.  12. 


268  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

The  mind,  as  we  have  been  treating  it,  is  the  whole  of  intelhgence 
with  all  the  moral  (affective)  attributes  added.  It  is  the  working 
force  of  society.  The  intellect,  or  the  brain,  if  any  one  prefers,  is  a 
sort  of  receptacle,  and  knowledge  is  its  contents. 

Let  us  suppose  there  to  exist  hundreds  of  thousands  of  boxes, 
made  after  a  sort  of  common  pattern  as  regards  size  and  shape,  but 
differing  enormously  both  in  the  materials  of  which  they  are  made 
and  the  workmanship  displayed  in  making  them.  Some  of  them  are 
made  of  the  finest  mahogany  or  rosewood,  and  are  beautifully  pol- 
ished, paneled,  and  veneered,  or  exquisitely  carved  without  and  inlaid 
with  gold  or  precious  stones.  Others  are  made  of  very  coarse  mate- 
rial and  not  ev'en  dressed.  Some  may  even  be  made  of  straw  paper, 
incapable  of  resisting  any  strain  whatever.  Between  these  extremes 
there  are  all  conceivable  degrees  of  difference  in  both  respects,  but 
all  except  the  very  poorest  are  constructed  of  substantial  materials 
and  firmly  put  together.  Let  us  next  suppose  all  these  boxes  to  be 
filled  with  something  —  filled  with  every  thinkable  kind  of  objects 
—  the  contents  to  differ  in  value  far  more  than  do  the  boxes  them- 
selves. Some  are  filled  with  silver  or  gold,  or  with  pearls  of  great 
price,  or  large  diamonds  of  the  first  water.  Others  are  filled  with 
common  pebbles  gathered  on  the  beach,  or  with  rough  angular  stones 
of  the  gravel-pit,  with  impure  sand,  or  even  with  sawdust.  And 
between  these  extremes  again  there  are  all  conceivable  degrees  in 
the  value  of  the  contents  of  the  boxes. 

Now  the  boxes  typify  the  brain,  or  the  intellect,  the  "  preefficients  " 
of  intelligence  or  of  mind.  The  contents,  on  the  contrary,  typify  the 
acquired  qualities,  experience,  education,  training,  study,  and  medita- 
tion, in  a  word,  knowledge —  the  possessions  of  the  mind  —  every- 
thing that  has  been  added  to  the  original  substratum.  All  except  the 
very  poorest  strawboard  intellects  (idiots)  are  capable,  like  the  boxes, 
however  rudely  made,  of  holding  any  of  the  things  that  are  put  into 
them  and  of  preserving  them  securely.  Just  as  the  coarse  boxes,  made 
of  undressed  lumber,  will  hold  the  pearls  and  diamonds  as  well  and 
safely  as  the  most  highly  wrought  rosewood  boxes,  so  the  common 
intellects  of  all  but  the  congenitally  feeble-minded  will  hold  the 
greatest  truths  that  have  ever  been  discovered  ;  and  just  as  the 
rough  boxes  are  capable  of  being  smoothed  off,  and,  when  made  of 


Ch.  X]  THE  POWER  OF  CIRCUMSTANCES  269 

firm  and  fine-grained  lumber,  may  even  take  a  high  polish,  so  the 
cruder  intellects  may  be  cultivated,  refined,  and  polished. 

According  to  this  figure  the  mind  is  represented  by  both  the  boxes 
and  their  contents,  and  it  can  be  readily  seen  that  the  contents  may 
be  of  vastly  greater  value  than  the  box.  One  can  put  sawdust  into 
mahogany  boxes  and  diamonds  into  those  of  rude  oak.  In  fact,  this 
is  what  is  constantly  happening  with  the  minds  of  men.  It  is  only 
when  pearls  find  their  way  into  rosewood  boxes  that  true  genius 
comes  forth.  The  so-called  scientific  view  above  mentioned,  that 
no  external  influences  have  any  power  to  affect  the  mind,  relates 
entirely  to  the  boxes  and  ignores  their  contents  altogether.  We  may 
suppose  the  boxes  to  be  some  sort  of  conventional  thing  that  cannot 
be  changed,  but  it  is  always  possible  to  put  anything  whatever  into 
any  box.  Over  the  contents  society  has  complete  control,  however 
fixed  may  be  the  receptacle.  Why  is  it  not  just  as  scientific  to  deal 
with  the  contents  as  to  deal  with  the  receptacle  ?  It  certainly  is  not 
scientific  to  pretend  to  be  dealing  with  the  mind  and  to  ignore  the  con- 
tents of  the  mind.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  there  is  not  such  an  essential 
difference  between  intellects  as  to  prevent  most  sane  persons  from 
storing  their  minds  with  useful  knowledge  and  making  good  use  of 
such  stores  when  possessed,  and  almost  all  the  differences  that  exist 
among  minds  are  due  to  differences  in  their  contents.  This  in  turn 
is  due  to  differences  in  the  experience  that  different  persons  have. 

The  desirable  thing  would  of  course  be  to  find  a  case  of  a  human 
mind  of  normal  capacity  which  had  had  ?io  experience.  This  is 
obviously  impossible,  and  the  next  thing  to  it  would  be  to  find  a 
normal  human  being  who  had  been  so  sequestrated  during  all  his 
early  life  as  never  to  have  come  into  contact  with  other  human 
beings.  There  is  quite  an  array  of  alleged  cases  of  this  kind,  but 
when  we  investigate  them  we  find  them  of  Uttle  value.  The  oft- 
repeated  story  of  Psammetichus,  who  secluded  two  new-born  chil- 
dren so  that  they  should  never  hear  any  one  speak,  in  order  to 
ascertain  what  natural  language  would  be,  is  too  poorly  authenti- 
cated and  too  imperfectly  told  to  have  any  scientific  value.  We 
know  still  less  of  Hal  ben  Yokthan,  and  he  is  probably  a  m}th. 
The  wild  girl  of  Champagne  had  a  rudimentary  moral  sense  at  least, 
but  apparently  no  intelligence.    Kaspar  Hauser  was  a  real  character, 


2  70  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

and  we  know  something  of  him  after  he  revealed  himself,  but  noth- 
ing of  his  seclusion.  It  seems  not  to  have  been  so  complete  as  to 
prevent  him  from  learning  to  talk.  Rauber  ^  has  shown  that  persons 
belonging  to  civilized  races  condemned  to  complete  isolation  acquire 
no  trace  of  a  language.  Doubtless  a  sufificient  number  of  such 
thrown  together  for  a  long  period  would  learn  to  communicate.^ 
The  children  thus  isolated  by  Psammetichus  are  said  to  have  learned 
to  bleat  in  imitation  of  the  goat  that  suckled  them,  and  in  other 
cases  persons  thus  secluded  are  reported  to  have  uttered  sounds 
resembling  the  cries  of  wild  animals  with  which  they  had  associated  ; 
all  of  which  shows,  as  I  have  stated,  tbat  the  language  of  animals 
is  confined  to  one  part  of  speech,  the  interjection,  and  also  that  the 
interjection,  which  constitutes  the  language  of  feeling,  was  the  part 
of  speech  earliest  to  be  developed. 

Father  Xavier  when  a  missionary  in  India  was  told  by  the 
emperor  Akbar  that  an  experiment  had  been  made  there  to  deter- 
mine the  origin  of  language.  It  consisted  in  raising  thirty  children 
together  in  an  inclosed  space,  guarded  and  supplied  with  food  by 
nurses  condemned  to  silence  under  pain  of  death.  The  children 
were  said  to  have  grown  up  mute  and  stupid,  having  for  their  lan- 
guage only  a  few  gestures  relating  to  their  animal  wants.^ 

But  why  should  all  the  stress  be  laid,  as  has  been  the  case  in  all 
discussions  of  this  question,  on  the  subject  of  language  .■*  Language 
is  important  and  its  origin  interesting,  but  it  is  not  all.  The  real 
question  is,  What  kind  of  minds  would  persons  thus  isolated  have.? 
It  is  only  too  obvious  that  their  minds  would  be  almost  completely 
blank.  No  amount  of  native  mental  capacity  could  prevent  this. 
A  Bacon  or  a  Descartes,  if  made  the  subject  of  such  an  experiment, 
would  get  no  farther  than  one  of  moderate  powers.  He  would  appear 
to  ordinary  persons  a  fool.  Locke  was  right.  Mind  without  experi- 
ence is  a  blank  sheet  of  paper  or  an  empty  cabinet.  The  substratum 
of  mind  is  nothing  until  it  is  supplied  with  something  to  exercise 
itself  upon.    The  real  character  of  the  human  mind  depends  upon 

1  Homo  sapiens  ferus,  oder  die  Zustande  der  Verwilderten  und  ihre  Bedeutung 
fiir  Wissenschaft,  Politik  und  Schule.    Leipzig,  1885. 

2  Compare  Pure  Sociology,  pp.  188-191. 

'  Historiae  Societatis  Jesu,  Pars  quinta,  Tomus  posterior,  Auctore  Josepho  Juven- 
cio,  Lib.  XVIII.  14,  p.  461. 


Ch.  X]  THE  POWER  OF  CIRCUMSTANCES  271 

its  contents,  and  men's  minds  differ  mainly  according  to  what  they 
contain.    Henry  George  has  expressed  this  admirably: 

Take  a  number  of  infants  born  o'i  the  most  highly  civilized  parents  and 
transport  them  to  an  uninhabited  country.  Suppose  them  in  some  miraculous 
way  to  be  sustained  until  they  come  of  age  to  take  care  of  themselves,  and 
what  would  you  have.''  More  helpless  savages  than  any  we  know  of.  They 
would  have  fire  to  discover;  the  rudest  tools  and  weapons  to  invent;  language 
to  construct.  They  would,  in  short,  have  to  stumble  their  way  to  the  simplest 
knowledge  which  the  lowest  races  now  possess,  just  as  a  child  learns  to  walk. 
That  they  would  in  time  do  all  these  things  I  have  not  the  slightest  doubt,  for 
all  these  possibilities  are  latent  in  the  human  mind  just  as  the  power  of  walk- 
ing is  latent  in  the  human  frame,  but  I  do  not  believe  they  would  do  them  any 
better  or  worse,  any  slower  or  quicker,  than  the  children  of  barbarian  parents 
placed  in  the  same  conditions.  Given  the  very  highest  mental  powers  that 
exceptional  individuals  have  ever  displayed,  and  what  could  mankind  be  if  one 
generation  were  separated  from  the  next  by  an  interval  of  time,  as  are  the 
seventeen  year  locusts?  One  such  interval  would  reduce  mankind,  not  to 
savagery,  but  to  a  condition  compared  with  which  savagery,  as  we  know  it, 
would  seem  civilization.^ 

Even  this  falls  short  of  the  whole  truth  embodied  in  social  con- 
tinuity. 

If  we  reflect  a  moment  it  is  easy  to  see  that  the  differences  in 
men's  experiences  are  infinite.  No  two  persons  can  or  ever  do  have 
the  same  experience.  Even  between  Siamese  twins  there  must  be 
some  difference.  Nor  is  it  desirable  that  many  persons  should  have 
the  same  experiences.  What  we  call  a  "  community  "  is  a  number 
of  persons  occupying  the  same  area,  governed  by  the  same  laws, 
acquainted  with  the  same  facts,  having  largely  the  same  opinions 
and  even  the  same  sentiments.  A  long  continuance  of  these  con- 
ditions leads  to  degeneracy.  Certain  kinds  of  knowledge  even,  such 
as  that  furnished  by  village  gossip,  may  deteriorate  the  mind.  But 
it  is  worthless  knowledge.  No  useful  knowledge  can  do  any  harm 
by  being  shared  by  a  whole  community.  If  most  useful  knowledge 
could  be  shared  by  all  it  would  so  far  equalize  men's  minds  that  all 
the  now  current  theories  of  the  essential  differences  between  them 
would  be  abandoned.  There  would  certainly  remain  qualitative 
differences,  and  this  is  as  it  should  be,  but  the  present  aristocracy 
of  brains  would  be  shown  to  have  been  nothing  but  monopoly  of 
privilege. 

1  Progress  and  Poverty,  p.  355. 


272  APPLIED    SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

It  is  circumstances  that  determine  the  contents  of  the  mind,  and 
therefore  the  principal  differences  in  the  minds  of  men  are  due  to 
circumstances.  This  explains  the  power  of  circumstances.  This 
was  seen  even  by  Confucius,  who  said :  "  By  nature  we  nearly 
resemble  one  another;  condition  separates  us  very  far."  Adam 
Smith  says : 

The  difference  of  natural  talent  in  different  men  is,  in  reality,  much  less 
than  we  are  aware  of ;  and  the  very  different  genius  which  appears  to  distin- 
guish men  of  different  professions,  when  grown  up  to  maturity,  is  not,  upon 
many  occasions,  so  much  the  cause,  as  the  effect  of  the  division  of  labour.  The 
difference  between  the  most  dissimilar  characters,  between  a  philosopher  and 
a  common  street  porter,  for  example,  seems  to  arise  not  so  much  from  nature 
as  from  habit,  custom,  and  education.  When  they  came  into  the  world,  and 
for  the  first  six  or  eight  years  of  their  existence,  they  were,  perhaps,  very  much 
alike,  and  neither  their  parents  nor  playfellows  could  perceive  any  remarkable 
difference.  About  that  age,  or  soon  after,  they  come  to  be  employed  in  very 
different  occupations.  The  difference  of  talents  comes  then  to  be  taken  notice 
of,  and  widens  by  degrees,  till  at  last  the  vanity  of  the  philosopher  is  willing 
to  acknowledge  scarce  any  resemblance.^ 

Helvetius  remarks : 

We  may  apply  to  simple  citizens  what  I  have  said  of  empires.  We  see  in 
the  same  way  that  their  elevation  or  their  decline,  their  good  fortune  or  their 
misfortune,  are  the  products  of  a  certain  combination  of  circumstances  and  of 
an  infinity  of  accidents,  unforeseen  and  sterile  in  appearance.^ 

De  Candolle,  as  we  have  seen,  ascribes  far  more  to  circumstances 
than  to  heredity.  The  rise  of  great  men  to  eminence  and  the 
principal  external  causes  favorable  to  their  success  have  been 
enumerated  in  a  previous  chapter.  We  need  here,  therefore,  cite 
only  a  few  passages  that  we  find  scattered  through  his  book: 

Celebrity  is  still  less  hereditary  than  .speciality.  It  is  never  anything  but  an 
exception,  determined  by  various  causes  rarely  combined.  For  a  man  to  become 
celebrated  it  is  not  necessary  that  he  be  endowed  with  a  great  capacity.  There 
must  be  circumstances  favorable  to  him,  and  especially  the  will  to  act,  and  to 
show  himself  or  to  be  useful.  .  .  .  The  adaptation  to  external  circumstances 
becomes  then  the  principal  thing  in  determining  his  success.  .  .  .  The  way  of 
conducting  himself  and  of  working,  the  absence  of  certain  causes  of  distraction, 
a  more  habitual  surveillance  on  the  part  of  his  father,  in  a  word,  moral  and 
family  influences,  are  more  effective  than  a  purely  hereditary  transmission 
of  faculties  appropriate  to  science.   .  .  .     Physiological  laws  are  the  same  for 

1  Wealth  of  Nations,  Book  I,  Chap.  II;  Vol.  I,  London,  1899,  pp.  16-17. 

2  De  rHomme,  Vol.  I,  p.  31. 


Ch.  X]  THE  POWER  OF  CIRCUMSTANCES  273 

all  men.  Therefore  education  in  each  family,  example  and  advice  given,  must 
have  exerted  a  more  marked  influence  than  heredity  upon  the  special  career  of 
young  scientists.^ 

John  Stuart  Mill,  speaking  entirely  from  the  economic  standpoint 
and  not  at  all  from  that  of  achievement,  still  very  well  says: 

It  is  true  that  the  lot  of  individuals  is  not  wholly  independent  of  their  virtue 
and  intelHgence ;  these  do  really  tell  in  their  favor,  but  far  less  than  many 
other  things  in  which  there  is  no  merit  at  all.  The  most  powerful  of  all  the 
determining  circumstances  is  birth.  The  great  majority  are  what  they  were 
born  to  be.  Some  are  born  rich  without  work,  others  are  born  to  a  position  in 
which  they  can  become  rich  by  work,  the  great  majority  are  born  to  hard  work 
and  poverty  throughout  life,  numbers  to  indigence.  Next  to  birth  the  chief 
cause  of  success  in  life  is  accident  and  opportunity.  When  a  person  not  bom 
to  riches  succeeds  in  acquiring  them,  his  own  industry  and  dexterity  have  gen- 
erally contributed  to  the  result;  but  industry  and  dexterity  would  not  have 
sufficed  unless  there  had  been  also  a  concurrence  of  occasions  and  chances 
which  falls  to  the  lot  of  only  a  small  number.- 

Henry  George  was  an  egalitarian,  and  his  little  book  on  Progress 
and  Poverty  contains  many  true  sayings.  One  of  these  is  in  line 
with  the  thought  of  this  chapter: 

That  the  current  philosophy,  which  attributes  social  progress  to  changes 
wrought  in  the  nature  of  man,  does  not  accord  with  historical  facts,  we  have 
already  seen.  And  we  may  also  see,  if  we  consider  them,  that  the  differences 
between  communities  in  different  stages  of  civilization  cannot  be  ascribed  to 
innate  differences  in  the  individuals  who  compose  these  communities.  That 
there  are  natural  differences  is  true,  and  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  hereditary 
transmission  of  peculiarities  is  undoubtedly  true ;  but  the  great  differences 
between  men  in  different  states  of  society  cannot  be  explained  in  this  way. 
The  influence  of  heredity,  which  it  is  now  the  fashion  to  rate  so  highly,  is  as 
nothing  compared  with  the  influences  which  mold  the  man  after  he  comes  into 
the  world.'' 

Mr.  George  Gunton  is  quite  an  apostle  of  opportunity,  though, 
like  most  of  his  class,  his  standpoint  is  economic.  It  is,  however, 
true,  as  he  says,  that  "all  religious,  educational,  and  reformatory 
institutions  are  based  upon  the  idea  that  the  environment  is  more 
powerful  than  heredity  as  a  factor  in  determining  the  wants  and 
habits  of  man.     Indeed,  it  is  only  on  the  condition  that  the  general 

^  De  Candolle,  op.  cit.,  pp.  45,  103,  295,  296. 

2  Fortnightly  Review,  Vol.  XXXI  (New  Series,  Vol.   XXV),  February  i,   1879, 
p.  226;  also.  Socialism,  by  John  Stuart  Mill,  Chicago,  1879,  P-  3'- 
*  Henry  George,  op.  cit.,  p.  350. 


274  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

environment  remains  unchanged,  that  it  is  claimed  that  the  internal 
or  hereditary  qualities  govern  the  tendency  of  character."  ^ 

There  is  a  great  deal  of  literature  on  the  subject  of  the  relative 
intellectual  capacity  of  moderns  versus  ancients,  and  many  foolish 
things  have  been  said,  but  all  seem  to  agree  that  the  historic  period 
has  not  added  much  to  the  native  brain  power  of  mankind.  Very 
few,  however,  have  perceived  the  important  corollary  that  grows 
out  of  this  conclusion.  Buckle  was  one  of  the  few  to  see  it,  and  he 
expressed  it  in  these  words : 

Whatever,  therefore,  the  moral  and  intellectual  progress  of  men  may  be,  it 
resolves  itself  not  into  a  progress  of  natural  capacity,  but  into  a  progress,  if  I 
may  so  say,  of  opportunity ;  that  is,  an  improvement  in  the  circumstances 
under  which  that  capacity  after  birth  comes  into  play.  Here  then  lies  the  gist 
of  the  whole  matter.  The  progress  is  one,  not  of  internal  power,  but  of  exter- 
nal advantage.^ 

The  Mother  of  Circumstances.  —  As  the  reader  probably  knows, 
I  discussed  the  general  subject  of  opportunity  and  advantageous 
circumstances  in  the  concluding  chapter  of  Dynamic  Sociology  and 
specified  certain  circumstances  as  fundamental,  saying  : 

There  is  one  such  fundamental  circumstance  which  may,  from  this  point  of 
view,  be  regarded  as  the  mother  of  circumstances.  This  consists  in  an  initial 
acquaintance  with  the  given  field  of  labor  —  knowledge  that  such  a  field  exists. 
There  has  been  no  discoverer  so  great  in  this  world  as  to  owe  nothing  to  this 
circumstance,  none  who  might  not  have  lived  and  died  in  the  profoundest 
obscurity  had  not  some  external  force  first  lifted  him  to  that  height,  however 
humble,  from  which  he  was  able,  more  or  less  clearly,  to  overlook  the  field  of 
his  future  labors^  none,  who,  had  he  chanced  to  live  in  another  land  or  a  prior 
age,  could  have  achieved  results  which  he  was  enabled  to  achieve  under  the 
actual  circumstances.  The  number  of  Newtons  who  may  really  be  said  never 
to  have  had  an  opportunity  to  watch  an  apple  fall  to  the  ground,  may  be  great; 
for  to  the  sons  of  toil  and  want  and  circumscribed  existence,  reflection  even 
is  forbidden.  It  is  just  this  initial  circumstance,  this  vision  of  the  promised 
land,  that  education  is  specially  adapted  to  furnish  to  those  naturally  bright 
minds  whom  fortune  has  restricted  to  dark  and  narrow  regions.^ 

Buckle  says: 

The  child  born  in  a  civilized  land  is  not  likely,  as  such,  to  be  superior  to 
one  born  among  barbarians ;  and  the  difference  which  ensues  between  the  acts 
of  the  two  children  will  be  caused,  so  far  as  we  know,  solely  by  the  pressure 

^  Wealth  and  Progress,  pp.  196-197. 

2  Buckle,  History  of  Civilization  in  England,  Vol.  I,  London,  1857,  pp.  161-162. 

*  Dynamic  Sociology,  Vol.  II,  p.  613. 


Ch.  X]  THE  MOTHER  OF  CIRCUMSTANCES  275 

of  external  circumstances  ;  by  which  I  mean  the  surrounding  opinions,  knowl- 
edge, associations ;  in  a  word,  the  entire  mental  atmosphere  in  which  the  two 
children  are  respectively  nurtured.^ 

Suppose  the  child  born  among  barbarians  to  be  one  who,  if  born 
among  civihzed  people,  would  have  become  a  great  author,  philoso- 
pher, scientific  discoverer,  or  inventor.  It  is  clear  that  owing  to  his 
circumstances  he  can  never  become  any  of  these.  All  that  the 
hereditarians  can  say  is  that,  having  superior  genius,  he  may  dis- 
tinguish himself  among  the  barbarians  with  whom  his  lot  is  cast ; 
may  invent  better  weapons,  show  superior  cunning  in  outwitting 
enemies,  and  may  possibly  be  made  the  ruler  of  a  tribe.  Such 
things  have  happened.  But  with  his  superior  mental  powers, 
capable  if  properly  placed  of  working  in  the  highest  field,  he  must, 
in  consequence  of  his  circumstances  alone,  labor  in  a  very  low  field. 
And  yet  he  is  wholly  unconscious  of  his  true  powers  and  imagines 
that  he  is  at  his  proper  level. 

But  we  need  not  contrast  civilized  with  uncivilized  races.  There 
is  ample  room  for  contrast  between  persons  living  under  different 
circumstances  in  civilized  countries.  None  of  the  great  men  of 
letters  or  of  science  could  have  attained  to  the  place  they  occupy 
if  they  had  been  cut  off  permanently  from  all  knowledge  of  the 
field  they  finally  entered.  Something  must  happen  to  each  and 
every  one  of  them  that  gives  him  some  glimpse  of  his  future  life 
and  arouses  his  ambition  to  strive  for  it.  The  local  environment 
often  performs  this  service.  Goethe,  speaking  of  Beranger,  who, 
though  poor,  was  born  in  the  metropolis  and  lived  in  the  midst  of 
its  throbbing,  quickening  pulsations,  is  reported  by  Eckermann  to 
have  said: 

But  imagine  this  same  Beranger  —  instead  of  being  born  in  Paris,  and 
brought  up  in  this  metropolis  of  the  world  —  the  son  of  a  poor  tailor  in  Jena 
or  Weimar,  and  let  him  commence  his  career,  in  an  equally  miserable  manner, 
in  such  small  places,  and  ask  yourself  what  fruit  would  have  been  produced  by 
this  same  tree,  grown  in  such  soil  and  in  such  an  atmosphere.^ 

As  Professor  Cooley  says:  "A  man  can  hardly  fix  his  ambition 
upon  a  literary  career  when  he  is  perfectly  unaware,  as  millions  are, 

1  Buckle,  loc.  cit.,  p.  162. 

-  Conversations  of  Goethe  with  Eckermann  and  Soret.  Translated  from  the  Ger- 
man by  John  Oxenford,  revised  edition,  London,  1892,  p.  253  (May  3,  1827). 


276  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

that  such  a  thing  as  a  Hterary  career  exists."  ^  It  is  the  same  with 
a  scientific  career.  I  know  this  from  my  own  experience.  Roam- 
ing wildly  over  the  boundless  prairies  of  northern  Iowa  in  the  fifties, 
interested  in  every  animal,  bird,  insect,  and  flower  I  saw,  but  not 
knowing  what  science  was,  scarcely  having  ever  heard  of  zoology, 
ornithology,  entomology,  or  botany,  without  a  single  book  on  any 
of  those  subjects,  and  not  knowing  a  person  in  the  world  who  could 
give  me  the  slightest  information  with  regard  to  them,  what  chance 
was  there  of  my  becoming  a  naturalist  ?  It  was  twenty  years  before 
I  found  my  opportunity,  and  then  it  was  almost  too  late.  A  clear 
view  of  a  congenial  field  is  the  one  fundamental  circumstance  in 
any  one's  career. 

Equalization  of  Opportunity 

There  are  differences  not  only  in  the  talents  of  men  but  also  in 
their  tastes;^.  It  is  in  these  latter  rather  than  in  the  former  that 
they  differ  by  nature.  Almost  any  one  has  sufficient  talent  to  culti- 
vate almost  any  field,  but  there  is  little  hope  of  success  unless  the 
field  coincides  with  his  tastes  or  preferences.  True,  there  is  great 
adaptability,  and  if  one  must  work  in  a  particular  field  one  can 
reconcile  one's  self  to  it  and  plod  through  after  a  fashion.  It  is 
even  possible  and  somewhat  common  for  any  one  to  arouse  a 
certain  interest  in  whatever  he  is  obliged  to  do.  It  is  fortunate 
that  this  is  so.  But  I  believe  it  applies  mainly  to  routine  work.  I 
have  several  times  found  myself  taking  quite  a  strong  interest  in 
some  kind  of  routine  work  that  I  was  compelled  to  do,  which,  after 
I  finally  left  it  and  engaged  in  higher  work  suited  to  my  tastes,  I 
looked  back  upon  and  wondered  how  I  could  have  been  interested 
in  it.  My  experience  is  probably  that  of  many  similarly  circum- 
stanced. But  there  are  kinds  of  high-grade  work,  even  scientific, 
that  are  strongly  distasteful  to  me,  and  which  I  do  not  think  I 
could  bring  myself  ever  to  enjoy.  This  is  also,  in  all  probability,  a 
common  occurrence.  It  is  a  truism  that  any  one  can  do  more  and 
better  work  in  a  field  of  his  own  choosing.  It  may  be  compared  to 
rowing  with  the  tide  or  current,  while  working  in  an  uncongenial 

1  Cooley,  article  cited,  p.  327. 


Ch.  X]  EQUALIZATION  OF  OPPORTUNITY  277 

field  is  like  stemming  the  tide  or  the  current.  The  result  in  either 
case  is  the  algebraic  sum  of  personal  effort  and  a  natural  force,  but 
in  the  first  case  both  have  the  plus  sign,  while  in  the  second  one 
has  the  minus  sign. 

Difficult  or  impossible  as  it  may  be  to  forecast  the  talent  of  an 
untried  mind,  it  is  far  more  difficult  and  more  certainly  impossible 
to  forecast  its  tastes  and  preferences.  If  we  cannot  select  in 
advance  the  "exceptional  man,"  much  le&s_can__we  pick  out  _for 
him  his  career.  The  only  thing  that  can  be  doQe_Js_to  equalize 
opportunities,  so  as  not  only  to  enable  the  really  exceptional  rnaji 
to  defflOftstFat€  the  fact,  but  to  make  the  open  avenues  so  numerous 
and  so  easy  to  travel  that  he  will  be  sure  to  find  the  one  to  which 
he  is  best  adapted  by  nature.  In  this  way  the  negative  terms  of 
the  equation  are  eliminated  and  the  entire  energy  of  society  is  set 
free.  There  would  then  be  no  square  pegs  in  round  holes,  and  the 
right  man  would  always  he^in  the  right  place.  It  may  be  said  that 
in  view  of  the  small  number  of  progressive  minds  it  is  not  economi- 
cal to  extend  opportunities  to  all  the  dolts  and  dunces  merely  in 
the  hope  that  a  few  bright  minds  may  take  advantage  of  them. 
This  is  the  oligocentric  argument.  We  have  seen  how  false  is  the 
assumption  that  genius  is  rare.  But  even  admitting  that  it  is  rare, 
and  that  mediocrity  predominates,  there  are  all  gradations  in  that 
mediocrity,  and  the  social  value  of  even  the  lowest  types  of  mind, 
above  pathological  feeble-mindedness,  would  be  increased  by  giving 
them  a  chance  to  work  up  to  the  full  measure  of  their  powers. 
'  It  is,  however,  in  behalf  of  average  men,  who  are  not  expected 
to  do  much  of  the  progressive  work  of  society,  that  the  strongest 
plea  for  equal  opportunity  has  thus  far  been  made.  The  standpoint 
of  those  who  have  made  it  is  the  economic  standpoint,  and  the  most 
that  has  been  said  in  favor  of  equalizing  opportunities  has  been 
from  that  standpoint.  Thus  Professor  Sumner,  who,  as  a  disciple 
of  Herbert  Spencer,  is  upon  the  whole  rather  hostile  to  the  lower 
classes,  demands  equal  opportunities  for  all: 

Rights  should  be  equal,  because  they  pertain  to  chances,  and  all  ought  to 
have  equal  chances  so  far  as  chances  are  provided  or  limited  by  the  action  of 
society.  .  .  .  The  only  help  which  is  generally  expedient,  even  within  the  limits 
of  the  private  and  personal  relations  of  two  persons  to  each  other,  is  that  which 


278  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  li 

consists  in  helping  a  man  to  help  himself.  This  always  consists  in  opening  the 
chances.  ...  If  we  help  a  man  to  help  himself,  by  opening  the  chances  around 
him,  we  put  him  in  a  position  to  add  to  the  wealth  of  the  community  by  putting 
new  powers  in  operation  to  produce.  .  .  .  Instead  of  endeavoring  to  redistrib- 
ute the  acquisitions  which  have  been  made  between  the  existing  classes,  our 
aim  should  be  to  increase,  f/iultip/y,  and  extend  the  chances.  Such  is  the  work 
of  civilization.  Every  old  error  or  abuse  which  is  removed  opens  new  chances 
of  development  to  all  the  new  energy  of  society.  Every  improvement  in  educa- 
tion, science,  art,  or  government  expands  the  chances  of  man  on  earth. ^ 

Topinard  says: 

What  it  [society]  should  do  or  seek  to  do  is,  above  all,  to  equalize  as  much 
as  possible  the  external  conditions  of  the  combat  at  the  start.  It  is  customary 
in  a  duel  for  the  adversaries  to  have  the  same  arms,  the  same  kind  of  ground, 
the  same  clothing  as  nearly  as  possible,  the  same  kind  of  shoes,  etc.  The  rest 
is  left  to  the  valor  and  skill  of  the  combatants.  It  should  be  the  same  in  the 
social  struggle.  Birth  places  the  combatants  in  very  different  positions:  the 
one  has  capital,  property,  education,  rank  ;  the  other  has  none;  the  one  has  all 
the  chances  of  conquering ;  the  other  all  the  chances  of  being  conquered.  In 
a  word,  the  sons  are  not  exclusively  responsible  for  their  own  acts  ;  they  are 
responsible  for  their  fathers'  and  ancestors',  and  for  the  situation  in  which  the 
latter  have  left  them.  This  is  a  monstrosity  —  that  which  from  the  beginning 
of  society  has  weighed  down  most  on  evolution,  as  we  know.'^ 

Mr.  Gunton  returns  repeatedly  to  this  subject,  saying: 

The  first  and  indispensable  condition  for  the  permanent  development  of 
chAVTicier  \?,  increased  social  opportiifiities.  .  .  .  Under  all  conditions,  without 
regard  to  race,  climate,  or  state  of  development,  the  universal  principle  —  the 
first  essential  condition  upon  which  the  permanent  progress  of  society  depends 
• — xs  the  enlarged  social  opportunities  of  the  masses.  .  .  .  The  question  .  .  . 
that  most  urgently  demands  the  attention  of  the  true  statesman  to-day,  beside 
which  all  schemes  for  mere  administrative  reform  are  incomparably  insignificant, 
is  that  of  increasing  the  opportunities  for  elevating  the  social  character  of  the 
masses.'"' 

Some  of  the  passages  already  quoted  from  Kidd's  Social  Evolu- 
tion to  illustrate  other  aspects  of  our  general  subject  would  have 
been  quite  as  appropriate  here,  especially  the  one  used  under  the 
head  of  Education  as  Opportunity  (supra,  p.  250),  but  he  rings  the 
changes  so  often  that  more  than  one  of  his  views  of  the  question 
are  needed  to  bring  out  his  whole  thought : 

1  William  Graham  Sumner,  What  Social  Classes  Owe  to  Each  Other,  New  York, 
1883,  pp.  164-168. 

2  Paul  Topinard,  Science  and  P'aith,  etc.,  translated  by  Thomas  J.  McCormack, 
Chicago,  1899,  p.  327.  3  Gunton,  op.  cit.,  pp.  229,  240,  376. 


Ch.  X]  EQUALIZATIOxN   OF  OPPORTUNITY  279 

It  would  seem  that  there  can  be  little  doubt  as  to  the  nature  and  the  tendency 
of  the  development  so  far.  What,  then,  it  may  be  asked,  is  it  destined  to  ac- 
complish in  the  future  ?  The  answer  must  apparently  be,  that  it  must  complete 
the  process  of  evolution  in  progress,  by  eventually  bringing  all  the  people  into 
the  rivalry  of  life,  not  only  on  a  footing  of  political  equality,  but  on  conditions 
of  equal  social  opportunities.  This  is  the  end  which  the  developmental  forces  at 
work  in  our  civilisation  are  apparently  destined  to  achieve  in  the  social  life  of 
those  people  amongst  whom  it  is  allowed  to  follow  its  natural  and  normal  course 
uninterrupted  by  disturbing  causes,  —  an  end,  when  its  relationships  are  per- 
ceived, as  moving  to  the  imagination,  as  vast  and  transforming  in  character,  as 
that  which  Marx  anticipated.^ 

It  will  be  perceived  that  Kidd  conceives  this  movement  as  a 
phase  of  spontaneous  social  evolution,  and  as  such  its  consideration 
would  belong  to  pure  sociology.  There  is  a  sense  in  which  this  is 
true,  but  it  is  the  same  sense  in  which  everything  that  takes  place 
in  society  is  spontaneous.  The  development  of  art,  for  example, 
has  been  spontaneous  in  this  sense,  but  the  natural  inference  which 
most  persons  draw  from  it,  which  Kidd  seems  himself  to  draw,  that 
therefore  there  is  no  use  in  interfering  with  it  or  trying  to  acceler- 
ate it,  is  exactly  paralleled  in  art  ;  and  to  say  this  is  precisely  the 
same  as  to  say  to  a  sculptor  that  there  is  no  use  in  his  troubling 
himself  to  chisel  his  block  of  marble,  as  the  spontaneous  forces  of 
social  evolution  are  going  to  work  out  in  their  own  good  time  and 
way  all  the  statues  that  the  world  can  possess. 

The  economic  aspect  is  of  course  the  final  test.  It  is  the  end. 
But  we  are  here  dealing  with  the  means  to  the  end,  viz.,  achievement. 
In  considering  the  equalization  of  opportunities  we  now  more  espe- 
cially mean  the  opportunity  to  achieve.  The  whole  difficulty  with 
the  discussion  of  social  questions  has  always  been  this  haste  to  deal 
with  the  end,  this  impatience  with  everything  that  relates  to  the 
means.  This  is  why  so  little  progress  has  been  made  with  these  ques- 
tions. The  fact  is,  that  the  end  can  only  be  attained  through  means. 
All  attempts  to  reach  the  end  directly  are  destined  to  fail.  I  appre- 
hend that  most  of  the  disappointment  with  this  book  will  be  due  to 
my  inability  to  deal  with  ends,  and  to  the  necessity  of  clinging  to  the 
means  as  the  only  way  by  which  ends  can  be  attained.  But  it  will  be 
remembered  that  this  was  also  the  method  pursued  in  Dynamic  Sociol- 
ogy. I  there  showed  that  the  means  constitute  a  series  growing  more 

'  Kidd,  op.  cil.,  pp.  227-22S. 


28o  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  II 

and  more  remote  from  the  end,  that  this  series  consists  of  five  terms, 
that  not  only  the  end  itself  but  no  less  than  four  of  the  terms  of  the 
series  are  practically  beyond  the  reach  of  social  action,  and  that  not 
until  the  fifth  term  of  the  series  is  reached  do  we  find  anything 
tangible,  anything  upon  which  society  can  directly  lay  hold  and 
exert  its  power  to  change,  modify,  and  improve.  But  it  was  also 
found  that  the  entire  series  of  means  are  so  related  and  dependent, 
each  upon  the  immediately  antecedent  one,  that  whatever  affects 
any  one  affects  all  above  it,  so  that  it  is  not  necessary  to  apply  force 
to  any  of  the  intermediate  terms,  as  the  force  applied  to  the  most 
remote  term  is  communicated  automatically  through  the  entire  series 
and  ultimately  expends  itself  without  loss  in  transmission  upon  the 
end  itself.  The  rude  comparison  made  of  a  row  of  bricks  stood  on 
end,  of  which  it  is  only  necessary  to  touch  the  first  one  to  see  them 
all  fall  in  succession,  is  a  perfect  illustration  of  the  process  and  one 
within  the  comprehension  of  all.  The  entire  second  volume  of  that 
work  is  devoted  to  the  logical  discussion  of  the  relation  of  the  end 
to  these  several  means,  and  to  the  proof  that  society  need  concern 
itself  only  with  the  most  remote  term  of  the  series,  over  which  it  has 
complete  control.  All  the  other  terms  may  be  safely  left  to  take 
care  of  themselves,  and  whatever  effects  can  be  wTOught  in  this  most 
remote  term,  there  called  the  "initial  means,"  will  certainly  reach 
and  correspondingly  affect  the  end.^ 

We  are  now  again  confronted  with  practically  the  same  problem. 
The  economic  conditions  constitute  the  end,  and  it  is  not  different 
from  the  end  described  in  the  earlier  treatise.  The  equalization  of 
opportunity  is  the  tangible,  realizable  means,  and  it  is  the  same 
means  as  before.  The  difference  in  both  the  end  and  the  means  is 
only  a  difference  in  the  names.  I  was  simply  more  strictly  philo- 
sophical then,  and  reduced  the  economic  conditions  to  the  bed-rock  of 
human  happiness,  to  which  complexion  they  must  come  at  last  ;  and 
I  called  the  equalization  of  opportunity  education,  but  surely  the 
whole  trend,  drift,  and  logic  of  this  and  the  preceding  chapter  have 
been  to  pile  up  the  evidence  that  all  influences,  all  environments, 
and  all  opportunities  converge  to  this  one  focal  point,  re^solyje  them- 
selves into  and  constitute  education. 

1  Dynamic  Sociology,  Vol.  II,  pp.  106-110. 


Ch.  X]  EQUALIZATION  OF  OPPORTUNITY  281 

There  is  no  use  in  talking  about  the  equalization  of  wealth. 
Much  of  the  discussion  about  "  equal  rights  "  is  utterly  hollow.  All 
the  ado  made  over  the  system  of  contract  is  surcharged  with  fallacy. 
There  can  be  no  equality  and  no  justice,  not  to  speak  of  equity,  so 
long  as  society  is  composed  of  members,  equally  endowed  by  nature, 
a  few  of  whom  only  possess  the  social  heritage  of  truth  and  ideas 
resulting  from  the  laborious  investigations  and  profound  meditations/ 
of  all  past  ages,  while  the  great  mass  are  shut  out  from  all  the  lightl 
that  human  achievement  has  shed  upon  the  world.  The  equalization 
of  opportunity  means  the  equalization  of  intelligence,  and  not  until 
this  is  attained  is  there  anv  virtue  or  any  hope  in  schemes  for  the 
equalization  of  the  material  resources  of  society. 


Part  III 
IMPROVEMENT 


Sociology  stands  for  pure  science,  while  philanthropy 
stands  for  applied  science.  Pure  science  seeks  to 
know  the  truth  for  its  own  sake,  regardless  of  the 
gain  or  loss  involved  in  abstract  knowledge.  The 
applications  of  science  have  for  their  avowed  motive 
and  purpose  the  desire  to  convert  abstract  knowledge 
into  human  profit,  by  way  of  addition  to  human  wealth, 
power  and  happiness.  —  Frederick  Howard  Wines. 


CHAPTER   XI 

RECONCILIATION    OF  ACHIEVEMENT  WITH 
IMPROVEMENT 

Ayant  apprecie  le  present  comme  un  produit  ndcessaire  du  passe,  la  sociologie 
peut  desormais  aborder  la  determination  directe  de  1'  avenir.  —  Auguste  Comte. 

The  end  of  morality  is  the  best  utilization  of  the  present  environment. — 
Simon  N.  Patten. 

Le  plus  grand  service  qu'on  puisse  rendre  a  la  science  est  d'y  faire  place 
nette  avant  d'y  rien  construire.  —  Cuvier. 

Ipsum  Posse  et  ipsum  Scire  naturam  humanam  amplificant,  non  beant.  — 
Bacon. 

koheleth. 

It  has  been  said  that  the  purpose  of  applied  sociology  is  improve- 
ment ;  nevertheless,  attention  has  thus  far  been  drawn  chiefly  to 
questions  of  achievement.  But  the  only  definition  that  I  have  ever 
given  of  the  subject-matter  of  sociology  is  human  achievement. 
Much  was  said  of  achievement  in  Pure  Sociology,  but  there  the  dis- 
cussion was  confined  to  actual  achievement,  and  nothing  was  said  of 
potential  achievement.  This  latter  belongs  clearly  to  applied  sociol- 
ogy, and  to  it  Part  II  may  be  said  to  have  been  devoted.  It  remains 
to  be  shown  how  achievement  maybe  reconciled  with  improvement. 
As  already  said,  it  is  the  means  to  it.  But  after  all,  we  have  not  been 
dealing  so  much  with  even  potential  achievement  as  with  the  means 
to  that,  with  potential  or  latent  social  energy  and  the  way  to  render 
it  actual  or  active. 

There  is  a  very  general  impression  that  civilization  does  not 
increase  human  happiness.  This  view  is  held  by  persons  most  of 
whose  other  opinions  on  social  questions  are  directly  opposite. 
Leisure-class  philosophers  usually  hold  it,  but  so  do  also  socialistic 
philosophers.  There  must,  therefore,  be  considerable  truth  in  it. 
Optimists  and  pessimists  also  agree  on  this  point,  the  first  maintain- 
ing that  it  is  as  it  should  be,  and  the  second  that  there  can  be  no 
improvement.    I  have  taken  a  middle  ground,  viz.,  that  material 

285 


286  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

civilization  is  upon  the  whole  progressive  in  the  sense  of  actually 
bettering  the  condition  of  society,  but  I  admit  that  the  improvement 
is  in  no  fixed  proportion  to  the  degree  of  civilization.  If  it  advanced 
with  this  in  any  regular  way  it  would  be  in  some  such  relation  as  its 
logarithm.  But  there  is  probably  no  regular  relation  between  the 
two.  The  improvement  that  comes  with  civilization  is  due  to  a  sort 
of  accidental  overflow,  a  certain  surplus  that  cannot  be  prevented 
from  finding  its  way  through  the  meshes  of  the  social  net  and 
redounding  to  the  benefit  of  most  or  all  of  the  members  of  society. 
The  case  is  analogous  to  that  of  increased  production.  According 
to  the  iron  law  of  political  economy  it  should  not  benefit  the  pro- 
ducer, but  nevertheless  it  always  has  done  so  to  a  slight  extent, 
and  cannot  be  prevented  from  doing  so.^ 

Now  the  purpose  of  applied  sociology  is  to  show  that  achievement 
and  improvement  should  at  least  go  hand  in  hand.  It  is  probably 
possible  to  prove  that  improvement  may  advance  more  rapidly  than 
achievement,  that  social  welfare  should  increase  faster  than  the  arts 
of  civilization.  The  reason  why  achievement  produces  so  little  effect 
is  that  it  is  not  appropriated  by  society.  It  is  simply  used.  It  is 
not  possessed  (see  supra,  pp.  85-90).  Only  a  minute  fraction  of  man- 
kind know  how  to  do  anything  but  simply  use  it  as  they  find  it. 
The  rest  know  nothing  about  what  it  really  is.  They  are  in  no  con- 
dition to  appreciate  it.  Probably  nine  out  of  every  ten  who  should 
send  a  message  by  wireless  telegraphy  and  it  should  fail  to  reach  its 
destination  would  curse  the  system  and  the  inventor  and  apply  the 
term  "  humbug  "  to  both.  All  the  grand  results  of  science  are  treated 
in  that  cavalier  manner  by  the  great  majority  of  those  who  profit  by 
them.  This  is  because  they  know  nothing  about  them,  nothing  of 
their  history  or  of  their  essential  nature.  They  are  no  more  to  them 
than  the  simplest  arts.  They  are  thought  of  only  as  they  may  be 
made  useful  in  supplying  their  wants.  In  such  a  condition  of  things 
it  cannot  be  expected  that  the  fullest  results  will  flow  from  achieve- 
ment. It  is  like  trying  to  introduce  new  ideas  and  customs  into  a 
community  of  backwoodsmen.  They  are  not  prepared  for  them. 
As  a  matter  of  fact,  science  and  art  are  far  in  advance  of  the  people. 
The  enormous  intellectual  inequalities  render  this  so.    There  has 

^  Compare  Pure  Sociology,  p.  280. 


Ch.  XI]         ETHICAL  CHARACTER  OF  ALL  SCIENCE  287 

been  no  general  elevation  of  society  as  a  whole  corresponding  to  the 
brilliant  and  rocket-like  flights  of  certain  specially  favored  individuals. 
The  world  is  not  ripe  nor  ready  for  the  blessings  of  science  that  a 
few  privileged  men  have  given  it,  and  therefore  it  receives  only  a 
small  part  of  the  advantages.  On  this  point  Dr.  Wallace  well 
remarks  : 

We  are  just  now  living  at  an  abnormal  period  of  the  world's  liistory,  owing 
to  the  marvelous  developments  and  vast  practical  results  of  science,  having  been 
given  to  societies  too  low  morally  and  intellectually,  to  know  how  to  make  the 
best  use  of  them,  and  to  whom  they  have  consequently  been  .curses  as  well  as 
blessings.^ 

Von  Baer  said  that  the  public  is  interested  only  in  the  philosophy 
of  science,  which  is  very  true,  and  only  in  its  practical  results  as 
affecting  their  personal  welfare. 


Ethical  Character  of  All  Science 

In  dealing  with  interesting  facts  of  nature,  with  great  truths  and 
scientific  principles,  we  are  apt  to  imagine  that  these  things  are 
ends  in  themselves,  and  we  sometimes  hear  such  expressions  as 
"science  for  its  own  sake,"  or  "knowledge  for  its  own  sake."  But 
there  is  no  such  thing.  There  is  always  an  ulterior  purpose,  and 
that  purpose  is  ethical  in  the  sense  that  it  relates  to  feeling.  The 
student  or  investigator  may  from  long  discipline  cling  persistently 
to  the  objective  and  intellectual  aspect,  but  it  is  because  he  sees 
that  this  is  the  way  to  attain  the  ethical  end.  The  intellect,  as  I 
have  been  to  the  greatest  pains  to  show,  always  employs  the  indirect 
method.  That  is,  it  deals  with  means  to  ends.  I  could  not  now 
express  this  better  than  I  expressed  it  in  the  chapter  of  Dynamic 
Sociology  that  deals  with  the  end  of  all  effort,  where  I  logically 
reduced  all  other  alleged  ends  to  the  one  ultimate  end,  happiness. 
At  the  close  of  that  discussion  I  said  : 

The  above  considerations  are  the  logical  outcome  of  a  thoughtful  study  of 
the  phenomena  of  feeling.  It  may  seem  strange  to  some  that  these  phenomena 
should  be  thus  placed  at  the  very  base  of  a  philosophic  system  whose  chief 

1  Contributions  to  the  Theory  of  Natural  Selection.  A  Series  of  Essays.  By  Alfred 
Russel  Wallace,  London,  1870,  p.  330. 


288  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

object  is  to  exalt  the  intellect,  and  which  expressly  avows  that  only  by  intel- 
lectual culture  and  the  increase  of  knowledge  can  the  true  progress  of  mankind 
be  secured.  There  is  an  apparent  incongruity  between  the  doctrine,  on  the  one 
hand,  that  progress  consists  essentially  and  solely  in  the  elevation  of  the  feel- 
ings, the  increase  of  pleasure,  the  elimination  of  pain,  the  intensification  of 
sentiment,  the  creation  and  diffusion  of  new  enjoyments,  the  encouragement 
of  natural  emotions,  the  gratification  of  the  normal  instincts,  the  satisfaction 
of  desire,  and  the  general  pursuit  of  happiness ;  and  the  doctrine,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  progress  is  to  be  attained  solely  through  the  cultivation  of  the  intel- 
lect, the  acquisition  of  knowledge,  and  the  thorough  and  universal  dissemination 
and  enforced  adoption  of  educational  measures  for  the  elevation  and  systematic 
development  of  the  cold,  objective  faculties  of  the  mind.  To  bring  these  two 
seemingly  incoherent  and  incongruous  doctrines  into  harmony,  and  to  show  the 
true  mechanical  dependence  of  the  one  upon  the  other,  as  cause  and  effect,  is 
one  of  the  primary  objects  of  this  work.^ 

We  are  again  confronted  with  practically  the  same  problem,  and 
the  reconciliation  of  achievement  with  improvement  is  only  a  slightly 
different  way  of  looking  at  or  stating  the  problem.  But  it  becomes 
much  clearer  when  we  recognize  that  all  science  and  all  intellectual 
operations  have  an  ethical  purpose.  They  are  based  on  a  recog- 
nition that  the  end  cannot  be  attained  directly,  and  hence  the 
necessity  of  proceeding  according  to  the  indirect  or  intellectual 
method,  and  of  employing  appropriate  means,  however  remote, 
provided  they  be  effective.  Many  wise  men  have  seen  and  acknowl- 
edged the  ethical  purpose  of  science.  Bacon  defined  its  purpose  as 
the  "relief  of  the  estate  of  man."  Descartes,  in  his  discourse  on 
method,  says: 

As  soon  as  I  had  acquired  some  general  notions  respecting  physics,  and  com- 
menced to  test  them  in  connection  with  certain  specific  difiiculties,  I  observed 
how  far  they  may  lead  and  how  much  they  differ  from  principles  that  are  being 
used  now  ;  and  I  thought  I  could  not  keep  them  hidden  without  sinning  greatly 
against  the  law  which  enjoins  us  to  secure  so  far  as  in  us  lies  the  general  good 
of  all  men  :  for  they  have  shown  me  that  it  is  possible  to  arrive  at  knowledge 
which  is  very  useful  to  life,  and  in  place  of  that  speculative  philosophy  that 
they  teach  in  the  schools,  there  may  be  found  a  practical  one,  by  which,  know- 
ing the  force  and  the  action  of  fire,  of  water,  of  air,  of  the  stars,  of  the  heavens, 
and  of  all  the  other  bodies  that  surround  us,  as  distinctly  as  we  know  the 
various  trades  of  our  artisans,  we  might  employ  them  in  the  same  way  in  all 
the  uses  to  which  they  are  adapted,  and  thus  render  ourselves,  as  it  were, 
masters  and  possessors  of  nature.^ 

1  Dynamic  Sociology,  Vol.  II,  pp.  129-130. 

2  CEuvres  de  Descartes,  Paris,  1844,  pp.  39-40. 


Ch.  XI]         ETHICAL  CHARACTER  OF  ALL  SCIENCE  289 

Huxley  regarded  even  the  study  of  protoplasm  as  having  a  bear- 
ing on  the  welfare  of  man,  and  in  his  celebrated  address  on  the 
Physical  Basis  of  Life  he  says: 

We  live  in  a  world  which  is  full  of  misery  and  ignorance,  and  it  is  the  plain 
duty  of  each  and  all  of  us  to  try  to  make  the  little  corner  he  can  influence 
somewhat  less  miserable  and  somewhat  less  ignorant  than  it  was  before  he 
entered  it.^ 

But  although  all  scientific  truth  may  and  in  all  probability  will 
ultimately  benefit  mankind,  it  is  especially  the  social  sciences  that 
are  adapted  directly  to  this  function.  As  regards  political  economy, 
it  is  clear  that  Adam  Smith  took  this  view,  for  he  thus  defined  its 
scope  and  purpose : 

Political  oeconomy,  considered  as  a  branch  of  the  science  of  a  statesman  or 
legislator,  proposes  two  distinct  objects  :  first,  to  provide  a  plentiful  revenue 
or  subsistence  for  the  people,  or  more  properly  to  enal)le  them  to  provide  such 
a  revenue  or  subsistence  for  themselves  ;  and  secondly,  to  supply  the  state  or 
commonwealth  with  a  revenue  sufficient  for  the  public  service.  It  proposes  to 
enrich  both  the  people  and  the  sovereign. 2 

In  my  paper  on  the  Purpose  of  Sociology,  published  in  1 896  ^  and 
which  forms  Chapter  IX  of  the  Outlines  of  Sociology,  I  showed 
(p.  202)  that  other  economists  had  taken  a  humanitarian  view,  and 
notably  Malthus,  who  is  popularly  regarded  as  the  author  who,  more 
than  any  other,  taught  a  gospel  of  despair.  I  there  quoted  also  a 
passage  from  Cunningham's  Politics  and  Economics,  which  would 
be  in  place  here,  but  need  not  be  repeated. 

Sociology  was  founded  on  this  broad  basis,  and  Comte,  notwith- 
standing the  twelve  years  devoted  to  writing  the  Positive  Philoso- 
phy which  forms  its  scientific  basis,  never  for  a  moment  lost  sight 
of  his  purpose.  Science  with  him  was  only  a  means  to  action. 
Indeed,  it  was  a  secondary  means,  viz.,  a  means  to  prevision,  which 
is  the  direct  means  to  action  :  Science,  (Von  prevoyancc,  prevoyance, 
if  oil  action.  That  he  foresaw  much  earlier  the  necessity  of  a  pro- 
longed scientific  study  as  a  preparation  for  his  final  practical  work 
appears  from  a  remark  contained  in  a  letter  to  his  friend  Valat  as 

1  Fortnightly  Review,  Vol.  XI  (New  Series,  Vol.  V),  February  i,  1869,  p.  145. 

2  Wealth  of  Nation.s,  Rook  IV,  Introduction.  Reprinted  from  the  si.xth  edition, 
London,  1899,  Vol.  I,  p.  427. 

*  American  Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  II,  pp.  446-460. 


290  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  ill 

early  as  1819:  "My  labors,"  he  says,  "are  and  will  be  in  two 
orders,  scientific  and  political.  I  should  set  little  value  upon  the 
scientific  studies,  did  I  not  continually  think  of  their  utility  to  the 
human  race."  ^ 

That  Comte  never  took  any  other  view  is  attested  by  numerous 
passages  in  all  his  works.^  Many  other  sociologists  have  expressed 
themselves  more  or  less  clearly  on  this  point.  Among  these  Ratzen- 
hofer,  whom  death  has  so  recently  snatched  from  us,  has  the  first 
claim  to  be  heard.    He  says : 

A  purposeful  science  gives  rise  to  exact  ideas  as  to  what  its  own  develop- 
ment must  mean,  in  contradistinction  to  that  objectless,  so  to  speak,  anarchical 
science,  which  reaches  out  its  feelers  shortsightedly  in  all  directions,  with- 
out really  knowing  what  for.  The  positive  method,  on  the  contrary,  demands 
a  purposeful  organization  of  scientific  research,  according  to  which  especially 
public  expenditure  and  private  outlay  are  brought  into  harmony  with  the  im- 
portance of  social  affairs.^ 

That  Schaeffle  shared  these  views  appears  from  a  review  by  him 
of  this  same  work,  in  which  he  quotes  approvingly  the  following 
passage,  which  begins  on  the  same  page : 

If  we  consider  the  task  of  science  to  be  the  seeking  of  laws  for  all  phe- 
nomena, we  find  that  a  multitude  of  endeavors  which  are  but  distantly  related 
to  science  sail  under  its  flag;  for  the  search  for  laws  in  phenomena  is  not  the 
gratification  of  mere  desire  of  knowledge,  but  the  effort  even  in  itself  is  purpose- 
ful, because  only  from  conformity  to  law  can  conclusive  inferences  regarding 
the  past  and  future  arise.  That,  in  this  case,  the  past,  whether  it  be  investi- 
gated or  ascertained  through  deduction,  will  be  put  at  the  service  of  prevision 
lies  in  the  nature  of  purposeful  science. "^ 

A  few  modern  sociologists  (Durkheim,  Espinas,  Worms,^  etc.) 
have  affected  to  see  in  sociology  a  science  without  a  purpose,  and 
to  deprecate  all  attempts  to  put  it  to  any  use.  The  last  named 
author,  however,  expressly  states  that  what  he  calls  the  social  art, 
with  which  he  confounds  applied  sociology,  is  simply  to  be  adjourned 
to  a  later  date.    But  judging  from  a  much  more  recent  work  of  his 

^  The  Philosophy  of  Auguste  Comte,  by  L.  Levy-Bruhl,  authorized  translation, 
New  York,  1903,  p.  8. 

2  See  especially  Politique  positive,  Vol.  Ill,  p.  623. 

^  Die  sociologische  Erkenntnis,  von  Gustav  Ratzenhofer,  Leipzig,  1898,  p.  17. 

*  American  Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  IV,  p.  534. 

^  La  Sociologie  et  le  Droit,  par  Rene  Worms,  Paris,  1895,  P-  "  (Extrait  de  la 
Revue  Internationale  de  sociologie,  3<=  annee,  No.  i,  Janvier,  1895). 


Ch.  XI]         ETHICAL  CHARACTER  OF  ALL  SCIENCE  291 

already  mentioned  (supra,  p.  40),  it  would  seem  that  he  does  not 
think  it  necessary  to  adjourn  it  much  longer,  for  he  says: 

The  proper  rule  to  follow  in  order  to  reconcile  the  two  apparently  contrary 
desiderata  is  simply  this:  not  to  think  of  application  so  long  as  we  are  pursuing 
science,  but  when  we  have  completed  our  scientific  work,  to  pass  immediately 
to  the  examination  and  putting  into  practice  of  whatever  it  admits  of.  It 
results  from  all  this  that  science  is  logically  anterior  to,  and  at  least  theoreti- 
cally independent  of  art,  while  art  depends  upon  it  from  every  point  of  view. 
One  may  apply  one's  self  to  the  first,  leaving  the  second  temporarily  out  of  the 
account.^ 

1 

But  really  no  one  ever  leaves  the  purpose  wholly  out-  of  the 

account.  M.  Adolphe  Coste,  who  also  confounded  applied  sociology 
with  the  social  art,  nevertheless  clearly  expressed  this  truth  in  the 
following  paragraph : 

In  approaching  the  sociological  art  under  its  last  form,  the  action  of  men 
with  a  view  to  modifying  social  phenomena,  we  are  touching  without  question 
that  which  gives  to  sociology  its  principal  interest.  Without  a  practical  end, 
without  a  final  utility,  the  science  would  be  vain.  Even  those  who  extol  the 
disinterested  search  for  principles  and  their  consequences  do  not  mean  to  pro- 
pose pure  speculation  as  the  sole  legitimate  use  of  intellectual  activity.  They 
are  at  bottom  only  contending  for  the  temporary  abstaining  from  utilitarian 
considerations  so  long  as  a  sufficiently  complete  body  of  doctrine  has  not  been 
acquired,  in  order  that  no  immediate  preoccupation  shall  come  in  to  influence 
tlie  observation  of  facts  or  their  interpretation.  But  in  the  end,  whatever  may 
be  the  division  of  labor  between  the  speculative  and  the  active,  between  scien- 
tific and  practical  men,  science  has  only  one  end :  utility.- 

And  so  it  must  always  be.  Men  work  for  a  purpose,  if  it  is  noth- 
ing more  than  their  own  improvement.  On  the  lower  planes  of 
activity  under  the  universal  law  of  conation,^  this  is  all  that  can  be 
expected,  but  on  the  higher  plane  of  genius,  whether  inventive, 
creative,  or  philosophic,"*  this  egoistic  jjurpose  is  expanded  and  made 
to  include  others  than  self  and  ultimately  all  mankind,  so  that 
achievement  is  thoroughly  altruistic  and  humanitarian.  It  is  not 
the  fault  of  those  who  achieve  if  achievement  does  not  constitute 
improvement.  These  always  intend  that  it  shall.  The  whole  army 
of  investigators,  discoverers,  and  inventors  are  bending  all  their 

^  Philosophic  des  sciences  sociales,  par  Rene  Worms.  I.  Objet  des  sciences 
sociales,  Paris,  1903,  p.  174. 

2  Le.s  Principes  d'une  sociologie  objective,  par  Adolphe  Coste,  Paris,  1899,  p.  221. 
2  Compare  Pure  Sociology,  pp.  247  ff.  *  Op.  cit..  Chap.  XVIII. 


292  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

energies  in  the  task  of  ameliorating  the  condition  of  mankind.  If 
they  do  not  succeed,  and  in  so  far  as  they  do  not  succeed,  it  is 
because  society  fails  to  avail  itself  of  their  services  and  allows  them 
to  be  misapplied  and  wasted.  That  this  is  largely  the  case  is  only 
too  obvious,  and  if  applied  sociology  has  any  purpose  it  is  to  show 
how  this  can  be  prevented. 

The  failure  to  assimilate  achievement  is  due  to  the  enormous 
artificial  inequalities  in  society.  It  is  due  to  the  conditions  pointed 
out  in  Chapter  VII.  It  is  due  to  the  exploitation  of  the  unintelligent 
class  by  the  intelligent  class,  and  so  long  as  there  remains  a  great 
mass  who  are  not  in  possession  of  the  truth  that  has  been  given 
to  the  world  and  only  a  small  class  who  do  possess  this  social 
heritage,  such  are  the  egoistic  and  acquisitive  laws  of  human  nature 
that  no  just  distribution  of  the  fruits  of  achievement  is  possible. 
For  knowledge  is  power,  and  sympathy,  altruism,  benevolence,  and 
philanthropy  are  utterly  unreliable  principles,  and  cannot  in  the  least 
be  depended  upon  to  insure  any  sort  of  equity  in  society.  Their 
whole  function  is  mere  patchwork.  The  only  hope  of  an  equitable 
distribution  of  the  fruits  of  achievement  lies  in  putting  exactly  the 
same  arms  into  the  hands  of  one  member  of  society  as  of  another. 
When  every  man  knows  exactly  to  what  he  is  entitled  he  can  be 
depended  upon  to  demand  and  obtain  it.  Only  through  this  equali- 
zation of  power,  i.e.,  knowledge,  can  this  result  be  brought  about, 
and  improvement  reconciled  with  achievement. 

Assimilation  of  Achievement 

I  imagine  this  objection  to  be  raised  :  If  it  is  impossible  for 
society  to  assimilate  the  achievements  of  a  few  men,  what  can  it  do 
with  those  of  a  much  larger  number  .''  It  has  been  shown  that  the 
number  may  be  increased  a  hundredfold.  What  could  society  do 
with  all  this  work  ?  Would  it  not  be  utterly  bewildered  in  the 
attempt  to  handle  it  ? 

These  questions  would  certainly  be  pertinent  under  the  prevailing 
views  relative  to  genius.  If  a  hundred  times  as  many  more  rockets 
had  to  be  shot  up  in  the  midst  of  the  surrounding  darkness  they 
would  have  no  permanent  effect  in  illuminating  it.    The  doctrine 


Ch.  XI]  ASSIMILATION  OF  ACHIEVEMENT  293 

that  geniuses  are  exceptional  beings,  totally  different  from  and 
independent  of  the  rest  of  mankind,  as  incapable  of  mixing  with  the 
rest  of  the  world  as  oil  is  of  mixing  with  water,  would,  were  it  true, 
be  fatal  to  all  schemes  of  improvement.  If  the  rest  of  the  world  is 
to  remain  as  it  is  and  more  of  these  prodigies  hunted  out  and  set  to 
work  in  it,  the  present  confusion  will  be  worse  confounded.  The 
world  cannot  handle  the  present  output.  Assuming  that  society 
remains  as  it  is,  but  that  the  output  is  greatly  increased,  it  evidently 
could  do  nothing  whatever  with  the  product. 

The  same  conclusion  follows  from  the  "exceptional  man"  theory. 
This  is  only  one  aspect  of  the  oligocentric  theory  in  general.  Even 
supposing  that  it  is  possible  to  select  in  advance  the  exceptional 
men,  which  of  course  it  is  not,  the  process  would  result  in  more 
harm  than  good  to  society.  It  would  only  increase  the  social  inequali- 
ties which  are  the  cause  of  all  the  trouble,  and  it  would  increase  them 
in  a  demoralizing  way,  viz.,  by  pampering  and  favoritism.  The  only 
kind  of  inequalities  that  do  harm  are  artificial  inequalities.  The  "  ex- 
ceptional man"  theory,  if  put  into  practice,  would  increase  the  arti- 
ficial inequalities  only.  We  have  seen,  and  statistically  demonstrated, 
that  all  the  great  social  inequalities  are  purely  artificial.  They  are 
due  to  privilege.  They  are  made  by  society.  All  the  geniuses,  all 
the  heroes,  all  the  great  men  of  the  world  have  been  products  of 
their  environment  —  not  the  physical  nor  yet  the  ethnological 
environment  —  but  products  of  one  or  other  of  the  artificial  environ- 
ments we  have  been  studying,  —  the  local,  the  economic,  the  social, 
or  the  educational  environment.  They  are  all  artificial,  and  how  many 
geniuses,  heroes,  and  great  men  there  may  have  been  who  never  came 
under  the  influence  of  any  of  these  artificial  environments,  and  con- 
sequently never  were  heard  from,  no  one  either  knows  or  ever  will 
know.  But  from  the  train  of  reasoning  pursued  and  based  on  the 
statistics  obtainable,  it  appears  probable  that  the  number  of  these 
"  mute  inglorious  "  and  latent  "  .sports  of  nature  "  has  been  as  much 
greater  than  that  of  the  patent  ones  as  the  number  of  non-privileged 
is  greater  than  the  number  of  privileged  members  of  society. 

But,  as  we  saw  in  the  last  chapter,  the  foundation  of  the  entire 
current  philosophy  of  genius  is  false,  and  therefore  the  questions 
asked  above,  being  based  on  that  philosophy,  are  wholly  beside  the 


294  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

mark  and  require  no  answer.  The  conditions  to  increased  achieve- 
ment imply  and  involve  its  assimilation.  If  the  increase  is  a  natural 
one,  i.e.,  if  it  is  the  result  of  the  extension  of  equal  opportunities  to 
all,  so  that  the  real  merit,  talent,  genius,  or  working  power  of  every 
one  is  brought  out,  it  will  no  longer  be  isolated  as  now.  For  it  will 
be  found  that  there  are  others,  possessing  nearly  equal  powers,  collab- 
orating with  every  man  of  genius,  sharing  his  results,  and  contribut- 
ing toward  their  realization.  In  other  words,  there  will  be  created 
not  only  geniuses  but  along  with  them  a  market  for  the  products  of 
genius.  In  the  existing  state  of  society  there  is  scarcely  any  market 
for  achievement.  Indeed,  there  is  a  close  analogy  between  the  pro- 
duction of  ideas  and  the  production  of  wealth.  The  only  meaning 
that  the  word  "overproduction  "  can  have  in  economics  is  the  pro- 
duction of  goods  in  excess  of  the  market  for  them.  It  never  means 
their  production  in  excess  of  the  need  for  them.  That  is  conceivable, 
but  in  practice  it  rarely  or  never  happens.  There  is  no  possibility 
of  there  being  too  much  of  the  useful  products  of  industry.  The 
great  need  is  for  increased  production,  provided  it  is  allowed  to  find 
its  way  into  the  hands  of  those  who  want  it.  Overproduction  thus 
always  goes  along  with  want,  hunger,  and  misery.  This,  as  I  have 
shown,  is  due  to  the  absence  of  any  proper  system  of  social  distribu- 
tion, in  distinction  from  economic  distribution,  and  is  a  consequence 
of  the  unorganized  state  of  society.  It  is  the  same  with  the  production 
of  knowledge  and  with  all  forms  of  achievement.  It  is  impossible  to 
have  too  much  knowledge.  Society  cannot  have  too  many  active 
and  efficient  workers  in  any  of  the  great  lines  of  human  achieve- 
ment. There  cannot  be  too  many  artists,  philosophers,  thinkers,  too 
many  inventors  and  scientific  investigators.  There  cannot  be  too 
many  statues,  paintings,  thoughtful  books.  An  excess  of  labor- 
saving  machines  is  inconceivable.  Too  many  great  truths  of  na- 
ture cannot  be  discovered.  But  for  all  this,  as  for  the  necessaries  of 
life,  there  must  be  a  market.  It  is  of  no  use  to  cast  pearls  before 
swine.  A  public  that  cannot  appreciate  and  assimilate  human 
achievement  renders  it  impossible.  There  must  be  a  demand  before 
there  can  be  a  supply.  Therefore  it  really  would  be  useless  to  mul- 
tiply geniuses  unless  at  the  same  time  the  number  of  those  who  can 
appreciate  the  work  of  genius  is  correspondingly  multiplied. 


Ch.  XI]  ASSIMILATION  OF  ACHIEVEMENT  295 

All  this  shows  the  vast  superiority  of  the  logic  of  opportunity 
over  the  current  philosophy  of  genius.  The  equalization  of  oppor- 
tunity creates  a  market  for  the  products  of  genius.  However  small 
the  number  of  actual  producers  in  this  field  may  be,  the  number  of 
appraisers  of  the  work  of  these  few  would  be  enormously  increased. 
This  increase  in  the  users  of  intellectual  products  would  of  itself 
constitute  the  strongest  possible  stimulus  to  the  workers  themselves. 
This  great  epeirogenic  movement  in  which  all  mankind  should  par- 
ticipate would  be  infinitely  superior  from  every  point  of  view  to  the 
fitful  and  haphazard  social  volcanism  that  has  thus  far  prevailed. 
Under  it  all  achievement  would  be  immediately  assimilated  and  fully 
utilized.  Not  only  so,  but  the  demand  for  more  and  better  would  be 
steady  and  imperative,  and  would  call  into  action  all  the  powers  of 
the  human  mind.  It  is  impossible  for  us,  accustomed  to  the  old 
stage-coach  methods,  to  form  any  adequate  conception  of  the  teem- 
ing, seething  world  of  thought  and  action  that  the  acceptance  by 
society  of  the  logic  of  opportunity  in  its  full  measure  would  create. 
Achievement  would  be  universal  and  its  assimilation  complete. 

But  the  assimilation  of  achievement  means  its  utilization,  and  its 
utilization  means  the  true  improvement  of  man's  estate.  This  intel- 
lectual assimilation  is  attended  with  immense  satisfaction.  The 
entire  movement  is  positive.  There  are  no  negative  elements.  All 
satisfaction  is  agreeable,  and  the  sum  of  the  agreeable  increments 
would  constitute  a  fullness  of  life  not  equaled  by  any  of  the  pleasures 
of  sense.  But  even  those  who  conceive  of  human  happiness  as  con- 
sisting entirely  in  the  gratification  of  physical  wants  would  also  find 
their  goal  here,  for  the  equalization  of  opportunity  would  secure  the 
economic  as  completely  as  the  spiritual  end.  It  could  not  fail  to 
bring  about  the  complete  social  distribution  of  the  economic  prod- 
ucts of  achievement,  and  with  the  immensely  increased  production 
of  such  products  that  the  new  science,  art,  and  industry  would  insure, 
all  the  physical  wants  of  mankind  would  be  supplied  along  with  the 
spiritual.  The  reconciliation  of  achievement  with  improvement 
would  be  complete. 


CHAPTER  XII 

METHOD    OF   APPLIED    SOCIOLOGY 

XaXeTTOL  TO,  KttXa.  —  GREEK    PROVERB. 

No  lotus  without  a  stem.  —  Indian  Proverb. 

Quiconque  ouvre  une  dcole,  ferme  une  prison.  —  Victor  Hugo. 

If  what  has  been  said  thus  far  could  be  instrumental  to  some 
degree  in  arousing  an  interest  in  the  subjects  discussed  and  in  creat- 
ing a  realizing  sense  of  their  importance,  nothing  that  could  be  added 
in  the  way  of  indicating  how  the  ends  can  be  attained  would  have 
much  value.  For  I  do  not  pretend  to  be  wiser  than  others  in  devis- 
ing ways  and  means.  And  I  am  satisfied  that  the  average  intelli- 
gence of  mankind  is  amply  sufficient  to  work  out,  adopt,  and  carry 
into  effect  practical  measures  for  the  accomplishment  of  any  clearly 
perceived  and  strongly  desired  end.  Moreover,  untried  methods  are 
always  tentative,  and  it  rarely  happens  that  the  first  plan  proves  in 
all  respects  practicable.  Plans  and  methods  have  to  be  worked  over 
and  over,  cautiously  tested  and  watched,  altered  and  patched,  and 
tried  again,  until  at  last  they  are  found  to  work.  Even  then  unex- 
pected events  and  conditions  are  constantly  presenting  themselves, 
requiring  further  modification,  and  a  great  scheme  is  never  perfected, 
but  is  a  perpetual  evolution. 

It  would,  therefore,  ill  become  a  mere  theorist  to  propose  a  scheme 
of  such  far-reaching  magnitude  as  that  of  setting  the  energies  of 
human  society  to  work,  of  utilizing  in  the  interest  of  humanity  at 
large  the  latent  and,  as  it  were,  waste  energies  of  society,  of  multi- 
plying the  agents  of  civilization  and  with  them  the  achievements  of 
the  race,  and  finally  of  bringing  about  a  notable  improvement  in  the 
condition  of  society  and  the  general  welfare  of  mankind.  As  already 
said,  if  I  have  shown  that  all  this  can  be  done,  that  it  is  a  practical 
conception  and  not  a  visionary  or  Utopian  dream,  I  surely  ought  to 
be  satisfied.    But  I  imagine  that  some  readers  may  have  even  grown 

2g6 


Ch.  XII]  METHOD  OF  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  297 

impatient  with  the  somewhat  prolonged  demonstration  which  I  have 
been  obhged  to  enter  into  of  this  primary  truth,  and  are  curious  to 
know  how  all  this  is  to  be  brought  about.  If  there  are  such,  I  am 
sure  they  will  be  disappointed,  and  must  necessarily  be  disappointed, 
because,  in  the  very  nature  of  things,  no  perfect  plan  for  such  a 
complicated  operation  could  be  drawn  up  by  anything  short  of 
omniscience.  It  would  be  utterly  useless  to  go  into  details,  any 
and  all  of  which  would  be  liable  not  only  to  alteration  but  to  rejec- 
tion upon  trial.  All  that  can  be  done,  therefore,  is  to  discuss  the 
general  method  of  applied  sociology,  leaving  the  art  itself  entirely  to 
practical  minds  and  to  the  future. 

Those  who  have  read  Dynamic  Sociology,  unless  they  expect  me 
to  repudiate  that  work  entirely  and  reject  the  method  that  I  there 
outlined,  know  already  what  method  I  recommend.  I  hope  I  am 
somewhat  wiser  now  than  I  was  when  I  wrote  that  book,  and  I  know 
that  I  have  been  compelled  to  abandon  .some  of  the  positions  there 
taken,  but  the  general  philosophy  that  it  contains  is  still  my  own, 
and  nothing  has  occurred  to  weaken  my  conviction  that  the  method 
of  that  work  as  logically  presented  in  the  second  volume  is  not  only 
sane  and  sound  but  also  practicable  whenever  society  sees  fit  to  adopt 
it.  It  is  applied  science  in  distinction  from  the  art,  to  which  I  make 
no  pretensions.  I  can  do  nothing  more  now,  and  I  can  really  add 
little  to  what  is  there  set  down,  while  space  forbids  any  such  elabo- 
rate treatment  as  is  there  made  of  the  subject. 

In  the  review  of  Dynamic  Sociology  by  Grant  Allen  in  Mind,  to 
which  I  have  already  alluded  (supra,  p.  104),  and  which  is  mainly 
adverse,  the  writer  said  : 

Education  is  Mr.  Ward's  panacea  for  all  the  ills  that  flesh  is  heir  to  :  the 
cure  for  our  curse  of  overworked  millions  on  the  one  hand,  and  unemployed 
millions  on  the  other.  Viewed  in  itself,  this  central  theme  is  so  familiar,  trite, 
and  almost  trivial,  that  Mr.  Ward  might  seem  to  have  hard  work  in  spreading  it 
over  two  solid  and  bulky  volumes.  In  reality,  however,  he  has  gone  so  deeply 
into  the  matter,  and  has  wrought  out  his  theory  so  logically  from  first  principles, 
that  his  book  commands  respect  not  merely  as  a  complete  and  fully  rounded 
social  philosophy  of  its  own  sort,  but  also  as  a  curious  piece  of  strictly  original 
and  independent  thinking.  What  with  the  ordinary  prophets  of  education  is  a 
])ious  opinion,  is  with  Mr.  Ward  a  logical  conclusion,  as  rigorously  deduced 
from  given  premisses  as  a  proposition  of  Euclid.^ 

1  Mind,  Vol.  IX,  April,  1884,  pp.  305-306. 


298  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

He  proceeds  to  say  some  very  foolish  things  reflecting  the 
oligocentric  views  of  his  master,  Herbert  Spencer,  and  quotes  a 
passage  from  page  407  of  Vol.  I,  which  he  supposes  to  carry  with 
it  its  own  refutation,  but  which  not  only  reflects  the  whole  truth 
that  we  have  been  illustrating  in  the  previous  chapters,  but  also 
contains  a  clear  enunciation  of  the  doctrine  now  current  under  the 
name  of  "social  heredity,"  which  is  supposed  to  be  of  much  later 
date.     That  passage  is  as  follows  : 

The  reason  why  the  intelligence  of  Europe  and  America  to-day  is  so  much 
greater  than  that  of  Greece  and  Rome  two  thousand  years  ago  is  not  to  any 
great  extent  because  the  power  of  intellect,  or  co-efficient  of  intelligence,  has 
increased,  but  because  the  acquired  l<nowledge  is  so  much  greater  both  in 
quantity  and  quality.  And  this,  when  sifted  to  the  bottom,  may  be  attributed 
to  the  more  universal  practice  of  recording,  preserving,  and  inculcating  on  suc- 
ceeding generations  the  truths  learned  by  preceding  ones  and  found  by  experi- 
ence to  be  most  valuable.  Science  itself  is  capable  of  being  reduced  to  this 
formula.  The  general  deduction  which  follows  of  itself  from  these  facts  obvi- 
ously is  that,  where  intellect  is  equal,  intelligence  will  vary  with  the  amount  of 
education . 

This  versatile  and  truly  able  writer,  who,  as  many  know,  advanced 
before  his  death  in  1899  far  beyond  the  teachings  of  his  master 
and  repudiated  many  of  his  doctrines,  seems  also  to  have  acquired 
new  views  of  education,  for  in  an  article  in  the  Cosmopolitan  for 
October,  1897,  on  Modern  College  Education,  he  says: 

An  intelligent  system  of  higher  education  designed  to  meet  the  needs  of 
modern  life  would  begin  by  casting  away  all  preconceptions  equally,  and  by 
reconstructing  its  curriculum  on  psychological  principles.  (And,  I  may  add  in 
parenthesis,  the  man  to  reconstruct  it  would  be  Professor  Lester  Ward.)  ^ 

The  compliment  is  undeserved,  for  although  I  did  not  overlook 
the  subject  of  curriculums,  and  actually  outlined  their  general  char- 
acter (Vol.  n,  pp.  621  ff.),  still  I  disclaim  any  qualifications  for  this 
branch  of  pedagogy,  and  can  only  do  here  as  in  other  parts  of  the 
general  method  of  applied  sociology:  suggest  guiding  principles 
without  pretending  to  specify  means.  I  entered  my  caveat  to  the 
word  "education"  (pp.  553,  557),  and  acknowledged  its  inadequacy 
to  convey  my  meaning.  I  defined  that  meaning  rigidly,  and  showed 
that  it  was  wholly  different  from  any  of  the  current  meanings  of 
the  word.    And  yet  I  could  not  find  a  substitute  without  coining 

1  The  Cosmopolitan,  Vol.  XXIII,  October,  1897,  p.  613. 


Ch.  XII]  METHOD  OF  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  299 

a  new  word,  which  I  knew  would  repel  the  reader  and  prevent  him 
from  following  my  thought.  I  have  reflected  on  the  subject  all 
these  years,  and  I  am  still  unable  to  dispense  wholly  with  the  word 
"education."  It  possesses  many  of  the  attributes  that  are  needed. 
It  has  great  range,  flexibility,  and  elasticity,  and  although  these  are 
qualities  that  wholly  unfit  a  word  for  technical  scientific  use,  still 
they  are  just  the  qualities  that  philosophers  require.  The  practice 
in  philosophy  has  always  been  to  take  some  word  possessing  these 
qualities,  invest  it  with  some  one  great  central  thought,  and  what- 
ever it  may  mean  in  other  connections  and  in  other  systems,  make 
it  stand  in  one  system  for  that  thought.  In  my  system  education 
means  the  "  universal  distribution  of  extant  knowledge  "  (p.  108). 
It  makes  complete  abstraction  of  all  questions  of  discipline,  culture, 
and  research,  and  takes  account  solely  of  infonnation.  It  does  not 
ignore  the  education  of  experience,  but  maintains  that  it  is  a  slow 
and  costly  method.  The  value  of  experience  to  the  world  has,  how- 
ever, been  immense,  and  where  genial  minds  are  concerned  it  may 
become  a  fair  substitute  for  positive  education  or  instruction.  In  con- 
sidering the  local  environment  we  saw  how  powerfully  it  acts,  and 
leisure  without  instruction  has  been  sufficient  to  develop  vast  treas- 
ures of  talent.  But  we  were  then  dealing  solely  with  the  specially 
talented,  and  we  saw  that  true  genius,  while  it  cannot  overcome 
all  obstacles,  as  is  claimed,  will  avail  itself  of  any  and  all  favorable 
circumstances  and  burst  its  bonds.  But  for  average  minds,  i.e.,  for 
the  immense  majority  of  mankind,  although  they  are  capable  of  good 
work  when  supplied  with  the  materials  to  work  upon,  experience  alone 
will  never  raise  them  to  the  working  point.  They  must  have  positive 
instruction,  and  must,  as  it  were,  be  compelled  to  acquire  knowledge, 
otherwise  they  simply  will  never  acquire  it.  But  once  acquired,  no 
matter  how,  it  becomes  a  power  with  them  as  with  other  men. 

In  my  early  work  the  philosophy  of  education  was  a  sort  of 
intuition.  I  saw  it  all,  and  I  saw  and  fully  worked  out  the  reasons 
for  it.  But  my  method  was  synthetic.  I  had  not  the  means,  and 
indeed  the  means  did  not  exist,  to  discuss  the  question  analytically. 
The  literature  dealt  with  in  the  present  work  was  nearly  all  subse- 
quent to  my  earlier  one,  and  if  any  of  it  was  earlier  it  either  failed 
to  furni.sh  the  needed  information,  like  Galton's  works,  or  else  I 


300  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

was  unacquainted  with  it.  And  it  was  twelve  years  before  the  only 
book  appeared  that  really  does  furnish  the  data  for  an  analytical 
study  of  the  subject,  viz.,  Odin's  Genese  des  Grands  Hommes.  De 
Candolle's  work  is  valuable  so  far  as  it  goes,  but  it  is  utterly  inade- 
quate to  the  purpose.  The  work  of  Odin  opens  up  the  field  and 
shows  how  such  strictly  social  questions  may  be  reduced  to  a  rigidly 
scientific  treatment.  But  the  gratifying  part  of  this  analytic  study 
has  been  that  it  at  once  and  completely  confirms  the  conclusions  at 
which  I  arrived  synthetically.  The  inductive  proof  is  even  more 
complete  than  the  deductive,  and  I  now  feel  that  my  entire  system 
stands  on  an  immutable  foundation.  Whatever  power  the  local,  the 
economic,  or  the  social  environment  may  have  to  stimulate  and 
unfold  the  genius  of  man,  it  acquires  solely  by  virtue  of  its  educa- 
tional quality,  and,  moreover,  no  form  of  privilege  is  sufficient  in 
and  of  itself  to  develop  the  intellectual  powers  of  average  men  and 
create  a  market  for  the  products  of  achievement.  This  can  be  done 
only  by  positive  education,  or  instruction,  and  without  this  popular 
demand  there  is  an  early  limit  to  intellectual  productivity. 

Administration  of  the  Social  Estate 

The  method  of  applied  sociology  is  the  administration  of  the 
social  estate.  The  social  heritage,  human  achievement,  which,  as 
we  have  seen,  consists  of  the  knowledge  that  has  been  brought 
into  the  world  by  the  labors  of  the  elite  of  mankind,  has  been 
bequeathed  to  all  the  members  of  society  equally,  share  and  share 
alike.  But  through  inattention,  neglect,  and  general  bad  manage- 
ment it  has  got  into  the  hands  of  a  few  privileged  persons  only. 
The  case  is  analogous  to  that  of  a  wealthy  man  with  a  large  family 
dying  intestate  in  a  country  whose  laws  provide  that  the  children 
shall  share  the  property  equally,  but  in  which,  as  often  happens,  a 
few  of  the  children  take  possession  of  it  all,  and  with  the  aid  of 
shrewd  and  unscrupulous  lawyers,  succeed  in  keeping  the  rest  from 
receiving  any  part  of  it. 

But  there  is  a  fundamental  difference  between  spiritual  and  mate- 
rial wealth.  In  the  former  its  possession  by  one  does  not  diminish 
the  share  of  another.    All  the  heirs  inherit  it  all,  and  all  may  possess 


Ch.  XII]    ADMINISTRATION  OF  THE  SOCIAL  ESTATE  301 

it  all.  And  yet  it  has  been  thus  far  found  impossible  to  transmit  more 
than  a  very  small  amount  of  the  social  heritage  to  any  but  the  most 
favored  individuals.  It  is  all  transmitted,  otherwise  the  social  con- 
tinuity would  be  interrupted  and  degeneracy  would  set  in.  But  it 
is  distributed  in  small  parcels  to  many  individuals,  each  of  whom 
has  a  different  part  and  kind  from  the  rest ;  or  small  groups  possess 
one  kind  and  other  small  groups  possess  another  kind  of  spiritual 
wealth,  the  several  individuals  and  groups  knowing  nothing  of  the 
possessions  of  the  others.  The  consequence  is  that  men  move  about 
together  as  at  a  masked  ball,  knowing  nothing  of  those  with  whom 
they  come  in  contact. 

As  regards  skill,  which  is  a  form  of  knowledge,  —  knowledge  of 
Hozv,  —  and  which  has  been  acquired  with  great  labor,  it  is  to  be 
supposed  that  the  different  kinds  of  skill  are  distributed  among 
different  groups  of  individuals,  each  group  following  its  particular 
craft.  This  relates  chiefly  to  the  statical  operations  of  society  — 
reproducing  copies,  multiplying  the  same  product,  repetition,  imita- 
tion —  and,  being  mainly  economic,  there  is  no  special  complaint 
that  society  has  not  performed  this  function  tolerably  well.  There 
is  also  a  vast  amount  of  very  special  and  detailed  knowledge,  par- 
ticularly of  the  kind  that  is  called  expert  knowledge,  which  there 
would  not  be  any  advantage  in  rendering  much  more  universal  than 
it  is.  It  partakes  very  closely  of  the  nature  of  skill.  Then  there  is 
much  knowledge  in  the  world  that  is  of  very  little  use,  but  most  of 
this  is  not  the  result  of  prolonged  research,  unless  it  be  by  persons 
of  unbalanced  minds. 

These  and  certain  other  kinds  of  knowledge  which  it  is  needless 
to  particularize,  even  if  they  belong  to  the  social  heritage,  could  not 
profitably  be  universally  distributed.  The  law  of  the  division  of 
labor  has  specialized  this  knowledge  and  restricted  it  to  those  who 
can  use  it  to  the  advantage  of  society.  It  is  not  with  these,  there- 
fore, that  we  have  to  do,  but  it  seemed  best  to  mention  them  in 
order  to  anticipate  an  objection  that  would  almost  certainly  be  made 
by  a  certain  class  who  are  habitually  arrested  on  the  threshold  of  a 
subject,  however  grave,  if  they  see  one  seeming  defect  in  the  logic. 

What  then  is  the  .social  heritage  }  What  knowledge  is  it  the  duty 
of  society  to  extend  to  all  its  members  without  e.xception  }    This  of 


302  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

course  is  a  very  difficult  question.  It  belongs  rather  to  administra- 
tion than  to  philosophy,  and  demands  the  serious  and  prolonged 
attention  and  study  of  practical  men.  All  that  can  be  done  in  a 
work  on  applied  sociology  is  to  suggest  general  principles.  It  would 
be  of  no  use  to  take  up  one  field  of  knowledge  after  another  and 
try  to  decide  on  each  one  separately.  It  is  necessary  first  to  decide 
on  some  comprehensive  canons  to  follow,  and  to  adopt  some  practi- 
cal classification  of  the  different  kinds  of  knowledge,  partly  from  the 
standpoint  of  their  usefulness,  but  also  from  that  of  their  logical 
connections  with  each  other.  The  primary  principle  is  that  every 
human  being  of  mature  age  and  sound  mind  should  be  put  in  pos- 
session of  all  that  is  known.  Such  a  proposition  may  sound  Utopian, 
but  it  is  not  at  all  so  when  the  idea  is  fully  grasped.  It  would  per- 
haps be  clearer  to  some  minds  to  say  that  every  such  being  should 
be  in  possession  of  all  truth.  When  we  say  knowledge  the  idea  of 
memorizing  millions  of  facts  is  likely  to  rise  in  the  mind.  The  prop- 
osition does  not  imply  anything  of  the  kind.  The  knowledge  implied 
is  that  of  laws  and  principles.  It  is  generalized  knowledge,  under 
which  all  facts  and  details  necessarily  fall.  These  no  more  need  to 
be  specially  attended  to  than  we  need  specially  to  attend  to  every 
pulsation  of  the  heart  in  order  to  live.  When  the  great  truths  are 
known  every  minor  truth,  every  small  item  of  knowledge,  every 
detail  in  the  whole  range  of  experience  and  of  nature,  finds  its  place 
immediately  the  moment  it  is  presented  to  consciousness.  And  only 
to  a  mind  in  possession  of  general  truths  do  such  details  possess  any 
meaning  or  any  value.  To  minds  devoid  of  general  knowledge  all 
special  knowledge  presents  a  chaos.  No  item  of  it  can  be  assigned 
a  place  where  its  relations  to  other  items  can  be  seen  or  where  its 
position  in  the  world  as  a  whole  can  be  fixed.  The  mind  is  in  a  state 
of  confusion  and  bewilderment,  and  thought  in  such  a  mind,  if  it 
can  be  so  called,  forms  no  guide  to  life  or  action. 

The  Order  of  Nature.  — There  are  a  few  principles  that  are  suffi- 
ciently general  to  be  safely  set  down  in  advance,  to  be  followed  and 
never  lost  sight  of  in  the  work  of  administering  the  social  estate. 
In  Dynamic  Sociology  (Vol.  II,  p.  492)  I  stated  one  of  these,  viz., 
that  the  most  general  knowledge  is  the  most  practical.  In  the  Out- 
lines of  Sociology  (pp.  ii8ff.),  I  stated  another,  viz.,  that  the  first 


Ch.  XII]  THE  ORDER  OF  NATURE  10 1 

essential  is  to  find  out  the  order  of  nature  and  to  make  it  the  primary- 
rule  of  pedagogy  to  follow  that  order.  Both  these  principles  are 
fundamental,  and  the  second  one  is  so  important  that  it  seems  to 
demand  further  emphasis.  It  not  only  belongs  to  the  very  essence 
of  method,  but  it  constitutes  the  first  canon  of  practice.  Unless  it 
is  fully  realized  and  respected  there  is  no  hope  of  attaining  the  end. 
Under  any  other  principle  the  difficulties  would  be  so  great  that  any 
attempt  to  do  so  would  probably  fail. 

To  make  clear  my  meaning  I  will  revert  to  what  was  said  in  Pure 
Sociology  (p.  45)  on  the  philosophy  of  style  as  illustrating  methodol- 
ogy. It  was  there  shown  that  both  the  force  and  the  ease  of  style 
are  due  to  the  causal  connection  existing  between  the  elements  of 
discourse.  The  most  fundamental  of  all  the  faculties  of  the  human 
mind  is  that  of  causality.  Schopenhauer  maintained  that  the  idea  of 
causation  was  the  only  innate  idea.  The  fact  is,  that  it  is  the  con- 
dition of  all  thinking.  If  educationists  could  only  perceive  this  and 
keep  it  in  mind  in  all  schemes  for  making  pupils  and  students  learn, 
they  would  quickly  revolutionize  existing  methods.  It  is  always  easy 
for  the  mind  to  pass  from  an  antecedent  to  a  consequent  when  they 
stand  in  the  relation  of  cause  and  effect.  But  if  they  merely  stand 
the  one  before  the  other  on  a  printed  page,  or  in  succession  in  oral 
speech,  with  nothing  to  show  that  the  one  is  the  cause  of  the  other, 
their  retention  in  thought  requires  an  arbitrary  act  of  memory,  and 
learning  is  slow  and  tedious.  It  is  also  uninteresting  and  irksome, 
whereas  the  learning  of  things  that  are  shown  to  be  causally  con- 
nected and  naturally  related  possesses  a  charm  that  carries  the 
young  mind  along  irresistibly  and  makes  study  a  pleasure.  It  has 
the  same  superiority,  too,  from  the  standpoint  of  retention.  What 
is  arbitrarily  rqemorized  and  painfully  acquired  is  distasteful  and  the 
mind  gladly  turns  away  from  it  and  dismisses  it.  It  takes  no  per- 
manent hold  upon  the  faculties.  But  the  pleasure  of  following  up 
a  logical  chain  of  causally  connected  truths  plows  its  little  groove 
in  the  plastic  young  brain,  which  abides,  perhaps  forever. 

What  is  true  of  minor  studies  is  true  also  of  major  ones.  There  are 
great  fields  of  knowledge  jvhich  are  called  sciences,  and  these  pos- 
sess causal  relations  among  one  another.  There  are  certain  of  these 
sciences,  the  ones  that  deal  with  the  laws  and  principles  of  nature 


304  APPJJEL)   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

rather  than  with  its  concrete  facts,  that  are  capable  of  being  arranged 
in  such  an  order  that  it  becomes  obvious  that  each  one  grows  out 
of  and  depends  upon  the  one  next  below  it  in  the  series.  These 
sciences  are  sometimes  called  abstract,  but  the  term  is  not  happy, 
because,  although  they  deal  with  laws,  still  their  contents  are  all 
material.  That  is,  their  subjects  consist  in  the  laws  of  matter. 
Herbert  Spencer  more  properly  called  them  "abstract-concrete" 
sciences.  In  some  cases,  however,  this  does  not  seem  to  hold,  and 
perhaps  the  term  abstract  should  be  retained.  There  are  at  least 
six  sciences  capable  of  being  thus  arranged,  and  when  their  scope  is 
accurately  defined  these  six  sciences  are  found  to  embrace  all  nature. 
Every  conceivable  phenomenon,  fact,  force,  property,  substance,  or 
thing  in  the  entire  universe  finds  its  place  and  explanation  under  one 
or  other  of  these  six  sciences. 

These  sciences,  as  now  commonly  recognized,  arranged  in  their 
ascending  order  from  the  standpoint  of  dependence  and  subordina- 
tion, are:  (i)  astronomy,  (2)  physics,  (3)  chemistry,  (4)  biology, 
(5)  psychology,  (6)  sociology.  It  will  be  seen  at  a  glance  that  thus 
arranged  these  sciences  stand  in  the  inverse  order  of  their  degrees  of 
exactness,  astronomy  being  the  most  and  sociology  the  least  exact. 
It  has  also  been  found,  and  any  one  can  verify  it,  that  the  phenomena 
they  present  diminish  in  generality  and  increase  in  complexity  as 
we  ascend  in  the  series,  those  of  astronomy  being  the  most  general 
and  least  complex  and  those  of  sociology  the  least  general  and  most 
complex,  while  all  the  intermediate  ones  conform  to  the  same  law. 
Many  other  tests  have  been  applied,  all  of  which  agree  in  showing 
that  this  is  the  true  order  of  nature,  and  that  the  phenomena  of 
this  universe  present  themselves  to  our  comprehension  in  this  order. 

But  from  the  pedagogic  standpoint  the  most  important  fact  is  that 
each  term  of  the  series  embraces  phenomena  not  contained  in  the 
one  next  below  it  but  clearly  growing  out  of  that,  and  constituting  a 
sort  of  differentia  of  the  next  higher  term.  This  is  a  causal  relation, 
and  there  is  a  sense  in  which  the  antecedent  terms  may  be  regarded 
as  the  causes  of  the  consequent  terms.  In  view  of  this  it  becomes 
obvious  that  the  order  in  which  these  sciences  should  be  studied  is 
the  order  in  which  they  stand  in  the  series,  and  any  attempt  to  study 
the  higher  ones  before  the  lower  ones  have  been  studied  not  only 


Ch.  XII]    ADMINISTRATION  OF  THE  SOCIAL  ESTATE  305 

must  involve  a  great  waste  of  time  and  energy,  but  must  fail  to 
furnish  any  true  knowledge  of  science  and  of  nature.  It  must  also 
be  very  difficult,  irksome,  and  tedious,  and  what  little  is  learned  is 
speedily  forgotten.  On  the  other  hand,  a  study  of  the  sciences  in 
their  natural  order,  if  conducted  by  a  teacher  at  all  suited  to  his 
vocation,  must  be  attractive  from  the  start,  the  subject  being  easy 
to  grasp  and  retain,  and  calculated  to  afford  a  true  conception  of 
nature  and  the  universe. 

There  are  of  course  many  other  departments  of  knowledge,  either 
called  sciences  or  capable  of  being  made  sciences,  which  are  not 
the  same  as  the  six  here  enumerated,  but  there  is  not  one  such  that 
might  not  be  classed  under  one  or  other  of  these.  It  would  only 
require  the  careful  attention  of  competent  persons  whose  business  it 
might  be  to  draw  up  the  curriculum.  However  remote  any  such 
might  seem  from  the  abstract  sciences  above  enumerated,  there 
would  be  found  some  mark  which  would  indicate  its  true  place. 
For  the  concrete  sciences  this  task  would  usually  be  easy.  Geology, 
for  example,  falls  readily  under  astronomy,  since  it  treats  of  one  of 
the  planets  ;  zoology  and  botany  belong  to  biology.  A  great  array 
of  the  higher  sciences,  including  economics,  history,  pedagogy,  and 
the  rest,  are  now  classed  as  special  social  sciences,  and  belong  to 
sociology.  These  need  not  be  enumerated  here.  I  have  listed  many 
of  them  on  previous  occasions.^  And  so  we  might  take  up  the  pro- 
spectuses of  all  the  universities  and  assign  every  branch  that  has  ever 
been  taught  its  place  under  the  proper  science  of  this  so-called  hier- 
archy. I  would  challenge  any  one  to  name  a  branch  of  learning  that 
I  could  not  thus  classify.  But  I  fancy  that  the  order  in  which  the 
manifold  subjects  of  any  comprehensive  curriculum  stand  in  it,  or 
that  in  which  they  are  actually  taught,  would  be  very  different  from 
the  order  of  the  sciences  under  which  they  would  fall,  as  given  above. 
I  doubt  whether  the  question  of  arranging  studies  according  to  the 
order  of  nature  occurs  except  very  rarely  to  the  makers  of  pro- 
spectuses or  educational  programs.  I  know  of  only  a  very  few  ex- 
ceptions. The  most  prominent  of  these  is  the  University  Nouvelle 
under  the  direction  of  its  enlightened  rector,  Dr.  Guillaume  De  Greef. 

^American  Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  I,  May,  1896,  pp.  742  ff.;  Vol.  VII,  March,  1902, 
pp.  634,  635  ;  Outlines  of  Sociology,  pp.  122  ff. ;  Pure  Sociology,  p.  14. 


306  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

In  the  opening  lecture  of  his  course  on  the  methodology  of  the 

social  sciences,  delivered  in  that  institution  on  November  29,  1883, 

he  says  : 

The  natural  bond  being  thus  established  by  the  University  between  the 
mathematical,  physical,  chemical,  and  physiological  sciences  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  economic,  moral,  juridical,  and  political  sciences  on  the  other,  the  posi- 
tion of  sociology  at  the  summit  of  this  encyclopedic  system  of  instruction 
is  clearly  justified  ;  this  new  advance  was  the  necessary  and  legitimate  conse- 
quence of  all  the  antecedent  steps  in  its  progress.^ 

It  appears  that  M.  Alexis  Bertrand,  Professor  of  Philosophy  in 
the  Faculty  of  Letters  of  the  University  of  Lyons,  advocates  at  least 
the  adoption  of  this  reform,^  but  to  what  extent  he  has  succeeded 
in  introducing  it  I  am  not  informed. 

Of  course  somebody  is  going  to  ask.  How  about  mathematics 
and  logic  ?  The  answer  is  that  these  are  not  sciences  in  the  present 
use  of  the  term.  I  deny  that  they  furnish  any  information  whatever 
about  nature  and  the  universe.  They  are  simply  norms.  They  are 
aids  to  the  study  of  science.  They  have  been  called  abstract  sciences 
/car  i^o'x^rjv.  They  are  certainly  abstract,  for  they  abstract  all  real- 
ity and  deal  only  with  the  hypothetical.  If  treated  as  sciences  they 
should  be  called  hypothetical  or  theoretical  sciences.  This  of  course 
applies  only  to  the  pure  forms  of  those  disciplines.  With  regard  to 
mathematics,  Comte  says  : 

In  the  present  state  of  the  development  of  our  positive  knowledge,  I  think 
it  proper  to  regard  mathematical  science  less  as  a  constituent  part  of  natural 
philosophy  properly  so  called,  than  as  being,  since  Descartes  and  Newton,  the 
true  fundamental  basis  of  all  natural  philosophy. ^ 

Throughout  his  works  he  constantly  insists  that  mathematics  is 
the  criterion  of  the  relative  exactness  (positivity)  of  all  the  sciences. 
It  teaches  us  nothing  about  the  stars  and  planets,  but  the  fact  that 
the  laws  of  the  solar  system  are  capable  of  the  most  complete 
mathematical  expression  fixes  the  position  of  solar  astronomy  at  the 
base  of  the  series  of  sciences  arranged  in  the  order  of  nature.  So, 
too,  the  relative  position  of  all  the  other  sciences  in  the  series  is  fixed 

1  L'fivolution  des  Croyances  et  des  Doctrines  politiques,  par  Guillaume  De  Greef, 
Bruxelles-Paris,  1895,  P-  -^-  Compare  also  his  Lois  sociologiques,  2^  edition,  revue, 
Paris,  1S96,  Chap.  I. 

-  Revue  internationale  de  sociologie,  7^  annee,  octobre,  1899,  p.  680. 

3  Philosophie  positive,  Vol.  I,  p.  86. 


Ch.  XII]  THE   DIFFUSION  OF  KNOWLEDGE  307 

by  the  degree  to  which  their  laws  can  be  reduce'd  to  a  mathematical 
expression.  But  pure  mathematics  does  not  deal  with  real  things. 
Geometry,  which  is  the  type,  does  not  teach  us  anything  about  the 
earth,  notwithstanding  its  etymology.  Points  and  lines  and  planes 
are  not  real  things.  But  applied  mathematics,  as  it  is  called,  con- 
stitutes a  study  of  nature,  and  all  branches  of  it  can  be  referred  to 
their  proper  science  in  the  series.  And  as  to  arithmetic,  algebra, 
trigonometry,  and  calculus,  they  are  methods,  tools,  instruments, 
arts,  not  sciences. 

What  has  been  said  of  logic  applies  of  course  to  formal  logic  only. 
That  is  perhaps  the  norm  of  thinking,  but  it  has  no  sucli  value  as 
mathematics,  because  we  think  by  it  whether  we  know  its  rules  or 
not.  But  in  logic  as  in  mathematics,  much  that  is  called  by  that 
name  belongs  to  the  philosophy  of  nature.  Mill's  logic  is  that  and 
little  else.  As  such,  in  so  far  as  strictly  scientific,  it  also  falls 
naturally  into  the  series  of  sciences,  and  both  Mill  and  Wundt 
treat  under  the  name  of  logic  all  the  sciences  of  the  hierarchy,  — 
both  of  them,  curiously  enough,  dealing  at  last  with  sociology. 

One  other  objection  may  be  anticipated,  though  it  could  only  be 
raised  by  a  very  superficial  mind.  It  might  conceivably  be  asked  if  I 
would  exclude  the  rudiments  of  an  education,  —  reading  and  wi"iting. 
But  these  are  simply  arts  — the  primary  means  to  all  learning  (see 
Dynamic  Sociology,  Vol.  II,  p.  625).  No  system  of  education  can 
ignore  any  of  the  means  by  which  it  is  made  possible  even  to  begin 
to  work.  The  invention  of  these  and  of  all  the  forms  of  calculus 
belongs  to  human  achievement,  and  was  sufficiently  dealt  with  in 
Pure  Sociology  (pp.  26  ff.).  We  are  here  concerned  only  with  the 
acquisition  of  knowledge,  and  all  possible  facilities  to  this  end  are 
sim))ly  presupposed. 

The  Diffusion  of  Knoivlcdgc.  —  In  the  administration  of  the 
social  estate  the  first  and  principal  task  is  to  hunt  up  all  the  heirs 
and  give  to  each  his  share.  But  every  member  of  society  is  equally 
the  heir  to  the  entire  social  heritage,  and,  as  we  have  already  seen, 
all  may  possess  it  without  depriving  any  of  any  part  of  it.  And 
as  the  social  heritage  consists  of  the  knowledge  that  has  been 
brought  into  the  world,  this  task  is  nothing  less  than  the  diffusion 
of  all  knowledge  among  all  men.    When  this  knowledge  is  properly 


308  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

classified  it  falls  into  natural  groups  and  consists  of  a  series  of  great 
truths.  These  truths  contain  within  them  a  multitude  of  minor 
truths,  but  these  minor  truths  need  not  be  all  actually  possessed 
by  every  mind.  They  are  really  known  when  the  general  truths  are 
known,  but  the  extent  to  which  they  are  specially  appropriated  may 
be  left  optional.  All  will  select  some  of  them,  but  different  persons 
will  require  an  acquaintance  with  different  parts  of  this  detailed 
knowledge  according  to  their  tastes  and  pursuits.  For  general 
guidance  in  life,  and  in  order  to  occupy  a  position  of  social  equality 
with  all  others,  the  great  groups  of  knowledge  only  need  to  be  pos- 
sessed. This  general  knowledge  is  embraced  in  the  six  great  sciences 
of  the  hierarchy,  and  if  they  are  acquired  in  the  order  of  nature  they 
will  be  both  easily  and  thoroughly  acquired.  This  of  course  pre- 
supposes that  the  necessary  instruments  for  their  acquisition  be  first 
supplied.  —  Such  is  an  outline  of  the  method  of  applied  sociology. 
The  rest  is  matter  of  detail. 

Knowledge  will  always  be  increasing,  and  nothing  can  prevent 
this.  Society  does  not  need  to  concern  itself  with  this.  Its  duty  is 
to  see  that  knowledge  is  assimilated.  Its  value  to  society  not  only 
increases  with  the  number  possessing  it,  but  it  increases  according 
to  some  law  of  progression.  It  is  difficult  to  formulate  this  law. 
A  rough  idea  may  be  conveyed  by  saying  that  the  value  of  knowl- 
edge relatively  to  the  number  possessing  it  increases  in  about  the 
same  ratio  as  does  the  value  of  a  diamond  relatively  to  its  size.  In 
general  it  may  be  said  that  the  rate  of  increase  grows  constantly 
more  rapid  as  universality  is  approached.  Its  full  value  can  never 
be  realized  until  universality  is  actually  reached.  When  only  a  few 
possess  it,  it  has  little  value.  It  may  even  be  injurious.  The 
inequalities  engendered  lead  to  all  forms  of  exploitation  and  social 
misery.  The  differences  of  opinion  that  always  arise  from  this  source 
divide  society  into  factions  and  cause  all  manner  of  strifes.  Most 
of  the  evils  of  this  nature  are  due  to  the  ignorance  of  the  most  of 
mankind  of  truths  that  are  known  to  a  few.  A  large  part  of  the  war 
and  bloodshed  in  the  world  is  over  matters  that  are  already  settled 
and  may  have  been  long  settled,  but  only  in  the  minds  of  a  select 
number  who  have  no  means  of  placing  the  rest  in  possession  of 
the  truth  which  they  possess.    This  is  the  duty  of  society,  and  the 


Ch.  XII]  THE  DIFFUSION  OF  KNOWLEDGE  309 

individuals  possessing  this  knowledge  are  not  to  blame  nor  respon- 
sible for  the  resulting  inequalities.  Usually  they  do  all  they  can  to 
impart  their  knowledge  to  others,  for,  as  was  shown  in  Pure  SocioL 
ogy  (p.  444),  the  mind  is  essentially  altruistic,  and  next  to  the  pleas- 
ure derived  from  the  acquisition  of  knowledge  and  the  discovery  of 
truth,  its  greatest  satisfaction  is  in  imparting  this  knowledge  and 
this  truth  to  others.  But  those  who  possess  knowledge  are  so  few 
and  those  who  are  without  it  are  so  many  that  the  influence  of  the 
former  upon  the  latter  is  only  that  of  a  pebble  dropped  into  the  sea. 
Not  only  do  wise  men  strive  to  teach  everybody  around  them  what 
they  know,  but  they  make  great  sacrifices  of  time  and  energy  in 
writing  books  to  spread  their  knowledge  throughout  the  world  and 
hand  it  down  to  future  generations.  Many  establish  institutions  of 
learning  and  conduct  them,  partly  of  course  for  profit  or  for  a  liveli- 
hood, but  largely  from  a  sense  of  their  usefulness  to  mankind.  In 
condemning  private  schools,  as  I  did  in  Dynamic  Sociology,  and  as 
I  still  do  on  the  grounds  there  urged,  for  the  most  part,  I  did  not 
and  do  not  mean  to  condemn  the  motives  that  inspire  them.  Except 
where  they  are  instituted  for  sectarian  propagandism,  or  to  influence 
public  opinion  in  the  defense  of  vested  interests,  they  usually  emanate 
from  motives  as  disinterested  as  any  —  often  very  high  and  bordering 
on  the  humanitarian.  Observing  that  society  largely  neglects  the 
highest  of  all  its  duties,  and  continues  to  leave  the  great  majority  of  its 
members,  even  in  the  most  enlightened  countries,  in  abject  ignorance 
of  what  they  need  most  to  know,  the  founders  of  private  institutions 
of  learning  seek  to  perform  this  function  for  society  as  well  as  they 
can.  In  so  far  as  the  supplying  of  the  mere  instruments  for  acquir- 
ing knowledge  is  concerned  —  and  many  get  no  farther  than  this  — 
they  are  fairly  successful,  and  certain  ones  rise  to  a  position  in  which 
they  become  in  large  measure  true  public  institutions. 

But  both  public  and  private  educational  institutions  have  always 
been  and  still  remain  chaotic.  False  notions  prevail  as  to  what 
education  is  and  is  for.  The  moment  a  step  is  made  beyond  the 
rudiments  all  object  seems  to  be  lost  sight  of,  method  is  abandoned, 
organization  is  not  thought  of,  and  a  vast  mass  of  purposeless  and 
useless  rubbish  is  forced  upon  the  learner.  As  Mr.  Spencer  says 
of  England,  and  as  is  equally  true  of  every  country  : 


3IO  APPLIED    SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

The  vital  knowledge  —  that  by  which  we  have  grown  as  a  nation  to  what 
we  are,  and  which  now  underlies  our  whole  existence  —  is  a  knowledge  that 
has  got  itself  taught  in  nooks  and  corners  while  the  ordained  agencies  for 
teaching  have  been  mumbling  little  else  but  dead  formulas.^ 

Most  educationists  deny  that  the  conferring  of  knowledge  should 
form  any  part  of  education,  and  consider  that  this  belongs  to 
experience  in  connection  with  affairs  after  school  days  are  over.  In 
Dynamic  Sociology  (Vol.  II,  pp.  554  ff.)  I  gave  a  number  of  defini- 
tions of  education,  confirming  this  statement.  I  have  collected  many 
more,  all  to  the  same  effect.  Scarcely  any  advance  was  made  by  the 
somewhat  famous  "  Committee  of  Ten  "  near  the  close  of  the  nine- 
teenth century,  who  were  appointed  to  report  on  the  proper  method 
of  teaching  science.  They  gave  no  concise  definition  of  education, 
but  their  views  are  incoherently  set  forth  in  an  extended  report. 
Dr.  Albion  W.  Small  made  some  appropriate  comments  on  this  re- 
port which  are  quite  in  point.    He  summarized  their  views  as  follows : 

The  end  of  education  is,  fir.st,  completion  of  the  individual;  second,  implied 
in  the  first,  adaptation  of  the  individual  to  such  cooperation  with  the  society  in 
which  his  lot  is  cast  that  he  works  at  his  best  with  the  society  in  perfecting  its 
own  type,  and  consequently  in  creating  conditions  favorable  to  the  development 
of  a  more  perfect  type  of  individual. 

He  then  goes  on  to  say : 

The  Committee  of  Ten  seems  to  have  stopped  at  conclusions  which  tacitly 
assume  that  psychical  processes  in  the  individual  are  ends  unto  themselves. 
To  be  sure  there  are  signs  of  a  vague  looking  for  of  judgment,  from  the  tribu- 
nal of  larger  life,  upon  the  products  of  this  pedagogy,  but  the  standards  of  a 
real  test  seem  to  have  had  little  effect  upon  the  committee's  point  of  view.  We 
are  told  (p.  168)  that  the  mind  is  chiefly  developed  in  three  ways:  "(«)  by  cul- 
tivating the  powers  of  discriminating  observation ;  ((5)  by  strengthening  the 
logical  faculty  ...(c)  by  improving  the  process  of  comparison,  i.e.,  the  judg- 
ment." We  are  further  told  that  "studies  in  language  and  the  natural  sciences 
are  best  adapted  to  cultivate  the  habits  of  observation ;  mathematics  for  the 
training  of  the  reasoning  faculties ;  history  and  allied  branches  to  promote  the 
mental  power  which  we  call  the  judgment."  The  naively  mediaeval  psychology 
behind  all  this  would  be  humorous  if  it  were  not  tragical.  ...  If  I  am  not 
mistaken,  a  consensus  is  rapidly  forming,  both  in  pedagogy  and  in  sociology, 
to  the  effect  that  action  in  contact  with  reality,  not  artificial  selection  of 
abstracted  phases  of  reality,  is  the  normal  condition  of  maximum  rate  and 
symmetrical  form  of  personal  development. 

1  Education :  Intellectual,  Moral,  and  Physical,  by  Herbert  Spencer,  New  York, 
1866,  p.  54. 


Ch.  XII]  THE  DIFFUSION  OF  KNOWLEDGE  3  i  i 

Once  more,  the  Committee  of  Ten  was  content  to  remain  in  the  dismal 
sliadows  of  the  immemorial  misconception  that  disjecta  tnevibra  of  representa- 
tive knowledge  are  the  sole  available  resource  for  educational  development. 
I  do  not  find  among  the  fundamental  concepts  of  the  report  any  distinct  recog- 
nition of  the  coherence  of  the  things  with  which  intelligent  pedagogy  aims  to 
procure  personal  adaptation.  The  report  presents  a  classified  catalogue  of 
subjects  good  for  study,  but  there  is  no  apparent  conception  of  the  cosmos  of 
which  these  subjects  are  abstracted  phases  and  elements.  Nowhere  in  the 
report  do  I  find  recognition  that  education  when  it  is  finished  is  conscious  con- 
formity of  individuals  to  the  coherent  cosmic  reality  of  which  they  are  parts. 
Until  our  pedagogy  rests  upon  a  more  intelligent  cosmic  philosophy,  and  espe- 
cially upon  a  more  complete  synthesis  of  social  philosophy,  we  can  hardly 
expect  curricula  to  correspond  with  the  essential  conditions  to  which  human 
action  must  learn  to  conform.^ 

If  such  a  report  is  the  best  that  the  nineteenth  century  could 
produce,  then  surely  there  is  call  for  reform  in  pedagogy.  All 
attempts  to  define  education  seem  to  be  smitten  with  that  same 
vagueness  and  meaninglessness,  showing  that  there  exist  no  sharp, 
definite,  and  clear-cut  ideas  on  the  subject  among  educationists 
anywhere.  The  phrase  itself  "development  of  the  mind,"  so  con- 
stantly used,  is  meaningless  Nothing  could  be  more  false  than 
that  the  study  of  mathematics  strengthens  the  reasoning  faculties. 
Mathematicians  are  poor  reasoners.  I  mean  those  who  have  studied 
pure  mathematics  only.  Mathematics,  too  exclusively  pursued, 
destroys  both  the  reason  and  the  judgment.  This  is  because  it 
consists  in  prolonged  thinking  about  nothing.  A  "point"  has 
neither  length,  breadth,  nor  thickness.  It  is  nothing.  A  line  with- 
out thickness  is  equally  nothing.  It  is  true,  as  Mill  says  in  his 
Logic,  that  mathematicians,  however  they  may  define  these  terms, 
do  not  and  cannot  so  conceive  them,  but  always  invest  them  with 
material  attributes,  and  that  geometry  could  never  have  existed  but 
for  men's  experiences  with  real  things.  But  the  constant  effort  to 
divest  everything  of  reality  and  to  live  in  a  purely  hypothetical 
world  is  demoralizing  (I  had  almost  said  demcntalizing)  to  the 
thinking  powers. 

The  idea  that  history  promotes  the  judgment  is  equally  false.  For 
by  history  the  committee  of  course  meant  the  traditional  history 
that  we  have,  and  which  I  have  defined  as  "a  record  of  exceptional 

1  American  Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  II,  May,  1S97,  pp.  S39-841. 


312  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

phenomena"  (supra,  p.  234).  The  only  faculty  such  a  study  could 
strengthen,  the  only  one  that  it  calls  into  exercise,  is  the  memory. 
The  events  are  all  accidents  without  causal  connection,  and  there- 
fore the  reason  has  nothing  to  do  with  them.  There  is  nothing  in 
them  to  exercise  the  judgment  about.  They  are  simply  so  many 
<7  isolated  and  disconnected  facts.  They  can  only  be  memorized  and 
marveled  at.  This  is  a  kind  of  luxury,  and  history  is  a  form  of 
amusement.  The  only  kind  of  history  that  could  exercise  the 
reason  and  the  judgment  would  be  that  which  studies  the  conditions 
underlying  social  phenomena  and  their  relations  of  coexistence  and 
sequence —  in  a  word  their  causal  relations.  But  this  is  sociology, 
a  science  which  the  committee  did  not  even  recognize. 

The  only  thing  that  can  "develop"  or  "strengthen  "  the  facul- 
ties or  the  mind  is  knowledge,  and  all  real  knowledge  is  science. 
The  effect  of  this  on  the  mind  is  to  furnish  it  with  something.  It 
constitutes  its  contents,  and,  as  we  have  seen,  the  power,  value,  and 
real  character  of  mind  depend  upon  its  contents.  Without  knowl- 
edge the  mind,  however  capable,  is  impotent  and  worthless.  But 
there  is  a  great  mass  of  knowledge  in  the  world.  It  does  no  good 
unless  it  is  possessed  by  the  mind.  It  is  a  power  as  soon  as  it  is 
possessed  by  the  mind.  It  is  as  useful  to  one  mind  as  to  another. 
It  is  the  only  working  power  in  society,  and  the  working  power  of 
society  increases  in  proportion  to  the  number  possessing  it,  —  prob- 
ably in  a  greater  proportion.  Only  a  few  minds  possess  any  con- 
siderable part  of  it.  All  are  capable  of  possessing  it  all  The 
paramount  duty  of  society,  therefore,  is  to  put  that  knowledge  into 
the  minds  of  all  its  members.^ 

There  is  only  one  point  that  seems  to  call  for  special  emphasis, 
and  this  is  the  one  to  which  the  most  strenuous  objection  is  likely 
to  be  made.  I  fancy  I  hear  some  one  ask.  Would  you  expect 
society  to  go  down  into  the  slums  and  bring  out  and  educate  all  the 
worthless  rabble,  —  the  canaille  and  the  gamins,  the  prostitutes  and 
criminals  .'*  The  question  is  inapplicable  except  in  so  far  as  it  relates 
to  the  youth  of  these  classes,  for  no  one  supposes  that  society  will 
undertake  to  educate  adults,  and  the  slums  contain  relatively  few 
children.    But  it  may  as  well  be  said  that  the  denizens  of  the  slums 

1  All  of  Dynamic  Sociology,  Vol.  II,  pp.  593-619,  belongs  here. 


Ch.  XII]  THE   DIFFUSION  OF  KNOWLEDGE  313 

are  the  same  kind  of  people  as  the  inhabitants  of  the  most  respect- 
able quarters.  They  are  not  fools  by  any  means,  but  men  and 
women  with  normal  minds,  susceptible,  if  surrounded  by  the  same 
influences,  of  becoming  as  capable  and  intelligent  people  as  any. 
And  as  to  the  criminals,  they  are  the  geniuses  of  the  slums.  They 
have,  and  must  have  in  order  to  ply  their  vocation  successfully,  a 
large  amount  of  true  talent,  and  the  only  difference  between  them 
and  other  talented  persons  is  in  the  field  in  which  they  exercise 
their  talents.  In  a  certain  very  proper  sense  society  has  forced 
them  into  this  field  and  they  are  making  the  best  use  they  can  of 
their  native  abilities.  The  slums  can  never  be  broken  up  by  peri- 
odical raids  and  the  occasional  punishment  of  a  few  of  their  inhab- 
itants. This  has  been  tried  from  time  immemorial  without  the  least 
success.  Is  it  to  be  supposed  that  the  persons  who  are  seized  and 
fined  and  subjected  to  other  annoyances  and  discomforts  are  going 
to  be  thus  reformed  and  made  good  citizens  ?  They  go  back  with 
more  bitter  hatred  of  society  and  continue  to  injure  it  and  endanger 
it  more  than  before,  and  they  fully  justify  their  attacks  upon  it, 
realizing  that  it  is  responsible  for  their  condition. 

But  there  is  no  need  of  having  any  slums.  The  people  that  make 
up  the  slums  and  the  criminal  classes  of  society  are  capable  of 
being  made  good  and  useful  citizens,  —  nay,  in  the  normal  proportion 
of  all  classes,  they  may  become  agents  of  civilization  and  may  con- 
tribute to  human  achievement.  But  just  as  you  cannot  tame  a  full- 
grown  wild  animal,  but  must  take  the  young  and  surround  them 
with  the  proper  conditions,  so  it  is  necessary  to  apply  this  principle 
to  wild  men  and  take  them  in  their  youth.  This,  so  far  from  being 
an  unreasonable  demand,  is  the  most  pressing  of  all  social  duties. 
There  is  no  other  class  in  society  whose  education  is  half  so  impor- 
tant as  this  lowest  and  most  dangerous  class.  Society  ought  to 
have,  and  will  one  day  have,  the  wit  to  devise  means  of  reaching 
this  class  without  its  becoming  a  very  heavy  charge.  It  must  apply 
scientific  principles  that  will  render  the  work  automatic  and  self- 
executing  (see  infra,  p.  331),  but  whatever  the  cost,  it  is  a  work 
tliat  must  be  done,  and  which  when  done  will  a  thousand  times 
repay  the  cost. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

PROBLEMS   OF   APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY 

Logical  consequences  are  the  scarecrows  of  fools  and  the  beacons  of  wise 
men.  —  Huxley. 

L'art  est  la  joie  sociale,  comme  I'amour  est  la  joie  individuelle.  —  Gabriel 
Tarde. 

Mille  piacer  non  vaglion  un  tormento.  —  Petrarch. 

The  ultimate  problem  on  the  side  of  pure  Science  is :  What  is  worth 
doing?  The  ultimate  practical  problem  is  :  Hoiv  may  the  thing  worth  doing 
be  done  ?  —  Albion  VV.  Small. 

The  reader  who  has  intelligently  followed  the  discussion  to  this 
point,  whether  he  accepts  the  conclusions  or  not,  cannot  fail  to 
perceive  that  for  applied  sociology  as  here  conceived  there  is  really 
only  one  live  problem,  that  of  the  maximum  equalization  of  intelli- 
gence. This  at  least  is  the  only  practical  problem.  For  the  practi- 
cal is  something  that  can  be  done.  Society  can  solve  this  problem. 
I  know  of  no  other  problem  of  applied  sociology  that  society  can 
solve  until  this  one  is  solved.  Most  of  the  others  would  solve  them- 
selves long  before  this  one  received  its  cotnplete  solution.  An 
approximate  solution  of  the  primary  question  would  naturally  and 
automatically  put  the  great  majority  of  all  other  social  problems  in 
the  way  of  at  least  ultimate  solution. 

And  yet  this  is  not  even  recognized  as  a  social  problem,  while  a 
long  train  of  problems  which  are  completely  insoluble  in  the  present 
state  of  society  are  being  violently  attacked  by  a  great  army  of 
would-be  reformers.  In  most  cases,  even  if  we  could  imagine  them 
solved  for  the  time  being,  they  would  not  stay  solved,  for  the  same 
conditions  which  now  produce  the  evils  complained  of  would  imme- 
diately revive  them  and  the  work  would  require  to  be  done  over 
again,  and  so  on  indefinitely.  There  can  be  no  permanent  success 
in  the  solution  of  social  questions  without  striking  at  the  root  of 
the  evils  and  removing  their  underlying  causes.     This  of  course 

314 


Ch.  XIII]  PROBLEMS  OF  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  315 

sounds  trite,  and  no  one  would  deny  it  in  the  abstract.  The  diffi- 
culty does  not  lie  in  the  abstract  principle,  but  in  making  it  appear 
that  the  underlying  cause  of  all  social  evils  is  what  we  allege  it  to 
be.  To  those  who  cannot  or  will  not  see  this  it  is  useless  further 
to  expatiate. 

If  all  other  problems  are  incapable  of  solution  in  the  present 
state  of  society,  and  all  efforts  at  social  reform  before  society  has 
been  rendered  capable  of  it  are  chiefly  wasted,  it  may  pertinently 
be  asked  :  Why  enter  at  all  into  the  discussion  of  other  problems  .-• 
I  confess  that  I  see  very  little  use  in  doing  so.  The  only  justifica- 
tion of  such  a  course  is  the  fact  that  a  work  on  applied  sociology 
is  expected  to  deal  with  such  problems.  Of  the  hundreds  of  persons 
who,  either  in  reviews  of  Pure  Sociology  or  in  private  communica- 
tions, have  reminded  me  of  my  promise  to  write  a  work  on  applied 
sociology  to  supplement  the  other  and  complete  the  system  of 
sociology,  I  do  not  suppose  that  one  has  anticipated  the  discussion 
of  what  I  regard  as  the  real  problem,  while  probably  nearly  all 
have  expected  me  to  tell  them  how  the  relations  of  capital  and 
labor  are  to  be  adjusted.  But  although  I  have  been  deluged  for 
years  with  discussions  of  that  question  and  have  read  hundreds  of 
proposed  solutions  of  it,  still  I  frankly  confess  that  I  am  unable  to 
propose  any  solution.  Nevertheless  I  am  perfectly  satisfied  that  if 
laborers  were  as  intelligent  as  capitalists  (I  will  not  go  further  than 
that)  the  question  would  solve  itself  in  short  order. 

And  so,  just  as  Topsy  was  obliged  to  " 'fess  "  although  she  had 
not  stolen  anything,  I  will  try  to  meet  the  implied  obligation, 
although  I  have  little  to  offer.  But  I  am  not  alone  in  this,  for  I 
deny  that  any  one  else  is  capable  of  proposing  a  solution  of  current 
social  problems  that  has  the  remotest  chance  of  success.  I  do  not 
mean  that  I  intend  to  propose  solutions  of  social  problems.  That 
is  farthest  from  my  thought.  I  propose  only  to  discuss  a  few  of 
them,  not  so  much  even  to  state  the  problems  as  to  try  to  picture 
the  condition  of  society,  and  to  contrast  it  in  some  cases  with  what 
may  be  regarded  as  an  improved  state.  But  even  so  modest  an 
undertaking  as  that  is  liable  to  two  grave  dangers.  One  of  these 
is  utopianism.  Not  that  utopianism  is  anything  so  bad.  When  it 
does  not  profess  to  be  anything  else,  and  is  well  done,  there  is  no 


3i6  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [PartIII 

more  useful  kind  of  literature  The  danger  is  of  trying  to  pass  off 
a  Utopia  for  something  serious.  Moreover,  I  have  no  talent  for 
that  class  of  writing.  It  requires  a  Plato,  a  More,  or  a  Bellamy. 
Much  less  have  I  the  talent  for  satire  like  that  of  Jules  Verne  or 
Mr.  Wells.  The  other  danger  in  trying  to  picture  the  future  of 
society  is  even  greater.  It  is  that  of  falling  short  of  the  reality,  or 
at  least  of  entirely  missing  it.  How  impossible  it  would  have  been, 
for  example,  for  the  keenest  mind  of  the  seventeenth  century  to 
predict  the  state  of  society  at  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  !  The 
guesses  would  not  only  have  all  been  wrong  but  they  would  have 
all  fallen  short  of  the  reality.  Probably  none  of  the  items  of 
progress  that  did  take  place  would  have  been  thought  of,  and 
the  ones  imagined  would  never  have  taken  place.  For  example, 
people  have  been  talking  about  aerial  navigation  ever  since  my 
earliest  recollection  (and  of  course  long  before),  and  I  fully 
expected  to  live  to  see  men  freely  flying  across  the  skies.  Such 
a  consummation  seems  now  quite  as  remote  as  it  did  fifty  years 
ago.  But  no  one  then  dreamed  of  ocean  cables,  or  electric 
motors,  or  wireless  telegraphy.  Yet  these  have  come  and  the 
other  not. 

It  would  be  perhaps  even  more  hazardous  to  predict  moral 
reforms  in  society.  It  is  generally  believed  that  there  is  very  little 
moral  progress  in  the  world.  This  is  because  human  character 
does  not  greatly  improve.  But  when  any  one  reads  the  real  history 
of  the  world  with  his  eyes  open  he  must  see  that  there  has  been 
immense  moral  progress.^  The  moral  progress  of  the  world  is  not 
due  to  any  great  extent  to  improvement  in  human  character.  It  is 
due  almost  wholly  to  improvement  in  human  institutions.  Even  if 
I  was  sure  that  society  would  take  up  and  solve,  as  it  could  easily 
do,  the  problem  of  the  equalization  of  intelligence,  I  would  not  dare 
make  any  very  specific  predictions  as  to  the  result  in  the  direction 
of  social  improvement.  The  present  crying  social  evils  would 
doubtless  be  quickly  cured  for  the  most  part,  but  no  one  could 
foretell  what  else  would  happen.  It  is  very  possible  that  in 
"looking  backward"  the  cure  of  these  evils  would  be  regarded  as 
among  the  least  of  the  benefits  of  the  new  regime.    We  are  thus 

1  Pure  Sociology,  pp.  450-453. 


Ch.  XIII]  ETHICAL  SOCIOLOGY  317 

restricted  to  a  very  narrow  horizon,  and  anything  that  is  said  about 
the  future  of  society,  however  wise  it  may  seem  now,  is  Hkely  to  be 
of  a  kind  calculated  to  provoke  a  smile  even  on  the  part  of  the 
immediate  descendants  of  its  author. 


Ethical  Sociology 

As  all  know,  in  the  two  great  systems  of  Auguste  Comte  and 
Herbert  Spencer  ethics  is  placed  at  the  summit  of  the  series  as  a 
science  of  the  same  kind  as  the  other  great  sciences.  In  treating 
of  the  order  of  nature  in  the  last  chapter  I  did  not  follow  those 
authors,  because  I  do  not  regard  ethics  as  a  science  in  any  such 
sense  as  belongs  to  sociology,  biology,  etc.  In  so  far  as  it  can  be 
rendered  a  science  it  belongs  under  sociology  as  one  of  the  special 
social  sciences.  This  is  so  obvious  that  it  seems  strange  that  Comte 
and  Spencer  should  have  been  so  illogical  as  to  class  ethics  as  a 
science.  To  stand  where  they  put  it,  it  should  have  been  shown 
that  it  is  a  great  field  of  natural  phenomena  and  laws  derived  from 
sociology,  as  the  science  next  below  it,  but  independent  of  sociology 
in  other  respects,  as  is  the  case  with  all  the  other  sciences  of  the 
series.  It  should  have  been  shown  that  the  phenomena  of  ethics 
are  more  complex  and  less  general  than  those  of  sociology,  and 
that  its  laws  and  principles  are  less  exact.  No  attempt  was  made 
by  either  of  those  authors  to  show  any  of  these  things,  and  to  any 
one  reading  their  works  it  is  evident  that  neither  of  them  treats 
ethics  as  a  science. 

There  seems  to  be  only  one  way  of  explaining  their  procedure, 
and  that  is  by  assuming  that  throughout  their  prolonged  treatment 
of  the  real  sciences — about  which  and  their  natural  order,  as  I  have 
always  insisted,^  they  were  substantially  agreed  —  the  utility  of  it  all 
was  constantly  in  their  minds,  and  they  clearly  perceived  the  ethical 
character  of  all  science.  They  were  determined  that  their  .systems 
should  not  begin  and  end  with  pure  science  without  any  attempt  to 
show  their  application  to  the  condition  of  society.  In  their  ethical 
treatises  they  both  aimed  at  the  improvement  of  society.  Comte's 
Positive  Polity,  as  all  know,  was  an  effort  at  far-reaching  social 

1  Compare  Pure  Sociology,  pp.  65-69. 


3i8  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

reform.    Spencer  characterized  his  ethics  as  a  "regulative  system," 
saying  : 

I  am  the  more  anxious  to  indicate  in  outline,  if  I  cannot  complete,  this  final 
work,  because  the  establishment  of  rules  of  right  conduct  on  a  scientific  basis  is 
a  pressing  need.  Now  that  moral  injunctions  are  losing  the  authority  given  by 
their  supposed  sacred  origin,  the  secularization  of  morals  is  becoming  impera- 
tive. Few  things  can  happen  more  disastrous  than  the  decay  and  death  of  a 
regulative  system  no  longer  fit,  before  anotlier  and  fitter  regulative  system  has 
grown  up  to  replace  it.^ 

We  are  not,  of  cour.se,  concerned  either  with  the  pretensions  or 
the  success  of  either  of  these  treatises,  but  it  is  clear  that  both 
were  intended  as  practical  applications  to  society  of  the  scientific 
systems  that  preceded  them.  They  were  not  attempts  to  treat 
another  and  higher  science  in  the  series.  If  their  treatment  of 
the  other  sciences  can  be  called  pure  science,  their  treatment  of 
ethics  must  be  called  applied  science.  Not  only  so,  but,  following 
immediately  upon  sociology,  as  they  do,  and  dealing  almost  exclu- 
sively with  social  phenomena,  what  they  called  sociology  may 
properly  be  called  pure  sociology,  and  what  they  called  ethics, 
applied  sociology.  Ethical  sociology  is  applied  sociology,  and 
applied  sociology  is  essentially  ethical,  in  the  sense  of  the  new 
ethics  (see  supra,  p.  28),  i.e.,  in  the  sense  of  an  attempt  to  show  on 
scientific  principles  how  society  may  be  improved.  For  the  improve- 
ment of  society  is  the  new  ethics.  All  ethical  systems  based  on 
science  are  at  bottom  programs  of  social  reform,  and  even  though 
they  be  impracticable  they  belong  to  sociology.  Sociology  is  the 
science  of  welfare,  and  even  pure  sociology  has  this  end  in  view.  All 
schemes  of  social  reform  that  have  thus  far  been  proposed  are  based 
on  the  assumption  of  the  present  inequality  of  information  and  of  a 
continuance  of  that  inequality,  but  the  complete  social  appropriation 
of  all  established  truth  needed  to  secure  social  welfare  is  the  only 
remedy  that  sociology  can  offer  with  any  promise  of  ultimate  success. 

Privative  Ethics.  —  Ethical  Sociology  naturally  falls  under  two 
somewhat  sharply  defined  heads :  privative  ethics  and  positive 
ethics.  The  first  is  that  about  which  we  hear  most,  because  every- 
where throughout  society  there  is  and  always  has  been  privation. 

1  Preface  to  The  Data  of  Ethics,  or  Part  I  of  The  Principles  of  Ethics,  written  and 
pubhshed  in  1879,  '^^^  republished  in  The  Principles  of  Ethics,  Vol.  I,  1892. 


Ch.  XIII]  PRIVATIVE  ETHICS  319 

This  privation  is  the  source  of  great  pain,  suffering,  and  misery,  and 
these  appeal  to  the  sympathies  of  those  who  do  not  have  to  undergo 
them.  Hence  nearly  all  reform  movements  are  designed  to  secure 
in  some  degree  the  mitigation  of  these  evils.  The  most  prominent 
fact  in  social  life  is  the  economic  struggle  for  existence.  Some 
who  consider  themselves  highly  scientific  maintain  that  this  is 
natural  and  proper,  and  they  base  their  claim  on  the  admitted  fact 
that  a  similar  struggle  for  existence  has  always  gone  on  in  the 
organic  world,  and  that  through  it  organic  evolution  has  been 
accomplished.  This,  they  say,  is  nature's  method,  and  all  attempts 
artificially  to  thwart  nature's  plans  emanate  from  sentimentalism 
and  end  in  failure. 

That  there  was  a  fallacy  in  this  kind  of  reasoning  I  satisfied  my- 
self quite  early,  but  it  required  considerable  reflection  and  a  long 
time  to  formulate  the  true  laws  underlying  the  whole  subject.  I 
succeeded  at  last  in  working  it  all  out,  and  will  give  here  in  a  foot- 
note ^  the  references  to  the  places  where  the  results  were  published. 
I  need  only  say  here  that  the  view  above  stated  ignores  the  intel- 
lectual factor  which  completely  reverses  the  biologic  law.  The 
whole  effect  of  intelligence  has  been  to  do  away  with  the  struggle 
for  existence.  The  industrial  arts  and  civilization  in  its  entirety 
have  been  the  result  of  the  successful  conflict  of  mind  with  nature. 
The  law  of  nature  has  been  neutralized  in  the  physical  world  and 
civilization  is  the  result.  It  is  still  in  force  in  the  social  and  espe- 
cially in  the  economic  world,  but  this  is  because  the  method  of 
mind  has  not  yet  been  applied  to  these  departments  of  nature. 
The  physical  forces  have  been  studied,  their  nature  learned,  the 
way  to  control  and  utilize  them  found  out,  and  they  have  become 
the  powerful  servants  of  man.  The  social  forces,  which  are  just  as 
natural  and  uniform  in  their  action  as  the  physical,  have  not  yet 
been  studied  or  their  laws  discovered,  and  therefore  they  are  not 

1  "  Mind  as  a  Social  Factor,"  Mind,  London,  Vol.  IX,  October,  18S4,  pp.  563-573  ; 
"The  Psychologic  Basis  of  Social  Economics,"  Address  of  the  Vice-President,  Sec- 
tion I,  Economic  Science  and  Statistics,  American  Association  for  the  Advancement 
of  Science,  Rochester  Meeting,  August,  1892,  Proceedings,  Vol.  XLI,  Salem,  1S92, 
pp.  301-321  ;  the  same  somewhat  condensed,  Annals  of  the  Academy  of  Political  and 
Social  Science,  Vol.  Ill,  Philadelphia,  January,  1893,  pp.  464-482;  The  Psychic 
Factors  of  Civilization,  Boston,  1893,  Chap.  XXXIII. 


320  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

under  control  and  no  attempt  is  made  to  utilize  them.  The  existing 
competitive  system  in  society  is  the  consequence.  Whenever  society 
becomes  sufficiently  intelligent  to  grapple  with  the  social  forces  as 
it  has  with  the  physical  forces  they  will  yield  as  readily  and  come 
as  fully  under  its  control.  The  world  sustains  now  the  same  rela- 
tion to  the  social  forces  that  it  did  to  the  physical  before  there  was 
any  form  of  art  whatever,  i.e.,  the  equivalent  of  the  lowest  known 
state  of  savagery. 

The  evils  of  society  are  due  to  the  competitive  system  in  a  state 
of  artificial  inequality  of  intelligence,  and  as  this  state  has  always 
existed  it  is  supposed  that  it  always  must  exist.  The  world  has 
scarcely  begun  to  reflect  upon  the  possibility  of  any  other  system. 
All  kinds  of  false  notions  prevail  on  the  subject,  such  as  that  the 
only  motives  to  industry  are  the  fear  of  want  and  the  love  of  gain. 
To  some  minds  the  idea  of  a  state  of  society  without  competition 
for  gain  is  inconceivable.  Still,  such  a  state  is  not  difficult  to  con- 
ceive when  any  one  diveSts  himself  of  traditional  ideas.  There  are 
many  other  things  to  compete  for  besides  money  or  wealth.  John 
Stuart  Mill,  in  discussing  communism,  says  : 

The  institution  provides  that  there  shall  be  no  quarreling  about  material 
interests  ;  individualism  is  excluded  from  that  department  of  affairs.  But  there 
are  other  departments  from  which  no  institutions  can  exclude  it :  there  will 
still  be  rivalry  for  reputation  and  for  personal  power.  When  selfish  ambition 
is  excluded  from  the  field  in  which,  with  most  men,  it  chiefly  exercises  itself, 
that  of  riches  and  pecuniary  interest,  it  would  betake  itself  with  greater  inten- 
'sity  to  the  domain  still  open  to  it,  and  we  may  expect  that  the  struggles  for 
preeminence  and  for  influence  in  the  management  would  be  of  great  bitterness 
when  the  personal  passions,  diverted  from  their  ordinary  channel,  are  driven  to 
seek  their  principal  gratification  in  that  other  direction.  For  these  and  various 
reasons  it  is  probable  that  a  Communist  association  would  frequently  fail  to 
exhibit  the  attractive  picture  of  mutual  love  and  unity  of  will  and  feeling  which 
we  are  often  told  by  Communists  to  expect,  but  would  often  be  torn  by  dissen- 
sion and  not  unfrequently  broken  up  by  it.^ 

This  is  no  doubt  true,  and,  if  there  is  any  virtue  in  struggling, 
there  would  be  plenty  of  things  to  struggle  for  if  wealth  could  not 
be  had  by  struggling.  The  shallowness  of  the  claim  that  there 
would  be  no  incentive  to  action  if  that  of  gain  was  withdrawn  is 

1  Fortnightly  Review,  Vol.  XXXI  (New  Series,  Vol.  XXV),  April  i,  1879,  P-  S^i; 
also  Socialism,  by  John  Stuart  Mill,  Chicago,  1879,  pp.  114-115. 


Ch.  XIII]  PRIVATIVE  ETHICS  321 

sufficiently  shown  by  the  present  state  of  society.  With  the  poor 
of  course  it  is  a  struggle  for  existence,  and  the  business  class, 
the  next  most  numerous,  compete  on  the  economic  plane,  but 
above  these  in  the  social  scale  are  the  professional  class,  the  class 
of  high  officers  with  a  life  tenure,  and  in  the  Old  World  still,  the 
nobility.  None  of  these  three  classes  has  any  pecuniary  incentive 
to  rivalry.  The  nobility  despise  all  mercenary  motives  and  look 
down  upon  the  business  class.  The  other  two  classes  profess  more 
or  less  contempt  for  everything  that  relates  to  money-getting. 
And  yet  in  all  these  classes  there  is  great  rivalry  in  many  lines,  as 
everybody  knows,  and  not  a  little  animosity  and  bitterness.  Some 
of  this  is  rivalry  for  something  even  worse  than  gain —  pomp  and 
show  and  pretense  of  social  superiority  —  but  part  of  it,  as  was 
shown  in  Part  II,  is  intellectual,  and  consists  of  rivalry  in  achieve- 
ment. On  this  higher  plane  competition  takes  the  form  of  honorable 
emulation. 

It  thus  appears  that  three  of  the  five  principal  classes  of  society 
have  always  been  more  or  less  completely  exempt  from  economic 
competition,  and  yet  they  seem  to  have  had  all  the  spur  to  activity 
that  they  required.  They  certainly  never  felt  the  need  of  the  eco- 
nomic spur  in  such  a  degree  as  to  wish  to  change  their  condition 
for  the  sake  of  it.  On  the  contrary,  those  who  were  under  that 
influence  would  at  any  time  have  been  glad  to  get  out  from  under 
it.  Moreover,  most  of  the  advocates  of  the  necessity  of  an  eco- 
nomic stimulus  as  a  condition  to  industry  have  belonged  to  these 
upper  classes.  They  do  not  feel  the  need  of  it  for  themselves,  and 
regard  it  as  essential  only  to  others.  The  whole  doctrine  belongs 
to  the  leisure-class  philosophy,  and  is  as  hollow  as  the  rest  of  it. 

The  competitive  system  of  human  society,  like  that  of  nature  in 
general,  conforming  to  the  biologic  law,  as  I  have  defined  it,^  con- 
sists in  creating  a  great  surplus  of  human  beings,  many  times  more 
than  can  subsist  under  the  economic  conditions  of  subsistence,  and 
in  keeping  down  this  surplus  by  killing  off  the  greater  part  of  them. 
This  is  clearly  shown  by  the  stati.stics  of  mortality  of  the  different 
social  classes.  These  statistics  have  been  carefully  compiled  by 
such   well-known    statisticians    as    Mulhall,    Conrad,    Casper,   and 

1  Psychic  Factors  of  Civilization,  pp.  250,  251. 


322  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  HI 

Charles  Booth.  They  show  that  while  the  average  longevity  of  the 
rich  is  from  55  to  56  years,  that  of  the  poor  is  only  28  years.  The 
mortality  of  infants  in  noble  families  in  Germany  is  less  than 
6  per  cent,  while  among  the  poor  it  is  between  30  and  40  per  cent. 
Of  the  working  classes  50  per  cent  of  the  children  die  during  the 
first  five  years  of  their  lives,  while  of  the  upper  classes  only  25  per 
cent  die  during  that  period.  Of  the  former  over  5  per  cent  of  the 
children  are  stillborn,  of  the  latter  less  than  3  per  cent.  In  the 
wealthy  sections  of  Paris  from  1817  to  1836  the  number  who  died 
annually  was  as  i  to  65,  while  in  the  poorer  sections  it  was  as  i  to  1 5. 
In  the  district  of  the  Champs  Elysees  the  average  mortality  is  about 
I  per  cent.  In  the  poor  quarter  of  Montmartre  it  is  4.3  per  cent. 
Kidd  sums  up  Booth's  statistics  of  poverty  in  London  as  follows : 

The  total  percentage  of  the  population  found  to  be  "  in  poverty,"  as  the 
result  of  these  inquiries,  is  stated  to  be  30.7  per  cent  for  all  London.  This  very 
large 'percentage  does  not,  it  must  be  understood,  include  any  of  the  "  regularly 
employed  and  fairly  paid  working  class."  Despite  the  enormous  accumulation 
of  wealth  in  the  richest  city  in  the  world,  the  entire  middle  and  upper  classes 
number  only  17.8  per  cent  of  the  whole  population.  In  estimating  the  total 
percentage  of  the  population  of  London  "  in  poverty,"  the  rich  districts  are  of 
course  taken  with  the  poor,  but  in  37  districts,  each  with  a  total  population  of 
over  30,000,  and  containing  altogether  1,179,000  persons,  the  proportion  in 
poverty  in  no  case  falls  below  40  per  cent,  and  in  some  of  them  it  reaches 
60  per  cent.^ 

All  this  simply  shows  that  the  competitive  system  in  society,  as 
in  the  organic  world,  proceeds  by  producing  a  surplus  and  killing 
it  off.  The  surplus  population  is  killed  by  poverty.  The  premature 
deaths  are  all  ascribed  to  certain  well-known  diseases,  and  it  is  pop- 
ularly supposed  that  the  poor  as  well  as  the  rich  all  die  of  disease. 
Nobody  inquires  what  is  the  cause  of  the  disease.  Among  the  poor 
the  diseases  are  mainly  due  to  insufficient  nourishment  and  undue 
exposure  joined  with  excessive  toil.  These  influences  keep  the 
physical  system  in  such  a  low  state  that  any  slight  cause  will  pro- 
duce the  particular  disease  that  it  tends  to  produce,  while  the  same 
cause  would  have  no  effect  upon  a  well-nourished  body.  It  is  well 
known  that  zymotic,  and  indeed  all  germ  diseases,  attack  weak  con- 
stitutions and  that  robust  constitutions  resist  them.    When  any  one 

1  Kidd,  op.  cit.,  p.  73. 


Ch.  XIII]  PRIVATIVE  ETHICS  323 

is  a  little  "run  down"  he  is  apt  to  be  attacked  by  some  disease 
that  he  would  have  "thrown  off"  if  he  had  been  normal.  But  the 
poor  are  always  "run  down,"  and  when  a  disease  attacks  them 
they  have  no  reserve  power  to  throw  it  off.  Hence  they  usually 
die.  This  accounts  for  the  relatively  high  death  rate  among  the 
poor.  The  excess  of  child  mortality  is  due  to  the  weak  constitu- 
tions of  underfed  mothers,  often  also  overworked.  It  is  impossible 
for  them  to  nurse  or  properly  nourish  their  children,  who  are 
born  with  weak  constitutions  on  account  of  the  mothers'  impover- 
ished condition.  The  stillborn  represent  cases  in  which  the  placen- 
tal nourishment  is  insufficient  to  sustain  the  Ufe  of  the  fetus  and 
it  literally  dies  of  starvation.  In  these  and  many  other  ways  the 
social  conditions  keep  down  the  surplus  population  by  simply  killing 
those  that  are  born  before  they  arrive  at  the  age  of  reproduction. 

There  is  another  important  law  that  has  been  established  by 
statistics,  viz.,  that  reproduction  is  in  the  inverse  ratio  to  intelli- 
gence. As  early  as  1852  Spencer  worked  out  the  law  that 
throughout  the  organic  world  reproduction  diminishes  as  evolution 
advances,^  and  he  showed  that  it  was  true  of  human  population. 
Many  since  then  have  been  working  at  the  problem,  especially 
with  reference  to  man,  and  the  result  has  always  been  the  same. 
But  in  the  case  of  man  it  is  always  a  question  of  intellectual  devel- 
opment. Indeed,  the  study  of  man  from  this  point  of  .view  began 
much  earlier,  for  Hippolyte  Passy  in  1839  found  that  in  Paris  the 
number  of  births  per  marriage  averaged  1.97  among  the  rich,  and 
2.86  among  the  poor.^  Mulhall  shows  that  in  the  democratic 
quarter  of  Montmartre  100  women  had  on  an  average  175  children, 
while  in  the  Champs  Elysees,  or  aristocratic  quarter,  the  same 
number  of  women  had  only  86  children.^  Nitti  shows  that  the 
average  birth  rate  per  1000  inhabitants  is  approximately  as  follows: 
in  Pa'-is  among  the  poor  28,  among  the  rich  20  ;  in  Naples,  poor 
39-50,  rich  24-28  ;  among  the  extremely  rich  of  Paris  16.4,  ex- 
tremely poor  38.8.*   It  is  shown  that  marriages  are  contracted  much 

1  Westminster  Review,  Vol.  LVII  (New  Series,  Vol.  I),  April,  1852,  pp.  468-501 
(published  anonymously);  expanded  in  Principles  of  Biology,  Vol.  II,  Part  VI. 

2  cf  Kdouard  van  der  Smissen,  La  Population,  Bru.xelles,  1S93,  pp.  349-353- 
^  Dictionary  of  Statistics,  London,  1892,  p.  93. 

*  F.  Nitti,  Population  and  the  Social  System.  London,  1S94.  pp.  154-158. 


324  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

earlier  among  the  poor,  and  that  much  less  prudential  restraint 
is  practised,  so  that  child-bearing  takes  place  about  as  fast  as  the 
laws  of  nature  will  permit.  The  intelligent  well-to-do  classes,  on 
the  other  hand,  not  only  marry  later  but  have  children  at  much 
longer  intervals.  The  practice  of  one  form  or  another  of  neo-Mal- 
thusianism  is  very  prevalent  among  intelligent  persons.^  This  is 
largely  because  they  are  able  to  see  that  it  is  difficult  to  rear  large 
families  in  the  present  state  of  society,  while  the  poor  and  ignorant 
possess  no  foresight  of  this  kind.  The  effect  on  the  population, 
however,  is  not  as  great  as  it  is  commonly  pictured,  for,  as  we 
have  seen,  the  poor  do  not  succeed  in  rearing  all  their  children. 
They  have  all  the  care  and  burden  with  only  a  small  part  of  the 
satisfaction. 

The  great  bulk  of  the  literature  of  this  question  is  devoted  to 
deploring  the  diminished  birth  rate  and  consequent  supposed  lessen- 
ing of  the  population,  and  all  manner  of  schemes  for  inducing  man- 
kind to  propagate  more  rapidly  have  been  proposed.  It  is  seen  that 
the  less  civilized  countries  increase  most  rapidly,  and  it  is  feared 
that  the  more  civilized  may  eventually  be  outnumbered  and  over- 
run by  relative  barbarians.  For  the  primary  law  of  conquest  and 
subjugation  according  to  which  all  past  social  evolution  has  taken 
place  (see  Pure  Sociology,  Chapter  X)  is  still  operative,  and  no 
nation  is  so. high  in  the  state  of  civilization  brought  about  by  suc- 
cessive social  assimilations  that  it  may  not  still  be  compelled  to 
undergo  them  and  go  through  the  long  series  of  steps  that  lead 
from  conquest  to  nationality.  France  is  particularly  alarmed  and 
fears  that  she  may  be  Germanized,  but  Germany  herself  may  not 
be  so  entirely  safe,  and  may  ultimately  be  Russianized. 

But  barring  these  international  complications  there  is  really  no 
cause  for  alarm  at  the  diminished  birth  rate  in  civilized  countries. 
It  is  the  surest  possible  mark  of  increasing  intelligence.  It  shows 
that  the  rational  faculty  is  a  power  in  social  matters,  and  that  man- 
kind are  growing  more  and  more  resolved  to  emancipate  themselves 
from  the  tyranny  of  the  biologic  law.  If  society  will  not  grapple 
collectively  with  that  law,  then  individuals  who  are  wise  enough  to 

'  The  Evolution  of  Sex,  by  Patrick  Geddes  and  J.  Arthur  Thomson,  London,  1901, 
p.  310. 


Ch.  XIII]  PRIVATIVE  ETHICS  325 

do  so  will  circumvent  it  and  outwit  nature.  Malthus  himself  said  : 
"  To  a  rational  being,  the  prudential  check  to  population  ought  to 
be  considered  as  equally  natural  with  the  check  from  poverty  and 
premature  mortality."  ^  And  John  Stuart  Mill  declared  that  "  little 
improvement  can  be  expected  in  morality  until  the  producing  large 
families  is  regarded  with  the  same  feelings  as  drunkenness  or  any 
other  physical  excess."  ^ 

But  will  it  always  be  necessary  to  restrict  population  at  such  a 
sacrifice  of  the  natural  functions  of  life  and  of  human  happiness  ? 
Not  if  society  ever  succeeds  in  collectively  neutralizing  the  bio- 
logic law.  If  it  shall  abolish  the  economic  struggle  for  existence, 
do  away  with  the  horrors  of  poverty,  and  render  all  its  members 
free  and  independent,  the  incentive  to  keep  down  population  will 
be  removed  and  the  laws  of  reproduction  can  take  their  normal 
course.  Multiplication  cannot  of  course  go  on  at  the  rate  pre- 
scribed by  nature  after  those  born  are  assured  a  normal  duration 
of  life  and  the  chance  to  reproduce  in  turn,  because  the  Malthu- 
sian  law,  which  is  the  law  of  the  whole  organic  world,  forbids  this, 
but  intelligent  beings  will  not  desire  to  increase  at  this  rate  and 
will  know  how  to  regulate  their  fertility  so  that  it  shall  not  only 
come  within  the  range  of  possibility,  but  shall  also  secure  the  max- 
imum of  personal  satisfaction. 

Such  are  the  results  of  the  law  of  nature  working  in  society.  It 
is  often  said  that  this  is  the  fault  of  society,  that  society  itself  creates 
these  conditions,  makes  criminals,  etc.    Thus  Mill  remarks  : 

In  the  economy  of  society,  if  there  be  any  who  suffer  physical  privation  or 
moral  degradation,  whose  bodily  necessities  are  either  not  satisfied  or  satisfied 
in  a  manner  which  only  brutish  creatures  can  be  content  with,  this,  though 
not  necessarily  the  crime  of  society,  \s  pro  tanto  a  failure  of  the  social  arrange- 
ments. And  to  assert  as  a  mitigation  of  the  evil  that  those  who  thus  suffer  are 
the  weaker  members  of  the  community,  morally  or  physically,  is  to.  add  insult 
to  misfortune.* 

Yet  Mill's  idea  seems  to  have  been  that  those  possessing  wealth 
should    have   their  sympathies  quickened    by  a  contemplation  of 

1  Principle  of  Population,  third  edition,  London,  1806,  Vol.  II,  Appendi.x,  p.  516. 

2  Principles  of  Political  Economy,  etc.,  fourth  edition,  London,  1S57,  Vol.  I, 
Book  II,  Chap.  XIII,  §  i,  p.  448,  note. 

3  Fortnightly  Review,  Vol.  XXXI  (New  Series,  Vol.  XXV),  Jan.  i,  i879,p.  225; 
Socialism,  Chicago,  1879,  pp.  28-29. 


326  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

such  conditions,  and  should  in  some  way  do  something  to  reHeve 
them.  This  was  also  the  end  of  Herbert  Spencer's  ethics  :  an 
appeal  to  benevolence.  His  two  large  volumes  culminated  in  that. 
Mojis  laborabat.  The  socialists  and  communists  and  reformers  gen- 
erally are  more  philosophical,  for  they  all  demand  a  reorganization 
of  society  and  the  taking  of  such  matters  into  the  hands  of  society 
itself,  instead  of  leaving  them  to  the  caprice  of  individuals.  In- 
stead of  a  private  charity  they  would  make  it  a  public  charity. 
They  tacitly  assume  that  60  or  80  per  cent  of  the  members  of 
society  are  and  must  always  remain  objects  of  charity,  "the  weaker 
members  of  the  community."  Yet  on  any  kind  of  theory  of  social 
equality  or  social  justice  society  belongs  to  them.  They  are  the 
big  end  of  society.    Thus  far  the  tail  has  been  wagging  the  dog. 

As  regards  this  whole  subject  of  privative  ethics,  all  that  can  be 
said  is  that  when  the  problem  of  the  equaUzation  of  intelligence 
shall  have  been  solved  and  society  awakes  from  its  long  and  fitful 
sleep,  it  will  all  be  over,  like  a  horrid  nightmare,  and  the  world  will 
be  thankful  that  it  was  only  a  dream.  Mankind  want  no  eleemosy- 
nary schemes,  no  private  nor  public  benefactions,  no  fatherly  over- 
sight of  the  privileged  classes,  nor  any  other  form  of  patronizing 
hypocrisy.  They  only  want  power  —  the  power  that  is  theirs  of 
right  and  which  lies  within  their  grasp.  They  have  only  to  reach 
out  and  take  it.  The  victims  of  privative  ethics  are  in  the  immense 
majority.  They  constitute  society.  They  are  the  heirs  of  all  the 
ages.  They  have  only  to  rouse  and  enter  upon  their  patrimony  that 
the  genius  of  all  lands  and  of  all  time  has  generously  bequeathed 
to  them. 

Positive  Ethics.  —  Very  little  is  ever  said  of  positive  ethics,  and 
yet  to  the  sociologist  it  is  the  main  problem.  The  old  ethics,  as  I 
explained  in  Pure  Sociology  (p.  420),  is  essentially  negative,  and  it 
is  also,  theoretically  at  least,  temporary,  since  the  realization  of  its 
ideals,  could  this  be  attained,  would  terminate  it.  Privative  ethics 
belongs  to  the  new  ethics,  but  it  resembles  negative  ethics  in  this 
last  mentioned  respect,  and  with  the  equalization  of  intelligence  it 
would  quickly  cease  to  have  any  importance  for  sociology.  But 
positive  ethics,  which  has  for  its  field  the  increase  of  human  happi- 
ness, would  not  only  still  remain  and  permanently  continue,  but  it 


Ch.  XIII]  POSITIVE  ETHICS 


327 


would  practically  begin  when  privative  ethics  ended.  For  so  long 
as  there  remains  so  much  pain  in  the  world  any  one  is  almost 
ashamed  to  talk  about  increasing  the  pleasure.  It  is  considered 
almost  sinful  to  be  happy  when  so  many  are  miserable.  And  hence 
it  cannot  be  expected  that  there  will  be  any  very  strong  effort 
made  to  improve  society  from  the  positive  side  while  it  stands  in 
so  great  need  of  improvement  from  the  negative  side.  The  fact 
is  that  society  is  still  in  a  pain  economy  (see  Pure  Sociology, 
pp.  283  ff.),  and  positive  ethics  will  not  be  able  to  claim  the  chief 
attention  until  it  shall  have  emerged  from  that  and  fairly  entered 
a  pleasure  economy.  How  long  that  will  be  will  depend  entirely 
upon  how  soon  and  how  energetically  it  undertakes  its  own  regen- 
eration. Its  destinies  are  in  its  own  hands,  and  it  can  move  at 
once,  or  it  can  delay  and  procrastinate  indefinitely.  It  will  probably 
do  the  latter.  All  that  applied  sociology  can  do  is  to  point  the  way. 
If  society  does  not  see  fit  to  take  that  way  the  responsibility  is 
with  society  and  not  with  applied  sociology. 

We  may,  however,  at  least  consider  a  few  of  the  modes  in  which, 
as  it  seems  to  us  now,  the  positive  improvement  of  the  lot  of  man 
is  likely  to  be  effected.  Some  of  these  must  necessarily  be  eco- 
nomic. The  conditions  of  existence  are  such  that  human  happiness 
depends  in  large  degree  upon  the  material  surroundings  of  each 
individual.  As  has  been  consistently  maintained,  it  consists  entirely 
in  the  normal  exercise  of  the  faculties.  But  in  order  to  that  exer- 
cise there  must  be  freedom  from  restraint.  By  faculties  is  meant 
the  functions  of  nature.  The  bodily  functions  are  imperative.  The 
most  vital  of  them  all  is  the  alimentary  function.  If  the  demands 
of  the  stomach  are  not  regularly  and  adequately  supplied  life  is 
jeopardized.  Abundant  nourishment  for  the  body  is  therefore  the 
first  condition  to  liberty.  But  there  are  many  other  material  wants 
that  are  also  essential,  some  of  them  even  to  life.  In  cold  climates 
clothing  and  shelter  as  well  as  such  artificial  heat  as  fuel  can  pro- 
cure are  conditions  of  existence.  All  these  are  furnished  by  money 
or  its  equivalent,  and  no  person  can  live  in  society  as  it  is  now  con- 
stituted without  the  wherewithal  to  purchase  food,  clothing,  shelter, 
and  fuel.  There  are  thousands  of  other  real  wants  the  deprivation 
of  which  restrains  the  freedom  to  exercise  the  faculties.    The  means 


328  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

of  supplying  these  are  usually  the  same  as  those  required  to  supply 
the  primar)-  wants.  In  general,  up  to  a  certain  point,  the  more  of 
these  means  an  individual  possesses  the  more  wants  he  can  supply, 
the  more  complete  is  the  power  to  exercise  all  his  faculties,  and  the 
greater  is  the  volume  of  his  life.  In  short,  considering  society  as 
it  actually  is,  and  as  it  is  likely  to  remain  for  a  long  time  to  come, 
within  certain  limits  that  may  be  approximately  determined,  the 
more  any  one  possesses  of  this  world's  goods  the  greater  may  be 
the  measure  of  his  happiness. 

The  important  corollary  from  all  this  is  that,  provided  it  can  be 
equitably  distributed  among  the  members  of  society,  the  larger  the 
amount  of  such  goods  in  the  world  the  better.  But  even  in  the 
richest  countries  the  total  wealth  is  only  about  one  thousand  dollars 
per  capita.  At  five  per  cent  this  would  yield  fifty  dollars  per  annum. 
At  the  very  lowest  estimate. this  would  not  feed,  clothe,  and  house 
an  average  human  being,  including  infants.  Of  course  the  male 
adult  population  is  supposed  to  be  earning  something,  but  three 
fourths  of  the  population  earn  nothing.  Look  at  it  any  way  we 
will,  and  assuming  the  most  equitable  distribution  possible,  the 
wealth  of  the  world  is  lamentably  deficient  for  the  ordinary  wants 
of  mankind. 

It  follows  from  this  that  the  prime  desideratum  is  the  itKrease 
of  production.  But  some  think  that  production  cannot  be  increased. 
These  are  the  ones  who  talk  about  over-production.  Enough  has 
been  said  on  the  latter  point.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  over- 
production in  the, sense  of  producing  more  than  is  needed.  Ten, 
twenty,  or  even  a  hundred  times  as  much  is  needed  as  is  produced. 
The  only  question  is,  Can  production  be  thus  increased  t  It  cer- 
tainly can.  There  is  scarcely  any  limit  to  the  possible  increase  of 
production.  This  is  especially  true  of  artificial  products.  The  world 
has  scarcely  commenced  to  use  machinery.  Rodbertus  was  right  in 
believing  "  that  natural  wealth  exists  in  practically  unlimited  quanti- 
ties ;  that  the  mission  of  machinery  is  to  centuple  human  produc- 
tivity, and  that  the  vice  does  not  reside  in  the  inability  to  produce, 
but  in  defective  social  organization."^  Professor  Clark  says  that 
"  general  over-production  of  qualitative  increments  is  a  theoretical 

1  See  De  Greef,  La  Sociologie  ficonomique,  Paris,  1904,  p.  18. 


Ch.  XIII]  POSITIVE  ETHICS  329 

and  practical  impossibility.  .  .  .  New  motive  powers,  machines, 
and  processes  are  multiplying,  and  promise  to  increase,  beyond  any 
discernible  limit,  the  capacity  of  man  to  transform  what  nature  places 
in  his  hand."  ^ 

Every  little  while  the  mills  shut  down  because  they  cannot  get 
rid  of  their  product.  This  shows  that  much  more  could  be  produced 
by  the  existing  plants  if  the  market  existed.  Suppose  the  demand 
to  increase  tenfold,  does  any  one  suppose  the  market  would  be 
allowed  to  remain  long  unsupplied .-'  If  it  should  increase  a  hun- 
dredfold it  would  be  supplied  just  as  quickly  as  the  machinery 
could  be  constructed.  But  in  order  really  to  satisfy  all  human 
wants  it  would  undoubtedly  increase  a  hundredfold.  Suppose  this 
actually  to  take  place,  what  would  it  mean .-'  It  would  mean  that  the 
satisfaction  that  mankind  derives  from  the  consumption  of  wealth 
would  be  a  hundred  times  as  great  as  now.  Of  course  a  large  part 
of  this  would  go  to  the  negative  side  of  the  account.  Suppose 
it  to  take  half  of  it  (and  it  could  scarcely  be  less)  to  supply  the 
privation  entailed  by  present  bad  social  conditions,  there  would 
remain  the  other  half,  or  fifty  times  as  much  as  now  falls  to  the 
lot  of  the  average  man,  to  be  set  down  on  the  positive  side  of  the 
account.  He  would  be  carried  as  far  over  into  a  pleasure  economy 
as  he  now  is  in  a  pain  economy. 

It  may  be  said  that  no  one  could  consume  any  such  amount. 
The  present  millionaire  consumes  many  times  as  much  and  still  is 
not  satisfied.  Of  course  he  wastes  it,  —  indulges  in  ostentatious 
rivalry  to  display  his  wealth  and  surpass  other  millionaires.  It  is 
doubtful  whether  this  affords  him  anything  worthy  to  be  called 
happiness.  Positive  ethics  does  not  contemplate  anything  of  this 
kind.  But  it  demands  the  satisfaction  of  all  natural  wants,  material 
and  spiritual,  the  means  of  rearing  a  family  free  from  all  fear  of 
want,  of  educating  children  to  the  limit  of  their  capacities  and  tastes, 
of  building  attractive  homes  stocked  with  all  enlightening  agencies, 
of  moving  about  in  the  world  slifficiently  to  shake  off  all  narrow 
provincialism,  and  of  living  in  the  great  stream  of  human  progress. 
For  every  member  of  society  to  be  able  to  do  this  would  take  not 
less  than  a  hundred  times  the  means  that  now  falls  to  the  lot  of  the 

1  The  Philosophy  of  Wealth,  by  John  B.Clark,  Boston,  1886,  pp.  95.  100. 


330  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

average  human  being.  There  would  be  no  object  in  the  increased 
production  unless  there  were  a  correspondingly  increased  consump- 
tion. In  the  language  of  "political  economy,"  positive  ethics 
demands  an  enormous  rise  in  the  standard  of  living.  It  should  go 
no  further  than  the  satisfaction  of  real  wants,  but  every  want  satis- 
fied adds  to  the  fullness  of  life.  Nor  can  we  judge  by  existing 
wants.  It  demands  the  creation  of  new  wants  and  the  satisfaction 
of  these.  The  whole  object  of  the  fine  arts  is  to  create  new  wants 
in  order  to  satisfy  them.  This  lifts  the  man  so  much  higher  in  the 
scale  of  existence.  But  life  itself  is  capable  of  being  made  a  fine 
art.  The  human  organization  is  susceptible  of  being  attuned  to 
a  thousand  refined  and  ennobling  sentiments  to  which  it  is  now 
a  stranger,  and  every  chord  that  is  struck  on  this  harp  of  a 
thousand  strings  creates  a  thrill  that  lifts  the  soul  into  a  higher 
world. 

Such  is  the  mission  of  posit i\-e  ethics,  and  it  represents  a  state 
that  contains  within  itself  no  limitations  as  to  duration.  From  a 
quite  different  standpoint  I  have  once  before  endeavored  to  peer 
into  the  future  of  the  human  race.^  I  was  then  concerned  with 
combating  the  more  or  less  superficial  views  still  current  relative 
to  the  early  decline  of  the  race,  and  had  in  view  man's  future 
possible  achievement  rather  than  his  improvement  in  the  ethical 
sense,  but  it  is  obvious  that  the  two  must  go  hand  in  hand.  At 
the  conclusion  of  that  paper  I  said  : 

From  any  such  standpoint  as  that  from  which  we  are  now  viewing  the  races 
of  men  the  world  appears  to  be  in  an  infantile  state.  Europe  and  North 
America,  where  the  highest  civilization  is  found,  form  much  less  than  half  the 
globe,  and  the  population  of  those  areas  is  proportionally  still  less.  By  far  the 
greater  part  of  the  earth  has  scarcely  been  touched  with  the  spirit  of  science. 
That  this  influence  is  destined  to  spread  over  the  whole  earth  is  scarcely  open 
to  doubt.  But  the  scientific  achievements  of  the  most  advanced  races,  great  as 
they  may  seem  when  compared  with  pre-scientific  ages,  are  really  trifling  when 
looked  at  from  the  standpoint  of  possibilities. 

Every  one  has  seen  a  map  of  the  surface  of  the  planet  Mars  with  its  wonder- 
ful canals.  Schiaparelli  was  perfectly  right  in  saying  that  they  indicate  the 
action  of  inteUigent  beings.    The  chief  objection  to  this  view  is  the  gigantic 

^  La  Differenciation  et  I'lntegration  sociales,  une  Utopia  sociologique,  Annales  de 
I'Institut  international  de  sociologie,  Tome IX,  Paris,  1903,  pp.  49-85  ;  Social  Differ- 
entiation and  Social  Integration,  American  Journal  of  Sociology,  Chicago,  Vol.  VIII, 
May,  1903,  pp.  721-745. 


Ch.  XIII]  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  ATTRACTION  33 1 

scale  on  which  these  works  are  projected.  It  is  said  that  man  has  never  under- 
taken anything  so  colossal.  The  comparatively  trifling  task  of  cutting  a  chan- 
nel large  enough  for  ships  to  pass  through  the  narrow  Isthmus  of  Panama  has 
well-nigh  baffled  his  powers.  What  can  be  thought  of  a  scheme  of  making  a 
whole  continent  a  network  of  great  rivers  many  miles  in  width.''  Without  pre- 
tending to  any  knowledge  of  areography,  and  without  expressing  any  opinion 
as  to  the  nature  of  the  Martian  canals,  I  will  merely  use  this  as  an  illustration 
of  the  possibilities  of  an  intelligent  being  occupying  a  planet  for  a  sufficiently 
prolonged  period.  If  these  canals  really  represent  gigantic  engineering  opera- 
tions, their  magnitude  is  no  obstacle  to  our  understanding  them.  Mars,  from 
his  position  in  the  solar  system,  is  many  million  years  older  than  the  earth. 
Assuming  that  he  has  had  an  approximately  parallel  experience  with  that  of 
the  earth,  his  Tertiary  period  began  ages  earlier  than  ours.  If  the  intelligent 
being,  whatever  its  physical  form,  was  developed  there  at  the  same  relative 
date  as  man,  that  being  has  been  in  existence  millions  of  years  longer  than  man. 
The  age  of  race  differentiation  need  not  have  been  longer  than  that  of  man. 
All  the  rest  of  that  vast  period  has  been  passed  in  race  integration  and  what- 
ever followed  this.  We  may  suppose  that  an  era  of  science  was  evolved  there 
as  here  and  at  approximately  the  same  stage  in  the  history  of  the  species. 
But  that  era  has  lasted  thousands  of  times  as  long  as  has  ours.  Man  has 
only  just  begun  the  conquest  of  nature.  We  may  suppose  that  in  Mars  the 
conquest  of  nature  is  complete,  and  that  everj'  law  and  every  force  of  nature 
has  been  discovered  and  utilized.  Under  such  conditions  there  would  seem  to 
be  scarcely  any  limit  to  the  power  of  the  being  possessing  this  knowledge  to 
transform  the  planet  and  adapt  it  to  its  needs. 

The  lesson  is  that  man  may  also  do  this.  With  any  considerable  part  of  the 
time  that  the  supposed  inhabitants  of  Mars  have  had,  man  can  scarcely  fail  to 
reach  a  stage  at  which  he  will  become  absolute  master  of  his  physical  environ- 
ment, and  at  which  the  operations  which  he  now  performs  will  seem  like  the 
work  of  ants.  Just  as  he  has  now  learned  that  in  union  is  strength,  and  that 
the  way  of  safety,  success,  and  achievement  lies  through  association,  so  he  will 
then  have  learned  that  this  is  as  true  of  races  as  of  individuals,  and  that  the 
union,  association,  and  complete  fusion  of  all  races  into  one  great  homogeneous 
race  —  the  race  of  man  —  is  the  final  step  in  social  evolution. 

The  future  of  positive  ethics  is  unlimited,  and  while  the  possibili- 
ties of  human  achievement  are  thus  vast,  those  of  social  improvement 
may  and  doubtless  will  fully  keep  pace  with  it. 


The  Prin'ciple  of  Attraction 

The  final  problem  of  applied  sociology  is  that  of  showing  how  it 
may  be  reduced  to  rigidly  scientific  principles.  In  all  my  works  I 
have  consistently  maintained  that  sociology  is  a  true  science,  that  it 
is  a  domain  of  natural  forces,  and  that  its  phenomena  conform  in  all 


332  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

respects  to  the  Newtonian  laws.  If  this  is  the  case  the  phenomena 
of  society  may  and  indeed  must  be  proceeded  with  in  precisely  the 
same  way  that  the  man  of  science  proceeds  with  the  phenomena  of 
the  physical  world.  Let  us  imagine  a  physicist  in  his  laboratory  at 
work  on  some  practical  problem.  Let  us  suppose  that  he  is  deaUng 
with  gases  and  is  trying  to  make  them  pass  into  different  receptacles, 
or  through  certain  liquids,  or  to  separate  those  that  are  mechanically 
mixed  and  obtain  them  in  the  pure  state.  It  matters  not  what  the 
problem  before  him  may  be,  he  never  thinks  of  employing  but  one 
fundamental  principle,  and  that  may  be  called  the  principle  of  attrac- 
tion. It  is  true  that  the  word  "  attraction  "  is  objectionable,  and  that 
most  physicists  now  assume  that  even  what  is  called  the  attraction 
of  gravitation  is  not  attraction  at  all,  but  some  kind  of  atom-pelting 
which  is  little  understood.  Attraction  in  the  sense  that  one  body 
draws  another  to  or  toward  it  when  there  is  nothing  but  empty  space 
between  them,  called  action  at  a  distance  {actio  in  distans),  is,  as 
Newton  said,^  an  "  absurdity."  But  aside  from  this  purely  physical, 
or  rather  metaphysical  sense,  the  word  "attraction"  is  appropriate 
and  useful,  and  there  is  no  substitute  for  it.  Moreover,  everybody 
clearly  understands  what  is  meant  by  it.  It  also  has  several  con- 
venient derivatives  (attractive,  attractively,  attractiveness,  not  to 
speak  of  the  verb,  to  attract,  from  which  all  these  words  are  derived) 
that  render  it  thoroughly  manageable  in  discussing  the  questions  to 
which  it  applies.  When  we  say  that  a  magnet  attracts  iron,  or  that 
a  subject  is  attracting  attention,  no  less  than  when  we  speak  of  an 
attractive  person  or  an  attractive  theme,  we  are  sure  to  be  under- 
stood precisely  as  we  mean  to  be.  And  when  the  physicist  seeks  to 
attract  his  gases  into  the  retorts  arranged  for  them  there  is  no 
metaphysical  principle  involved.  As  he  pumps  one  out  another 
rushes  in  according  to  laws  that  he  perfectly  understands.  Although 
the  gases  themselves  are  not  forces,  yet  they  act  under  the  influence 
of  forces.  In  other  words,  they  possess  properties,  and  at  bottom 
all  properties  are  forces. 

But  the  subjects  experimented  with  need  not  be  fluids  in  order  to 
be  subject  to  the  principle  of  attraction.    They  may  on  the  one  hand 

1  Third  letter  to  Bentley.    Four  Letters  from  Sir  Isaac  Newton  to  Doctor  Bentley, 
London,  1756,  pp.  25-26.    See  also  Pure  Sociologj',  p.  171. 


Ch.  XIII]  THE  PRINCIPLE  OF  ATTRACTION  333 

be  solids,  for  all  material  substances  possess  properties,  or  on  the 
other  hand  they  may  belong  to  the  subtle  medium  which,  for  want 
of  a  better  term,  is  called  ether.  The  physicist  deals  with  gases  and 
air,  with  water  and  oil,  with  viscid  and  gelatinous  substances,  with  iron 
and  steel,  and  rock  and  adamant,  all  according  to  this  same  principle. 
But  he  needs  and  uses  no  other  when  he  deals  with  magnetism, 
gravitation,  electricity,  heat,  or  light.  He  can  make  all  these  sub- 
stances, forces,  and  elements  of  nature  do  his  bidding  simply  by  the 
process  of  attraction.  This,  it  is  true,  is  a  somewhat  generalized 
view,  and  the  investigator  does  not  usually  employ  that  term,  but  if 
he  will  analyze  his  processes  he  will  see  that  they  all  may  be  reduced 
to  that  form  of  expression.  The  antithesis  of  this  process  w^ould  be 
to  attempt  to  force  his  gases  into  his  tubes  and  retorts,  and  gener- 
ally to  try  and  compel  natural  forces  to  obey  his  will.  It  is  perfectly 
obvious  that  this  would  be  impossible,  and  he  never  so  much  as  once 
thinks  of  resorting  to  it. 

Not  only  all  experimentation  but  also  all  invention  is  based  on  the 
principle  of  attraction.  I  have  fully  worked  out  the  laws  of  inven- 
tion and  of  the  control  of  physical  forces  in  other  works,^  and  need 
not  repeat  anything  previously  said,  but  it  is  clear  that  the  process 
is  the  same  that  has  been  outlined  above,  although  now  placed  in  a 
somewhat  different  light  for  a  specific  purpose.  That  purpose  is  to 
show  that  when  we  pass  from  physical  forces  to  psychic  forces  there 
is  no  change  in  the  process  or  the  method.  This  becomes  clear 
when  we  come  to  compare  experimentation  and  invention  in  the 
physical  world  with  the  control  of  animal  activities.  We  here  have 
to  do  with  another  of  the  great  sciences  of  the  hierarchy,  viz.,  psy- 
chology, and  especially  with  that  branch  of  psychology  which  lies 
nearest  to  biology  and  which  binds  these  two  sciences  together,  viz., 
the  subscience  that  I  have  called  psychics  (see  Pure  Sociology,  pp. 
150-159).  So  far  as  experimentation  and  invention  are  concerned 
l)sychics  does  not  differ  in  any  essential  respect  from  physics,  but 
the  principle  of  attraction  is  still  more  clearly  seen  to  be  its  essential 
basis.  It  was  there  shown  that  the  laws  of  mind  are  the  same  for 
all  beings  endowed  with  psychic  attributes.    The  social  forces,  as  I 

1  Psychic  Factors  of  Civilization,  Chapters  XXVII  to  XXIX  ;  Pure  Sociology,  pp. 
255.  493  ff- 


334  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

have  always  maintained,  reside  in  the  affective  or  subjective  facul- 
ties, and  these  were  fully  developed  in  the  animal  world  before  man 
made  his  appearance.  They  are  the  same  in  the  highest  types  of 
men  as  in  the  lowest  types  of  animals,  and  they  are  natural  forces 
as  uniform  and  reliable  as  the  forces  that  control  the  inorganic 
world.  They  are  of  course  more  complex  and  difficult  to  grasp,  and 
grow  increasingly  more  so  with  organic  development,  until  in  rational 
man  they  are  still  further  complicated  by  the  presence  of  the  direct- 
ive agent.  They  are  not,  however,  inscrutable,  and  their  study  not- 
withstanding all  these  complications  is  possible,  and  it  is  not  specially 
difficult  to  discover  and  formulate  their  laws.  When  the  law  of 
parsimony  (Pure  Sociology,  pp.  i6i  ff.)  and  the  principle  of  attrac- 
tion are  clearly  understood  it  becomes  possible  to  enter  upon  the  field 
of  social  experimentation  and  social  invention  with  the  prospect  of 
their  ultimately  yielding  results  as  much  more  important  than  those 
of  physical  experimentation  and  physical  invention  as  this  field  is 
higher  and  more  vitally  important  than  the  other.  This  is  saying 
much  when  we  consider  the  vast  results  that  have  flowed  from  the 
study  of  the  physical  world  by  scientific  methods,  but  in  view  of  all 
that  has  been  said  I  do  not  hesitate  to  go  that  far. 

Attractive  Labor.  —  Any  man  who  breaks  a  new  way  by  uttering 
a  great  truth  that  had  escaped  the  attention  of  the  world  is  worthy 
to  receive  the  homage  of  the  world,  and  the  fact  that  such  a  man 
uttered  other  things  that  the  world  rejects,  or  is  not  yet  ready  to 
accept,  is  a  poor  reason  for  withholding  that  homage.  Attractive 
labor  is  not  the  only  principle  announced  by  Charles  Fourier  that 
has  since  been  recognized  as  resting  on  a  scientific  basis.^  Of  it 
Comte  says  with  an  apology  in  a  footnote  for  mentioning  it : 

To  pursue  many  different  occupations  at  the  same  time,  and  purposely  pass 
from  one  to  the  other  with  all  possible  rapiditj'  :  such  is  the  new  plan  of  uni- 
versal labor  that  they  dare  to-day  systematically  to  recommend  to  civilized 
humanity  as  essentially  attractivep- 

Much  more  boldly  John  Stuart  Mill  speaks  of  Fourierism  as  "a 
system  which,  if  only  as  a  specimen  of  intellectual  ingenuity,  is 

1  He  clearly  stated  the  law  of  survivals  in  ethnology,  and  his  periods  of  human 
history  and  culture  are  essentially  those  of  Lewis  H.  Morgan. 

2  Philosophie  positive,  Vol.  IV,  pp.  423-424. 


Ch.  XIII]  ATTRACTIVE  LABOR  ^--c 

O  O  D 

highly  worthy  of  the  attention  of  any  student,  either  of  society  or 
of  the  human  mind."    And  he  goes  on  to  say: 

There  is  scarcely  an  objection  or  a  difficulty  which  Fourier  did  not  foresee, 
and  against  which  he  did  not  make  provision  beforehand  by  self-acting  con- 
trivances, grounded,  however,  upon  a  less  high  principle  of  distributive  justice 
than  that  of  Communism,  since  he  admits  inecjualities  of  distribution  and  indi- 
vidual ownership  of  capital,  but  not  the  arbitrary  disposal  of  it.  The  great 
problem  which  he  grapples  with  is  how  to  make  labor  attractive,  since,  if  this 
could  be  done,  the  principal  difficulty  of  Socialism  would  be  overcome.  He 
maintains  that  no  kind  of  useful  labor  is  necessarily  or  universally  repugnant, 
unless  either  excessive  in  amount  or  devoid  of  the  stimulus  of  companionship 
and  emulation,  or  regarded  by  mankind  with  contempt.' 

Spencer,  without  mentioning  any  names,  remarks  : 

When  we  have  come  fully  to  recognize  the  truth  that  there  is  nothing 
intrinsically  more  gratifying  in  the  efforts  by  which  wild  animals  are  caught,  than 
in  the  efforts  expended  in  rearing  plants,  and  that  the  combined  actions  of 
muscles  and  senses  in  rowing  a  boat  are  not  by  their  essential  natures  more 
productive  of  agreeable  feeling  than  those  gone  through  in  reaping  corn,  but 
that  everything  depends  on  the  co-operating  emotions,  which  at  present  are  more 
in  accordance  with  the  one  than  with  the  other  ;  we  shall  infer  that  along  with 
decrease  of  those  emotions  for  which  the  social  state  affords  little  or  no  scope, 
and  increase  of  those  which  it  persistently  exercises,  the  things  now  done  with 
dislike  from  a  sense  of  obligation  will  be  done  with  immediate  liking,  and  the 
things  desisted  from  as  a  matter  of  duty  will  be  desisted  from  because  they  are 
repugnant.- 

And  again  : 

We  come  now  to  a  question  of  special  interest  to  us  —  Can  the  human  con- 
stitution be  so  adapted  to  its  present  conditions,  that  the  needful  amount  of 
labour  to  be  gone  through  will  be  agreeable  .''  An  affirmative  answer  will,  to  most 
people,  seem  absurd.  .  .  .  Though  they  probably  know  some  who  so  love  work 
that  it  is  difficult  to  restrain  them,  —  though  here  and  there  they  meet  one  who 
complains  that  a  holiday  is  a  weariness  ;  yet  it  does  not  seem  to  them  reason- 
able to  suppose  that  the  due  tendency  to  continuous  labour,  which  is  now  an 
exceptional  trait,  may  become  a  universal  trait.^ 

Veblen  and  Ratzenhofer  have  shown  (see  Pure  Sociology,  pp. 
162,  245)  that  the  odium  of  labor  is  a  matter  of  caste,  that  it  is 
shunned  and  not  respectable  because  habitually  performed  by  per- 
sons of  a  lower  class,  and  that  in  and  of  itself  there  is  nothing 

1  Fortnightly  Review,  Vol.  XXXI  (New  Series,  Vol.  XXV),  April  i,  1879,  p.  523; 
Socialism,  by  John  Stuart  Mill,  Chicago,  1879,  pp.  120-121. 

2  Data  of  Ethics  (Principles  of  Ethics,  Vol.  I),  pp.  183-184  (§  67). 
'Principles  of  Ethics,  Vol.  I,  pp.  4S8,  489  (§  202). 


336  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

unpleasant  about  work  that  does  not  exhaust  the  system.  We 
are  brought  back  to  the  principle  that  has  been  several  times  stated, 
that  the  normal  exercise  of  the  faculties  is  not  only  agreeable,  but, 
in  the  broadest  sense  of  the  expression,  constitutes  the  sum  total 
of  human  happiness.  In  the  state  of  society  which  it  was  sought  to 
picture  in  the  last  section  not  only  would  the  economic  production 
be  greatly  increased  but  the  amount  of  labor  required  to  produce  it 
would,  on  account  of  the  increased  use  of  machinery,  be  materially 
diminished.  There  is  no  reason  why,  under  such  conditions,  the  labor 
of  supplying  society  with  all  the  material  goods  needed  for  its  gen- 
eral comfort  should  not  become  both  agreeable  and  attractive. 
There  would  be  no  necessity  of  waiting  for  the  slow  action  of  evolu- 
tion in  transforming  human  character,  as  contemplated  by  Spencer. 
The  result  can  as  easily  be  brought  about  by  the  transformation  of 
human  institutions.  There  is  no  such  inherent  dislike  for  labor  as  he 
describes.  The  reason  why  men  prefer  to  exercise  their  faculties  in 
the  chase  and  in  such  sports  as  rowing  a  boat  is  that  these  pursuits 
are  respectable,  while  reaping  corn  is  the  work  of  peasants  which 
men  of  the  higher  social  classes  would  be  ashamed  to  be  seen  doing. 
The  equalization  of  intelligence  would  soon  brush  away  these  social 
cobwebs  and  make  all  labor  respectable,  even  as  the  books  now 
declare  it  to  be. 

How  to  make  labor  attractive,  like  all  other  questions  of  method, 
belongs  to  the  social  art  and  to  practical  minds.  It  has  been  abun- 
dantly shown,  and  not  entirely  by  Fourier,  that  it  is  possible.  Not 
only  so,  but  it  is  proved  by  a  thousand  concrete  cases  that  labor  is 
attractive,  considered  as  a  regular  mode  of  deriving  both  pleasure 
and  profit  from  the  exercise  of  the  faculties.  It  is  only  necessary  to 
divest  it,  first,  of  the  artificial,  or  at  least  unnatural  odium  derived 
from  the  spirit  of  caste,  and  secondly,  of  the  undue  excess  to  which 
it  is  carried  in  society,  which  would  rob  the  most  enjoyable  forms 
of  activity  of  all  their  charms.  To  devise  means  for  rendering  all 
labor  attractive  is  the  function  of  society  when  it  shall  have  become 
rational.  Society  has  displayed  ingenuity  (see  Pure  Sociology, 
p.  568)  in  many  ways  and  with  the  equalization  of  intelligence  this, 
as  with  the  individual,  will  become  a  leading  trait.  The  principal 
method  of  such  social  action  remains  to  be  dealt  with. 


Ch.  XIII]  ATTRACTIVE  LEGISLATION  o.-. 

^  o  / 

Attractive  Legislation.  —  Although  I  have  made  frequent  use  of 
this  expression  and  somewhat  fully  treated  the  topic  in  other  works, 
still  this  has  always  been  in  an  incidental  way.  It  is  here  only  that 
it  finds  its  systematic  place,  and  all  that  has  been  said  of  it  in  other 
places  may  be  regarded  as  belonging  here.  It  constitutes  the  most 
important  application  of  the  principle  of  attraction  in  general,  and 
serves  better  than  any  other  example  to  illustrate  the  scientific 
character  of  sociology.  When  we  say  that  society  does  anything 
we  mean  of  course  that  it  does  it  according  to  some  settled  method 
of  social  action.  Society  of  course  is  an  abstraction,  but  it  is  one  of 
those  abstractions  that  are  always  doing  something.  Society  always 
possesses  an  organization,  and  it  is  this  organization  that  acts.  It 
would  be  as  reasonable  to  object  to  the  statement  that  an  army  does 
anything.  An  army  is  an  abstraction  in  the  same  sense  that  society 
is  such.  It  is  an  organization  capable  of  doing  much,  and  this  is  all 
that  is  meant  by  the  action  or  the  work  of  society. 

Social  organizations  differ  greatly  in  their  details,  but  they  all  agree 
in  acting  through  some  regularly  constituted  authority.  We  Ameri- 
cans, accustomed  to  see  all  laws  enacted  by  representatives  of  the 
people  chosen  by  their  ballots  and  constantly  watched  by  their  con- 
stituents, are  slow  to  acknowledge  that  the  so-called  laws  of  the 
Russian  government,  for  example,  which  we  know  to  be  made  by 
a  few  individuals  without  any  knowledge  or  cooperation  on  the  part 
of  the  people,  really  are  laws,  and  we  would  fully  justify  the  people 
in  disobeying  and  repudiating  them  if  they  had  the  power  to  do  so. 
And  yet  we  must  remember  that  representative  government  is  of  very 
recent  date,  and  is  limited  to  a  few  of  the  most  advanced  countries. 
Society  has,  however,  at  all  times  and  in  all  lands  been  organized 
so  that  it  could  act.  It  was  doubtless  so  to  a  certain  extent  in  the 
simplest  hordes  of  the  protosocial  stage,  though  here  we  may  go 
back  until  the  condition  is  reached  in  which  we  find  gregarious 
animals,  which,  nevertheless,  possess  a  sort  of  intuitive  organization 
that  serves  their  purpose.  But  after  the  first  conquest  the  con- 
stituted authority  of  the  new  amalgamating  society  resides  in  the 
army  with  its  chieftains,  and  these  rule  with  an  iron  hand.  Later 
on,  as  was  shown  in  Pure  Sociology  (p.  206),  laws  are  made  and  the 
state  emerges.    The  action  of  the  state  is  always  that  of  society, 


338  APPLIED   SOCIOLOGY  [Part  III 

and  it  grows  more  and  more  intelligent  with  each  step  in  social  assim- 
ilation. But  for  a  great  while  the  intelligence  of  society  is  lodged 
in  a  few  individuals  who  constitute  its  rulers.  During  all  this  period 
these  constituted  authorities  are  much  more  intelligent  than  the 
people  at  large.  It  is  therefore  more  inventive,  and  while  the 
ingenuity  displayed  is  largely  directed  to  securing  the  personal  ends 
of  these  comparatively  few  persons,  still  a  small  share  of  it  always 
tends  to  the  amelioration  of  the  whole  mass.  As  I  have  previously 
stated  (Outlines  of  Sociology,  p.  276),  autocracies  are  more  intelli- 
gent, or  rather,  less  stupid  than  democracies,  and  for  the  very  rea- 
son that  they  are  not  representative.  A  people  so  low  intellectually 
as  to  tolerate  an  autocracy  could,  if  we  conceive  it  to  be  democrat- 
ically organized,  do  nothing  in  the  way  of  social  invention.  But  auto- 
cratically organized  it  may  do  much,  depending  upon  the  mental 
character  of  its  rulers.  Nothing,  however,  worthy  of  the  name  of 
scientific  legislation,  i.e.,  legislative  invention  in  the  interests  of  the 
people,  is  possible  except  in  a  democracy  in  which  all  the  people 
are  intelligent,  so  that  the  representatives  of  the  people  are  persons 
of  considerable  mental  development.  When  the  people  become  so 
intelligent  that  they  know  how  to  choose  as  their  representatives 
persons  of  decided  ability,  who  know  something  of  human  nature, 
who  recognize  that  there  are  social  forces,  and  that  their  duty  is  to 
devise  ways  and  means  for  scientifically  controlling  those  forces  on 
exactly  the  same  principles  that  an  experimenter  or  an  inventor  con- 
trols the  forces  of  physical  nature,  then  we  may  look  for  scientific 
legislation.  And  the  fundamental  principle  that  will  be  applied  in 
all  cases  will  be  the  principle  of  attraction.  They  will  see  that 
mandatory  and  prohibitory  laws  are  highly  expensive  and  largely 
ineffective,  and  that  the  only  cheap  and  effective  way  to  control  the 
social  forces  and  cause  men  to  perform  the  acts  beneficial  to  society 
is  to  offer  such  inducements  as  will  in  all  cases  make  it  to  their 
advantage  to  perform  such  acts.  It  is  probable  that  nearly  or  quite 
all  the  socially  advantageous  action  could  be  secured  through  attract- 
ive legislation. 

It  must  not  be  supposed  that  such  legislation  can  be  conducted 
to  any  considerable  extent  in  the  open  sessions  of  legislative 
bodies.    These   will  doubtless   need  to  be  maintained,  and  every 


Ch.  XIII]  ATTR.\CTIVE  LEGISLATION 


JO^ 


new  law  should  be  finally  adopted  by  a  vote  of  such  bodies, 
but  more  and  more  this  will  become  a  merely  formal  way  of  putting 
the  final  sanction  of  society  on  decisions  that  have  been  carefully 
worked  out  in  what  may  be  called  the  sociological  laboratory.  Legis- 
lation will  consist  in  a  series  of  exhaustive  experiments  on  the  part 
of  true  scientific  sociologists  and  sociological  inventors  working  on 
the  problems  of  social  physics  from  the  practical  point  of  view.  It 
will  undertake  to  solve  not  only  questions  of  general  interest  to  the 
state,  —  the  maintenance  of  revenues  without  compulsion  and  with- 
out friction  and  the  smooth  and  peaceful  conduct  of  all  the  operations 
of  a  nation, — but  questions  of  social  improvement,  the  amelioration 
of  the  condition  of  all  the  people,  the  removal  of  whatever  privations 
may  still  remain,  and  the  adoption  of  means  to  the  positive  increase 
of  the  social  welfare,  in  short  the  organization  of  human  happiness 
(see  Dynamic  Sociology,  Vol.  II,  p.  156). 

Attractive  labor  could  never  be  fully  secured  without  the  aid  of 
attractive  legislation,  and  one  of  the  leading  problems  always  before 
the  scientific  legislator  must  be  that  of  rendering  labor  more  and 
more  attractive  and  agreeable.  The  goal  toward  which  all  his 
efforts  would  tend  would  be  a  state  of  society  in  which  no  one 
should  be  obliged  to  do  anything  that  is  in  any  way  distasteful  to 
him,  and  in  which  every  act  should  be  so  agreeable  that  he  will  do 
it  from  personal  preference.  The  great  economy  of  this  is  apparent 
at  a  glance,  since  all  the  negative  terms  of  the  equation  would  be 
eliminated  and  all  energy  conserved.  This  would  increase  in  the 
same  degree  the  productive  power  of  society,  and  the  increased 
production  that  would  result,  assuming,  as  in  such  a  state  of  society 
it  is  safe  to  assume,  that  it  was  equitably  distributed,  would  still  fur- 
ther contribute  to  the  general  welfare.  Thus  all  the  varied  streams 
of  benefit  would  unite  in  securing  the  twofold  end  of  increasing  the 
sum  total  of  social  efficiency  and  social  improvement. 


LIST  OF  AUTHORS  AND  TITLES  OF  WORKS,  ARTI- 
CLES, AND  MEMOIRS  QUOTED  OR  CITED,  WITH 
CRITICAL  AND  EXPLANATORY  NOTES  i 


[Figures  in  black  type  refer  to  pages  of  this  work] 


In  many  cases,  and  especially  in  the  quotations  placed  at  the  heads  of 
chapters,  etc.,  full  references  would  be  literary  blemishes.  These  and  other 
deficiencies  from  the  standpoint  of  completeness  and  utility  will  in  great  part  be 
supplied  by  this  list. 

Allbutt,  T.  Clifford 

On  Brain  Forcing.    Brain,  London,  Vol.  I,  April,  1878,  pp.  60-78. 
Quoted  on  pp.  265-266. 

Allen,  Grant 

The  Genesis  of  Genius.    Atlantic  Monthly,  Vol.  XLVII,  Boston,  March, 
1881,  pp.  371-381. 
See  p.  139. 
Ward's   Dynamic  Sociology.    Mind,  A  Quarterly  Review  of   Psychology 
and  Philosophy,  London,  Vol.  IX,  April,  1884,  pp.  305-311. 
Quoted  on  pp.  104  and  297. 
Modern  College  Education:   Does  it  Educate,  in  the  Broadest  and  Most 
Liberal  Sense  of  the  Term?    The  Cosmopolitan,  Vol.  XXIII,  New 
York,  October,  1897,  pp.  611-616. 
Quoted  on  p.  298. 

Aristotle 

Aristotelis  de  Anima   Libri   III.    Recognovit  Guilelmus   Biehl.    Lipsiae, 
1896. 

The  quotation  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  X,  p.  224,  occurs  on 
p.  85  of  this  edition  (F.  4.  430  a).    See  also  p.  236. 

AVERROES 

See  Draper,  Renan,  and  Ueberweg. 

Bacon,  Francis,  Lord 

The  Works  of  Francis  Bacon,  Baron  of  Verulam,  Viscount  of  St.  Albans, 
and  Lord  High  Chancellor  of  F^ngland,  collected  and  edited  by  James 

\  For  the  third  time  it  is  my  pleasant  duty  to  acknowledge  the  assistance  rendered 
me  by  Mr.  David  Hutcheson,  Superintendent  of  the  Reading  Rooms  of  the  Library  of 
Congress,  in  the  bibliographical  work  connected  with  my  writings,  and  especially  with 
the  preparation  of  this  volume. 

341 


342 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


Spedding,  Robert  Leslie  Ellis,  and   Douglas  Denon  Heath.  Vol.  I, 
New  York,  1869. 

The  passage  quoted  in  the  footnote  to  p.  68  is  from  the  Praefatio 
to  the  Instauratio  Magna,  p.  205.  That  placed  at  the  head  of  Chap- 
ter Vn,  p.  84,  is  from  the  Novum  Organum,  Book  I,  Aph.  LXI, 
p.  264.  The  quotation  on  p.  117  is  also  from  the  Novum  Organum, 
Book  I,  Aph.  XLVI,  p.  254.  That  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  XI, 
p.  285,  is  from  Book  H,  Aph.  XLIX,  p.  516.    See  also  p.  101. 

Bagehot,  Walter 

Physics  and  Politics  ;    or.  Thoughts    on   the  Application  of  the   Princi- 
ples of  "Natural  Selection"  and  "  Inheritance"  to  Political  Society. 
International  Scientific  Series,  New  York,  1877. 
Quoted  on  pp.  33-34. 

Barth,  Paul 

Die  Philosophic  der  Geschichte  als  Sociologie.  Erster  Theil:  Einleitung 
und  kritische  Ubersicht,  Leipzig,  1897. 
See  p.  47. 

Bastian,  Adolf 

Der  \'6lkergedanke  im  Aufbau  einer  Wissenschaft  vom  Menschen.  Berlin, 
1881. 

See  p.  43. 

Beccaria,  Cesare 

Dei  Delitti  e  delle  Pene.  Milano,  1764.  Also  in  Opere  di  Cesare  Bec- 
caria, Milano,  Vol.  I,  1821,  pp  1-126.  The  maxim  quoted  on  p.  31 
is  printed  in  italics  on  p.  10  of  the  Opere,  Vol.  I. 

Bentham,  Jeremy 

The  Works  of  Jeremy  Bentham,  published  under  the  superintendence  of 
his  executor,  John  Bowring.    Edinburgh  and  London,  1843. 
Quoted  on  p.  31. 

Blacksto.n'e,  Sir  Willia.ai 

Commentaries  on  the  Laws  of  England.     London,  1 765-1 769. 
See  p.  74. 

Blatchford,  Robert  (Nuxquam) 

Merrie  England.    People's  Edition,  London,  1894. 
Quoted  on  p.  97. 
BucKE,  Richard  Maurice 

Man's  Moral  Nature:  An  Essay.    New  York,  1879. 
Quoted  on  p.  34. 

Buckle,  Henry  Thomas 

History  of  Civilization  in  England.     London,  Vol.  I,  1857;  Vol.  II,  1861. 
The  passage  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  VII,  p.  84.  is  so  modified. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  343 

without  altering  the  sense,  as  to  be  complete  in  itself.  It  is  the  be- 
ginning of  a  longer  passage  that  runs  as  follows:  "The  totality  of 
human  actions  being  thus,  from  the  highest  point  of  view,  governed 
by  the  totality  of  human  knowledge,"  etc.,  Vol.  I,  p.  209.  This  is 
simply  the  following  up  of  what  was  said  on  the  preceding  page,  as 
follows :  "  The  total  actions  of  mankind,  considered  as  a  whole,  are 
left  to  be  regulated  by  tlie  total  knowledge  of  which  mankind  is 
possessed." 

The  passages  on  pp.  274  and  275  are  literal  quotations. 

BuNYAN,  John 

Grace  Abounding  to  the  Chief  of  Sinners.    [Constituting  an  autobiography 
of  John  Bunyan.]    Works  of  that  Eminent  Servant  of  Christ,  John 
Bunyan,   Minister  of  the   Gospel.    Illustrated    Edition,  two  volumes 
in  one,  Philadelphia,  187 1,  pp.  29-63. 
Quoted  on  pp.  255-256. 

Candolle,  Alphoxse  de 

Histoire  des  Sciences  et  des  Savants  depuis  deux  Siecles,  prdc^dde  et  sui- 
vie  d'autres  etudes  sur  des  sujets  scientitiques,  en  particulier  sur 
I'hereditd  et  la  selection  dans  I'espece  humaine.  Deuxieme  edition 
considerablement  augmentee,  Geneve-Bale,  1885. 

See  pp.  138,  161.  181,  196.  300.    Quoted  on  pp.  146,  162,  164- 
165,  200,  201,  204.  211,  245,  272-273. 

Carlyle,  Thomas 

Sartor  Resartus.    London,  1834. 
Quoted  on  p.  126. 

On  Heroes,  Hero-worship,  and  the  Heroic  in  History.     London,  1840. 

The  saying  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  X,  p.  224,  universally 
credited  to  Carlyle,  frequently  quoted,  and  placed  conspicuously  in 
a  panel  in  the  national  library  at  Washington,  does  not  seem  to 
occur  in  quite  so  simple  a  form  in  any  of  Carlyle's  works,  but  in  the 
first  lecture  of  this  one,  on  The  Hero  as  Divinity,  he  says:  "The 
History  of  the  World,  I  said  already,  was  the  Biography  of  Great 
Men,"  and  a  little  farther  on  :  '-The  History  of  the  world  is  but  the 
Biography  of  great  men."  In  the  first  of  these  cases  he  probably 
referred  to  the  following  near  the  beginning  of  that  lecture  :  "  Uni- 
versal History,  the  history  of  what  man  has  accomplished  in  this  world, 
is  at  bottom  the  History  of  the  Great  Men  who  have  worked  here." 

Ten  years  earlier  he  had  said  :  '•  History  is  the  essence  of  innu- 
merable Biographies"  (Thoughts  on  History.  Fra.ser's  Magazine, 
Vol.  II,  November,  1830,  pp.  413-418.  See  p.  4'4)-  Tliis  article 
is  reproduced  in  his  Critical  and  Miscellaneous  Essays,  \ol.  II, 
Boston,    1838,  pp.  244-257,  where  it  is  entitled:   On   History.     See 


344  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 

p.  247.  James  Anthony  F"roude,  the  historian,  who  wrote  Thomas 
Carlyle  :  A  History  of  the  First  Forty  Years  of  his  Life,  1 795-1 835, 
London,  1882,  in  two  volumes,  quotes  from  his  diary  of  January-  13, 
1832,  the  following  words  :  "  Biography  is  the  only  history." 

Carnegie,  Andrew 

The    Carnegie    Institution    of  Washington,    D.C.,   founded    by    Andrew 
Carnegie,  Washington,  1902.    Trust  deed,  pp.  8-12. 
Quoted  on  p.  266. 

Cicero,  Marcus  Tullius 
De  Divinatione. 

The  quotation  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  IX,  p.  129,  occurs 
in  Liber  II,  58  (119)-  In  the  Opera  Omnia,  Halis  Saxonum,  1779, 
this  is  on  p.  707. 

Clark,  John  B. 

The  Philosophy  of  Wealth.  Economic  Principles  Newly  Formulated. 
Boston,   1886. 

Quoted  on  pp.  328-329. 

COMTE,    AUGUSTE 

Lettres  d'Auguste  Comte  k  M.  Valat,  professeur  de  mathdmatiques,  ancien 
recteur  de  I'Acaddmie  de  Rhodez.    1815-1844.     Paris,  Dunod,  1870. 
Quoted  on  p.  290. 

Plan  des  Travaux  Scientifiques  n^cessaires  pour  r^organiser  la  Socidt^. 
Paris,  Mai,  1822.  Reprinted  in  Appendice  g^ndral,  Troisi^me  Partie, 
du  Systfeme  de  Politique  Positive,  Vol.  IV,  Paris,  1854,  pp.  47-136. 

See  p.  358.  The  phrase  "  physique  sociale "  first  occurs  on 
p.  124  of  the  Appendix.  I  discussed  the  whole  subject  in  Pure 
Sociology,  pp.  147-150. 

Cours  de  Philosophie  Positive.  Paris,  Vol.  I,  1830;  Vol.  II,  1835;  Vol. 
Ill,  1838;  Vol.  IV,  1839;  Vol.  V,  1841  ;  Vol.  VI,  1842.  Troisi^me 
Edition,  augment^e  d'une  Preface  par  E.  Littrd,  Paris,  1869.  Uni- 
form with  the  first  edition.  I  prefer  and  cite  this  edition  and  not 
the  fifth,  1892,  which  unfortunately  is  not  uniform  in  its  paging 
with  earlier  editions. 

See  pp.  163,  262.  Quoted  on  pp.  41,  42,  51,  69,  101-102,  170, 
248.  306,  334. 

The  Positive  Philosophy  of  Auguste  Comte,  freely  translated  and  con- 
densed   by  Harriet  Martineau,    with    an    Introduction    by    Frederic 
Harrison.    In  three  volumes,  London,  1896. 
Quoted  on  page  41. 

Syst^me  de  Politique  Positive,  ou  Traite  de  Sociologie,  Instituant  la 
Religion  de  I'Humanitd.  Vol.  I,  1851  ;  Vol.  II,  1852  :  Vol.  Ill,  1853  ; 
Vol.  IV,  1854. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


345 


The  passage  placed  under  the  title  of  Part  I  occurs  on  page  78  of 
Vol.  Ill ;  that  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  X,  p.  224,  on  p.  487 
of  Vol.  I  ;  that  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  XI,  p.  285,  on  p.  623 
of  Vol.  III.  The  quotations  on  p.  108,  are  from  Vol.  II,  pp.  461 
and  462.  See  also  pp.  43,  290. 
Testament  d'Auguste  Comte  avec  les  documents  qui  s'y  rapportent,  pieces 
justificatives,  prieres  quotidiennes,  confessions  annuelles,  correspon- 
dance  avec  Alme.  de  Vaux.  Public  par  ses  executeurs  conformement 
a  ses  dernieres  volont^s.  Paris,  10  rue  Monsieur  le  Prince,  Sep- 
tembre,  1884. 

See  p.  99.    The  French  text  reads :  "  L'homme  devient  de  plus 
en  plus  religieux." 

CoNDORCET,  Marie  Jean  Antoine 

Tableau  Historique  des  Progr^s  de  I'Esprit  Humain.    Paris,  1900.    Biblio- 
theque  Positiviste. 

Quoted  on  pp.  66-67,  102,  244-245,  247-248. 

Cooley,  Charles  H. 

Genius,   Fame,  and  the  Comparison  of  Races.    Annals  of  the  Academy 
of  Political  and  Social  Science,  Vol.  IX,  Philadelphia,  May,   1897, 

PP-  317-358. 

See  pp.  144,  255.    Quoted  on  pp.  144,  263,  265,  275-276. 

CosTE,  Adolphe 

Nouvel  Exposd  de   I'Economie  Politique  et  de  la  Physiologic  Sociale. 
Paris,  1889. 
See  p.  172. 
Les  Principes  d'une  Sociologie  Objective.    Paris,  1899. 

See  p.  181.    Quoted  on  p.  291. 
L'Exp^rience  des  Peupleset  les  Previsions  qu'elle  autorise.     Paris,  1900. 
[Deuxi^me  partie  de  la  Sociologie  Objective.] 

The  quotation  on  the  title-page  occurs  on  p.  611.     See  also  p.  89. 
Le   Facteur  Population  dans  I'Evolution  Sociale.     Revue  Internationale 
de  Sociologie,  cf  Annde,  Paris,  Aout-Septembre,  1901,  pp.  569-612. 
See  p.  172. 
Dieu  et  I'Ame.    Essai  d'Iddalisme  Experimental.    Deuxi^me  Edition,  prd- 
c^d^e  d'une  Preface  de  Rene^  Worms.    Paris,  1903. 
Quoted  on  p.  67. 

Cunningham,  William 

Politics  and  Economics  :  An  Essay  on  the   Nature  of  the  Principles  of 
Political  Economy,  together  with  a  Survey  of  Recent  Legislation. 
London,  1885. 
See  p.  289. 


346  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 

CuviER,  Georges 

I  have  not  succeeded  in  finding  the  quotation  placed  at  the  head  of 
Chapter  XI,  p.  285,  in  any  of  Cuvier's  works.  It  occurs  in  Pro- 
fessor Huxley's  Anniversary  Address  to  the  Geological  Society  of 
London,  published  as  an  Appendix,  separately  paged  in  Roman,  at  the 
end  of  Vol.  XVIII  of  the  Quarterly  Journal,  in  the  Proceedings  of 
the  Annual  General  Meeting  of  21st  February,  1862,  pp.  xl-liv,  in  a 
footnote  to  p.  xlvii.  This  address  is  reproduced  in  his  Lay  Sermons, 
New  York,  1 871,  where  the  same  footnote  occurs  on  p.  215. 

Dallemagne,  Jules 

Ddgdndrescence  Individuelle  et  D^generescence  Collective.    Extrait  de  la 
Revue  de  Belgique.     Bruxelles,  1897    53  pp.  8°. 
See  p.  181. 

Dana,  James  Dwight 

Manual  of  Geology.     Second  Edition,  New  York,  1874. 

Quoted  on  p.  85. 
On  Cephalization.    Part  V,  Cephalization  a  Fundamental  Principle  in  the 
Development  of  the  System  of  Animal  Life.     American  Journal  of 
Science,  3d  Ser.,  Vol.  XII,  New  Haven,  October,  1876,  pp.  245-251. 
See  p.  85. 

Darwin,  Charles  Robert 

Journal  of  Researches  into  the  Natural  History  and  Geology  of  the 
Countries  visited  during  the  Voyage  of  H.  M.  S.  Beagle  round  the 
World.  New  Edition,  New  York,  1871. 
See  p.  124. 
The  Life  and  Letters  of  Charles  Darwin,  including  an  Autobiographical 
Chapter.  Edited  by  his  son,  Francis  Darwin.  New  York,  Vol.  I, 
1888;  Vol.  II,  1887. 

Autobiography  quoted  on  p.  262. 

De  Greef,  Guillaume 

Introduction  a  la   Sociologie.     Bruxelles-Paris,  Premiere   Partie,    1886  ; 
Deuxieme  Partie,  1889. 
Quoted  on  p.  245. 
Les  Lois  Sociologiques.    Paris,  1893.    Deuxieme  edition,  revue,  Paris,  1896. 

See  p.  306. 
L'Evolution  des  Croyances  et  des  Doctrines  Politiques.     Bruxelles-Paris, 
1895. 

Quoted  on  p.  306. 
Le  Materialisme  Historique.  Annales  de  I'lnstitut  International  de  Soci- 
ologie, Tome  VIII,  Travaux  des  Annees  1900  et  1901.    Paris,  1902, 
pp.  137-184. 

See  pp.  40-41. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


347 


Introduction  a  I'Histoire  de  I'Economie  Sociale.    Revue  Internationale  de 
Sociologie,  ii^  Annee,  No.  12,  Paris,  Decembre,  1903,  pp.  881-921. 
The  quotation  on  p.  43  consists  of  three  selections  from  pp.  882 
and  883.    This  article  is  simply  an  extract  from  the  author's  work, 
La  Sociologie  Economique.     See  the  next  entry. 
La  Sociologie  Economique.     Paris,  1904. 

Quoted  on  pp.  43  and*  328,  the  latter  credited  to,  but  apparently 
not  quoted  from,  Rodbertus ;  also  on  p.  358. 

Descartes,  Rexe 

Les  Principes  de  la  Philosophic,  Merits  en  Latin  et  traduits  en  Franqais 
par  un  de  ces  amis.    Nouvelle  edition  revue  et  corrig^e,  Paris,  1724. 
Quoted  on  p.  86. 
Oluvres  de  Descartes.    Nouvelle  edition  par  M.  Jules  Simon,  Paris,  1844. 
Quoted  on  pp.  31.  262,  288.    See  also  pp.  76,  86. 

Draper,  John  William 

History  of  the  Conllict  between  Religion  and  Science.     The  International 
Scientific  Series.    Fifth  Edition,  New  York,  1875. 

On  p.  150,  speaking  of  Averroes,  Draper  says:  "He  was  pointed 
out  as  the  originator  of  the  atrocious  maxim  that  '  all  religions  are 
false,  although  all  are  probably  useful,' "  which  I  place  at  the  head 
of  Chapter  VI,  p.  50,  in  support  of  the  view  set  forth  on  p.  65. 
Further  quoted  on  p.  164.    See  also  p.  76. 

DURKHEI.M,    EmILE 

De  la  Division  du  Travail  Social.     Etude  sur  TOrganisation  des  Societes 
Supdrieures.     Paris,  1893. 
Quoted  on  p.  171. 
Les  Ragles  de  la  M^thpde  Sociologique.     Biliotheque  de  la  Philosophie 
Contemporaine.     Deuxi^me  edition  revue  et  augmentde,  Paris,  1901. 
Quoted  on  pp.  171-172. 

Eckermann,  Johann  Peter 

Gesprache  mit  Goethe  in  den  letzten  Jahren  seines  Lebens,  1823-1832. 
Zweite  Ausgabe,  Leipzig,  1837. 
See  p.  275. 

Fernow,  Bernhard  Eduard 

The  Providential  Functions  of  Government  with  Special  Reference  to  Nat- 
ural Resources.  Address  as  Vice-President  of  Section  L  Economic 
Science  and  Statistics,  of  the  American  Association  for  tlie  Advance- 
ment of  Science.  Springfield,  1895.  Proceedings,  Vol.  XLIV,  Salem, 
1896,  pp.  325-344;  Science,  New  Series,  Vol.  II,  August  30,  1895, 
pp.  252-265. 
See  p.  17. 


348  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 

FisKE,  John 

Sociology  and  Hero- Worship.     An   Evolutionist's  reply  to    Dr.   James. 
Atlantic  Monthly,  Vol.  XLVII,  Boston,  January,  1881,  pp.  75-84. 
See  p.  139. 

FoLKMAR,  Daniel 

Lemons  d'Anthropologie  Philosophique.  Ses  Applications  a  la  Morale 
Positive.  Biblioth^que  Internationale  des  Sciences  Sociales.  Paris, 
1900. 

Quoted  on  p.  108. 

FouiLLEE,  Alfred 

L'Evolutionnisme  des  Id^es-Forces.    Paris,  1890. 

See  p.  17. 
Le    Mouvement    Positiviste    et    la  Conception  Sociologique    du    Monde. 
Paris,  1896. 

Quoted  on  pp.  44  and  45. 

Froude,  James  Anthony 

Thomas  Carlyle  :  A  History  of  the  First  Forty  Years  of  his  Life,  1795- 
1835      London,  1882. 

See  under  Carlyle,  above. 

Galton,  Francis 

Hereditary  Talent  and  Character.  Macmillan's  Magazine,  Vol.  XII,  Lon- 
don, Part  I,  June,  1865,  pp.  157-166  ;  Second  Paper,  August,  1865, 
pp.  318-327. 

Quoted  on  p.  137. 
Hereditary  Genius.    An  Inquiry  into  its  Laws  and  Consequences.    London, 
1869.    New  and  revised  edition  with  an  American  preface,  New  York, 
1870     Second  edition,  London  and  New  York,  1892.    [My  references 
are  all  to  this  last  edition.] 

Quoted  on  pp.  117,  137,  162-163,  247,  251,  253-254,  255,  267. 
On  Blood  Relationship.    Proceedings  of  the  Royal  Society  of  London, 
Vol.  XX,  pp.  394-402 
See  p.  119. 
On  the  Causes  which  operate  to  create  Scientific  Men.   Fortnightly  Review, 
Vol.  XIX  (New  Series,  Vol.  XIII),  March,  1873,  pp.  345-351. 
Quoted  on  p.  138. 
English  Men  of  Science  :  their  Nature  and  Nurture.    London,  1874. 

Quoted   on  pp.   119.   123,  201.    See   also  pp.   117,   125,    139, 
197,  205. 
A  Theory  of  Heredity.    Journal  of  the  Anthropological  Institute,  Vol.  V, 
pp.  329-348.    Contemporary  Review,  Vol.  XXVIII,  London,  Decem- 
ber, 1875.  pp.  80-95. 
Quoted  on  p.  120. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


349 


The  History  of  Twins,  as  a  Criterion  of  the  relative  Powers  of  Nature  and 
Nurture.    Eraser's   Magazine,   Vol.  XCII   (New  Series,  Vol.  XII), 
London,  November,  1875,  pp.  566-576. 
Quoted  on  p.  118. 

Geddes,  Patrick,  and  Thomson,  J.  Arthur 

The  Evolution  of  Sex.    Revised  Edition,  London,  igoi. 
See  p.  324. 

George,  Henry 

Progress  and  Poverty.     New  York,  1882. 
Quoted  on  pp.  256-257,  271.  273. 

GiDDixGS,  Franklin  Henry 

The  Principles  of  Sociology.     An  Analysis  of  the  Phenomena  of  Associa- 
tion and  of  Social  Organization.    New  York,  1896. 
Quoted  on  pp.  109,  170,  181. 

Goethe,  Johann  Wolfgang  von 

Conversations  of  Goethe  with  Eckermann  and  Soret.    Translated  from  the 
German  by  John  Oxenford.    Revised  Edition,  London,  1892. 
Quoted  on  p.  275. 

Gould,  George  M. 

The  Meaning  and  Method  of  Life.  A  Search  for  Religion  in  Biology. 
New  York,  1893. 

The  quotation  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  X,  p.  224,  occurs  on 
p.  189. 

Gray,  Asa 

Darwiniana:  Essays  and  Reviews  pertaining  to  Darwinism.  New  York, 
1877. 

See  p.  86. 

Gray,  Thomas 

Elegy  :  Written  in  a  Country  Churchyard,  1749.  To  be  found  in  all  col- 
lections. In  that  entitled  -'The  Golden  Treasury  of  the  Best  Songs 
and  Lyrical  Poems  in  the  English  Language,"  selected  and  arranged 
with  notes  by  Francis  Turner  Palgrave,  New  York,  1891,  it  occurs 
on  pp.  1 71-176. 

The  three  stanzas  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  VIII,  p.  113, 
contain  the  most  perfect,  as  well  as  the  most  celebrated,  expression  of 
the  thought  of  that  chapter  in  any  language. 

GuizoT.  Fkantois  Pikkre  Guillau.me 

Histoire  de  la  Civilisation  en  P'rance  depuis  la  Chute  de  I'Empire  Remain. 
Troisi^me  Edition,  Paris,  1840.    4  vols. 

The  quotation  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  V,  p.  40,  occurs  on 
p.  377  of  Vol.  III. 


350  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 

GUMPLOWICZ,  LUDWIO 

Pessimismus  und  Optimismus  in  der  Sociologie.    Die  Wage,  eine  Wiener 
Wochenschrift,  V.  Jahrgang,  No.   i6,  April   13,  1902,  pp.  248-249; 
No.  18,  April  27,  1902,  pp.  282-284. 
See  pp.  19-20. 

GuxTOx,  George 

Wealth  and  Progress.  A  Critical  Examination  of  the  Labor  Problem,  etc. 
New  York,  1887. 

Quoted  on  pp.  273-274,  278. 

Hartmaxx,  Eduard  vox 

Philosophic  des  Unbewussten.  Zehnte  erweiterte  Auflage  in  drei  Theilen, 
Leipzig,  1889. 

See  pp.  72-73.     On  p.  366  of  Part  II  hesays  "  selbst  die  christ- 
liche  Askese  ist  durch  und  durch  selbstsiichtig." 

Helvetius,  Claude  Adriex 

De  I'Homme,  de  ses  Facult^s  Intellectuelles  et  de  son  Education.   Ouvrage 
posthume.    2  vols.,  Londres,  1773. 
Quoted  on  pp.  77,  247.  256,  272. 

HUTCHESOX,   FrAXCIS 

An  Inquiry  into  the  Original  of  our  Ideas  of  Beaut)'  and  Virtue.  In  two 
Treatises.  Fifth  Edition,  London,  1753.  Treatise  I:  Of  Beauty, 
Order,  Harmony,  and  Design,  pp.  1-104  ;  Treatise  II  :  An  Inquiry 
concerning  Moral  Good  and  Evil,  pp.  105-310. 

The  passage  quoted  on  p.  31  occurs  on  p.  1S5  of  this  edition,  and 
therefore  in  Treatise  II.  The  work  originally  appeared  in  1720,  but 
I  have  not  been  able  to  consult  an  earlier  edition. 

Huxley,  Thomas  Hexry 

On  the  Physical  Basis  of  Life.  An  Address  delivered  in  Edinburgh, 
November  18,  1868.  Fortnightly  Review,  Vol.  XI  (New  Series, 
Vol.  V),  London,  February,  1869,  pp.  129-145. 
Quoted  on  p.  289. 
Administrative  Nihilism.  An  Address  to  the  Members  of  the  Midland 
Institute,  October  9,  1871.  Fortnightly  Review,  Vol.  XVI  (New 
Series,  Vol.  X),  London,  November  i,  1871,  pp.  525-543.  Also  in 
Critiques  and  Addresses,  London,  1873,  pp.  3-32. 

The  quotation  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  IV,  p.  37,  occurs  on 
p.  541  of  the  Fortnightly  Review  cited  above,  and  on  p.  29  of  the 
Critiques  and  Addresses. 
On  the  Hypothesis  that  Animals  are  Automata.  Fortnightly  Review, 
Vol.  XXII  (New  Series,  Vol-  XVI),  London,  November  i,  1874, 
PP-  555-580. 

The  quotation  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  XIII,  p.  314,  occurs 
on  p.  577. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  35 1 

Technical    Education.     Fortnightly  Review,  Vol.    XXIX    (New  Series, 
Vol.  XXIII),  London,  January  i,  1878,  pp.  48-58. 
Quoted  on  p.  266. 
Government,  Anarchy  or  Regimentation.   Nineteenth  Century,  Vol.  XXVII, 
London,  January-June,  1890,  pp.  843-866. 

The  remarkable  passage  alluded  to  on  p.  20,  and  quoted  in  full  in 
Pure  Sociology,  p.  143,  occurs  on  p.  863  of  this  article. 
Evolution  and  Ethics,  and  other  Essays.    New  York,  1896.    This  includes 
his  well-known  Romanes  Lecture,  1893,  and  the  Prolegomena  to  it, 
1894. 

The  quotation  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  III,  p.  18,  occurs  in 
the  Romanes  Lecture  on  p.  79. 

Ingalls,  John  James 

Opportunity.    A  poem. 

Quoted  on  p.  252. 

Jacoby,  Paul 

Etudes  sur  la  Selection  dans  ses  Rapports  avec  THeredite  chez  I'Homme. 
Paris,  1 88 1.    Seconde  Edition,  1904. 

See  pp.  139,  140,  172-181.    Quoted  on  pp.  172-173,  177-178. 
179. 

James,  William 

Great  Men,  Great  Thoughts  and  the   Environment.     Atlantic   Monthly, 
Vol.  XLVI,  Boston,  October,  1880  ;  Great  Men  and  their  Environ- 
ment.   In  The  Will  to  Believe  and  other  Essays  in  Popular  Philosophy. 
London,  1897. 
See  p.  139. 

Jefferson,  Tho.mas 

The  Writings  of  Thomas  Jefferson.  Collected  and  edited  by  Paul  Leices- 
ter Ford,  New  York,  1899. 

The  passage  quoted  on  p.  250  is  contained  in  a  letter  to  Colonel 
Charles  Yancey,  and  occurs  on  p.  4  of  Vol.  X  of  this  edition  of 
Jefferson's  works. 

Johnson,  Samuel 

A  Dictionary  of  the  English  Language  :  in  which  the  words  are  deduced 
from  their  originals,  and  illustrated  in  the  different  significations  by 
examples  from  the  best  writers.  To  which  are  prefixed  a  History  of 
the  Language,  and  English  Grammar.    In  two  volumes  (fol.),  London, 

1775- 

Quoted  on  p.  115. 

Joly,  Henri 

Psychologie  des  Grands  Hommes.    Paris,  1883. 
See  p.  140. 


352  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 

JUVEN'CIUS,  JOSEPHUS 

Historiae  Societatis  Jesu  Pars  Quinta.    Tomus  posterior.  Ab  Anno  Christi 
MDXCI   ad   MDCXVL    Auctore  Josepho  Juvencio  Societatis  ejus- 
dem  Sacerdote.  Romae,  MDCCX.  Liber  XVIII,  Partis  V.  14,  p.  461. 
See  p.  270. 

Kant,  Immanuel 

ijber  Padagogik.    Sammtliche  Werke,  Leipzig,  1838.    Neunter  Theil. 

Quoted  on  p.  248. 
Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  herausgegeben  von  G.  Hartenstein.    Leipzig, 
1868. 

Quoted  on  pp.  66,  67. 

KiDD,  Ben'jamix 

Social  Evolution.     New  Edition  with  a  New  Preface,  New  York,  1894. 
Quoted  on  pp.  98-100,  108,  250,  279,  322.     See  also  p.  162. 

King,  W.  Francis  H. 

Classical  and  Foreign  Quotations.  A  Polyglot  Manual  of  Historical  and 
Literary  Sayings,  noted  passages  in  poetry  and  prose,  phrases,  prov- 
erbs, and  bons  mots,  with  their  references,  translations,  and  indexes. 
Third  edition,  revised  and  rewritten,  London,  1904. 

See  p.  79.  The  saying  :  "  Calomniez,  calomniez,  il  en  restera  tou- 
jours  quelque  chose,"  is  usually  credited  to  Beaumarchais  as  occurring 
in  his  comedy  Le  Barbier  de  Seville,  Act  II,  sc.  viii,  but  it  does 
not  appear  there  in  just  this  form  in  any  edition  I  have  consulted. 
It  is,  however,  much  older.  The  Latin  form  as  given  by  Bacon 
is,  "  Audacter  calumniare,  semper  aliquid  hjeret."  King  gives  still 
earlier  references. 

KOHELETH 

The  book  Koheleth  is  the  same  as  the  book  of  Ecclesiastes  in  the  Old 
Testament,  and  the  passage  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  XI, 
p.  285,  is  from  the  first  chapter  and  eighteenth  verse  of  the  latter. 
In  the  King  James  translation,  not  changed  in  the  revised  version,  it 
reads:  "He  that  increaseth  knowledge  increaseth  sorrow."  The 
meaning,  of  course,  is  that  pain  and  misery  increase  with  the  increase 
of  knowledge,  a  widespread  belief  found  in  both  the  upper  and  lower 
classes,  due,  as  is  shown  in  that  chapter,  to  the  inequalities  of  intelli- 
gence and  the  want  of  assimilation  of  knowledge  by  society.  I  have 
several  times  met  with  the  passage  in  Latin  :  "Qui  auget  scientiam, 
auget  et  dolorem,"  credited  to  the  Koheleth  by  authors  who  apparently 
do  not  suspect  that  this  book  is  part  of  the  Bible. 

Lamarck,  Jean 

Recherches  sur  I'Organisation  des  Corps  vivans,  et  particulierement  sur 
son  origine,  sur  la  cause  de  ses  developpements  et  des  progres  de  sa 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  353 

composition,  et  sur  celle  qui,  tendant  continuellement  a  la  detruire 
dans  chaque  individu,  amene  n^cessairement  sa  mort.  Paris,  An  X 
(1802). 

Quoted  on  p.  66. 
Philosophic  Zoologique,  ou  Exposition  des  considerations  relatives  k  I'his- 
toire  naturelle  des  animaux,  a  la  diversite  de  leur  organisation  et  des 
facultds  qu'ils  en  obtiennent ;  aux  causes  physiques  qui  maintiennent 
en  eux  la  vie  et  donnent  lieu  aux  mouvements  qu'ils  executent  ;  enfin, 
a  celles  qui  produisent  las  unes  le  sentiment,  les  autres  Tintelligence 
de  ceux  qui  en  sont  doues.  Nouvelle  edition  revue  et  precedde  d'une 
introduction  biographique  par  Charles  Martins,  Paris,  1873. 

Quoted  Oil  p.  66. 

La  Rochefoucauld,  Franxois,  Due  de 

Maximes  du  Due  de  La  Rochefoucauld,  precede  d'une  notice  de  sa  vie  par 
Suard. —  Pensees  Diverses  de  Montesquieu.  —  Qiuvres  choisies  de 
Vauvenargues.    Paris,  1S61. 

The  maxim  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  IX,  p.  129,  is  No.  153 
of  this  collection  and  occurs  on  p.  36.  The  one  quoted  on  p.  134  is 
No.  32  of  the  first  Supplement  and  No.  165  of  the  edition  of  1665. 
It  occurs  on  p.  86. 

Leibnitz,  Gottfried  Wilhel.m  von 

Die  Werke  von  Leibniz  gemass  seinem  handschriftlichen  Nachlasse  in 
der  Koniglichen  Bibliothek  zu  Hannover.  Durch  die  Munificenz 
Seiner  Majestat  des  Konigs  von  Hannover  ermdglichte  Ausgabe  von 
Onno  Klopp.  Hannover,  1864- 1884.  Erste  Reihe,  Sechster  Band, 
1872. 

Quoted  on  p.  247. 

Leidv,  Joseph 

Ward's    Natural    Science    Establishment.      Popular    Science    Monthly, 
Vol.  XVL  New  York,  March,  1880,  pp.  612-614. 
Quoted  on  p.  103. 

Letourneau,  Charles 

La  Sociologie  d'apr^s  rEthnologie.  Troisi^me  Edition  revue  et  corrig^e, 
Paris,  1892. 

Quoted  on  p.  69. 

L^vy-Bruhl,  L. 

The  Philosophy  of  Auguste  Comte.    Authorised  Translation  [by  Kathleen 
de  Beaumont-Klein],  to  which  is  prefixed  an  Introduction  by  Fred- 
eric Harrison.     New  York,  1903. 
See  p.  290. 


354  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 

LiTTRE,    EMILE 

Preface  d'un  Disciple.   Cours  de  Philosophic  Positive,  par  Auguste  Comte. 
Troisi&me  Edition  augment^e  d'une  Preface  par  E.  Littrd.    Tome  pre- 
mier, Paris,  1896,  pp.  V-L. 
Quoted  on  p.  262. 

Locke,  John 

The  Philosophical  Works  of  John  Locke.  Edited  with  a  Preliminary  Essay 
and  Notes,  by  J.  A.  St.  John.     2  vols.,  London,  1902. 

The  doctrine  referred  to  on  p.  236  is  discussed  on  pp.  15  and  142 
of  this  edition. 

LOMBROSO,  CeSARE 

Genio  e  Follia  in  rapporto  alia  medicina  legale,  alia  critica  ed  alia  storia. 
Roma  &  Torino,  1882. 
See  p.  142. 
L'Uomo  di  Genio  in  rapporto  alia  psichiatria,  alia  storia  ed  all'  estetica. 
5a  ed.   del    Genio   e    Follia    completamente   mutata.     Torino,    1888. 
6a  ed.,  1894. 
See  p.  142. 
L'Homme   de  Gdnie.     Traduction  sur  la  6e  Edition   italienne,  par  F.  C. 
d'Istria,  et  precddd  d'une  preface  de  C.  Richet.    Paris,  1889. 
See  pp.  142,  181,  213. 
The   Man   of   Genius.     English   translation   of  the   above.    London   and 
New  York,  1891. 
See  p.  142. 

LoMBROSO,  Cesare,  and  Laschi,  R. 

II  Delitto  politico  e  le  Rivoluzioni  in  rapporto  al  diritto,  all'  antropologia 
criminale  ed  alia  scienza  di  governo.    Torino,  1890. 
See  p.  143. 
Le  Crime  politique  et  les  Revolutions  par  rapport  au  droit,  k  I'anthropolo- 
gie  criminelle  et  a  la  science  du  gouvernement.    Traduit  de  I'italien 
par  A.  Bouchard.     2  vols.,  Paris,  1892. 
See  p.  143.     Quoted  on  p.  181. 

Lubbock,  Sir  John,  Bart.  (The  Right  Hon.  Lord  Avebury) 

The  Origin  of  Civilization  and  the  Primitive  Condition  of  Man.    Mental 
and  Social  Condition  of  Savages.    New  York,  1871. 
Quoted  on  p.  34. 
Prehistoric  Times.  Sixth  Edition  revised  (Edition  de  luxe),  New  York,  1904. 
Quoted  on  pp.  34,  67. 

LuCANUs,  M.  Ann^us 

De  Bello  Civili.  Cum  Hug.  Grotii,  Farnabii  notis  integris  &  variorum 
selectis.  Accurante  Corn.  Schrevelio.  Amstelodami,  A°.  1669.  (M. 
Annaei  Lucani  Civilis  Belli,  sive  Pharsahae.    Liber  quintus.) 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


i55 


The  line  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  III,  p.  18,  as  epitomizing 
the  oligocentric  world  view,  is  line  343  of  Book  V  and  occurs  at  the 
top  of  p.  227  of  this  edition. 

Macaulay,  Thomas  Babington,  Lord 

The  Works  of  Lord  Macaulay  complete.    Edited  by  his  Sister,  Lady  Tre- 
velyan,  in  eight  volumes.    Vol.  VIII,  London,  1866. 
Quoted  on  p.  249. 
Mach,  Ernst 

On  the  Part  played  by  Accident  in  Invention  and  Discovery.    Translated 
by  Thomas  J.  McCormack.    The  Monist,  Vol.  VI,  Chicago,  January, 
1896,  pp.  161-175. 
Quoted  on  p.  102. 

Malthus,  Thomas  Robert 

An  Essay  on  the  Principle  of  Population.    Third  Edition,  2  vols.,  Lon- 
don, 1806. 

The  passage  quoted  on  p.  325  occurs  in  Vol.  II  on  p.  516  (in  the 
Appendix). 

Martin,  H.  Newell 

The  Study  and  Teaching  of  Biology.     Popular  Science  Monthly,  Vol.  X, 
New  York,  January,  1877,  pp.  298-309. 
Quoted  on  p.  103. 

Mazzini,  Joseph  (Giuseppe) 

The  Duties  of  Man.    Addressed  to  Workingmen.    Reprinted  by  permis- 
sion of  Mrs.  Emilie  Ashurst  Venturi,  editor  of  The  Life  and  Writ- 
ings of  Joseph  Mazzini.    New  York,  1892. 
Quoted  on  p.  248. 

Mill,  John  Stuart 

A  System  of  Logic,  rationative  and  inductive,  being  a  connected  view  of 
the  principles  of  evidence  and  the  methods  of  scientific  investigation. 
London,  1843.   Eighth  Edition,  New  York  and  London,  1900. 
Quoted  on  p.  84. 
Principles  of  Political  Economy  with  some  of  their  applications  to  Social 
Philosophy.     P'ourtli  Edition,  London,  1857. 
Quoted  on  p.  325. 
Inaugural  Address  delivered  to  the  University  of  St.  Andrews,  Feb.  i,  1867. 

Quoted  on  p.  102. 
Chapters  on  Socialism.     Fortnightly   Review,  Vol.  XXXI  (New  Series, 
Vol.  XXV),  London,  January  i,  1879,  PP-  217-237;  March  i,  1879, 
PP-  373-382;  April  I,  1879.  pp.  513-530. 
Quoted  on  pp.  273,  320,  325,  334-335. 
Socialism.    Chicago,  1879.    Reprint  of  the  above  papers. 
Quoted  on  same  pages  as  the  preceding. 


356  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 

Montaigne,  Michel  Eyquem  de 

Essais  de  Montaigne.  Publics  d'apr^s  I'ddition  la  plus  authentique,  et  avec 
des  sommaires  analytiques  et  de  nouvelles  notes,  par  Amaury  Duval. 
Paris,  1822. 

The  passage  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  VII,  p.  84,  is  a  mod- 
ernized and  somewhat  altered  form  of  a  longer  passage  that  occurs 
in  one  of  his  essays,  which  runs  as  follows  :  "Si  avons  nous  beau 
monter  sur  des  eschasses ;  car,  sur  des  eschasses,  encores  fault  il 
marcher  de  nos  jambes  ;  et  au  plus  eslevd  throsne  du  monde,  si  ne 
sommes  nous  assis  que  sur  nostre  cul."  Op.  cit..  Vol.  VI,  Liv.  Ill, 
Chapter  XIII,  p.  188. 

Montesquieu,  Charles  de  Secondat,  Baron  de 

De  I'Esprit  des  Loix.  CEuvres  de  Montesquieu.  Nouvelle  Edition,  5  vols., 
Paris,  1808. 

See  p.  149. 
Pens^es  Diverses  de   Montesquieu.     In    Maximes   et   Pens^es    Diverses. 
Paris,  1864.    See  above  under  La  Rochefoucauld. 

See  p.  244.  The  original  runs  as  follows :  "  On  aurait  du  mettre 
I'oisivete  parmi  les  peines  de  I'enfer ;  il  me  semble,  au  contraire, 
qu'on  I'a  mise  parmi  les  joies  du  paradis."    Also  quoted  on  p.  251. 

More,  Sir  Thomas 

Utopia.    Translated  into  English  by  Ralph  Robinson,  1556.    Edited  by 
Edward    Arber.     English    Reprints.    London,    No.  14  (bound  with 
Latimer's  Sermons,  No.  13),  1869. 
Quoted  on  p.  31.    See  also  p.  72. 

Morley,  John 

On  Compromise.    London,  1874. 

Quoted  on  p.  13.    See  also  p.  131. 

Mulhall,  Michael  G. 

Dictionary  of  Statistics.    London,  1892. 
See  pp.  321,  323. 

Napoleon  Bonaparte 

Napoleon   in    Council,  or   the   Opinions  delivered  by   Bonaparte  in  the 
Council  of  State.    Translated  from  the  French  of  Baron  Pelet  (de  la 
Lozere)  by  Captain  Basil  Hall,  R.N.    London,  1837. 
Quoted  on  p.  249. 

Newton,  Sir  Isaac 

Four  Letters  from  Sir  Isaac  Newton  to  Doctor  Bentley,  containing  some 
Arguments  in  Proof  of  a  Deity.  Printed  for  R.  and  J.  Dodsley,  Pall 
Mall.    London,  1756,  Letter  III,  pp.  23-32. 

See  p.  332.  The  passage  referred  to  is  as  follows  :  "  That  Gravity 
should  be  innate,  inherent  and  essential  to  Matter,  so  that  one  Body 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


.57 


may  act  upon  another  at  a  Distance  thro'  a  Vacuum,  without  the 
Mediation  of  anything  else,  by  and  through  which  their  Action  and 
Force  may  be  conveyed  from  one  to  another,  is  to  me  so  great  an 
Absurdity,  that  I  believe  no  Man  who  has  in  philosophical  Matters 
a  competent  Faculty  of  thinking,  can  ever  fall  into  it."  This  passage 
occurs  in  the  third  letter  and  on  pp.  25-26  of  the  pamphlet. 

NiTTI,    FrAiNXESCO    S. 

Population  and  the  Social  System.    London,  1894. 
See  p.  323. 

Novicow,  Jacques 

L'Affranchissement  de  la  Femme.    Paris,  1902. 
See  p.  80. 

Odin,  Alfred 

Gen^se  des  Grands  Hommes.  Gens  de  Lettres  Franqais  Modernes. 
Paris,  1895.  Tome  Premier  (text).  Tome  Second  :  Tableau  Chrono- 
logique  de  la  Litterature  Fran^aise.  Liste  de  6382  Gens  de  Lettres 
Fran^ais  accompagnee  de  33  Tableaux  et  de  24  Planches  hors  Texte. 
See  pp.  134,  143,  300.  The  first  of  the  two  quotations  from 
M.  Odin  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  IX,  p.  129,  occurs  on  p.  123, 
and  the  second  on  p.  560.  In  all  other  cases  the  page  is  given  in 
the  text.  These  quotations  occur  on  pp.  155-156,  157,  158,  160, 
161.  166,  168-169,  179-180,  181,  193-194,  195,  200,  202,  204,  207, 
209-210,  211,  212,  213-214,  218,  219,  233,  235-236,  238-239,  240. 
245,  254,  257-258,  259.  Besides  these  literal  quotations  (transla- 
tions) from  the  text  (Vol.  I),  numerous  tables  are  adapted  from  Vol.  II, 
as  well  as  the  four  maps  and  one  graphic  chart,  Plates  I-V,  accom- 
panying pp.  151,  153,  155,  192,  193. 

Parkinson,  James 

Organic  Remains  of  a  Former  World.    An  Examination  of  the  Mineral- 
ized Remains  of  the  Vegetables  and  Animals  of  the  Antediluvian 
World  generally  termed  Extraneous  Fossils.    Vol.  I  containing  the 
Vegetable  Kingdom,  London,  1804. 
See  p.  234. 

Patten,  Simon  X. 

The  Theory  of  Social  Forces.  Supplement  to  the  Annals  of  the  American 
Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science,  Vol.  VII,  No.  i,  Philadel- 
phia, January,  1896  (separately  paged). 

The  quotation  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  XI,  p.  285,  occurs 
on  p.  125. 

i'ETRARCH    (PeTRARCA),    FRANCESCO 

Le  Rime  di  Francesco  Petrarca,  restituite  nell'  ordine  e  nella  lezione  del 
testo  originario,  sugli  autograft  col  sussidio  di  altri  codici  e  di  stampe, 


358  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 

e  corredate  di  varianti  e  note  da  Giovanni  Mestica.    Edizione  critica, 
Firenze,  1896. 

The  line  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  XIII,  p.  314,  occurs  in 
Sonetto  CXCV,  on  p.  324,  in  the  following  connection  : 

1'  mi  vivea  di  mia  sorte  contento, 
Senza  lagrime  e  senza  invidia  alcuna ; 
Che,  s'altro  amante  k  piu  destra  fortuna, 
Mille  piacer  non  vaglion  un  tormento. 

Plato 

Phasdon. 

See  p.  60. 
Theaetetus. 

See  p.  236. 

Plutarch 

De  Placitis  Philosophorum. 
See  p.  236. 

Post,  Albert  Hermann 

Die  Grundlagen  des  Rechts  und   die  Grundziige  einer  Entwicklungsge- 
schichte.    Leitgedanken  fiir  den  Aufbau  einer  allgemeinen  Rechtswis- 
senschaft  auf  sociologische  Basis.    Oldenburg,  1884. 
See  p.  43. 

QUETELET,  AdOLPHE 

Sur  rHomme  et  le  Ddveloppement  de  ses  Facultds,  ou  Essai  de  Physique 
Sociale.     Paris,  1835. 

See  p.  136.  See  also  Pure  Sociology,  p.  149.  On  the  statue  of 
Quetelet  which  stands  in  front  of  the  Palais  des  Academies  in  Brus- 
sels are  engraved  these  words  :  Crdateur  de  la  Physique  Sociale,  1835. 

Dr.  De  Greef  in  his  recent  work  :  La  Sociologie  Economique  (see 
supra,  p.  347),  discusses  at  length  the  question  of  social  physics  and 
the  use  of  the  expression  by  Comte  and  Quetelet  (see  pp.  151  ff.,  187 
ff.);  and  on  p.  188  he  says,  "En  1835  Quetelet  n'avait  aucune  con- 
naissance  des  publications  de  Comte  de  1822-1824;  il  n'y  a  done  pas 
eu  de  sa  part  tentative  cf  appropriation.''''  One  can  readily  accept 
this  statement,  as  Comte's  early  papers  were  then  so  little  known. 
They  were  not  embodied  in  the  fourth  volume  of  his  Politique  Posi- 
tive until  1854,  but  the  expression  was  used  in  his  Philosophie  Posi- 
tive, Vol.  I,  p.  22,  which  appeared  in  1830.  It  is  probable  that 
Quetelet  was  equally  ignorant  of  that  work. 

Rathbone,  Eleanor 

Review  of  Herbert  Spencer's  Various  Fragments.     International  Journal 
of  Ethics,  Vol.  IX,  No.  i    Philadelphia,  October,  1898,  pp.  11 5-1 17. 
Quoted  on  p.  259. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  359 

Ratzenhofer,  Gustav 

Die  sociologische  Erkenntnis.    Positive  Philosophic  des  socialen  Lebens, 
Leipzig,  1898. 

Quoted  on  pp.  43-44,  47,  290.    See  also  p.  335. 
Die  Kritik  des  Intellects.    Positive  Erkenntnistheorie.    Leipzig,  1902. 
See  p.  87. 

Rauber,  August 

Homo  sapiens  ferus,  oder  die  Zustande  der  Verwilderten  und  ihre  Bedeu- 
tung  fiir  Wissenschaft,  Politik  und  Schule.    Leipzig,  1885. 
See  p.  270. 

Reade,  Winwood 

Martyrdom  of  Man.     Second  Edition,  New  York,  1876. 
Quoted  on  p.  34. 

Renan,  Joseph  Erxest 

Averroes  et  TAverroisme.    Essai  historique.    Paris,  1852. 

See  the  alleged  saying  of  Averroes  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter 
VI,  p.  50.  Renan  in  this  work  exhaustively  discusses  all  aspects  of 
Averroism.  In  Chapter  II,  §  xi,  and  Chapter  III,  §  xvi,  he  sets  forth 
the  religious  doctrines  of  Averroes,  and  especially  their  relation  to 
Christianity.  Many  of  his  doctrines  were  very  ambiguous,  and  sev- 
eral schools  arose  differing  in  their  interpretation  of  them.  It  is  to 
these  rival  disciples  and  not  to  the  literal  words  of  their  master  that 
the  saying  in  question  is  to  be  ascribed. 

Ribot,  TnfiODULE 

L'Hdredite  Psychologique.    Paris,  1873.   2e  Edition,  1882;  36  Edition,  1887. 

See  p.  138.    Quoted  on  pp.  215-216. 
Heredity  :  A  Psychological  Study  of  its  Phenomena,  Laws,  Causes,  and 
Consequences.    From  the  F>ench  of  Th.  Ribot.    London,  1875. 
See  p.  138. 

RiCHTER,  Jean  Paul  F. 

Life  of  Jean  Paul  F.  Richter,  together  with  his  Autobiography.    Trans- 
lated from  the  German.     London,  1845. 
Quoted  on  p.  181. 

Robertson,  John  Mackinnon 

The  Economics  of  Genius.    The  Forum,  Vol.  XXV,  New  York,  April,  1 898, 
pp.  I  78- 1 90. 

See  p.  144.    Quoted  on  p.  145. 

Ross,  Edward  Alsworth 

Moot  Points  in  Sociology.     V.  The  Social  Forces.    American  Journal  of 
Sociology,  Vol.  IX,  ^'o.  4,  Chicago,  January,  1904,  pp.  526-548. 
See  p.  40. 


360  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 

Saint-Simon,  Claude  Henri,  Comte  de 

La  Parabole  :  Lettres  de  Henri  Saint-Simon  k  MM.  les  jur^s,  qui  doivent 
prononcer  sur  I'accusation  intent^e  centre  lui.    Paris,  1820,  pp.  1-8. 
Quoted  on  p.  37. 

SCHAEFFLE,    ALBERT 

Review  of  Ratzenhofer  :   Die  Sociologische  Erkenntnis.    American  Jour- 
nal of  Sociology,  Vol.  IV,  No.  4,  Chicago,  January,  1899,  pp.  528-543, 
See  p.  290. 

Schiller,  Johann  Christoph  Friedrich  von 

Was  heisst  und  zu  welchem  Ende  studirt  man  Universalgeschichte?  Eine 
akademische  Antrittsrede.  (Erschien  zuerst  im  deutschen  Mercur, 
1789,  im  November.)  Sammtliche  Werke  in  zehn  Banden.  Neunter 
Band,  Stuttgart  und  Tubingen,  1844,  pp.  224-242. 

The  quotation  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  VI,  p.  50,  occurs  on 
p.  230. 
Schopenhauer,  Arthur 

Ueber  die  vierfache  Wurzel  des  Satzes  vom  zureichenden  Grunde.    Ru- 
dolstadt,  1 8 13. 
See  p.  87. 
Die  Welt  als  Wille  und  Vorstellung.    Dritte  verbesserte  und  betrachtlich 
vermehrte  Auflage.    Leipzig,  1859. 
Quoted  on  p.  244. 
Parerga  und  Paralipomena.     Kleine  philosophische  Schriften.     Siebente 
Auflage,  herausgegeben  von  Julius  Frauenstadt.    Leipzig,  1891. 
Quoted  on  p.  87. 
Seligman,  Edwin  R.  A. 

The  Economic  Interpretation  of  History.     Publications  of  the  American 
Economic  Association.     Third   Series,  Vol.   I,   No.    i.     Papers  and 
Proceedings  of  the  Fourteenth  Annual  Meeting,  Washington,  D.C., 
December  27-30,  1901.    New  York,  1902,  pp.  369-387. 
See  p.  41. 
The  Economic  Interpretation  of  History.    New  York,  1902. 
See  p.  41. 

Seneca,  Lucius  Ann^us 

CEuvres  completes  de  S^n^que  le  Philosophe,  avec  la  Traduction  en  Fran- 
^ais.  Publides  sous  la  direction  de  M.  Nisard.  Paris,  1869.  Epis- 
tola  LXIV.    Q.  Sextii  et  Veterum  Sapientium  Laudatio. 

The  passage  placed  under  the  title  of  Part  II,  p.  Ill,  as  true  of 
human  achievement  to-day  as  it  was  at  the  beginning  of  our  era, 
occurs  on  pp.  636-637  of  this  edition  of  Seneca's  works. 

Shakespeare,  Willia.m  , 

Julius  Caesar. 

Quoted  on  p.  251. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  361 

Small,  Albion  W. 

Some  Demands  of  Sociology  upon  Pedagogy.    American  Journal  of  Soci- 
ology, Vol.  II,  No.  6,  Chicago,  May,  1897,  pp.  839-849. 
Quoted  on  pp.  310-311. 
The  Significance  of  Sociology  for  Ethics.     Universit}'  of   Chicago.    The 
Decennial  Publications,  Vol.  IV  (reprint),  Chicago,  1902. 

The  quotation  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  XIII,  p.  314,  occurs 
on  p.  9  of  this  reprint. 

Smissex,  Edouard  van  der 

La  Population,  les  Causes  de  ses  Progrfes,  et  les  Obstacles  qui  en  arretent 
I'Essor.     Bruxelles,  1893. 
See  p.  323. 

Smith,  Adam 

An  Inquiry  into  the  Nature  and  Causes  of  the  Wealth  of  Nations.    Re- 
printed from  the  Sixth  Edition  with  an  Introduction  by  Ernest  Bel- 
fort  Bax.    2  vols.,  London,  1899. 
Quoted  on  pp.  272.  289. 

SoMBART,  Werner 

Socialism  and  the  Social  Movement  in  the  19th  Century,  with  a  Chronicle 
of  the  Social  Movement  1 750-1 896.    Translated  by  Anson  P.  Atter- 
bury.     With  an  Introduction  by  John  B.  Clark.    New  York,  1898. 
See  p.  93. 

Spencer,  Herbert 

A  Theory  of  Population  deduced  from  the  General  Law  of  Animal  Fer- 
tility.   Westminster   Review,  Vol.  LVII  (New  Series,  Vol.  I),  Lon- 
don, April,  1852,  pp.  468-501.    (Published  anonymously.) 
See  p.  323. 
Progress,  its  Law  and  Cause.     Westminster  Review,  Vol.  LXVII  (New 
Series,  Vol.  XI),  London,  April  i,  1857,  pp.  445-485. 
Quoted  on  p.  18. 
Classification  of  the  Sciences.     Originally  published  in  1864.    Reprinted 
in  Essays,  Scientific,   Political,  and  Speculative,  Vol.   Ill,  London, 
1874,  pp.  9-32. 
See  p.  304. 
Reasons  for  dissenting  from  the  Philosophy  of  Comte.    Originally  pub- 
lished in  1864.    Reprinted  in  Essays,  Scientific,  Political,  and  Specu- 
lative, Vol.  Ill,  London,  1874,  PP-  59-80. 
Quoted  on  p.  41. 
Education,  Intellectual,  Moral,  and  Physical.     New  York,  1866. 

Quoted  on  pp.  102,  310. 
The  Principles  of  Sociolo-jy.     \'ol.  I,  New  York,  1877. 
Quoted  on  jij).  67  69. 


362  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 

The  Data  of  Ethics.    New  York,  1879.    Being  Part  I  of  the  Principles  of 
Ethics. 

The  quotation  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  VII,  p.   84,  occurs 
on  pp.  256-257  (§  97).   Quoted  also  on  pp.  318  and  335. 
Justice.    New  York,   1891.     Being  Part  IV  of  the  Principles  of  Ethics. 

See  p.  17. 
The  Principles  of  Ethics.    Vol.  I,  New  York,  1892. 

Quoted  on  pp.  318,  335. 
An  Autobiography.     New  York,  1904. 
Quoted  on  pp.  71,  259-260. 

Spinoza,  Benedict 

Ethica  (Benedict!  de  Spinoza  Opera  quotquot  reperta  sunt.    Recognove- 
runt  J.  Van  Vloten  et  J.  P.  N.  Land.    Volumen  prius,  Hagae  Comi- 
tum,  1882.    Ethica  Ordine  Geometrico  demonstrata). 
See  p.  31. 

Stein,  Ludwig 

Wesen  und  Aufgabe  der  Sociologie.    Abdruck  a.  d.  Archiv  f.  systema- 
tische  Philosophie,  Bd.  IV,  Berlin,  1898. 
See  p.  17. 

Sumner,  William  Graham 

What  Social  Classes  owe  to  each  other.    New  York,  1883. 
Quoted  on  pp.  277-278. 

Tarde,  Gabriel 

La  Croyance  et  le  Desir  et  la  Probability  de  leur  Mesure.  Revue  Philo- 
sophique,  Paris,  Aout  et  Septembre,  1880.  Reprinted  under  the  title 
La  Croyance  et  le  Ddsir,  in  Essais  et  Melanges  Sociologiques. 
Lyon-Paris,  1895,  pp.  235-308. 
See  p.  47. 
Les  Lois  de  I'lmitation.  Etude  Sociologique.  Paris,  1890.  Seconde  edi- 
tion, Paris,  1895. 

Quoted  on  p.  46.    See  also  p.  123. 
La  Logique  Sociale.    Paris,  1895. 

The  quotation  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  XIII,  p.  314,  occurs 
on  p.  422.    See  also  p.  47. 
Les  Lois  Sociales.    Esquisse  d'une  Sociologie.     Paris,  1898. 

See  p.  47. 
L'Opposition  Universelle.  Essai  d'une  Th^orie  des  Contraires.  Paris,  1 897. 

See  p.  123. 
La  Richesse  et  le  Pouvoir.    Revue  Internationale  de  Sociologie,  9^  Annde, 
Paris,  Aout-Septembre,  1901,  pp.  663-665. 
See  p.  40. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  363 

TopiNARD,  Paul 

Science  and  Faith,  or  Man  as  an  Animal,  and    Man  as  a  Member  of 
Society,   with  a  Discussion  of  Animal  Societies.     Translated  from 
the  Author's  Manuscript  by  Thomas  J.  McCormack.    Chicago,  1899. 
Quoted  on  p.  278. 

Ueberweg,   Friedrich 

A  History  of  Philosophy.     Translated  from  the  Fourth  German  Edition 
by  Geo.  S.  Morris.    2  vols.,  New  York,  1872. 

In  Vol.  II,  pp.  463  ff.,  the  views  of  Averroes  are  discussed,  and 
those  of  the  Italian  school  that  claimed  to  follow  him.  See  Averroes, 
Draper,  and  Renan,  above. 

Veblen,  Thorstein 

The  Theory  of  the  Leisure  Class.    An  Economic  Study  in  the  Evolution 
of  Institutions.    New  York,  1899. 
Quoted  on  p.  243. 
The  Theory  of  Business  Enterprise.    New  York,  1904. 
See  p.  89. 

Virgil  (Virgilius  Maro,  Publius) 
.iCneid  (P.  Virgilii  Maronis  .^Cneis). 
Quoted  on  p.  41. 

Voltaire,  Franc^ois  Marie  Arouet  de 

Le  Chapon  et  la   Poularde.    Dialogue  XIV.    CEuvres  completes  de  Vol- 
taire (in  70  vols.).    Paris,  1 784-1 789. 

Quoted  on  p.  33.    See  further  notes  on  this  in  The  Psychic  Fac- 
tors of  Civilization,  p.  349. 

Wallace,  Alfred  Russel 

Contributions  to  the  Theory  of  Natural  Selection.    A  Series  of  Essays. 
London,  1870. 

Quoted  on  p.  287. 

Ward,  Lester  F. 

The  Local  Distribution  of  Plants  and  the  Theory  of  Adaptation.    Popu- 
lar Science  Monthly,  Vol.  IX,  New  York,  October,  1876,  pp.  676-684. 
Quoted  on  pp.  124-125. 
Dynamic  Sociology,  or  Applied  Social  Science,  as  based  upon  Statical 
Sociology  and  the  Less  Complex  Sciences.    New  York,  1883.    Sec- 
ond Edition,  New  York,  1897. 

See  pp.  19,  34.  68,  70,  84,  141-142,  238,  241,  242,  279,  280, 
297-300,  302.  307.  309.  310.  312.  339. 

Quoted  on  pp.  231,  274,  287-288,  298. 
Mind  as  a  Social  Factor.   Mind  :  A  Quarterly  Journal  of  Psychology  and 
Philosophy,  Vol.  L\,  No.  36,  London,  October,  1884,  pp.  563-573- 
See  p.  319. 


364  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 

Sketch  of  Paleobotany.  Fifth  Annual  Reportof  the  United  StatesGeological 
Survey,  1883-1884.     Washington,  1885,  pp.  357-452,  pi.  Ivi-lviii. 
Quoted  on  pp.  234-235. 
Broadening  the  Way  to  Success.    The  Forum,  Vol.  II,  No.  4,  New  York, 
December,  1886,  pp.  340-350. 

See  p.  142.    Quoted  on  pp.  264-265. 
Neo-Darwinism  and  Neo-Lamarckism.    Annual  Address  of  the  President 
of  the  Biological  Society  of  Washington.    Vol.  VI,  Washington,  1891, 
pp.  11-71. 

See  pp.  120-121. 
The    Psychologic    Basis    of    Social    Economics.     Address    of    the  Vice- 
President  of   Section   I,    Economic   Science   and    Statistics,    of   the 
American  Association  for   the  Advancement  of  Science,  Rochester 
Meeting,   August,    1892.    Proceedings,  Vol.   XLI,   Salem,   1892,  pp. 
301-321  ;  Annals  of  the  Academy  of   Political  and  Social  Science, 
Vol.  Ill,  No.  4,  Philadelphia,  January,  1893,  pp.  464-482.    Publica- 
tions of  the  Academy,  No.  TJ. 
See  p.  319. 
The  Psychic  Factors  of  Civilization.     Boston,  1893. 

See  pp.  238,  319,  321,  333. 
Static    and    Dynamic    Sociology.    Political   Science    Quarterly,    Vol.   X, 
No.  2,  New  York  and  Boston,  June,  1895,  pp.  203-220. 
See  p.  31. 
The  Data  of  Sociology.    Contributions  to  Social  Philosophy,  VI.   American 
Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  I,  No.  6,  Chicago,  May,  1896,  pp.  738-752. 
See  p.  305. 
The    Purpose  of    Sociology.    Contributions    to    Social    Philosophy,    IX. 
American  Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  II,  No.  3,  Chicago,  November, 
1896,  pp.  446-460. 

The  references  to  the   views  of   Malthus,   mentioned  on  p.  289, 
occur  on  pp.  453-454. 
L'Economie  de  la  Douleur  et  I'Economie  du  Plaisir.    Annales  de  I'lnsti- 
tut  International  de  Sociologie,  Tome  IV,  Paris,  1898,  pp.  89-132. 

See  p.  31.    The  phrase  referred  to  occurs  on  p.  1 1 1 :  "  La  ten- 
dance subjective  de  la  philosophie  moderne." 
Utilitarian  Economics.    American  Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  Ill,  No.  4, 
Chicago,  January,  1898,  pp.  520-536. 

See  p.  31.    The  phrase  occurs  on  p.  535. 
Outlines  of  Sociology.    New  York,  1898. 

See  pp.  289,  302.  305,  338. 
Review  of    The  Theory  of    the    Leisure    Class,    by  Thorstein    Veblen. 
American  Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  V,  No.  6,  Chicago,  May,  1900, 
pp.  829-837. 

Quoted  on  pp.  244. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


365 


Contemporary   Sociology.     American    Journal    of    Sociology,    Vol.   VII, 
No.  4,  Chicago,  January,  1902,  pp.  475-500  ;  No.  5,  March,    1902, 
pp.  629-658  ;  No.  6,  May,  1902,  pp.  749-762. 
See  p.  305. 
Pure  Sociology.    A  Treatise  on  the  Origin  and  Spontaneous  Development 
of  Society.    New  York,  1903. 

The  numerous  references  to  this  work  need  not  be  specified  here. 
La  Differenciation  et  ITntegration  Sociales.     Une  Utopie  Sociologique. 
Annales  de  ITnstitut  International  de  Sociologie,  Tome  IX,  Paris, 
1903,  pp.  49-85- 

See  pp.  108,  330. 
Social  Differentiation  and  Social  Integration.    English  translation  of  the 
last.    American  Journal  of  Sociology,  Vol.  VIII,  No.  6,  Chicago,  May, 
1903,  pp.  721-745- 

See  p.  330.     Quoted  on  pp.  108.  330-331. 
Herbert    Spencer's    Autobiography.      Science,    New    Series,   Vol.    XIX, 
June  10,  1904,  pp.  873-879. 

See  p.  259.    Quoted  on  pp.  260,  261. 

Washington,  George 
Farewell  Address. 

Quoted  on  p.  249. 

Weismann,  August 

Essays  upon  Heredity  and  Kindred  Biological  Problems.    Authorized  trans- 
lation.   Edited  by  Edward  B.  Poulton,  Selmer  Schdnland,  and  Arthur 
E.  Shipley.    Oxford,  1889.     [Treated  as  Vol.  I,  though  not  so  called.] 
See  pp.  120-121.    His  celebrated  doctrine  of  the  immortality  of  the 
germ-plasm  is  set  forth  chiefly  in  the  first  and  third  lectures  (The 
Duration  of  Life,  Life  and  Death),  originally  published  in  1881  and 
1883  respectively.    See  pp.  22,  25,  33,  144,  146,  153,  of  this  volume. 
Essays  upon  Heredity  and  Kindred  Biological  Problems.  Vol.  II.   Edited 
by    Edward    B.    Poulton    and   Arthur    E.   Shipley.     Oxford,    1892. 
Authorized  translation. 
Quoted  on  p.  256. 
Aufsatze  iiber  Vererbung  und  verwandte  biologische  Fragen.    Jena,  1892. 
This  contains  the  original  German  of  practically  all  the  lectures 
contained  in  the  two  volumes  cited  above,  but  which   appeared  in 
English   in    advance  of  this  work,  although  they  had  probably  all 
appeared  separately  earlier. 

The  quotation  placed  at  the  head  of  Chapter  VI,  p.  50.  occurs  on 
p.  680.    It  is  rendered  by  the  English   translators  :  •'  The  path   to 
truth  often  lies  through  inevitable  error."    See  Vol.  11,  p.  106. 
Das  Keimplasma.    Line  Theorie  der  Vererbung.     Jena,  1892. 
See.  p.  121. 


366  APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 

The  Germ-plasm.  A  Theory  of  Heredity.  Translated  by  W.  Newton 
Parker  and  Harriet  Ronnfeldt.  New  York,  1893  (Translation  of  the 
last). 

See  p.  121. 

White,  Andrew  Dickson 

A   History  of   the  Warfare  of  Science  with   Theology  in  Christendom. 
2  vols.,  New  York,  1897. 
See  p.  76. 

Wines,  Frederick  Howard 

Sociology  and  Philanthropy.     Annals  of  the  American  Academy  of  Polit- 
ical and  Social  Science,  Vol.  XII,  Philadelphia,  July,  1898,  pp.  49-57. 
The  quotation  placed  after  the  title  of  Part  III,  p.  283,  occurs  on 
p.  49. 

Winiarsky,  Leon 

L'Enseignement  de  I'Economie  Politique  Pure  et  de  la  Mdcanique  Sociale. 
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des  Sciences  Sociales  [Exposition  Universelle  de  1900  a  Paris]. 
Brochure,  5  pages,  distril^uted  to  the  members  of  the  Congress. 

I  place  at  the  head  of  Chapter  I,  p.  3,  the  opening  paragraph  of 
this  report.  It  is  incorporated  along  with  all  the  other  reports  in 
the  volume  subsequently  published  by  the  Congress  under  the  title : 
Le  Premier  Congres  de  I'Enseignement  des  Sciences  Sociales.  Compte 
rendu  des  Seances  et  Texte  des  Mdmoires  pubHds  par  la  Commis- 
sion Permanente  Internationale  de  I'Enseignement  Social.  Paris, 
1901,  pp.  341-345- 
Woodward,  Robert  Simpson 

An  Historical  Survey  of  the  Science  of  Mechanics.     Address  delivered  at 
the  New  York  Academy  of  Sciences,  November  26,  1894.     Science, 
New  Series,  Vol.  I,  February  8,  1895,  pp.  141-157. 
Quoted  on  p.  265. 

Worms,  Rene 

La  Sociologie  et  le  Droit.     Extrait  de  la  Revue  Internationale  de  Socio- 
logie,  3^  Annde,  No.  i,  Janvier,  1895. 
See  p.  290. 
Philosophie  des  Sciences  Sociales.    I.  Objetdes  Sciences  Sociales.   Paris, 
1903. 

See  pp.  40,  290.    Quoted  on  p.  291. 

WUNDT,  WiLHELM 

Logik.     Eine    Untersuchung    der   Principien    der    Erkenntniss    und    der 
Methoden     wissenschaftlicher     Forschung.      Zweite    umgearbeitete 
Auflage.  2  vols.,  Stuttgart,  1895. 
See  p.  307. 


INDEX 


[Figures  in  black  type  refer  to  headings] 


Abbadie,  Jacques,  257. 

Abbot,  Charles,  ist  Lord  Colchester,  165. 

Abbott,    Charles,    Baron    Tenterden    of 

Henden.    See  Tenterden. 
Ability  distinguished  from  genius,  115. 
— ,  Latent,  1 14. 
Abstract  reasoning,  103,  104,  106. 

—  sciences,  106,  304,  306. 

Academia   Leopoldino-Carolina   Naturae 

Curiosorum,  235. 
Academies  of  science,  138,  197,  231,  235. 
Accident,  Opportunity  mistaken  for,  256, 

272. 
Achievement,  111. 

—  altruistic,  291. 

— ,  Assimilation  of,  292. 
— .  Conditions  to,  116. 

—  consists  in  knowledge,  106. 
— ,  Market  for,  294,  295,  300. 

— ,  Potential,  113,  127,  128,  141,  285. 
— ,  Social,  6,  15,  17,  37. 
— ,  Socialization  of,  21. 
— ,  to  whom  due,  132,  133. 

—  versus  genius,  241,  242. 

improvement,  6,  21,  84,  113,  285  ff., 

Acquired  characters,  120. 

Action  at  a  distance,  332. 

— ,  Dynamic,  6. 

Addison,  Joseph,  165,  263. 

Adamses,  The,  1 18. 

Adaptation,  Law  of,  125. 

Adler,  Felix,  28. 

Administration  of  the  social  estate,  300. 

Adversity    not     needed    as    a    spur    to 

achievement,  245,  265. 
Aerial  navigation,  316. 
iEschylus,  199. 
Affective  faculties,  42,  268. 
Agassiz,  Louis,  85,  98,  164,  165. 
Agents  of  civilization,  132,  145,  149,  221, 

224,  231,  242,  261,  296. 

,  Women  as,  231. 

Ahriman,  61. 


Air,  Primitive  ideas  of,  59,  75. 
Akbar,  Emperor  Mohammed,  270. 
Alexander  the  Great,  199. 
Allbutt,  T.  Clifford,  341. 

— , ,  quoted,  265-266. 

Alleged  self-made  men,  251,  252. 

Allen,  Grant,  104,  105,  139,  341. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  104,  297,  298. 

Altruism  an  unreliable  principle,  272. 

— ,  Luxury  of,  29. 

Ameliorative  function  of  society,  38. 

Ampere,  Andre  Marie,  148,  200. 

Anarchism,  11. 

Ancestor-worship,  57,  61. 

Ancients  versus  moderns,  274,  298. 

Ancillon,  Charles,  165. 

— ,  Jean  Pierre  Frederic,  165. 

Andamanese,  68. 

Androcentric  world  view,  79,  80,  98,  231, 

232. 
Anicet-Bourgeois,  Auguste,  217. 
Animals,  Life  of,  32,  t,'^,  51. 
Animal-worship,  57,  73. 
Animism,  52. 
Anlagen,  122. 
Anthropocentrism,  6. 
Anthropomorphic  ideas,  51,  75. 
Appearances  the  opposite  of  reality,  65, 

107,  113. 
Applied  science,  8,  9,  283. 

versus  art,  8,  10,  297. 

—  sociology,  5. 

,  Ethics  as,  28,  317,  318. 

,  Method  of,  296. 

not  an  art,  10. 

,  Problems  of,  96,  314. 

,  Purpose  of,  18,  36,  234,  292. 

,  Relation  of  pure  to,  3,  21,  85. 

,  Subject-matter  of,  5,  6,  21. 

,   Synthetic  treatment  of,  141. 

Arabian  Nights'  Entertainments,  58. 
Arago,  Dominique,  148. 
Archimedes,  199. 
Ariosto,  Ludovico,  263. 


367 


368 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


Aristocracy  of  brains,  94,  271. 

— ,  Tlie  leisure  class  as  an,  244. 

Aristotle,  199,  236,  341. 

— ,  quoted,  224. 

Art  distinguished  from  applied    science, 

8,  10,  297. 
— ,  The  social,  1 1. 
Artificial  environment,  131,  293. 
— ,  Superiority  of  the,  11,  22. 
Asceticism,  30,  72. 
Assimilation  of  achievement,  292. 
— ,  Social,  26,  109,  338. 
Astronomy,  Applied,  8,  9. 
— ,  Place  of,  in  the  hierarchy,  304. 
— ,  Sidereal,  9. 
Astrophysics,  9. 
Atavism,  120,  121. 
Attraction,  332. 
— ,  Principle  of,  313,  331. 
Attractive  labor,  334,  339. 
—  legislation,  313,  337. 
Australians,  68. 

Avebury,  The  Right  Hon.  Lord,  34,67,354. 
Averroes,  341,  347,  359,  363. 
— ,  quoted,  50. 

Babylonians,  60. 

Bach,  Johann  Sebastian,  239. 

Bacon,  Francis,  10 1,  145,  200,  263. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  68,  84,  117,  285,  288. 

— ,  Roger,  199. 

Bacteriology,  8,  9. 

Baer,  Karl  Ernst  von,  98,  287. 

Bagehot,  Walter,  342. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  33,  34,  181, 

Bain,  Alexander,  260. 

Balzac,  Honore  de,  263. 

Barth,  Paul,  47,  342. 

Basques,  157-159,  227. 

Bastian,  Adolf,  43,  342. 

Beaumarchais,  Pierre  A ugustin  Caronde, 

352- 
Beccaria,  Cesare,  342. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  31. 

Belgians,  157. 

Beliefs,  45,  106. 

Bellamy,  Edward,  316. 

Benevolence,  292. 

Bentham,  Jeremy,  342. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  31. 

Beranger.  Jean  Pierre,  217,  218,  239,  263, 


Bernard,  Claude,  239. 

Bertrand,  Alexis,  306. 

Berzelius,  Johan  Jacob,  164,  165. 

Billaut,  Adam,  217. 

Biography,  Fallacy  of,  188,  189,  200,  202, 

222,  235. 
— ,  Mercenary  schemes  of,  222. 
— ,  Relation  of,  to  history,  224,  235,  343, 

344- 
Biologic  law,  319,  321,  322.. 
Biological  statics,  124,  125,  127. 
Biology,  Applied,  8,  9. 
— ,  Place  of,  in  the  hierarchy,  304. 
Birth  rate  of  rich  and  poor,  323,  324. 

,  Schemes  to  increase  the,  324. 

Bismarck,  Otto  Eduard  Leopold,  Prince 

von,  134. 
Blackstone,  Sir  William,  74,  342. 
Blatchford,  Robert,  342. 
— ,  — ,  quoted,  97. 
Boccaccio,  Giovanni,  263. 
Bochart,  Samuel,  165. 
Boerhaave,  Hermann,  164. 
Booth,  Charles,  322. 
Bouffe,  Marie,  217. 
Bourgeoisie,  27,  98,  207,  243. 
Boursault,  E.,  217,  218. 
Boyle,  Robert,  145. 
Brain  compared  to  soil,  236,  237. 
—  mistaken  for  the  mind,  267,  268. 
Brains,  Aristocracy  of,  94,  271. 
Bretons,  159,  227. 
Broca,  Paul,  quoted,  249. 
Brown,  Robert,  164. 
Browning,  Robert,  263. 
Buccleuch,  Duke  of,  262. 
Bucke,  Richard  Maurice,  342. 

— , ,  quoted,  34. 

Buckle,  Henry  Thomas,  149,  263,  342. 

— , ,  quoted,  84,  88,  274,  275,  343. 

Buffon,  Georges  Louis  Leclerc,  200. 
Bunyan,  John,  239,  255,  256,  343. 
— ,  — ,  quoted,  255-256. 
Burke,  Edmund,  263. 
Burnouf,  Jean  Louis,  258. 
Burns,  Robert,  239,  255. 
Business  class,  26,  98,  321. 
Byron,  George  Gordon,  Lord,  263. 

Cables,  Ocean,  316. 
Caesar,  Julius,  256 
Calculus,  307. 


INDEX 


369 


Catnoens,  Luis  de,  263. 

Camper,  Peter,  164. 

Candolle,  Alphonse  de,  133,  138,  145, 
146,  161,  169,  181,  194,  196,  197, 
203,  204,  209.  213,  221,  231,  242, 
300,  343- 

— , .quoted,  145,  146,  162,  164-165, 

200,  201,  204,  211,  245,  272-273. 

Candolles,  de,  The,  264. 

Capacity  for  truth,  101,  241. 

Capital  and  labor,  Relations  of,  315. 

Cardoon,  124. 

Caribs,  68. 

Carlyle,  Thomas,  125,  149,  263,  264,  343, 

344- 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  126,  224,  343,  344. 

Carnegie,  Andrew,  266,  344. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  266. 

Carnegie  Institution  of  Washington,  223, 
266. 

Casper,  Johann  Ludwig,  321. 

Catalans,  157,  i  58. 

Catalepsy,  Savage  interpretation  of,  55. 

Categorical  imperative,  28. 

Catholic  Church,  Censorship  of  the,  77. 

Catholicism,  Effect  of,  on  literary  pro- 
ductivity, 162,  163,  167-169. 

Causa  efficiens,  58. 

—  finalis,  58. 
Causality,  303. 
Causation,  58,  87,  89,  303  ff. 
Cause,  Savage  ideas  of,  58,  59. 
Causes,  Adequate,  89,  90. 

— ,  Kfficient,  58,  87,  89. 

—  favorable  to  the  production  of  scien- 

tific men,  144,  145,  148,  162, 194,  211. 
— ,  Final,  58,  87. 
Cazales,  J.  A.  M.,  217,  218. 
Celibacy,  162  ff. 

Censorship  of  the  press,  77,  78. 
Cervantes  Saavedra,  Miguel  de,  263. 
Chaldeans,  60. 
Chamfort  (Champfort),  Sebastien  Roch 

Nicolas,  258. 
Champagne,  Wild  girl  of,  269. 
Champmesle,  Madame  Marie  Desmares, 

217. 
Chance,  Opportunity  mistaken  for,  256, 

272. 
Character,  Slow  improvement  of,  316. 
Charity,  Objects  of,  326. 
Charlatanry,  222. 


Chastity,  166. 

Chateaux,  Literary  productivity  of,  182- 

184,    18S,   191,   194,  195,   212,   227, 

231,  232. 
Chaucer,  Geoffrey,  263. 
Chemistry,  Applied,  8,  9. 
— ,  Place  of,  in  the  hierarchy,  304. 
Cheops,  Pyramid  of,  71. 
Chinese,  Intellectual  capacity  of  the,  109. 
Chinooks,  68. 

Christianity,  Immortality  doctrine  of,  60. 
Church,  Origin  of  the  word,  62. 
Cicero,  Marcus  Tullius,  344. 

— , ,  quoted,  129. 

Cimbrians,  157. 

Circumstances,  Mother  of,  274. 
— ,  Power  of,  267. 

—  versus  genius,  127,  220. 

Cities,  Influence  of,  on  intellectual  devel- 
opment, 173,  177,  181  ff.,  2H,  212, 
220. 

— ,  University,  of  France,  212. 

Civil  justice  versus  natural,  12,  22. 

Civilization,  Agents  of,  132,  145,  149, 
221,  224,  231,  296. 

•^,  Definitions  of,  11,  106,  129,  131,  132. 

— ,  Oriental  versus  occidental,  48,  49,  109. 

—  versus  progress,  84,  285,  286. 
Claims  of  feeling,  29. 

Clark,  John  B.,  344. 

— , ,  quoted,  328-329. 

Classes,  Social,  91,  92,  96. 
Classification  of  knowledge,  302,  303. 

the  sciences,  303  ff. 

Clausius,  Rudolf  M.,  164. 
Clay,  Artificial  utilization  of,  il. 
Cleavage,  Social,  26,  93. 
Climate,  149. 

Colbert,  Jean  Baptiste,  217. 
Coleridge,  Samuel  Taylor,  263. 
Collective  telesis,  12. 
Columbus,  Christopher,  256. 
Committee  of  Ten,  310,  311. 
Community,  Definition  of  a,  271. 
Competition,  Effect  of  removing,  123. 
— ,  Other  motives  to,  than  those  of  gain, 
320,321. 

—  versus  emulation,  321. 
Competitive  system,  320,  321. 

Comte,  Auguste,  8,  9,  19,  41-44,  70,  71, 
99,  163,  171,  262,  263,  289,  290,  317, 
344.  345.  358.  3''"- 


370 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


Comte,  Auguste,  quoted,  i,  41,  42,  51,  69, 
101-102,  108,  170,  224,  248,  285,  289, 
290,  306,  334,  345. 

Conation,  291. 

Concrete  sciences,  106. 

Condorcet,  Marie  Jean  Antoine,  345. 

— , ,  quoted,  66-67,  102,  244-245, 

247-248. 

Confucius,  quoted,  272. 

Congo  people,  68. 

Conquest  of  nature,  85. 

Conrad,  Johannes,  321. 

Conrart,  Valentin,  217. 

Consequences  of  error,  68,  82. 

Consumption  of  wealth,  329,  330. 

Contents  of  the  mind,  268  ff. 

Continuance  theory,  60. 

Continuity,  Social,  271. 

Contract,  System  of,  281. 

Cooley,  Charles  H.,  144,  255,  345. 

— , ,  quoted,  144,  263,  265,  275-276. 

Copernicus,  Nicolas,  199. 

Corn,  Indian,  126. 

Corneille,  Pierre,  256,  263. 

Corrozet,  Gilles,  217. 

Coste,  Adolphe,  89,  172,  181,  345. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  title-page,  67,  291. 

Cowper,  William,  263. 

Creation,  Special,  85. 

Creeds,  81. 

Criminals,  312,  313. 

Crossing  of  strains,  119,  121. 

Cunningham,  William,  289,  345. 

Curare,  Moral,  17. 

Curiosity,  234. 

Curriculums,  298,  305. 

Cuvier,  Georges,  85,  148,  200,  264,  346. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  285. 

Dahomans,  68. 

Dakotahs,  68. 

D'Alembert,  Jean  le  Rond,  239,  253-255. 

Dallemagne,  Jules,  181,  346. 

Damnation,  Eternal,  94. 

Dana,  James  Dwight,  346. 

— , ,  quoted,  85. 

Dante  Alighieri,  263. 
Darwin,  Charles  Robert,   124,   137,  262, 
264,  265,  346. 

— , ,  quoted,  262. 

Dassoucy,  Charles  Coypeaud,  217. 
Davy,  Sir  Humphry,  239. 


Dead  languages,  246. 

Death,  Savage  ideas  of,  54,  56,  75. 

Definition  of  justice,  22. 

De  Foe,  Daniel,  263. 

Defregger,  Franz  von,  239. 

Degeneration,  96,  122,  133,  142,  143,  162, 

271,  301,  330. 
De  Greef,  Guillaume,  40,  41,  46,  305,  346. 

.  — ,  quoted,  43,  245,  306,  328,  358. 

Deism,  182. 

Deity,  Evolution  of  the  conception  of,  61. 

Delille,  Jacques,  258. 

Delirium,   Savage  interpretation   of,   54, 

55.  75- 
Democracy,  16,  27,  44,  338. 
Democratic  party,  11. 
Demos,  99. 

Density  of  population,  169  ff.,  194,  212. 
,  Dynamic  versus  material,  171, 

172,  193,  194,  212. 
Deprivation,  25,  318,  319,  327. 
Descartes,  Rene,  76,  86,  88,  262,  263,  306, 

347- 
— ,  — ,  quoted,  31,  86,  262,  288. 
Desire,  how  related  to  beliefs,  45-48. 
— ,  True  nature  of,  25. 
Despair,  Philosophy  of,  14,  2S9. 
Despotism,  27. 

Destouches,  Philippe  Nericault,  254. 
Determinism,  Historical,  85. 
Dickens,  Charles,  263. 
Differentiation,  Race,  331. 
Diffusion  of  knowledge,  307. 
Diogenes  the  Cynic,  117. 

—  Laertius,  117. 
Directive  agent,  129. 
Discovery,  Scientific,  221. 

—  versus  learning,  102. 
Discussion  of  opportunity,  137. 

,  Method  of,  135. 

Disinherited,  The  intellectually,  96,  107. 
Disraeli,  Benjamin,  Earl  of  Beaconsfield, 

263. 
Dissenters,  74. 
Distribution,  Social  versus  economic,  294, 

295'  328,  339- 
Double,  Wide-spread  belief  in  a,  54. 
Doubt  the  condition  to  progress,  88. 
Draper,  John  William,  76,  341,  347,  363. 

— , ,  quoted,  164,  347. 

Dreams,  Savage  interpretation  of,  54,  55, 

75- 


INDEX 


371 


Drudgery,  96,  241,  244. 

Dryden,  John,  23>  263. 

Dualism,  Ethical,  28. 

— ,  Psychological,  85. 

— ,  Theological,  61. 

Du  Bellay,  Joachim,  217. 

Dumas,  Alexandre,  217,  218,  239. 

Durkheim,  £mile,  19,  171,  172,  193,  290, 

347- 
— ,  — ,  quoted,  171-172. 
Dynamic  action,  6. 

—  agent,  43,  129. 

—  density  of  population,   171,  172,   193, 

194,  212. 

Ecclesiastes,  352. 

— ,  quoted,  352. 

Ecclesiastical  institutions,  62. 

Echoes,  Savage  interpretation  of,  54,  55, 

75- 
Eckermann,  Johann  Peter,  275,  347. 
Economic  environment,    147,   198,   228, 

3^7- 

—  interpretation  of  history,  40,  82. 
Economy,  Pain  versus  pleasure,  32,  35, 

36,  51,  62,  327. 
Ecstasy,  56. 

Ectoderm,  The  social,  26. 
Education,  Amount  of  possible,  102,  229, 

230. 
— ,  Anthology  of,  247  ff. 

—  as  opportunity,  246,  280,  298  ff. 
— ,  Chaotic  condition  of,  309  ff. 

— ,  Defects  of  the  current,  81,  309  ff. 
— ,  Definitions  of,  231,  299,  310. 

—  does  not  pretend  to  furnish  knowledge, 

81,  310. 
— ,  False  ideas  about,  102,  309. 
— ,  Influence  of,  on  great  men,  126,  139, 

215  ff.,  229. 
— ,  Literary  versus  scientific,  246. 
— ,  Means  or  instruments  of,  307. 
— ,  Negative,  242. 

—  of  experience,  299. 

information,  299. 

nature,  102. 

— ,  I'ositive,  242,  246,  299,  300. 

— ,  Proper  object  of,  307. 

— ,  Synthetic   and    analytic    methods    of 

treating,  299. 
— ,  The  word,  29S,  299. 
— ,  Universal,  231. 


Educational  environment,  147,  211,  229. 

Efficacy  of  effort,  13,  131,  279. 

Efficiency,  Intellectual,  115,  116. 

— ,  .Social,  109,  113,  339. 

Efficient  cause,  58. 

Effort,  Efficacy  of,  13,  131,  279. 

— ,  The  sociological  principle  of,  13,  291. 

Egalitarianism,  7,  273. 

— .Intellectual,  95,   106,    107,   113,  230, 

236,  240,  272,  273,  313. 
Eldon,  Earl  of  (John  Scott),  117. 
Electric  motors,  316. 
Electricity,  Utilization  of,  8,  9,  11. 
filite,  Effect  of  destroying  the,  133. 
Emerson,  Ralph  Waldo,  165. 
Emotional  development,  99. 
Empedocles,  199. 

Emulation  versus  competition,  321. 
Encke,  Johann  Franz,  164. 
End  or  purpose  of  sociology,  5,  18,  24, 

234,  292. 
— ,  The  ultimate,  287. 
Endoderm,  The  Social,  26. 
Ends,  Means  to,  4,  279,  280,  287. 
Ennui,  25,  244,  245,  356. 
Environment,  Artificial,  131,  293. 

—  as  a   factor  in    the   development  of 

genius,  123,  139. 

—  conceived  as  the  cause  of  all  progress, 

130,  132,  165. 
— ,  Economic,  147,  198,  22S,  327. 
— ,  Educational,  147,  211,  229. 
— ,  Ethnological,  147,  156,  169. 
— ,  Knowledge  of  the,  ic6. 
— ,  Local,  147,  169,  228. 
— ,  Physical,  147,  148,  169. 
— ,  Religious,  147,  161,  169. 

—  represents  opposition,   123,   128,  130, 

— ,  Role  of  the,  116,  123,  127,  128,  130, 

139  ff.,  149. 
— ,  Social,  147,  204,  228. 

—  versus  genius,  127,  130. 
Environmental    factors,    145,    224,    228, 

230,  232,  238,  257,  293,  300. 

,  Negative,  233. 

Epicurus,  32. 

Epilepsy,  Savage  interpretation  of,  54,  75. 

Equal  freedom,  13. 

—  rights,  281. 

Equalization  of  intelligence,  93,  281,  314, 
316,  326,  336. 


372 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


Equalization  of  opportunity,  276,  294, 295. 
Equipment,  Mental,  95,  109. 
Erasmus,  Desiderius,  263. 
Error,  65. 

—  as  great  a  burden  to  the  mind  as  truth, 

lOI. 

—  attractive,  80,  81. 

— ,  Consequences  of,  68,  82. 

— ,  is  it  ever  useful  ?  65. 

— ,  Most  minds  mere  bundles  of,  81. 

— ,  Prevalence  of,  91. 

— ,  Principal  source  of,  91. 

— ,  Psychological  nature  of,  90. 

— ■  the  chief  obstacle  to  social  motion, 

no. 
— ,  Truth  and,  50. 

—  versus  ignorance,  65,  67,  81,  93. 
Espinas,  Alfred,  290. 

Ethical  character  of  all  science,  287,  317, 
318. 

—  dualism,  28. 

—  sociology,  317. 

Ethics  as  applied  sociology,  317,  318. 
— ,  Negative,  326. 

—  of  restraint,  28. 

— ,  Position  of,  in  the  hierarchy,  317,  318. 
— ,  Positive,  318,  326. 
— ,  Privative,  318,  326. 
— ,  The  new,  28,  84,  318. 
Ethnological  environment,  147,  156,  169. 
Eudemonism,  32. 
Eugenics,  119,  141. 
Euler,  Leonhard,  164,  165. 
Evolution,  Progress  versus,  18. 
Evolutionary  teleology,  86. 
Exceptional  man  theory,  266,  277,  293. 
Exercise  of  the  faculties,  25,  26,  244,  327, 

328.  33^- 
Experience,  All  knowledge  derived  from, 

236,  268  ff. 
— ,  Education  of,  299. 
— ,  Mind  without,  236,  269  ff. 
Experimentation,  332,  333,  338,  339. 
Exploitation,  244,  292. 

Fabre  d'£glantine,  Philippe  Fran9ois  Na- 

zaire,  217. 
Fabricius,  David,  164. 
Faculties,  Exercise  of  the,   25,   26,  244, 

327,  328,  336. 
Faire  marcher,  17. 
Faith  in  the  supernatural,  88. 


Faith,  Scientific,  86,  88,  89. 
Fallacy  of  biography,  188,  189,  200,  202, 
222,  235. 

history,  234,  241. 

statistics,  136,  147,  148,  233,  235. 

superstition,  117,  147,  235,  236. 

Falsehood,  Justified,  78,  79. 

Faraday,  Michael,  85,  239. 

Fear  of  spiritual  beings,  63,  64,  67. 

— ,  Perpetual  state  of,  among  animals, 

32-  33- 
— , ,  —  savages,  33-35,  51,  62, 

63,  94. 
Feeling,  Claims  of,  29. 
— ,  Interest  consists  in,  45. 
— ,  Language  of,  270. 
— ,  Relation  of,  to  ideas  and  opinions,  48. 
—  versus  function,  30. 

intellect,  288. 

Femow,  Bernhard  Eduard,  17,  347. 

Fetishism,  53,  61,  67,  69,  82. 

Feudalism,  27,  98. 

Fichte,  Johann  Gottlieb,  263. 

Fielding,  Henry,  263. 

Fijians,  68. 

Final  cause,  58. 

Fine  arts.  Object  of  the,  330. 

Fish  Lake,  90. 

Fiske,  John,  139,  348. 

Folkmar,  Daniel,  348. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  108. 

Fontenelle,  Bernard,  76. 

Fool's  puzzle,  131. 

Forces,  .Social,  319,  320,  332,  333,  338. 

— ,  Sociogenetic,  84. 

Fouillee,  Alfred,  17,  47,  348. 

— ,  — -,  quoted,  44,  45. 

Fourier,  Charles,  10,  334,  335,  336. 

Fourth  estate,  98. 

France,  Parochial  schools  of,  10. 

— ,  Physical  conditions  of,  149. 

— ,  Races  of,  1 56  ff. 

Frederick  the  Second's  diary,  78. 

Free  will,  85. 

Freedom,  Equal,  13. 

— ,  National,  26. 

— ,  Political,  26,  27. 

— ,  Social,  26. 

French    men   of  letters   and  of  science, 

Birthplaces  of,  149. 
,  Number  of,    148, 

150,  172,  176,  225  ff. 


INDEX 


373 


French    men   of  letters  and  of  science, 

Odin's  treatment  of,  148. 
,  Statistics  of,  1 50  £f., 

172  ff. 
Froude,  James  Anthony,  344,  348. 
Fuegians,  68. 

Function,  Ameliorative,  of  society,  38. 
— ,  Prevailing  subserviency  to,  35. 
— ,  Protective,  of  society,  38. 

—  versus  feeling,  30. 
Funerals,  Costly,  70. 
— ,  Sacrifices  at,  68  ff. 
Futility  versus  utility,  244. 

Gain,  Other  motives  than,  320,  321. 

Galileo  Galilei,  262. 

Galland,  Antoine,  257. 

Galton,  Francis,  104,  115,  116,  119-122, 

125,    127,    134,   137-139.    141.    142. 

149,    165,    194,    197,   201,   205-208, 

211,   213,   215,  220,  221,  223,  225, 

226,   231,   237,   239,  254,  255,  266, 

299,  348. 
— ,  — ,  quoted,  117,   118,   119,  120,   123, 

137,    138,    162-163,   201,   205,   247, 

251.  253-254.  255,  267. 
Garcilasso  [Inca]  de  la  Vega,  69. 
Gardin-Dumesnil,  Jean  Kaptiste,  258. 
Gauls,  157. 

Geddes,  Patrick.  324,  349. 
Generalization,  10. 

Genius  a  fixed  quantity,  128,  129,  220. 
- —  a  natural  force,  12S,  129. 
— ,   Amount  of,  in  society,  172,  225  ff., 

231,  236,  266. 
— ,  Apotheosis  of,  24,  128. 
— ,  Circumstances  that  repress,  274,  276. 
— ,  Definition  of,  115. 

—  distinguished  from  other  faculties,  115. 
— ,  False  ideas  of,  235,  266,  292,  293. 

— ,  Finest  types  of,  easily  repressed,  264, 
265. 

—  .Hereditary,   115,   118,   121,    122,   137, 

138. 
— ,  how  produced,  122,  269. 
— ,  in  what  sense  declining,  238,  239. 
— ,  Irrepressibility  of,  115,  137,  238-240. 
— ,  Moral  qualities  in,  114,  122,  268. 
— .Potential,    114,    115,    134,    141,   145, 

231,  240,  293. 

—  present  in  all  classes,  239,  253. 
— ,  Relativity  of,  232,  236. 


Genius,  Sporadic  character  of,  233,  234, 

286,  292,  293,  295. 
— ,  Universality  of,  236. 

—  versus  ability,  1 1 5. 
achievement,  241,  242. 

circumstances,  environment,  oppor- 
tunity, 127,  220. 

talent  and  merit,  148. 

Genlis,  Stephanie  Felicite  (Madame),  217. 

Geometry,  Ability  of  students  to  under- 
stand, 104,  105. 

—  based  on  experience,  311. 
George,  Henry,  349. 

— .  — ,  quoted,  256-257,  271,  273. 
Germ-plasm,  The  social,  95. 
Germs,  Immortality  of,  121. 
Gessner,  Jean,  165. 
Gibbon,  Edward,  263. 
Giddings,  Franklin  Henry,  349. 

— . ,  quoted,  109,  170,  181. 

Gods,  origin  of,  61. 

Goethe,  Johann  Wolfgang  von,  263,  349. 

— , ,  quoted,  275. 

Gould,  George  M.,  349. 

— , ,  quoted,  224. 

Gournay,  Jean  Claude  de,  17. 

Gravitation,  332. 

Gray.  Asa,  86,  349. 

— ,  Thomas,  349. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  113. 

Great  man  theory,  149. 

—  men,    Birthplaces   of,    181,    i88,    189, 

197,  198. 

,  Number  of,  172,  225  ff. 

regarded  as  exceptional  beings.  235. 

,  Role  of,  132,  133. 

Greatest  happiness  doctrine,  31. 

Greek  Church,  Censorship  of  the.  77. 

Grew,  Nehemiah,  164. 

Group  sentiment  of  safety,  64,  65. 

Growth  force,  127. 

Guizot,   Fran9ois   Pierre   Guillaume.    17, 

349- 

— . ,  quoted,  40. 

Gumplowicz,  Ludwig,  19,  350. 
Gunton,  George,  350. 
— ,  — ,  quoted,  273-274,  278. 
Gynaecocentric  theory,  98. 

Haeckel,  Ernst,  78. 
Hai  ben  Yokthan,  269. 
Hallam,  Henry,  165. 


374 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


Halley   Edmund,  262,  265. 
Hanstein,  L.  J.,  164. 

Happiness  consists  in   the  normal  exer- 
cise of  the  faculties,  25,  244. 
— ,  Greatest,  doctrine,  31. 

—  little  thought  of,  in  a  pain  economy, 

326,  327. 
— ,  Organization  of,  339. 
— ,  Pursuit  of,  32. 
Hardwicke,  Earl  of  (Philip  Yorke),  117, 

239- 

— , Devonshire,  263. 

Hartmann,  Eduard,  19,  20,  72,  350. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  350. 

Hartsoeker,  Nicolas,  164. 

Harvey,  William,  263. 

Hase,  Charles  Benoit,  165. 

Hauser,  Kaspar,  269,  270. 

Hawthorne,  Nathaniel,  239. 

Haydn,  Joseph,  239,  256. 

Heat,  Artificial  utilization  of,  11. 

Hebrews,  60. 

Hedonism,  32. 

— ,  Paradox  of,  19. 

Heer,  Oswald,  164. 

Hegel,  Georg  Wilhelm  Friedrich,  263. 

Heine,  Heinrich,  263. 

Helvetius,    Claude    Adrien,    19,    92,    97, 

103,  126,  236,  244,  247,  350. 

— , ,  quoted,  77,  247,  256,  272. 

Herbart,  Johann  Friedrich,  247. 
Hereditary   genius,    115,    118,    121,    122, 

137.  138- 
Heredity,  Latent  elements  in,  119,  120. 
— ,  Social,  95,  96,  107,  298. 
— ,  —  homologue  of,  123. 

—  versus    environment    or  opportunity, 

123,  127,  142,  264,  273. 
Heresy,  74,  75,  82,  88. 
Heretics,  74. 
Heritage,  The  social,  95,  96,   loi,   107, 

no,  281,  292,  300-302,  307. 
Herodotus,  71. 
Heroes  and  hero-worship,  130,   132,  134, 

149,  199. 
Herschels,  The,  118,  264. 
Heuristic  method,  143. 
Hierarchy  of  the  sciences,  9,  303  ff. 

,  Pedagogic  value  of  the,  304. 

Historical  intellectualism,  40. 

—  materialism,  40,  204. 

—  races,  107. 


History  as  a  mental  discipline,  310-312. 

—  defined,  234,  311-312. 
— ,  Fallacy  of,  234,  241. 

— ,  Interpretation  of,  40,  82. 

— ,  Relation  of  biography  to,    224,  235, 

343.  344- 
Hobbes,  Thomas,  165,  263,  264. 
Holmes,  Oliver  Wendell,  quoted,  79. 
Homer,  199. 
Homeric  poems,  58. 
Hooker,  Sir  Joseph,  260. 
Hookers,  The,  264. 
Hugo,  Victor,  263. 
— ,  — ,  quoted,  296. 
Huitzilopochtli,  69. 
Humanitarianism,  99. 
Humanities,  The,  103. 
Humboldt,    Baron    Alexander    von,    34, 

263. 
Hume,  David,  263. 
Hunger  a  form  of  privation,  25. 
Huss,  John,  239. 
Hutcheson,  David,  341. 
— ,  Francis,  350. 
— ,  — ,  quoted,  31. 
Huxley,  Thomas  Henry,  20,  260,  264,  350. 

— , ,  quoted,  18,  37,  266,  289,  314. 

Hypotheses,   Method    of   discussion   by, 

136,  178. 
— ,  Working,  115. 

Iberians,  157. 

Idea-forces,  44,  47,  48. 

Ideas,  Anthropomorphic,  51,  57,  59,  75. 

— ,  Dynamic  quality  of,  82,  83. 

— ,  Primitive,  50  ff. 

— ,  Religious,  52,  65,  82. 

—  rule  the  world,  40. 
Idees-forces,  44,  47. 

Ideological  interpretation  of  history,  41, 

82. 
Ideomotor  actions,  45,  48. 
Ignorance  versus  error,  65,  67,  81,  93. 
Illegitimacy,  165,  166,  254. 
Illusions,  Optical,  91. 
Imitation,  80,  89,  132,  301. 

—  the  sociological  homologue  of  hered- 

ity, 123. 
Immortality,  Christian  and  Mohammedan 
doctrine  of,  60. 

—  of  germs,  121. 

— ,  Pre-Christian  belief  in,  60. 


INDEX 


375 


Imperatives,  2S,  46. 

Improvement,  283,  339. 

— ,    Achievement    versus,    21,    84,     113, 

2S5ff.,  331. 
Inadaptation,  125. 
Indexes  of  proliibited  books,  77,  78. 
Indian  corn,  126. 
Indirect  or  intellectual  method,  4,  5,  287, 

2S8. 
Individual  telesis,  12. 
Inequalities,  Artificial,  292,  320. 
— ,  Intellectual,  23,  113,  286. 
— ,  Natural,  21,  113,  267. 
— ,  Social,  22,  293,  309,  31S. 
Inferior,  Narrow  use  of  the  term,  23. 
Information,  Education  of,  299. 
Ingalls,  John  James,  351. 

— , ,  quoted,  252. 

Ingersoll,  Robert  G.,  80. 

Inheritance,  Intellectual  versus  material, 

96. 
Inquisition,  74,  162,  163. 
Insanity,  Savage  interpretation  of^  54,  55, 

75- 
Instinct  of  sportsmanship,  243. 

workmanship,  243. 

Institutions,  Ecclesiastical,  62. 

— ,  Improvement  in,  316. 

— ,  Nature  of  human,  4,  5,  10. 

—  of  learning,  309. 
— ,  Sacerdotal,  62. 
Instruction,  246,  299,  300. 
Integration,  Social,  39,  331. 
Intellect  a  guide  to  the  will,  129. 

—  defined,  1 15. 

—  developed  in  excess  of  man's  needs, 

237,  238. 
^,  Latent,  141. 
■ —  of  savages  too  keen  for  their  good, 

106. 

—  versus  feeling,  288. 

mind,  267,  268. 

Intellectual  development,  149. 

—  egalitarianism,  95,  106,  107,  113,  230, 

236,  240,  272,  273,  313. 

—  inequalities,  23,  113,  286. 
Intellectualism,  40. 
Intelligence  defined,  39,  115,  267. 

— ,   Equalization    of,   93,   281,   314,   316, 

326,  336. 
— ,  Existing  inequality  of,  95. 
— ,  Oligarchy  of,  94. 


Intelligence,  Origin  of,  89. 

— ,  Reproduction   inversely  proportional 

to,  3^3'  3^4- 
—  rules,  92,  93. 
Intelligent  and  unintelligent  classes,  91  ff., 

292. 
Interest,  Beliefs  rest  on,  45. 
— ,  Religious,  46. 
— ,  Transcendental,  46. 
Interjection,  The,  270. 
Interpretation  of  history,  40,  82. 

natural  phenomena,  65,  75. 

Introduced  plants,  123. 

Invention  in  the  Tardean  sense,  132. 

— ,  Mechanical,  221. 

— ,  Quantity  of  force  not  increased  by, 

128. 
— ,  Social,  338,  339. 
Irrepressibility  of  genius,   115,  137,  235, 

238-240. 
Israelites,  Men  of  letters  among,  167. 

Jacoby,  Paul,  139,  140,  169,  174-176,  181, 
197,  213,  226,  227,  231,  351. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  172-173,  177-178,  179. 

James,  William,  139,  140,  351. 

Japanese,  Recent  awakening  of  the,  49, 
109. 

— ,  Truthfulness  of  the,  79. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  351. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  250. 

Jenner,  Edward,  164,  165. 

Jesuits,  Men  of  letters  among,  167. 

Johnson,  Samuel,  263,  351. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  115. 

Joly,  Henri,  140,  351. 

Jonson,  Ben,  165,  263. 

Judaism,  Effect  of,  on  literary  productiv- 
ity, 162. 

Judges  of  England,  118,  134,  239. 

Jussieu,  Antoine,  200. 

— ,  Laurent,  200. 

Jussieus,  The,  118,  264. 

Justice,  Definition  of,  22. 

— ,  Natural  versus  civil,  12,  22. 

— ,  Social  versus  political,  24. 

Juvencius,  Josephus,  270,  352. 

Kant,  Immanuel,  iq,  85,  263,  352. 
— ,  — ,  quoted,  66,  67,  248. 
Keats,  John,  263. 
Kennan,  George,  78. 


376 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


Kepler,  Johann,  85. 

Kidd,  Benjamin,  92,  162,  278,  352. 

— ,   — ,    quoted,    98-100,   108,   250,   279, 

322. 
King,  W.  Francis  H.,  352. 
Kipling,  Rudyard,  quoted,  35. 
Knowledge,  Classification  of,  302,  303. 
— ,  Diffusion  of,  307. 

—  easy  to  acquire  when  once  discovered, 

102. 
— ,  General,  302,  308. 

—  of  the  environment,  106. 

— ,  Relation  of,  to  truth,  90,  302. 

—  the  proper  object  of  education,  307, 

312. 
Koheleth,  352. 

—  quoted,  285,  352. 
Koofoo,  71. 

Labor,  Attractive,  334,  339. 

— ,  Capital  and,  315. 

— ,  Odium  of,  335,  336. 

Laborers,  manual.  Small  literary  produc- 
tivity of,  207  ff. 

Lafitau,  Joseph  Fran9ois,  74. 

Lagrange,  Joseph  Louis,  148. 

Laissez  faire,  13-17. 

Lamarck,  Jean,  148,  352. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  66. 

Landor,  Walter  Savage,  263. 

Language  as  illustrating  the  superiority 
of  the  artificial,  11,  12. 

— ,  Natural,  269,  270. 

—  of  feeling,  270. 
— ,  Study  of,  310. 

Laplace,  Pierre  Simon,  148,  239,  258. 
La    Rochefoucauld,    rran9ois.    Due    de, 
217,  220,  353. 

,  — , ,  quoted,  129,  134. 

Laschi,  R.,  143,  181,  188,  354. 
Latent  ability,  114. 

—  elements  in  heredity,  119,  120. 

—  intellect,  141. 
Latimer,  Hugh,  239. 
Latin  races,  82. 
Law,   Logic  of,  58. 

—  of  parsimony,  334. 

the  three  stages,  42,  72. 

Laws,  Mandatory  and  prohibitory,  338. 

—  of  nature,  86,  87. 
— ,  Repeal  of,  17. 

Lecky,  William  Edward  Hartpole,  78. 


Legislation,  Attractive,  313,  337. 

— ,  Scientific,  338,  339. 

Leibnitz,  Gottfried  Wilhelm  von,  263,  3«53. 

— , ,  quoted,  247. 

Leidy,  Joseph,  353. 
— ,  — ,  quoted,  103. 
Leisure  as  opportunity,  214,  242. 

—  classes,  135,  207  ff.,  214,  228,  242,  243, 

321. 
— ,  Small  amount  of,  utilized,  243,  245. 
Lenbach,  Franz,  239. 
Lessing,  Gotthold  Ephraim,  165,  263. 
Letourneau,  Charles,  68,  353. 
— ,  — ,  quoted,  69. 
Leverriel',  Urbain  Jean  Joseph,  239. 
Levy-Bruhl,  L.,  290,  353. 
Lewes,  George  Henry,  260. 
Lhomond,  Charles  Fran9ois,  258. 
Liberation,  Gospel  of,  iio,  128,  130. 
License,  Philosophy  of,  30. 
Light,  Artificial  utilization  of,  11. 
Lightning,  Utilization  of,  11,  75. 
Ligurians,  157. 
Linnaeus,  Carolus  (Karl  von  Linne),  164, 

165,  264. 
Literature  a  monopoly  of  privilege,  233. 

—  of  opportunity,  135,  299. 
Littre,  fimile,  354. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  262. 

Local  distribution  of  plants,  123-125. 

—  environment.  147,  169,  228. 
Locke,  John,  236,  247,  263,  270,  354. 
Logic  of  law,  58. 

magic,  58. 

opportunity,  224,  295. 

— ,  Position  of,  as  a  science,  306,  307. 
Logical,  Ambiguity  of  the  word,  58. 
Lombroso,  Cesare,  142,  143,  188,213,354. 
— ,  — ,  quoted,  181. 
Longevity  of  rich  and  poor,  322,  323. 
Lords  spiritual  and  temporal,  98. 
Lotze,  Rudolph  Hermann,  247. 
Love  a  form  of  privation,  25. 
Loyalty  of  the  lower  classes,  94. 
Lubbock,  Sir  John  (Lord  Avebury),  260, 

354- 

— , ( ),  quoted,  34,  67. 

Lucanus,  Marcus  Annaeus,  354. 

— , ,  quoted,  18. 

Luck,  Opportunity  mistaken  for,  256. 
Luther,  Martin,  73,  239,  263. 
Luxury  of  altruism,  29. 


INDEX 


377 


Macaulay,  Thomas  Babington,  263,  355. 

— , ,  quoted,  249. 

Mach,  Ernst,  355. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  102. 

Machinery,  Mission  of,  328. 

Maecenases,  135. 

Magic,  Logic  of,  58. 

Maize,  126. 

Malthus,  Thomas  Robert,  289,  355. 

— , ,  quoted,  325. 

Malthusian  law,  325. 
Mandatory  and  prohibitory  laws,  338. 
Manes,  56. 
Mann,  Horace,  247. 

Manual  laborers,  Small  literary  produc- 
tivity of,  207  ff. 
Maoris,  92,  108. 

Market  for  achievement,  294,  295,  300. 
Marmontel,  Jean  Fran9ois,  258. 
Mars,  The  planet,  330,  331. 
Martin,  H.  Newell,  355. 

— , ,  quoted,  103. 

Martineau,  Harriet,  41,  344. 
Marx,  Karl,  10. 

Materialism,  Historical,  40,  204. 
Mathematics,  Applied,  8,  307. 

—  as  a  mental  discipline,  310,  311. 
test  of  ability,  104. 

— ,  Place  of,   among  the  sciences,   306, 

307- 
Matter,  Dynamic  quality  of,  48. 
— ,  Spiritual  nature  of,  89. 
Maximization  of  pleasure,  28. 
Mazzini,  Joseph  (Giuseppe),  355. 
— ,  — ,  quoted,  248. 
Means  to  ends,  4,  279,  280,  287. 
Mediocrity,  113,  248. 
Mediumship,  56. 
Melancthon,  Philip,  74. 
Meliorism,  85. 
Men  of  letters,  French.    See  French  men 

of  letters. 

—  —  —  of   other  countries,    197,    198, 

210,  211,   220,   221. 

Menial  service,  96. 

Merit  distinguished  from  talent  and  gen- 
ius, 148. 

Mesocentric  theory,  132. 

Mesoderm,  The  social,  26,  98. 

Mesologists,  149. 

Metals,  Utilization  of  the,  il. 

Metamorphosis,  59,  60. 


Metempsychosis,  60,  73. 

Method  of  applied  sociology,  296. 

discussion  of  opportunity,  135. 

— ,  The  statistical,  118,  136-138. 

Meusel,  Wolfgang,  257. 

Mexicans,  69. 

Middle  Ages,  88,  98. 

Mill,  James,  264. 

— ,  John  Stuart,   19,  260,  264,  307,  31 1, 

355- 
— , ,  quoted,  84,  102,  273,  320,  325, 

334-335- 
Milton,  John,  263. 
Mind,   Brain  or   intellect    mistaken   for, 

267,  268. 
— ,  Contents  of  the,  268  ff. 
— ,  Tools  of  the,  12,  95,  307. 

—  without  experience,  236,  269  ff. 
Minimization  of  pain,  28. 
Misarchism,  1 1. 
Mitscherlich,  Eilhard,  164. 
Mobilization  of  society,  iii,  no. 
Modification  of  phenomena,  4,  8-10. 

social  structures,  5,  10. 

Mohammedanism,   Immortality  doctrine 

of,  60. 
Moliere,  Jean  Baptiste,  256,  263. 
Monism,  89. 
Monotheism,  61,  82. 
Montaigne,  Michel  Eyquem,  263,  356. 

— , ,  quoted,  84,  356. 

Montesquieu,  Charles  de  Secondat,  Baron 

de,  149,  244,  263,  356. 

— , , ,  quoted,  251,  356. 

Moral,  Abuse  of  the  word,  23. 

— ,  Primai-y  meaning  of  the  word,  28,  116. 

—  progress.  The  real,  84,  316. 

—  qualities  in  genius,  114,  122,  268. 
Morality,  Race,  28. 

More,  Sir  Thomas,  72,  316,  356. 

— , ,  quoted,  31. 

Morgan,  Lewis  H.,  334. 

Morley,  John,  131,  356. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  13. 

Mortality,  Statistics  of,  321  ff. 

Mother  of  circumstances,  274. 

Motherhood,  False  views  of,  80. 

Motion,  Newtonian  laws  of,  332. 

— ,  Social,  1 10. 

Movement,  iii,  1,  no. 

Mulhall,  Michael  G.,  321,  323,  356. 

Miiller,  Jean  de,  165. 


37S 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


Mutation,  i2'. 
Mutual  repulsion,  124. 
Mysticism,  166. 

Napier,  John,  145. 

Napoleon  Bonaparte,  256,  356. 

,  quoted,  249. 

National  freedom,  26. 

Natural  inequalities,  21,  113,  267. 

—  justice,  12,  22. 
Nature,  116. 

—  and  nurture,   116-128,  141,  145,  237, 

264,  273. 

— ,  Conquest  of,  85. 

— ,  Laws  of,  86,  87. 

— ,  Paradoxes  of,  66,  97,  107,  113. 

— ,  The  order  of,  302. 

Negative  education,  242. 

—  ethics,  326. 
Negroes  of  Africa,  68. 
Neo-Malthusianism,  324. 
New  Caledonians,  68. 

New  ethics.  The,  28,  84,  318. 

—  species,  121. 

Newton,  Sir   Isaac,    145,    257,  262,  264, 

265,  306,  332,  356. 

— . ,  quoted,  356-357. 

Newtonian  laws,  332. 
Niebuhr,  Barthold  Georg,  263. 
Nietzsche,  Friedrich,  24. 
Nirvana,  Social,  17. 

Nitti,  Francesco  S.,  323,  357. 

Nobility,  Degeneracy  of  the,  98. 

— ,  Literary  productivity  of  the,  204  ff., 

214,  228,  230,  233,  243. 
Noel,  Fran9ois  Joseph  Michel,  258.     "^ 
Not  genius  but  achievement,  241.  ^i| 
Novicow,  Jacques,  80,  357. 
Nurture,  122. 
— ,  Nature  and,  1 16-128,  141,   145,  237, 

264,  273. 

Obscurantism,  77  ff. 

Occupations  of  literary  men,  206  ff. 

Odin,  Alfred,  134,  140,  143,  147-154, 
156-160,  1 66,  167,  169,  174,  180, 
181,  183,  184,  187,  191-194,  196- 
198,  202,  206,  208-210,  212,  215, 
217,  218,  221,  223,  225-227,  231, 
257,  260,  263,  300,  357. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  129,  155-158,  160,  161, 
166,     168-169,    179-181,    193-195, 


200,   202,   204,   207,   209-214,    218, 

219.    233,    235-236,    238-240,    245, 

254.  257-259. 
Odium  of  labor,  335,  336. 
Ofificers,   Public,  as  a  leisure  class,   135, 

207  ff.,  243,  321. 
— ,  — ,  require  only  mediocre  talents,  1 18, 

134- 
Olbers,  Heinrich  Wilhelm  Mathias,  164. 
Oligarchy  of  intelligence,  94. 
Oligocentric  world  view,  7,  23,  119,  132, 

277,  293,  298. 
Opinions  distinguished  from  beliefs,  45. 
Opportunity,  129. 

—  a  condition  to  achievement,  114,  194, 

209,  234,  274. 

—  certain  to  come  to  all,  251,  252. 

— ,  Education  as,  246,  280,  281,  298-300. 
— ,  Equalization  of,  276,  294,  295. 
— ,  Leisure  as,  214,  242. 
— ,  Literature  of,  135. 
— ,  Logic  of,  224,  295. 

—  mistaken   for   luck    or   chance,    256, 

272. 
— ,  Success  implies,  251. 

—  varies  with  character,  114,  116. 

—  versus  genius,  127,  220. 

heredity,  123,  127,  142,  264,  273. 

Opposition  represented  by  the  environ- 
ment, 123,  128,  130,  131. 

—  to  science,  75. 
Optical  illusions,  <)\. 
Order  of  nature,  302. 
— ,  The  social,  38. 
Organization  of  happiness,  339. 
Oriental  civilization,  48,  49,  109. 
Ossianic  poems,  58. 
Overproduction,  294,  328. 
Owen,  Richard,  85,  264. 

Pain  economy,  32,  35,  36,  51,  62,  327. 
— ,  Minimization  of,  28. 
Paine,  Thomas,  82. 
Pai-Ute  Indians,  90. 
Parable  of  Saint-Simon,  37. 
Paradox  of  hedonism,  19. 
Paradoxes  of  nature,  66,  97,  107,  113. 

political  economy,  93. 

Paris,  Literary  productivity  of,  188,  194, 

195,  227,  231,  275. 
Parkinson,  James,  234,  357. 
Parochial  schools  of  France,  10. 


INDEX 


379 


Parsimony,  Law  of,  334. 
Parties,  Political,  10,  44. 
Pascal,  Blaise,  31,  263. 
Passy,  Hippolyte,  323. 
Patten,  Simon  N.,  357. 

— , ,  quoted,  285. 

Paul,  E.  A.,  104,  105. 

Perception,  go,  91. 

Persecution,  Effect  of,  74,  133,  162,  163. 

Pessimism,  Claims  of,  19. 

—  of  Lombroso,  142. 
— ,  Scientific,  14. 

— ,  Way  out  of,  36. 

Petrarch  (Petrarca),  Francesco,  263,  357. 

—  (— ).  — -  quoted,  314,  357-358- 
Phenomena,  Interpretation  of,  65,  75. 
— ,  Modification  of,  4,  8-10. 
Philanthropy,  29,  283,  292. 

Philip  of  Macedon,  199. 
Philosophy  of  despair,  14. 

license,  30. 

style,  303. 

— ,  Subjective  trend  of  modem,  31. 
Physical  environment,  147,  148,  169. 
Physics,  Applied,  8. 
— ,  Place  of,  in  the  hierarchy,  304. 
— ,  Social,  136,  339,  358. 
Plants,  Introduced,  123. 
— ,  Local  distribution  of,  123-125. 
Plato,  41,  60,  199,  236,  316,  358. 
Pleasure  consists  in  the  normal  exercise 
of  the  faculties,  25,  244. 

—  economy,  327. 

— ,  Maximization  of,  28. 

Plutarch,  236,  358. 

Poe,  Edgar  Allan,  239. 

Polarization,  130. 

Political  economy,  Paradoxes  of,  93. 

,  Purpose  of,  289. 

—  freedom,  26,  27. 

—  justice.  Social  versus,  24. 

—  parties,  11,  44. 
Politics,  II. 
Polynesians,  68. 
Polytheism,  61. 

Poor  versus  rich.    Literary  productivity 
of,  202-204. 

,  Mortality  of,  321  ff. 

Pope,  Alexander.  263. 

Positive  education,  242,  246,  299,  300. 

—  ethics,  318,  326. 
Possession  of  truth,  86,  308,  312. 


Post,  Albert  Hermann,  43,  358. 
Post-efficients  of  intelligence,  123. 
Potential    achievement,    113,    127,    128, 
141,  285. 

—  genius,    114,  115,    134,  141,   145,  231, 

240,  293. 
Pottery,  12. 
Poverty  a  bar  to  achievement,  228. 

—  increases  with  wealth,  20. 

—  kills  off  the  surplus  population,  322, 

3^3- 
— ,  Prevalence  of,  322  ff. 
Power  of  circumstances,  267. 
Practical  knowledge,  302. 

—  problems,  314. 
Prediction,  Social,  316,  317. 
Pre-efficients    of    intelligence,    117,    123, 

139,  268. 
Prevision,  Scientific,  289. 
Priesthood  as  a  leisure  class,  The,  242. 
— ,  Means  employed  by  the,  94. 
— ,  Origin  of  the,  63-65. 
— ,  Proper  use  of  the  term,  62. 
Priestley,  Joseph,  31. 
Primogeniture,  Effect  of,  on  genius,  139, 

201. 
— ,  Social,  107. 

Principle  of  attraction,  313,  331. 
Private  enterprise,  17. 

—  schools,  309. 
Privative  ethics,  318,  326. 
Privilege,  194,  233,  271,  293. 
Privileged  men,  261. 
Problems,  Insoluble,  314,  315. 

—  of  applied  sociology,  96,  314. 
Production,  Increase  of,  328-330,  339. 
— ,    Intellectual    versus    economic,    286, 

294,  295. 
Professions,   Liberal,  as  a  leisure  class, 

207  ff.,  215,  228,  243,  321. 
Progress,  Conditions  to,  82,  83. 
— ,  Definitions  of,  18,  19,  84. 
— ,  Genetic,  83. 
— ,  Obstacles  to,  no. 
— ,  The  real  moral,  84,  316. 

—  versus  civilization,  84,  285,  286. 

evolution,  18. 

Prohibitory  laws,  338. 

Proletariat,   Intellectual  capacity  of  the, 

230. 
— ,  (Jrigin  of  the,  26. 
— ,  Rise  of  the,  97. 


38o 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


Property,  Destruction  of,  at  funerals,  70, 

71- 
Prospective  investigations,  221. 
Protective  function  of  society,  38. 
Protestantism,  82. 
— ,    Effect   of,   on    literary   productivity, 

162  ff.,  167-169. 
Protoplasm,  289. 
Psammetichus,  269,  270. 
Psychics,  333. 

Psychology  a  pure  science,  9. 
— ,  Place  of,  in  the  hierarchy,  304. 
Public    officers   as    a   leisure   class,    135, 

207  ff.,  214,  228,  243,  321. 
do  not  require  great  talents,   118, 

134.  135- 

—  opinion,  44. 

—  schools,  106. 
Puffendorf,  Samuel  von,  165. 
Pure  sociology,  3,  2 1 . 

,  Relation  of,  to  applied,  3,  21,  85. 

Puritanism,  31,  72. 

Purpose  of  political  economy,  289. 

science,  283,  287  ff. 

sociology,  5,  18,  24,  234,  292. 

Pursuit  of  happiness,  32. 
Pyramids  of  Egypt,  71. 

Quatrefages  de   Breau,   Jean  Louis  Ar- 

mand  de,  108. 
Quetelet,  Adolphe,  136,  358. 
Quintilian  (Marcus  Fabius  Quintilianus), 

236. 

Rabelais,  Fran9ois,  263. 
Race  as    a  factor  in  achievement,    156, 
I58ff. 

—  differentiation  and  integration,  331. 

—  morality,  28. 

—  safety,  28,  35,  64,  65. 
Races,  Blending  of,  108. 
— ,  Equivalency  of,  108. 
— ,  Historical,  107. 

— ,  Intellectual  equality  of,  107,  108,  236. 

—  of  France,  1 56  ff . 

— ,  The  so-called  lower,  109. 

Racine,  Jean,  263. 

Rathbone,  Eleanor,  358. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  259. 

Ratio  sufficiens,  58. 

Rational,  Ambiguity  of  the  word,  58. 

Rationalism,  89. 


Rationality,  Beginnings  of,  50. 

Ratzenhofer,  Gustav,  87,  335,  359,  360. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  43-44,  47,  290. 

Rauber,  August,  270,  359. 

Reade,  Winwood,  359. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  34. 

Reconciliation  of  achievement  with  im- 
provement, 285. 

the  economic  and  ideological  inter- 
pretations of  history,  41. 

Reflections,  Savage  interpretation  of,  54, 

75- 
Reform,  4,  5,  10,  93. 
Reformation,  The  Protestant,  82. 
Regnault,  Henri  Victor,  239. 
Relation  of  knowledge  to  truth,  90. 

pure  to  applied  sociology,  3,  85. 

Relativity  of  genius,  232,  236. 
Religion  as  a  cause  of  progress,  99. 
— ,  Origin  of,  63. 

— ,  Tylor's  minimum  definition  of,  53. 
Religious  environment,  147,  161,  169. 

—  ideas,  52,  65,  82. 

—  interests,  46. 

—  structures.  62. 

Renan,  Joseph  Ernest,  341,  359,  363. 

Repeal  of  laws,  17. 

Reproduction    inversely  proportional   to 

intelligence,  323,  324. 
Republican  party,  11. 
Resistance  to  truth,  74  ff. 
Resources  of  society,  224. 
Restif,  Nicolas  Edme,  258. 
Restraint,  Ethics  of,  28. 
Reutter,  Johann  Adam  Karl  Georg,  256. 
Ribot,  Theodule,  78,  138,  359. 
— ,  — ,  quoted,  215-216. 
Rich   versus  poor.  Literary  productivity 

of,  202-204. 

,  Mortality  of,  321  ff. 

Richter,  Jean  Paul  F.,  165,  359. 

— , ,  quoted,  181. 

Rights,  Equal,  281. 

Rise  of  the  proletariat,  97. 

Rivarol,  Antoine,  258. 

Robertson,  John  Mackinnon,  144,  359. 

— , ,  quoted,  145. 

Rodbertus,  Johann  Karl,  328,  347. 
Role  of  the  environment,  116,  123,  127, 

128,  130,  139  ff.,  149- 
Ross,  Edward  Alsworth,  40,  359. 
Rousseau,  Jean  Jacques,  102,  256,  263. 


INDEX 


I 


Routine  ■work,  241. 
Roux,  Wilhelm,  120. 
Rudbeck,  Olaus,  164. 
Ruling  class,  26. 
Ruskin,  John,  263. 

Sacerdotal  institutions,  62,  65. 

Sacrifices,  68  ff. 

Safety,  Group  sentiment  of,  64,  65. 

— ,  Race,  28,  35,  64,  65. 

Saint-Simon,   Claude   Henri,   Comte  de, 

37.  360- 

— , , ,  Parable  of,  37. 

Salvation,  28,  45. 

Satan,  61. 

Savages,  Capacity  of,  for  education,  109. 

— ,  Intellect  of,  too  keen  for  their  good, 

ic6. 
— ,  Life  of,  33,  34- 

—  not  happy,  33. 

Scaliger,  Julius  Cassar,  117,  239,  255,  263. 
Scavenger,  Social  importance  of  the,  97. 
SchaefHe,  Albert,  290,  360. 
Scheighaeuser,  Johann,  165. 
Schiaparelli,  Giovanni  Virginio,  330. 
Schiller,  Johann  Christoph  Friedrich  von, 
263,  360. 

— , ,  quoted,  50. 

Schimper,  Wilhelm  Philip,  164. 

Schools,  Private,  309. 

— ,  Public,  106. 

Schopenhauer,  Arthur.  19,  244,303,  360. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  87,  244. 

Schwanthaler,  Ludwig  Michael,  239. 

Schweizer,  Gottfried,  164. 

Science  as  a  mental  discipline,  312. 

— ,  Conditions  to,  88. 

— ,  Ethical  character  of,  287,  317,  318. 

— ,  Great  talents  not  needed  for,  103,  241. 

— ,  how  it  advances,  176. 

— ,  Opposition  to,  75. 

— ,  Practical  results  of,  241. 

— ,  Pure  versus  applied,  8,  9,  283. 

— ,  Purpose  of,  283,  287  ff. 

—  versus  art,  8,  10,  297. 

Sciences,   Abstract    and    concrete,    106, 

304,  306. 
— ,  Classification  of  the,  303  ff. 
— ,  Hierarchy  of  the,  9,  303  ff. 
— ,  Relative  applicability  of  the,  8,  9. 
— ,  Special  social,  305. 
Scientific  discovery,  221. 


Scientific  legislation,  338,  339. 

—  men.  Causes  favorable  to  the  produc- 

tion of,  144,  145,  148,  162,  194,211. 
Scott,  John,  Earl  of  Eldon.      See  Eldon. 
— ,  Sir  Walter,  263. 
Self-consciousness,  3. 
Self-education,  230,  242. 
Self-made  men,  117,  239,  240,  251  ff. 

,  Alleged,  251,  252. 

Self-mutilation,  72. 
Self-orientation,  3,  21. 
Self-torture,  72. 

Seligman,  Edwin  R.  A.,  41,  360. 
Seneca,  Lucius  Annseus,  360. 

— , ,  quoted,  iii. 

Sensori-motor  actions,  45. 

Serfdom,  27. 

Shadows,  Savage  interpretation  of,  54,  75. 

Shakespeare,  William,  240,  256,  257,  263, 

360. 
— ,  — ,  quoted,  251. 
Shelley,  Percy  B.,  263. 
Shufu,  71. 
Siamese  twins,  271. 

Sismondi,  Jean  Charles  Leonard  de,  165. 
Slander,  79. 
Slavery,  5,  27. 
Slums,  312,  313. 
Small,  Albion  W.,  361. 

— , ,  quoted,  310-31 1,  314. 

Smiles,  Samuel,  163. 

Smissen,  Edouard  van  der,  323,  361. 

Smith,  Adam,  18,  257,  262,  263,  361. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  272,  289. 

Snake  bite,  Mortality  from,  in  India,  73. 

Social  achievement,  6,  15,  17,  37. 

—  appropriation    of    achievement,    286, 

287. 
truth,  83,  84. 

—  assimilation,  26,  109,  338. 

—  betterment,  84. 

—  classes,  91,  92,  96. 

—  cleavage,  26,  93. 

—  continuity,  271. 

—  distribution,  294,  295,  328,  339. 

—  ectoderm,  26. 

—  efficiency,  109,  113,  339. 

—  endoderm,  26. 

—  environment,  147,  204,  228. 

—  estate.  Administration  of  the,  300. 

—  forces,  310,  320,  332,  2,2,1,  338. 

—  freedom,  26. 


382 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


Social  germ-plasm,  95. 

—  heredity,  95,  96,  107,  298. 

—  heritage,   95,  96,   loi,   107,  no,  281, 

292,  300-302,  307. 

—  integration,  39,  331. 

—  invention,  338,  339. 

—  mesoderm,  26,  98. 

—  motion,  1 10. 

—  Nirvana,  17. 

—  order,  38. 

—  physics,  136,  339,  358. 

—  prediction,  316,  317. 

—  primogeniture,  107. 

—  sciences.  Special,  305. 

—  structures,  Development  of,  4. 

,  Modification  of,  5,  10. 

,  Repressive,  no. 

,  Stability  of,  4,  10. 

—  tissues,  26,  98. 

—  utility,  6. 

—  versus  political  justice,  24. 

—  welfare,  25,  339. 
Socialism,  10,  11,  20. 
Socialization  of  achievement,  21. 
Society,  Ameliorative  function  of,  38. 
— ,  Nature  and  action  of,  337. 

— ,  Resources  of,  224. 

Sociogenetic  forces,  84. 

Sociological  experimentation,  338,  339. 

—  perspective,  84. 
Sociology,  Applied,  5. 

— ,  End  or  purpose  of,  5,  18,  24,  234,  292. 
— ,  Ethical,  317. 

—  not  recognized  by  educationists,  312. 
— ,  Place  of,  in  the  hierarchy,  304,  307. 
— ,  Pure,  3,  21. 

— ,  Relation  of  pure  to  applied,  3,  85. 

Socrates,  199, 

Sombart,  Werner,  93,  361. 

Sophocles,  199. 

Soret,  Frederic  Jacob,  275,  349. 

Special  creation,  85. 

—  social  sciences,  305. 
Specialism,  242. 

Species,  Artificial  character  of,  239. 

— ,  New,  121. 

Spencer,  Herbert,  lo,-  17,  19,  42,  44,  45, 
61,  78,  139,  149,  171,  215,  257,  264, 
277.   298,   304,  317,   323,  326,  336, 

361,  365- 
— ,  — ,  quoted,  18,  41,  67-69,  71,  84,  102, 
259-260,  310,  318,  335. 


Spenser,  Edmund,  263. 
Spinoza,  Benedict,  31,  263,  362. 
Spirit  identified  with  wind,  59. 
— ,  Primitive  ideas  of,  54,  56,  59,  60. 
Spiritual  beings,  53,  65,  88,  91. 
,  Fear  of,  63,  64,  67. 

—  nature  of  matter,  89. 

—  pleasures,  30. 

—  wealth,  300,  301. 
Sportsmanship,  Instinct  of,  243. 
Standard  of  living,  330. 

State  functions.  Enlargement  of,  16. 

— ,  Origin  of  the,  337. 

Statics,  Biological,  124,  125,  127. 

Statistical  method,  118,  136-138. 

Statistics,  Abuse  of,  178,  180. 

— ,  Fallacy  of,  136,  147,  148,  233,  235. 

—  of  mortality,  321  ff. 
Steele,  Sir  Richard,  263. 
Stein,  Lorenz  von,  247. 
— ,  Ludwig,  17,  362. 
Stirp,  1 19-121. 

Stirpiculture,  119,  122,  149,235. 
Stoics,  236. 

Stone,  Artificial  utilization  of,  ll. 
Struggle  among  the  parts,  120. 

—  for  existence,  32,  35. 

,  Economic,  319,  325. 

Studer,  Bernard,  164. 

Style,  Philosophy  of,  303. 

Subjective  trend  of  modern  philosophy, 

31- 
Subject-matter  of  sociology,  5,  6,  18,  285. 
Submerged  tenth,  The,  100. 
Success  implies  opportunity,  251. 
Sufficient  reason,  58,  87. 
Summum  bonum,  29. 
Sumner,  William  Graham,  362. 

— , ,  quoted,  277-278. 

Sun-worship,  61. 

Superior,  Narrow  use  of  the  term,  23. 
Superiority  of  the  artificial,  11,  22. 
Supernatural,  The,  88,  99. 
Superstition  a  consequence  of  error,  72. 

—  as  a  cause  of  progress,  99. 

— ,  Fallacy  of,  117,  147,  235,  236. 

— ,  Principal  source  of,  88. 

Swift,  Jonathan,  165,  263. 

Swooning,  Savage  interpretation  of,  54, 

56. 
Sympathy  an    unreliable    principle,   292, 

325,  326. 


INDEX 


1^3 


Sympathy  as  a  motive  to  reforms,  93,  99. 
Syncope,  Savage  interpretation  of,  56. 
Synergy,  131. 
Syntheses,  Method  of  discussion  by,  136. 

Tables  of  literary  and  scientific  produc- 
tivity, [52-154,  168,  175,  180,  182- 
186,  188-192,  195,  196,  200,  201,  203, 
205-208,  210,  216,  217,  219. 

Taine,  Hippolyte  Adolphe,  236. 

Talent  distinguished  from  genius  and 
merit,  148. 

Tarde,  Gabriel,  40,  47,  80,  123,  128,  140, 
362. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  46,  314. 

Tasmanians,  68. 

Tasso,  Torquato,  263. 

Tastes  versus  talents,  276,  277. 

Telegraphy,  Wireless,  286,  316. 

Teleology,  Evolutionary,  86. 

Telesis,  1 2. 

Tencin,  Claudine  Alexandrine  Guerin  de, 
254. 

Tennyson,  Alfred,  263. 

Tenterden,  Lord  (Charles  Abbott),  117. 

Thackeray,  William  Makepeace,  263. 

Thales,  199. 

Theological  conceptions,  61. 

Theses,  Galton's,  115,  137,  138. 

— ,  Method  of  discussion  by,  136,  137. 

Third  estate,  27,  98. 

Thomson,  James,  165. 

— ,  J.  Arthur,  324,  349. 

Three  stages,  Law  of  the,  42,  72. 

Tissues,  Social,  26,  98. 

Tolstoi,  Leo,  19. 

Tombs,  Costly,  70,  71. 

Tongans,  68. 

Tools  of  the  mind,  12,  95,  307. 

Topinard,  Paul,  363. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  278. 

Tory  party,  1 1. 

Totemism,  60,  72. 

Trance,  Savage  interpretation  of,  54-56, 

75- 
Transcendental  interests,  46. 
Transmigration  of  souls,  60,  73. 
Triticum  aestivum,  127. 
Trois  etats,  42,  72. 
Truth,  80. 
—  and  error,  50. 
— ,  Capacity  for,  101,  241. 


Truth    easy  to    acquire  when   once  dis- 
covered, 102. 

—  no  greater  mental  burden  than  error, 

lOI. 

— ,  Possession  of,  85,  308,  312. 
— ,  Psychological  nature  of,  90. 
— ,  Relation  of  knowledge  to,  90. 
— ,  Resistance  to,  74  ff. 

—  should  be  made  attractive,  82. 
— ,  Social  appropriation  of,  83,  84. 
— ,  Unattractive  character  of,  80,  81. 
Tylor,  Edward  B.,  53. 

Tyndall,  John,  260. 

Ueberweg,  Friedrich,  341,  363,  365. 
Ultra-rational  sanctions,  92,  99. 
Unintelligent  classes,  91-94,  292. 
Universal  education,  231. 
Universite  Nouvelle,  305. 
Urban  population,  173  ff. 
Utilitarianism,  32. 
Utility,  Social,  6. 

—  versus  futility,  244. 

Utilization  of  the  materials  and  forces  of 

nature,  11,  129,  131. 
Itopianism,  10,  315,316. 

Valat,  P.,  289,  344. 

Veblen,  Thorstein,  89,  244,  335,  363,  365. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  243. 

Vega,  Garcilasso  de  la.    Sfi'  Garcilasso. 

Verne,  Jules,  316. 

Virchow,  Rudolf,  98. 

Virgil  (Publius  Virgilius  Maro),  363. 

—  { ),  quoted,  41. 

Vfilkergedanken,  43. 

Voltaire,  Fran9ois  Marie  Arouet  de,  82, 
263,  363. 

— , ,  quoted,  33,  224. 

Vries,  Hugo  de,  121. 

Wallace,  Alfred  Russel,  363. 

— , ,  quoted,  287. 

Wallis,  John,  164. 

W^ant,  25. 

Wants,  Material,  327,  328. 

— ,  New,  330. 

W^argentin,  Peter  Wilhelm,  164. 

Washington,  George,  365. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  249. 

Water,  Utilization  of,  11. 

W  att,  James,  239. 


384 


APPLIED  SOCIOLOGY 


Wealth,  Amount  of,  328. 

— ,  Equalization  of,  28 1. 

— ,  Spiritual,  300,  301. 

Weeds,  123. 

Weismann,   August,   120,   121,  239,  254, 

365- 
— ,  — ,  quoted,  50,  256,  366. 
Welfare,  Science  of,  318. 
— ,  Social,  25,  339. 
Wells,  H.  G.,  119,  316. 
Weltanschauung,  47. 
Weltschmerz,  19. 
Wesley,  John,  74. 
Wheat,  127. 
Whig  party,  1 1. 

White,  Andrew  Dickson,  76,  366. 
Wieland,  Christoph  Martin,  165. 
Wild  men,  269,  270,  274,  275. 
Wilkie,  David,  165. 
Will  a  true  natural  force,  129. 
' — ,  All  motion  primarily  attributed  to,  89. 
— ,  Free,  85. 

Wilson,  J.  Ormond,  104,  105. 
Wind,  Artificial  utilization  of,  11. 
—  identified  with  spirit,  59. 
Wines,  Frederick  Howard,  366. 

— , ,  quoted,  283. 

Winiarsky,  Leon,  366. 

— ,  — ,  quoted,  3. 

Wireless  telegraphy,  286,  316. 

Witchcraft,  73,  74. 

Wollaston,  William  Hyde,  164,  165. 

Women   as   agents    of   civilization,   231, 

232. 


Women  of  genius,  231,  232. 

letters,  195,  196,  232. 

Wonder,  235. 

Wood,  Utilization  of,  11. 

Woodward,  Robert  Simpson,  366. 

— , ,  quoted,  265. 

Wordsworth,  William,  263. 

Work  all  mental,  241. 

— ,  Routine,  241. 

Workmanship,  Instinct  of,  243. 

World  views,  7,  23,  40,  69,  70,  79,  80,  82, 

96,  98,  119,  132,  231,  232,  277,  293, 

298. 
Worms,  Rene,  40,  290,  366. 
— ,  — ,  quoted,  291. 
Wrangling,  104. 
Wren,  Sir  Christopher,  165. 
Wundt,  Wilhelm,  307,  366. 
Wurtz,  Charles  Adolphe,  164. 

Xavier,  Le  Pere  J.,  270. 
X-rays,  9. 

Yncas  of  Peru,  69 

Yokthan,  Hai  ben,  269. 

Yorke,   Philip,  Earl  of  Hardwicke     See 

Hardwicke. 
Young,  Arthur,  164. 
— ,  Edward,  165. 

Zea  Mays,  126. 
Zeitgeist,  44. 
Zola,  fimile,  78. 
Zoolatry,  73. 


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